Sandro Nannini, Unconscious, consciousness and intentionality in cognitive naturalism New studies on unconscious show an increasing reciprocal interest between psychoanalysts on the one hand and neuroscientists and philosophers of mind oriented toward naturalism and materialism on the other hand. Such an orientation was already manifest in Freud’s Entwurf der Psychologie and other essays. Moreover Freud could deny Descartes’ identification of mind to consciousness thanks to F. Brentano’s concept of intentionality. Freud could maintain that unconscious states such lapsus are strictly mental acts endowed with a goal, a content and a meaning, although they are not conscious, only because he followed Brentano and did not define mentality by its identification to consciousness but by its being endowed with intentionality. However, Freud unlike Brentano was not a dualist and oscillated between materialism and functionalism with regard to the Mind-Body Problem. Therefore, one can read in Freud’s psychoanalysis the attempt to reconcile naturalism with an anticartesian concept of mentality based on intentionality and not on consciousness. The same attempt can be recognized in philosophers of mind such as D.C. Dennett or the Churchlands. More in general, consciousness and the self can be naturalized only if intentionality has been previously reduced to a first order property of brain dynamics. In this perspective consciousness is reducible to a higher order property (a “format”) that gives unity and coherence to certain parts of brain activity. To sum up, those psychoanalysts who correct Freud’s theories in the light of contemporary neurosciences do not betray him but realize his deepest aspiration.
Scheda prodotto non validato
Scheda prodotto in fase di analisi da parte dello staff di validazione
|Titolo:||Inconscio, coscienza e intenzionalità nel naturalismo cognitivo|
|Citazione:||Nannini, S. (2013). Inconscio, coscienza e intenzionalità nel naturalismo cognitivo. SISTEMI INTELLIGENTI, XXV(3), 453-467.|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||1.1 Articolo in rivista|
File in questo prodotto: