Before solving a two-stage capacity and pricing game for oligopoly, Boccard and Wauthy (2000) argue that, as under duopoly, at a mixed strategy equilibrium of the pricing game the largest firm's expected profit is the profit accruing to it as a Stackelberg follower when the rivals supply their entire capacity. We point to a serious mistake in their argument and then we see how this important property can be satisfactorily established.

DE FRANCESCO, M.A. (2003). On a property of mixed strategy equilibria of the pricing game. ECONOMICS BULLETIN, 4, 1-8.

On a property of mixed strategy equilibria of the pricing game

DE FRANCESCO, MASSIMO ALFIERO
2003

Abstract

Before solving a two-stage capacity and pricing game for oligopoly, Boccard and Wauthy (2000) argue that, as under duopoly, at a mixed strategy equilibrium of the pricing game the largest firm's expected profit is the profit accruing to it as a Stackelberg follower when the rivals supply their entire capacity. We point to a serious mistake in their argument and then we see how this important property can be satisfactorily established.
DE FRANCESCO, M.A. (2003). On a property of mixed strategy equilibria of the pricing game. ECONOMICS BULLETIN, 4, 1-8.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/11365/50271
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