The aim of this contribution is to discuss some problems of pragma-dialectics that result from its specific view of the function of argumentation and to make suggestions as to how these problems can be resolved, among others, by relying on a different, epistemic view about the function of argumentation. The function of a critical discussion, according to pragma-dialectics, is to resolve a difference of opinion. Such a resolution is said to be needed because "otherwise we become intellectually isolated" (v.Eemeren / Grootendorst 1984, 1). Perplexing about this conception is its lack of any reference to truth: After all a difference of opinion implies that at least one of the opinions is false, and false beliefs probably lead to false choices, which is a much more general problem than intellectual isolation. On the other hand, pragma-dialectical critical discussion provides strong restrictions regarding the admissible means for resolving differences of opinion, namely the obligation to argumentation. The function of argumentation is seen in convincing the hearer of one's opinion and in justifying this opinion, respectively (e.g. v.Eemeren / Grootendorst 1984, 18). Unqualified convincing would be a mere rhetoric function of argumentation, which again neglects the connection to truth and, taking into consideration the strong structural restrictions for argumentation in pragma-dialectics, does not seem to be what pragma-dialecticians want. Justifying the thesis, on the other hand, might be an adequate conceptualisation of the function of argumentation but it is an explanation ignotum per ignotum. Such unclearness prevents the straightforward development of structures that would fulfil the desired function; and we have to look at these structures (i.e. the rules for a critical discussion) themselves to find out what desirable function they might fulfil and what function might be intended by pragma-dialecticians. Closer examination of these rules and their justifications reveals some serious problems (missing of a theory of arguments, dialogical conception of inferences, restriction to deductive arguments, no place for real discussion etc.) but does not reveal a clear conception of the function of the designed argumentation and discussion. For somebody not familiar with epistemology, (dialogical) logic etc. the whole pragma-dialectic discourse may appear as an empty activity of alternating turns in a game, which in the end lead to the victory of one participant who has "successfully defended his standpoint". But there seems to be no big difference to other competition games and no reason to believe in the defended standpoint. Some roots of these failures will be analysed (e.g. dialogical logic, rejection of justificationism, rejection of a monological conception of argumentation). Eliminating these roots liberates the way to develop an adequate conception of the function of argumentation (and later of a critical dispute), which can accommodate many other main ideas of pragma-dialectics, namely an epistemological conception, according to which the function of argumentation is to lead to knowledge. Such a clear conception of the argumentation's function then may be the basis for developing a homogenous conception of argumentation's structure and respective rules.

Lumer, C. (2007). Pragma-Dialectics and the Function of Argumentation. In Proceedings of the Sixth International Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp.909-915). Sic Sat.

Pragma-Dialectics and the Function of Argumentation

LUMER, CHRISTOPH
2007-01-01

Abstract

The aim of this contribution is to discuss some problems of pragma-dialectics that result from its specific view of the function of argumentation and to make suggestions as to how these problems can be resolved, among others, by relying on a different, epistemic view about the function of argumentation. The function of a critical discussion, according to pragma-dialectics, is to resolve a difference of opinion. Such a resolution is said to be needed because "otherwise we become intellectually isolated" (v.Eemeren / Grootendorst 1984, 1). Perplexing about this conception is its lack of any reference to truth: After all a difference of opinion implies that at least one of the opinions is false, and false beliefs probably lead to false choices, which is a much more general problem than intellectual isolation. On the other hand, pragma-dialectical critical discussion provides strong restrictions regarding the admissible means for resolving differences of opinion, namely the obligation to argumentation. The function of argumentation is seen in convincing the hearer of one's opinion and in justifying this opinion, respectively (e.g. v.Eemeren / Grootendorst 1984, 18). Unqualified convincing would be a mere rhetoric function of argumentation, which again neglects the connection to truth and, taking into consideration the strong structural restrictions for argumentation in pragma-dialectics, does not seem to be what pragma-dialecticians want. Justifying the thesis, on the other hand, might be an adequate conceptualisation of the function of argumentation but it is an explanation ignotum per ignotum. Such unclearness prevents the straightforward development of structures that would fulfil the desired function; and we have to look at these structures (i.e. the rules for a critical discussion) themselves to find out what desirable function they might fulfil and what function might be intended by pragma-dialecticians. Closer examination of these rules and their justifications reveals some serious problems (missing of a theory of arguments, dialogical conception of inferences, restriction to deductive arguments, no place for real discussion etc.) but does not reveal a clear conception of the function of the designed argumentation and discussion. For somebody not familiar with epistemology, (dialogical) logic etc. the whole pragma-dialectic discourse may appear as an empty activity of alternating turns in a game, which in the end lead to the victory of one participant who has "successfully defended his standpoint". But there seems to be no big difference to other competition games and no reason to believe in the defended standpoint. Some roots of these failures will be analysed (e.g. dialogical logic, rejection of justificationism, rejection of a monological conception of argumentation). Eliminating these roots liberates the way to develop an adequate conception of the function of argumentation (and later of a critical dispute), which can accommodate many other main ideas of pragma-dialectics, namely an epistemological conception, according to which the function of argumentation is to lead to knowledge. Such a clear conception of the argumentation's function then may be the basis for developing a homogenous conception of argumentation's structure and respective rules.
2007
9789051709162
Lumer, C. (2007). Pragma-Dialectics and the Function of Argumentation. In Proceedings of the Sixth International Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp.909-915). Sic Sat.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11365/18185
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