Condorcet exposed a limitation of majority-based pairwise comparison by showing that, for specific preference profiles over three alternatives, it leads to a contradiction. Arrow’s theorem is often introduced as a generalization of this finding. A novel formulation of the proof is presented that strictly adheres to this logic, establishing that for any non-dictatorial social choice rule, a contradiction-generating preference profile always exists and can be identified using a straightforward procedure.

D'Antoni, M. (2024). From Condorcet's paradox to Arrow: yet another simple proof of the impossibility theorem. SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, 1-10 [10.1007/s00355-024-01557-8].

From Condorcet's paradox to Arrow: yet another simple proof of the impossibility theorem

Massimo D'Antoni
2024-01-01

Abstract

Condorcet exposed a limitation of majority-based pairwise comparison by showing that, for specific preference profiles over three alternatives, it leads to a contradiction. Arrow’s theorem is often introduced as a generalization of this finding. A novel formulation of the proof is presented that strictly adheres to this logic, establishing that for any non-dictatorial social choice rule, a contradiction-generating preference profile always exists and can be identified using a straightforward procedure.
2024
D'Antoni, M. (2024). From Condorcet's paradox to Arrow: yet another simple proof of the impossibility theorem. SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, 1-10 [10.1007/s00355-024-01557-8].
File in questo prodotto:
File Dimensione Formato  
2024,SCW,From Condorcet_s paradox to Arrow.pdf

accesso aperto

Tipologia: PDF editoriale
Licenza: Creative commons
Dimensione 335.34 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
335.34 kB Adobe PDF Visualizza/Apri

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11365/1280216