Pragma-Dialectics and the Function of Argumentation

This contribution discusses some problems of Pragma-Dialectics and explains them by its consensualistic view of the function of argumentation and by its philosophical underpinnings. It is suggested that these problems can be overcome by relying on a better epistemology and on an epistemological theory of argumentation. On the one hand Pragma-Dialectics takes unqualified consensus as the aim of argumentation, which is highly problematic, (setc. 2) on the other it includes strong epistemological and rationalistic elements (sect. 3). <*One source of this incoherence is [@or: "are"?] Pragma-Dialectics' very problematic philosophical underpinnings, in particular Critical Rationalism as well as Logical Constructivism and Dialogic Logic of the Erlangen School (sect. 4).*> A detailed critique of the Pragma-Dialectical discussion rules shows the negative consequences of this foundation and indicates how they could be avoided (sects. 5-6).