This essay is about the interpretation of a classic puzzle of comparative political science: the explanation of variance in the allocation of ministerial portfolios among different coalition actors. After a brief review of the literature, from the classic Gamson theory to the recent “policy viable” theories of portfolio allocation, the essay challenges the traditional rule of the “parity norm”, moving from different alternative explanations. The opportunity to use an unique broad and comparative data set, in order to control macro and micro-institutional features in addition to the characters of the coalitions, determines a new perspective in this field of study. The statistical analysis run in the central section of the essay demonstrates that micro-institutional devices and country-specific factors are significant in explaining different types of deviation from the pattern of proportional allocation. Among these factors, the opportunity to use junior ministers and other institutional offices as a “watch dog” function seems to be relevant.
Verzichelli, L. (2008). Portfolio allocation. In Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe (pp. 237-268). OXFORD : Oxford University Press.
Portfolio allocation
VERZICHELLI, LUCA
2008-01-01
Abstract
This essay is about the interpretation of a classic puzzle of comparative political science: the explanation of variance in the allocation of ministerial portfolios among different coalition actors. After a brief review of the literature, from the classic Gamson theory to the recent “policy viable” theories of portfolio allocation, the essay challenges the traditional rule of the “parity norm”, moving from different alternative explanations. The opportunity to use an unique broad and comparative data set, in order to control macro and micro-institutional features in addition to the characters of the coalitions, determines a new perspective in this field of study. The statistical analysis run in the central section of the essay demonstrates that micro-institutional devices and country-specific factors are significant in explaining different types of deviation from the pattern of proportional allocation. Among these factors, the opportunity to use junior ministers and other institutional offices as a “watch dog” function seems to be relevant.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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https://hdl.handle.net/11365/24328
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