Johnson and the Atlantic Alliance in 1967: Rebuilding on Three Pillars

Based on a sample of US published and unpublished sources, the essay analyses some events in 1967 that were particularly meaningful for the recover of the Atlantic Alliance after the French military withdrawal of March 1966, and supports three main theses. First, even if the Vietnam war absorbed much time in the presidential agenda and in the activities performed by the Departments of State, Defense, and Treasury, transatlantic relations were not neglected in 1964-68. Second, some aspects of intra-bloc relations in those years may be considered more significative for interpreting Cold War developments and explaining détente than the patterns of inter-bloc confrontation under way. Third, the Johnson administration marked a breakthrough in those intra-bloc relations, because the long wave of American ‘patience’ towards the apparent incapacity of the Western European allies to elaborate common attitudes adequately matching the US expectations gradually lost momentum in the second half of the Sixties. Even if no really innovative design emerged from the Johnson administration record in transatlantic affairs, the President left a a satisfactory legacy to his successors, who would get the best chances for negotiating détente from a position of strength.