We examine how voters decide whether to influence others’ attitudes towards policies in the context of Pigouvian taxation. Data from a controlled laboratory experiment show that people in general are reluctant to stand up to persuade others. Among those who are willing, both tax supporters and objectors are equally likely to volunteer and are equally persuasive. As a result, the overall negative attitude against taxes remains. Interestingly, more polarized views rather than information advantages increase the probability of standing up as first voters, irrespective of what those views are. These findings offer an explanation and suggestions to address the continuing low public support for social-welfare-enhancing tax policies.
Huang, L., Tiezzi, S., Xiao, E. (2024). Who stands up to persuade?.
Who stands up to persuade?
Silvia Tiezzi;Erte Xiao
2024-01-01
Abstract
We examine how voters decide whether to influence others’ attitudes towards policies in the context of Pigouvian taxation. Data from a controlled laboratory experiment show that people in general are reluctant to stand up to persuade others. Among those who are willing, both tax supporters and objectors are equally likely to volunteer and are equally persuasive. As a result, the overall negative attitude against taxes remains. Interestingly, more polarized views rather than information advantages increase the probability of standing up as first voters, irrespective of what those views are. These findings offer an explanation and suggestions to address the continuing low public support for social-welfare-enhancing tax policies.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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https://hdl.handle.net/11365/1263996