In this paper a government form is modeled as an effectivity function scheme (EFS) i.e. a parameterized family of effectivity functions having admissible weight-profiles of assemblies as the relevant parameters. Working in a 2-jurisdiction outcome space we show that the existence of umpires is consistent with strong core-stability of both neo-parliamentary and semi-presidential government forms provided that the majority formation rule is collegial, namely there is one electorally fixed minimal majority coalition.

Vannucci, S. (2008). A Coalitional Game-Theoretic Model of Stable Government Forms with Umpires. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC DESIGN, 12(1), 33-44 [10.1007/s10058-008-0042-y].

A Coalitional Game-Theoretic Model of Stable Government Forms with Umpires

VANNUCCI, STEFANO
2008-01-01

Abstract

In this paper a government form is modeled as an effectivity function scheme (EFS) i.e. a parameterized family of effectivity functions having admissible weight-profiles of assemblies as the relevant parameters. Working in a 2-jurisdiction outcome space we show that the existence of umpires is consistent with strong core-stability of both neo-parliamentary and semi-presidential government forms provided that the majority formation rule is collegial, namely there is one electorally fixed minimal majority coalition.
Vannucci, S. (2008). A Coalitional Game-Theoretic Model of Stable Government Forms with Umpires. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC DESIGN, 12(1), 33-44 [10.1007/s10058-008-0042-y].
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11365/404444