In his paper âExplaining Deductive Inferenceâ Prawitz states what he calls Â«a fundamental problem of logic and the philosophy of logicÂ»: the problem of explaining Â«Why do certain inferences have the epistemic power to confer evidence on the conclusion when applied to premisses for which there is evidence already?Â». In this paper I suggest a way of articulating, and partly modifying, the intuitionistic answer to this problem in such a way as to both answer Prawitzâs problem and satisfy a requirement I argue to be crucial for any epistemic theory of the meaning of the logical constants: the requirement that evidence is epistemically transparent.
|Titolo:||Inference and Epistemic Transparency|
|Citazione:||Usberti, G. (2017). Inference and Epistemic Transparency. TOPOI, 1-14.|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||1.1 Articolo in rivista|