Andreotti e la teoria dei giochi

This paper deals with the topic of game theoretic modeling of communicative strategic situations. Recent literature, for instance Jaeger (2008), Stalnaker (2005), but also Lewis (1969), underlines the correspondence between game theoretical and Gricean approaches to communication. On the one hand, the patterns of iterated knowledge game theory typically uses may throw some light on the Gricean idea of speaker meaning; on the other hand, the patterns of reasoning related to the derivation, or calculation, of conversational implicatures may provide useful insights into the patterns of rational behavior game theory aims at clarifying. In practice, the overarching Cooperative principle is what justifies such a correspondence in that it introduces a strategic element into the explanation of the linguistic behavior of speakers. In the first part of the paper a case of competitive situation is presented. The utilities of the players involved in the game are such that any attempt to find an agreement is vane. Thus, according to the standard modeling, game theoretic tools, like cheap talk, are useless. In the second part of the paper, however, I devote myself to the analysis of the communicative exchanges that arise in such competitive situations arguing that, even in these cases, the logic we use in producing and interpreting messages can be better understood by tools and solution concepts of game theory, i.e. the assumption of knowledge of the structure of the game.