This paper determines the optimal ownership share held by a unit into a second unit when both face a tax-bankruptcy trade-off. Full ownership is optimal when the first unit has positive debt, because dividends help avoid its default. Positive debt is, in turn, optimal when its corporate tax rate exceeds a threshold, and/or thin capitalization rules place an upper limit on the debt level in the second unit, and/or the Volcker Rule bans bailout transfers to the second unit. Full ownership is no longer optimal only if there is a tax on intercorporate dividend. This theory rationalizes observations on multinationals, financial conglomerates, and family groups.
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|Titolo:||A trade-off theory of ownership and capital structure|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||1.1 Articolo in rivista|