The increasing interest in Hayek’s theory of knowledge centres mainly on his analysis of the competitive market as an impersonal mechanism for the discovery of privately known economic facts. The paper argues instead that Hayek's notion of knowledge is at least as relevant for the analysis of the competitive market as an institution, and that Hayek's notion of knowledge emphasizes aspects of informational asymmetries in decentralized systems that constitute the subject matter for insightful understanding of contract theory.
Zappia, C. (1997). Private information, contractual arrangements and Hayek’s knowledge problem. In Austrian Economics in Debate (pp. 264-284). LONDON : Routledge.
Private information, contractual arrangements and Hayek’s knowledge problem
ZAPPIA, CARLO
1997-01-01
Abstract
The increasing interest in Hayek’s theory of knowledge centres mainly on his analysis of the competitive market as an impersonal mechanism for the discovery of privately known economic facts. The paper argues instead that Hayek's notion of knowledge is at least as relevant for the analysis of the competitive market as an institution, and that Hayek's notion of knowledge emphasizes aspects of informational asymmetries in decentralized systems that constitute the subject matter for insightful understanding of contract theory.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
---|---|---|---|
Zappia1997.pdf
non disponibili
Tipologia:
Post-print
Licenza:
NON PUBBLICO - Accesso privato/ristretto
Dimensione
2.89 MB
Formato
Adobe PDF
|
2.89 MB | Adobe PDF | Visualizza/Apri Richiedi una copia |
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
https://hdl.handle.net/11365/13821
Attenzione
Attenzione! I dati visualizzati non sono stati sottoposti a validazione da parte dell'ateneo