Describing a new stock-flow framework for analysing journal editorial boards, Alberto Baccini demonstrates how in recent years journal growth in economics has stalled, member turnover has collapsed, and boards have become increasingly stable and insular. This raises critical questions about diversity, innovation, and governance in economics. It also offers a toolkit for studying the same dynamics in other fields.
Baccini, A. (2026). Economics journals are governed by a shrinking elite, 1-11.
Economics journals are governed by a shrinking elite
Alberto Baccini
2026-01-01
Abstract
Describing a new stock-flow framework for analysing journal editorial boards, Alberto Baccini demonstrates how in recent years journal growth in economics has stalled, member turnover has collapsed, and boards have become increasingly stable and insular. This raises critical questions about diversity, innovation, and governance in economics. It also offers a toolkit for studying the same dynamics in other fields.
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https://hdl.handle.net/11365/1328454