The paper provides a game-theoretic, sequential or multi-period, representation of the current definitions of contractual incompeteness, highlighting the case of a court that is unable to complete the contract. The finding of the analytical model is that by using the solution concept of "mixed strategies" the parties may reduce the occurrence of litigation in the implementation of the contract.
Farina, F. (2007). GAME-THEORETIC SOLUTIONS TO ENDOGENOUS CONTRACTUAL INCOMPLETENESS. In LEGAL ORDERINGS AND ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS (pp. 191-212). LONDON : ROUTLEDGE.
GAME-THEORETIC SOLUTIONS TO ENDOGENOUS CONTRACTUAL INCOMPLETENESS
FARINA, FRANCESCO
2007-01-01
Abstract
The paper provides a game-theoretic, sequential or multi-period, representation of the current definitions of contractual incompeteness, highlighting the case of a court that is unable to complete the contract. The finding of the analytical model is that by using the solution concept of "mixed strategies" the parties may reduce the occurrence of litigation in the implementation of the contract.
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https://hdl.handle.net/11365/12933
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