there are two strands of argument in this work. the first one is a criticism of foundational approaches to intersubjectivity claiming that subjectivity, and even lan- guage and thought, can be derived wholly from intersubjective, social constructions and communication. the second one concerns the claim that also animals develop artefacts, even non-material artefacts, “protovalues” and complex hierarchies: a basic form of intersubjectivity. a taxonomy of artefacts is introduced: properly abstract ar- tefacts (values, theories, works of art) are only human. these can be objective, and are not just social or purely intersubjective constructions, since they also depend on the human narrow language faculty, symbolic thinking, and conscious cognition. In my conclusion, I bring both strands together by distinguishing these two, only partially connected types of intersubjectivity, and appreciating Husserl’s, and d. W. Smith’s, “constitutional” approach to values in this light.
Varnier, G. (2014). L'intersoggettività, i valori e l'evoluzione della mente individuale. In Il mondo del noi : intersoggettività, empatia, comunità nella prospettiva fenomenologica (pp. 90-108). Roma : Studium.
L'intersoggettività, i valori e l'evoluzione della mente individuale
VARNIER, GIUSEPPE
2014-01-01
Abstract
there are two strands of argument in this work. the first one is a criticism of foundational approaches to intersubjectivity claiming that subjectivity, and even lan- guage and thought, can be derived wholly from intersubjective, social constructions and communication. the second one concerns the claim that also animals develop artefacts, even non-material artefacts, “protovalues” and complex hierarchies: a basic form of intersubjectivity. a taxonomy of artefacts is introduced: properly abstract ar- tefacts (values, theories, works of art) are only human. these can be objective, and are not just social or purely intersubjective constructions, since they also depend on the human narrow language faculty, symbolic thinking, and conscious cognition. In my conclusion, I bring both strands together by distinguishing these two, only partially connected types of intersubjectivity, and appreciating Husserl’s, and d. W. Smith’s, “constitutional” approach to values in this light.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
https://hdl.handle.net/11365/973291
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