I will be concerned with the following question: are there compelling arguments for postulating a distinction between the truth of a statement and the recognition of its truth, when truth is conceived along the lines of a suitable generalization of the intuitionistic idea that it should be characterized as the existence of a proof? I will argue that the distinction is not necessary within the conceptual framework of intuitionism by replying to two arguments to the contrary, one based on the paradox of inference, the other on considerations concerning the content of a statement.
Usberti, G. (2012). Anti-Realist Truth and Truth-Recognition. TOPOI, 31(1), 37-45 [10.1007/s11245-011-9110-y].
Anti-Realist Truth and Truth-Recognition
USBERTI, GABRIELE
2012-01-01
Abstract
I will be concerned with the following question: are there compelling arguments for postulating a distinction between the truth of a statement and the recognition of its truth, when truth is conceived along the lines of a suitable generalization of the intuitionistic idea that it should be characterized as the existence of a proof? I will argue that the distinction is not necessary within the conceptual framework of intuitionism by replying to two arguments to the contrary, one based on the paradox of inference, the other on considerations concerning the content of a statement.
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https://hdl.handle.net/11365/27199
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