Despite having always been assumed to be true, a relationship between the independence of regulatory agencies and their performance has never been formally tested. This paper aims at verifying whether formal regulatory independence affects the performance of national competition authorities in the EU member states. The author presents and discusses a statistical analysis which shows that greater formal independence leads competition authorities to investigate more cases and to issue more decisions.
Guidi, M. (2011). Does independence affect regulatory performance? The case of national competition authorities in the European Union. In Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Working Paper (pp. 1-25). Firenze : European University Institute.
Does independence affect regulatory performance? The case of national competition authorities in the European Union
Guidi Mattia
2011-01-01
Abstract
Despite having always been assumed to be true, a relationship between the independence of regulatory agencies and their performance has never been formally tested. This paper aims at verifying whether formal regulatory independence affects the performance of national competition authorities in the EU member states. The author presents and discusses a statistical analysis which shows that greater formal independence leads competition authorities to investigate more cases and to issue more decisions.
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https://hdl.handle.net/11365/1070311