A Cournot collaboration game is complemented with the hypothesis that the cost of R&D collaboration depends on firm’s directed knowledge distance with respect to potential R&D partners. The further hypothesis that directed distance may be non-uniform and pair-wise asymmetric reconciles theoretical predictions with qualitative evidence about concentration and multiplicity of components in industrial R&D networks. The welfare properties of sparse stable networks are also affected.
Caminati, M. (2020). Knowledge distance and R&D collaboration in Cournot oligopoly. METROECONOMICA, 1-25 [10.1111/meca.12310].
Knowledge distance and R&D collaboration in Cournot oligopoly
Caminati, Mauro
2020-01-01
Abstract
A Cournot collaboration game is complemented with the hypothesis that the cost of R&D collaboration depends on firm’s directed knowledge distance with respect to potential R&D partners. The further hypothesis that directed distance may be non-uniform and pair-wise asymmetric reconciles theoretical predictions with qualitative evidence about concentration and multiplicity of components in industrial R&D networks. The welfare properties of sparse stable networks are also affected.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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https://hdl.handle.net/11365/1115510