The well-known Knightian distinction between quantifiable risk and unquantifiable uncertainty is at odds with the dominant subjectivist conception of probability associated with de Finetti, Ramsey and Savage. Risk and uncertainty are rendered indistinguishable on the subjectivist approach insofar as an individual’s subjective estimate of the probability of any event can be elicited from the odds at which she would be prepared to bet for or against that event. The risk/uncertainty distinction has however never quite gone away and is currently under renewed theoretical scrutiny. The purpose of this article is to show that de Finetti’s understanding of the distinction is more nuanced than is usually admitted. Relying on usually overlooked excerpts of de Finetti’s works commenting on Keynes, Knight and interval valued probabilities, we argue that de Finetti suggested a relevant theoretical case for uncertainty to hold even when individuals are endowed with subjective probabilities. Indeed, de Finetti admitted that the distinction between risk and uncertainty is relevant when different individuals sensibly disagree about the probability of the occurrence of an event. We conclude that the received interpretation of de Finetti’s understanding of subjective probability needs to be qualified on this front.
Feduzi, A., Runde, J., & Zappia, C. (2014). De Finetti on uncertainty. CAMBRIDGE JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 38(1), 1-21.
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|Titolo:||De Finetti on uncertainty|
|Citazione:||Feduzi, A., Runde, J., & Zappia, C. (2014). De Finetti on uncertainty. CAMBRIDGE JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 38(1), 1-21.|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||1.1 Articolo in rivista|