Accountability Mechanisms: The Case of the European Banking Union

The establishment of new bodies always poses a dilemma for those who create them: how much discretion should the new bodies enjoy? This choice highlights the trade-off betweenautonomy (in order to take advantage of expertise and credibility) and democratic accountability. The scholarly literature has identified pros and cons related to each objective. This chapter applies this theoretical framework to the case of the recently established European Banking Union, by tracing the process that has led to the establishment of the European Banking Union institutions and analysing the balance between decisional autonomy and accountability that has been struck. Based on evidence from the functioning of the institutional set upof EU competition policy, the chapter also assesses the type of second-order mechanisms thatcould be activated. © Giliberto Capano, Michael Howlett, M Ramesh and Altaf Virani 2019. All rights reserved.