We provide a perturbed evolutionary model of matching on a graph. First, we obtain that maximal matchings are the singleton recurrent classes of the model without perturbations. Then, we apply stochastic stability analysis considering two different error models: the link-error model, where mistakes directly hit links, and the agent-error model, where mistakes hit agents’ decisions, and indirectly links. We find that stochastic stability is ineffective for refinement purposes in the link-error model – where all maximal matchings are stochastically stable – while it proves effective in the agent-error model – where all and only maximum matchings are stochastically stable.
Boncinelli, L., Pin, P. (2018). The stochastic stability of decentralized matching on a graph. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 108, 239-244 [10.1016/j.geb.2017.06.005].
The stochastic stability of decentralized matching on a graph
Pin, Paolo
2018-01-01
Abstract
We provide a perturbed evolutionary model of matching on a graph. First, we obtain that maximal matchings are the singleton recurrent classes of the model without perturbations. Then, we apply stochastic stability analysis considering two different error models: the link-error model, where mistakes directly hit links, and the agent-error model, where mistakes hit agents’ decisions, and indirectly links. We find that stochastic stability is ineffective for refinement purposes in the link-error model – where all maximal matchings are stochastically stable – while it proves effective in the agent-error model – where all and only maximum matchings are stochastically stable.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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https://hdl.handle.net/11365/1092864