This contribution analyses the theoretical foundations of Constitutional theory (individual and social rights in a liberal society, the rules of the "Social contract" game), the different approaches to the multi-level constitutional organizations (Cooperative federalism, Fiscal federalism, Competitive federalism and unctional federalism) and the determinants of Constitutional change (Adeshion and Secession). The link between the constitutional organization and income distribution across regions and states belonging to a Federation is underlined.
Farina, F. (2005). Constitutional Economics. In The Elgar Companion in Law and Economics (pp. 184-222). CHELTENHAM : Edwin Elgar.
Constitutional Economics
FARINA, FRANCESCO
2005-01-01
Abstract
This contribution analyses the theoretical foundations of Constitutional theory (individual and social rights in a liberal society, the rules of the "Social contract" game), the different approaches to the multi-level constitutional organizations (Cooperative federalism, Fiscal federalism, Competitive federalism and unctional federalism) and the determinants of Constitutional change (Adeshion and Secession). The link between the constitutional organization and income distribution across regions and states belonging to a Federation is underlined.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
https://hdl.handle.net/11365/12932
Attenzione
Attenzione! I dati visualizzati non sono stati sottoposti a validazione da parte dell'ateneo