We consider an economy with two types of firms (innovative and non-innovative) and two types of workers (skilled and unskilled), where workers' decisions are driven by imitative behavior, and thus the evolution of such an economy depends on the initial distribution of the firms. We show that there exists a continuous of high level steady states and only one low level and asymptotically stable equilibrium. There exists a threshold value on the initial number of firms to be overcome it to located in the basin of attraction of one of the high level equilibrium.
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|Titolo:||Dynamic complementarities, efficiency and Nash equilibria for populations of firms and workers|
|Rivista:||JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS|
|Citazione:||Accinelli, E., S., L., Punzo, L.F., & E., C. (2010). Dynamic complementarities, efficiency and Nash equilibria for populations of firms and workers. JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS, 53(1), 90-110.|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||1.1 Articolo in rivista|