Actio animae, actio intellectus. The role of action in two commentaries on De anima of the 13th century

In the translatio Vetus of the De anima the term actio occurs seldom and almost always in its moral meaning. In some cases, we simply find the transliteration of the Greek term (praxis: cf. de An., ii, 4, 415a19); in others, precisely the word actio, or even actus (de An., iii, 7, 431b10); in still others, the original term in Greek characters and the usual explanatory periphrasis employed by James of Venice (i.e., the one introduced by ‘id est’ and followed by the Latin translation; cf. de An.,, ii, 10, 433a17: πραξεως, id est actionis). In Michael Scotus’ translation from Arabic, the term actio occurs more frequently – and even more so in Averroes’ Commentarium magnum – covering a much wider semantic field: it is sometimes associated with passio (cf. e.g. de An., i, 1, 403a10, ed. Crawford, 18; i, 4, 408a4, ed. Crawford, 76), sometimes with operatio (cf. de An., ii, 4, 415a19, ed. Crawford, 179), sometimes, with an explanatory function, with motus (de An., ii, 5, 417a16, ed. Crawford, 212). The term actio also comes to mean any activity, function, capacity or operation of the soul; and there are also actiones that are specifically referred to the intellect (cf. de An., iii, 9, 432a16, ed. Crawford, 507). This analysis of actio in the translation from Arabic and – above all – in Averroes’ commentary has made it possible to shed light on the debate concerning the definition of the subject of the intellectual act in the writings on De anima produced by Masters of Arts between the first and the second half of the 13th-Century.