In section 1 we argue that the adoption of a tenseless no¬tion of truth entails a realistic view of propositions and provability. This view, in turn, opens the way to the in¬telligibility of the classical meaning of the logical con¬stants, and consequently is incompatible with the antireal¬ism of orthodox intuitionism. In section 2 we show how what we call the "potential" intuitionistic meaning of the logi¬cal constants can be defined, on the one hand, by means of the notion of atemporal provability and, on the other hand, by means of the operator K of epistemic logic. Intuitionis¬tic logic, as reconstructed within this perspective, turns out to be a part of epistemic logic, so that it loses its traditional foundational role, antithetic to that of clas¬sical logic. In section 3 we uphold the view that certain consequences of the adoption of a temporal notion of truth, despite their apparent oddity, are quite acceptable from an antirealist point of view.
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|Titolo:||Temporal and Atemporal Truth in Intuitionistic Mathematics|
|Citazione:||Martino, E., & Usberti, G. (1994). Temporal and Atemporal Truth in Intuitionistic Mathematics. TOPOI, 13(2), 83-92.|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||1.1 Articolo in rivista|
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