Justifying the epistemological theory of argumentation: on Harvey Siegel’s approach

The article discusses Harvey Siegel's general justification of the epistemological theory of argumentation in his seminal essay "Arguing with Arguments". On the one hand, the achievements of this essay are honoured, in particular a thorough differentiation of the different meanings of "argument" and "argumentation", the semantic justification of the fundamentality of arguments as sequences of propositions, and the detailed critiques of alternative theories of argumentation. On the other hand, suggestions for strengthening the theory are added to Siegel's expositions, which at the same time make different perspectives within the epistemological theory of argumentation recognisable: The epistemological theory of argumentation goes beyond the field mentioned by Siegel, also dealing, for example, with persuasive argumentative acts and co-operative argumentative discussions. The primacy of the epistemological theory cannot be justified semantically, but only instrumentally. The function of epistemically good arguments must be explained through a precise analysis of their way of functioning, the core of which is the examination of the fulfilment of criteria for the acceptability of the thesis.