We analyze a Bertrand-Edgeworth game in a homogeneous product industry, under efficient rationing and constant (and identical across firms) marginal cost until full capacity utilization. We solve for the unique equilibrium in a subset of the no pure strategy equilibrium region of the capacity space in which differences in individual capacities are sufficiently small.
DE FRANCESCO, M.A., Neri, S. (2013). Bertrand-Edgeworth Competition in an Almost Symmetric Oligopoly. STUDIES IN MICROECONOMICS, 1(2), 213-219 [10.1177/2321022213501259].
Bertrand-Edgeworth Competition in an Almost Symmetric Oligopoly
DE FRANCESCO, MASSIMO ALFIERO;
2013-01-01
Abstract
We analyze a Bertrand-Edgeworth game in a homogeneous product industry, under efficient rationing and constant (and identical across firms) marginal cost until full capacity utilization. We solve for the unique equilibrium in a subset of the no pure strategy equilibrium region of the capacity space in which differences in individual capacities are sufficiently small.
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https://hdl.handle.net/11365/50141
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