This chapter examines the domestic audience costs incurred by democratic leaders when they issue foreign policy commitments but fail to uphold them. By means of a randomized online survey experiment conducted among U.S. citizens, the study investigates two forms of inconsistent behavior – empty threats and unkept promises – and their interaction with policy outcomes in foreign military crises. Results reveal that while both behaviors lead to audience costs, leaders face higher penalties for backing down after threatening force than for breaking promises to avoid intervention. Notably, audience costs are amplified in the case of unsuccessful wars and mitigated when military interventions yield positive outcomes, even with casualties. By integrating audience costs theory with policy outcome assessments, this research provides new insights into the interplay between leader credibility, consistency, and foreign policy success. These findings have significant implications for understanding public approval dynamics and decision-making constraints in international relations.
Martini, S., Olmastroni, F., Isernia, P. (2025). Bound to the audience: foreign policy decision-making and the costs of empty threats and unkept promises in successful and unsuccessful war scenarios. In M. Grabowski, L. Verzichelli (a cura di), The international system in the post-pandemic world: perspectives for Europe and Asia (pp. 239-255). Abingdon, Oxon-New York : Routledge.
Bound to the audience: foreign policy decision-making and the costs of empty threats and unkept promises in successful and unsuccessful war scenarios
Martini, Sergio;Olmastroni, Francesco
;Isernia, Pierangelo
2025-01-01
Abstract
This chapter examines the domestic audience costs incurred by democratic leaders when they issue foreign policy commitments but fail to uphold them. By means of a randomized online survey experiment conducted among U.S. citizens, the study investigates two forms of inconsistent behavior – empty threats and unkept promises – and their interaction with policy outcomes in foreign military crises. Results reveal that while both behaviors lead to audience costs, leaders face higher penalties for backing down after threatening force than for breaking promises to avoid intervention. Notably, audience costs are amplified in the case of unsuccessful wars and mitigated when military interventions yield positive outcomes, even with casualties. By integrating audience costs theory with policy outcome assessments, this research provides new insights into the interplay between leader credibility, consistency, and foreign policy success. These findings have significant implications for understanding public approval dynamics and decision-making constraints in international relations.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
https://hdl.handle.net/11365/1297974
