Probabilistic Arguments in the Epistemological Approach to Argumentation.

In this paper I present a proposal on how to conceptualise and handle probabilistic arguments in an epistemological approach to argumentation. The epistemological approach to argumentation is an approach which aims at rationally convincing addressees or, more precisely, which takes knowledge or justified belief of an addressee to be the standard output of argumentation. Justified belief is based on epistemological principles which specify under which conditions a proposition is true or epistemically acceptable. For probabilistic arguments, probability theory provides the necessary epistemological principles. In the paper, first, the concept of probability is discussed and a conception of probability as rational approximation to truth is defended. This conception has ontological consequences, among others also for the definition of 'probabilistic argument', which are elaborated. Next, the epistemic processes of justifying basic and derivative probability judgements are analysed. Finally, the notion of 'derivative probabilistic argument' is defined in a precise way apt to serve as a criterion for deciding on the validity and adequacy of probabilistic arguments.