In the attempt to lay the basis for the construction of a theoretical framework to cast forensics and anti-forensics techniques in, we in- troduce a game-theoretic model for the source-identification prob- lem with known statistics. The framework is used to derive the Nash equilibrium for an asymptotic version of the game, in which the players’ strategies and the payoff are defined in terms of the er- ror exponents of the false positive and false negative probabilities. The payoff at the equilibrium is evaluated and the conditions under which the false negative error probability tends to zero derived.
Barni, M. (2012). A game theoretic approach to source identification with known statistics. In Proceedings of ICASSP 2012 (pp.1745-1748). New York : IEEE / Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Incorporated:445 Hoes Lane:Piscataway, NJ 08854:(800)701-4333, (732)981-0060, EMAIL: subscription-service@ieee.org, INTERNET: http://www.ieee.org, Fax: (732)981-9667.
A game theoretic approach to source identification with known statistics
BARNI, MAURO
2012-01-01
Abstract
In the attempt to lay the basis for the construction of a theoretical framework to cast forensics and anti-forensics techniques in, we in- troduce a game-theoretic model for the source-identification prob- lem with known statistics. The framework is used to derive the Nash equilibrium for an asymptotic version of the game, in which the players’ strategies and the payoff are defined in terms of the er- ror exponents of the false positive and false negative probabilities. The payoff at the equilibrium is evaluated and the conditions under which the false negative error probability tends to zero derived.
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https://hdl.handle.net/11365/35433
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