This paper assesses the rationale of George Shackle’s argument against Bayesian decision making in the light of recent developments of modern decision theory. The focus is on the so-called non-additive probability approach to decision theory under uncertainty, which, not unlike Shackle’s analysis, stresses the inability of agents to describe uncertain environments. A discussion of the pros and cons of the parallel between Shackle’s theory and the non-additive developments is provided.
Basili, M., Zappia, C. (2003). Shackle’s economic agent and modern decision theory. QUADERNI DEL DIPARTIMENTO DI ECONOMIA POLITICA, 394, 1-22.
Shackle’s economic agent and modern decision theory
BASILI, MARCELLO;ZAPPIA, CARLO
2003-01-01
Abstract
This paper assesses the rationale of George Shackle’s argument against Bayesian decision making in the light of recent developments of modern decision theory. The focus is on the so-called non-additive probability approach to decision theory under uncertainty, which, not unlike Shackle’s analysis, stresses the inability of agents to describe uncertain environments. A discussion of the pros and cons of the parallel between Shackle’s theory and the non-additive developments is provided.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
https://hdl.handle.net/11365/8522
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