The Italian fleet "in efficienza" (1919-43)

This chapter traces the evolution of Italian naval doctrine from 1919 to 1943, from the nineteenth-century logic of the fleet-in-being to the interwar formulation of fleet in efficienza (often framed as “defensive-offensive”), devised to offset numerical inferiority and to operate in a “narrow sea” such as the Mediterranean. The first part examines how Fascist foreign-policy aims, decision-making structures, interservice rivalry, budgetary choices, and uneven patterns of innovation (notably regarding carriers, effective air–sea cooperation, and technologies such as radar/sonar) shaped a major 1930s shipbuilding effort without resolving deeper structural shortfalls in denial and power-projection capabilities. The second part reassesses the naval war of 1940–43: from the cautious early application of doctrine (Calabria and convoy operations) to the shock of Taranto and a gradual reversion toward a more classic fleet-in-being posture, through Matapan and the prolonged war of attrition around the Libyan lifeline, where Allied intelligence, air–sea superiority, and operational adaptability proved decisive. The chapter concludes that fleet in efficienza ultimately failed because battleship-centered force design, technological-industrial weaknesses, and the absence of genuine air integration prevented Italy from imposing attrition and from aligning means and doctrine with its Mediterranean imperial objectives.