Majority judgment as recently formulated and advocated by Balinski and Laraki in their influential monograph (Majority Judgment (2010)) is a method to aggregate profiles of judgments which are expressed in a common language consisting of a linearly ordered, and typically bounded, set of grades. It is shown that majority judgment thus defined is strategy-proof but not coalitionally strategy-proof on a very comprehensive class of rich single peaked preference domains. The proof relies on the key observation that a common bounded linear order of grades makes the set of gradings a product of bounded chains, which is a special instance of a bounded distributive lattice. Relying on the foregoing result, this paper also provides a simple characterization of majority judgment with an odd number of agents by anonymity, bi-idempotence and strategyproofness on rich single peaked domains.
VANNUCCI, S. (2019). Majority judgment and strategy-proofness: a characterization. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY, 48(3), 863-886.
|Titolo:||Majority judgment and strategy-proofness: a characterization|
|Citazione:||VANNUCCI, S. (2019). Majority judgment and strategy-proofness: a characterization. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY, 48(3), 863-886.|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||1.1 Articolo in rivista|
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