We provide experimental evidence of Binmore and Samuelson’s (1999) insights into modelling the learning process through which equilibrium is selected. They proposed the concept of drift to describe the effect of perturbations on the dynamic process leading to equilibrium in evolutionary games with boundedly rational agents. We test two different versions of the modified Dalek game within a random-matched population. We also impose that the first mover makes his or her decision first (‘timing’) but the second mover is not informed of the first mover’s choice (‘lack of observability’) to emphasize the learning process taking place within the population. Our results support Binmore and Samuelson’s model.
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|Titolo:||Drift Effect under Timing without Observability: Experimental Evidence|
|Citazione:||Caminati, M., Innocenti, A., & Ricciuti, R. (2006). Drift Effect under Timing without Observability: Experimental Evidence. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION, 61(3), 393-414.|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||1.1 Articolo in rivista|