It is shown that, under a very comprehensive notion of single peakedness, an aggregation rule on a bounded distributive lattice is strategy-proof if and only if it admits one of three distinct and mutually equivalent representations by lattice-polynomials, namely whenever it can be represented as a generalized weak consensus rule, a generalized weak sponsorship rule, or an iterated median rule. The equivalence of individual and coalitional strategy-proofness that is known to hold for single peaked domains in bounded linearly ordered sets and in finite trees typically fails in such an extended setting. A related impossibility result concerning non-trivial anonymous and coalitionally strategy-proof aggregation rules is also obtained.
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|Titolo:||Strategy-proof aggregation rules and single peakedness in bounded distributive lattices|
|Citazione:||Savaglio, E., & Vannucci, S. (2019). Strategy-proof aggregation rules and single peakedness in bounded distributive lattices. SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, 52(2), 295-327.|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||1.1 Articolo in rivista|
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