The paper analyses the demand-side prerequisites for the efficient application of the bail-in tool in bank resolution, scrutinises whether the European bank crisis management and deposit insurance (CMDI) framework is apt to establish them, and proposes amend- ments to remedy identified shortcomings.
Mecatti, I. (2023). Who Should Hold Bail-Inable Debt and How can Regulators Police Holding Restrictions Effectively?. RIVISTA ITALIANA DI DIRITTO PUBBLICO COMUNITARIO, 1/2023, 92-118.
Who Should Hold Bail-Inable Debt and How can Regulators Police Holding Restrictions Effectively?
Irene Mecatti
2023-01-01
Abstract
The paper analyses the demand-side prerequisites for the efficient application of the bail-in tool in bank resolution, scrutinises whether the European bank crisis management and deposit insurance (CMDI) framework is apt to establish them, and proposes amend- ments to remedy identified shortcomings.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento:
https://hdl.handle.net/11365/1250234