We investigate the deterrent effect on driving behavior due to the introduction of Demerit Point System in Italy. In addition, we measure the incapacitation effect on fatal accidents. Our findings highlight the high potential of the penalty system in reducing road fatalities through deterrence and incapacitation. Despite this, its aggregate effectiveness in Italy ultimately depended on the consistency of the enforcement design. We then suggest several policy options to increase road safety through a credible enforcement.
Benedettini, S., Nicita, A. (2009). Deterrence, Incapacitation and Enforcement Design. Evidence from Traffic Enforcement in Italy. QUADERNI DEL DIPARTIMENTO DI ECONOMIA POLITICA, 564(564), 1-34.
Deterrence, Incapacitation and Enforcement Design. Evidence from Traffic Enforcement in Italy
BENEDETTINI, SIMONA;NICITA, ANTONIO
2009-01-01
Abstract
We investigate the deterrent effect on driving behavior due to the introduction of Demerit Point System in Italy. In addition, we measure the incapacitation effect on fatal accidents. Our findings highlight the high potential of the penalty system in reducing road fatalities through deterrence and incapacitation. Despite this, its aggregate effectiveness in Italy ultimately depended on the consistency of the enforcement design. We then suggest several policy options to increase road safety through a credible enforcement.
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https://hdl.handle.net/11365/9843
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