This paper investigates whether the lending activity of European development banks is affected by opportunistic political behavior, by looking at the change in loans extended by these entities in election years. The empirical analysis leverages on a unique manually collected dataset that includes all the development banks headquartered in Europe, for the period 2002–2015. A comparison with the rest of the European banking system reveals that while the political view of development banks cannot be supported as a general rule, it finds empirical evidence in flawed democracies, where large development banks actually tend to increase their lending activity in election years.

Frigerio, M., Vandone, D. (2020). European development banks and the political cycle. EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 62, 1-19 [10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2019.101852].

European development banks and the political cycle

Frigerio M.;
2020-01-01

Abstract

This paper investigates whether the lending activity of European development banks is affected by opportunistic political behavior, by looking at the change in loans extended by these entities in election years. The empirical analysis leverages on a unique manually collected dataset that includes all the development banks headquartered in Europe, for the period 2002–2015. A comparison with the rest of the European banking system reveals that while the political view of development banks cannot be supported as a general rule, it finds empirical evidence in flawed democracies, where large development banks actually tend to increase their lending activity in election years.
2020
Frigerio, M., Vandone, D. (2020). European development banks and the political cycle. EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 62, 1-19 [10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2019.101852].
File in questo prodotto:
File Dimensione Formato  
EJPE(2020).pdf

non disponibili

Tipologia: PDF editoriale
Licenza: NON PUBBLICO - Accesso privato/ristretto
Dimensione 616.81 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
616.81 kB Adobe PDF   Visualizza/Apri   Richiedi una copia

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11365/1144562