In this essay, I argue that our perception of the phenomenal world can be referred epistemically to what exists, but does not correspond to what exists, since the human brain did not evolve to provide a “true” image of reality but primarily to serve survival of the species. Perception is not a simple response to stimuli from the environment but is a higher-level cognitive experience that can provide us with indirect knowledge of the objects/events we relate to. From this perspective, I argue for a (non-corresponding) model of realist and representative perception.
Piccari, P. (2024). Il mondo percepito. ARKETE, 6 (2023), 45-76.
Il mondo percepito
Piccari, Paolo
2024-01-01
Abstract
In this essay, I argue that our perception of the phenomenal world can be referred epistemically to what exists, but does not correspond to what exists, since the human brain did not evolve to provide a “true” image of reality but primarily to serve survival of the species. Perception is not a simple response to stimuli from the environment but is a higher-level cognitive experience that can provide us with indirect knowledge of the objects/events we relate to. From this perspective, I argue for a (non-corresponding) model of realist and representative perception.| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Piccari-Paolo-2023.pdf
accesso aperto
Tipologia:
PDF editoriale
Licenza:
PUBBLICO - Pubblico con Copyright
Dimensione
853.2 kB
Formato
Adobe PDF
|
853.2 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizza/Apri |
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
https://hdl.handle.net/11365/1274294
