It is sometimes said that analytic philosophy focusses on the sciences and natural language(s), whereas so-called Continental philosophy is essentialy oriented on the human condition, mainly studied through psychological analysis and the great masterpieces of literature. There is truth in this, but the present monography proposes and explores a different perspective on the aforementioned dychotomy. It is the perspective on the concept-forming and ideal action of the model of the “philosophical exercises” (derived from “spiritual exercises”) in all traditional philosophy, as generally opposed to today’s analytic philosophy. This “paradigm of meditation”, I show, is originally and influentially present in Descartes, and still in Husserl, perhaps with deeper albeit very different forms and consequences. After all, Descartes eventually aims at separating philosophy of mind and epistemology from metaphysics and theology, and at the foundation of mechanistic physics, whereas Husserl aims at a pure philosophical foundation. As I show, however, Husserl’s foundationalist claims seem to get involved in various, unsolvable forms of aporia, his well-known (and “meditational”) “Cartesian turn” notwithstanding. On the other hand, Descartes turns out to be paradoxically closer than Husserl to the clear methods of analytic philosophy. To demonstrate this, I provide in an Appendix a wholly original and consistent formalization of the Cartesian cogito.
Si dice che la filosofia analitica studi le scienze e il linguaggio naturale, mentre la filosofia “continentale” si orienterebbe sulle grandi opere della letteratura. Questo volume esplora una diversa prospettiva: l’azione del modello degli “esercizi filosofici” nella filosofia tradizionale, opposta a quella analitica. Questo “paradigma della meditazione” è presente in Descartes, ed ancora, con forse maggiore efficacia ma in forme diverse, in Husserl. Descartes mira poi con esso a delimitare la filosofia della mente rispetto alla fondazione della fi-sica meccanicistica, mentre Husserl mira alla pura fondazione filosofica. La fondazione di Husserl si involve in aporie forse irresolubili, nonostante la sua “svolta cartesiana” – mentre Descartes si mostra come paradossalmente più vicino al paradigma meditativo classico, ma anche anche come più prossimo di Husserl alla lucidità dei metodi della filosofia analitica. Per questo in una appendice è fornita una interpretazione formale del cogito di Descartes
Varnier, G. (2020). Filosofia come meditazione e come fondazione in Descartes e in Husserl: strutture dell’io e soggetto a partire dalle Meditazioni Cartesiane. Lecce : Pensa Multimedia.
Filosofia come meditazione e come fondazione in Descartes e in Husserl: strutture dell’io e soggetto a partire dalle Meditazioni Cartesiane
Varnier, Giuseppe
2020-01-01
Abstract
It is sometimes said that analytic philosophy focusses on the sciences and natural language(s), whereas so-called Continental philosophy is essentialy oriented on the human condition, mainly studied through psychological analysis and the great masterpieces of literature. There is truth in this, but the present monography proposes and explores a different perspective on the aforementioned dychotomy. It is the perspective on the concept-forming and ideal action of the model of the “philosophical exercises” (derived from “spiritual exercises”) in all traditional philosophy, as generally opposed to today’s analytic philosophy. This “paradigm of meditation”, I show, is originally and influentially present in Descartes, and still in Husserl, perhaps with deeper albeit very different forms and consequences. After all, Descartes eventually aims at separating philosophy of mind and epistemology from metaphysics and theology, and at the foundation of mechanistic physics, whereas Husserl aims at a pure philosophical foundation. As I show, however, Husserl’s foundationalist claims seem to get involved in various, unsolvable forms of aporia, his well-known (and “meditational”) “Cartesian turn” notwithstanding. On the other hand, Descartes turns out to be paradoxically closer than Husserl to the clear methods of analytic philosophy. To demonstrate this, I provide in an Appendix a wholly original and consistent formalization of the Cartesian cogito.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
---|---|---|---|
varnier completo.pdf
non disponibili
Tipologia:
PDF editoriale
Licenza:
NON PUBBLICO - Accesso privato/ristretto
Dimensione
4.7 MB
Formato
Adobe PDF
|
4.7 MB | Adobe PDF | Visualizza/Apri Richiedi una copia |
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
https://hdl.handle.net/11365/1132477