We analyze a Bertrand-Edgeworth game in homogeneous product industry, under effcient rationing, constant marginal cost until full capacity utilization, and identical technology across firms. We solve for the equilibrium and establish its uniqueness for capacity configurations in the mixed strategy region of the capacity space such that the capacities of the largest and smallest firm are sufficiently close.
DE FRANCESCO, M.A., Salvadori, N. (2010). Bertrand-Edgeworth competition in an almost symmetric oligopoly.
Bertrand-Edgeworth competition in an almost symmetric oligopoly
DE FRANCESCO, MASSIMO ALFIERO;
2010-01-01
Abstract
We analyze a Bertrand-Edgeworth game in homogeneous product industry, under effcient rationing, constant marginal cost until full capacity utilization, and identical technology across firms. We solve for the equilibrium and establish its uniqueness for capacity configurations in the mixed strategy region of the capacity space such that the capacities of the largest and smallest firm are sufficiently close.
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https://hdl.handle.net/11365/32315
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