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**Entropy Resistant Cultures in Frail Nation-States:
the Radicalism of the Ethno-Regionalist Parties in Central and Eastern Europe.**

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To my beloved mother Violeta

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Central and Eastern Europe	
Chapel Hill Expert Survey	CHES
Collective Security Treaty Organization	CSTO
Commonwealth of Independent States	CIS
Comparative Manifesto Project	CMP
Expert Survey on Ethnonationalism in Party Competition	EPAC
Ethno-Regionalist Party	ERP
European Union	EU
European Council	EC
General Framework Agreement for Peace - Dayton Agreement	GFAP-DA
Minorities at Risk	MAR
North Atlantic Treaty Organization	NATO
Ohrid Framework Agreement	OFA

LIST OF PARTIES (english names and abbreviations)

Albanian Alternative	AA
Albanian Coalition Perspektive	ACP
Alliance of Independent Social Democrats	AISD
Alliance of the Vojvodina Hungarians	AVH
Bosniak Democratic Party of Sandzak	BDPS
Bosniak Party	BS
Bosniak Party of Democratic Action of Kosovo	BPDAK
Bridge	Bridge
Civic Initiative of Gora	CIG
Civil Congress of Ukraine (Slavic Party)	CCU
Coalition for Gora	CG
Coalition: SNP NS DSS	C-SNP-NS-DSS
Communist Party of Ukraine	CPU
Croatian Civic Initiative	HCI
Croatian Democratic Union 1990	CDU 1990
Croatian Democratic Union BiH	CDUBiH
Democratic Alliance of Croats in Vojvodina	DACV
Democratic Fellowship of Vojvodina Hungarians	DFVH
Democratic Party of the Albanians	DPA
Democratic Party of Turks	DPT
Democratic People's Alliance	DPA
Democratic Reform Party of Muslims	DRPM
Democratic Union for Integration	DUI
Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania	DUHR
Democratic Union of the Albanians	DUA
Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania	EAPL
Estonian United Left Party (Constitution Party)	ULP
For Human Rights in United Latvia	FHRUL
German Minority	GM
Harmony Centre (Concord)	HC
Independent Liberal Party	ILP
Independent Serbian Democratic Party	ISDP
Istrian Democratic Assembly	IDA
Latvian Russian Union-For Human Rights in United Latvia	LRU-FHRUL
Lithuanian Russian Union	LRU
Moravane	MORAVANE
Moravian National Party	MNP
Movement for National Unity of the Turks in Macedonia	MNUTM
Movement for Rights and Freedoms	MRF
National Democratic Party	NDP
National Democratic Revival	NDR
New Croatian Initiative	NCI
New Democratic Force – FORCA	NDF-F
New Democratic Party	NDP
New Serb Democracy *Democratic Front	NSD-DF
Opposition Bloc	OB
Our Home is Estonia	OHE

Party for Democratic Progress	PDP
Party for Democratic Prosperity	PPD
Party for Democratic Prosperity of Albanians in Macedonia -	PPD PDP
People's Democratic Party	
Party for Demokratik Action	PDA
Party for Movement of the Turks in Macedonia	PMTM
Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova	PCRM
Party of Democratic Action of Sandzak	PDAS
Party of Democratic Prosperity	PDP
Party of Labor	PL
Party of Regional Revival of Ukraine	PRRU
Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova	PSRM
Party Union Soyuz	PU
People's Democratic Party	PDP
People's Democratic Party	PDP
Progressive Democratic Party	PDP
Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine	PSPU
Radical Party of the Republic of Srpska	RPRS
Russian Party in Estonia	RPE
Serb Democratic Party of Kosovo and Metohija	SDP KM
Serbian Democratic Party	SDP
Serbian People's Party	SPP
Serbian Radical Party (Vojislav Sheshelj)	SRP Sheshelj
Serbian Radical Party of Republic of Srpska	SRP RS
SLOGA- UNITY	UNITY
SMK-MKP Hungarian Coalition	SMK-HC
Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (Burduhan)	SDPU(B)
Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (united) (Zbitnev)	SDPU (U)
Socialist Party	SP
Socialist Party of Latvia	SPL
Socialist Party of Ukraine	SDU
Socialist Party-Unity Movement	SPUM
Socialist People's Party of Montenegro	SPPM
Social-Political Movement "Equality in Rights"	SPMER
Srbian Demokrtatic Party of BiH	SDP RS
Srbian List	SL
Srbian List	SL
Srbian National Alliance	SNA
The Silesian Autonomy Movement	SAM
Turkish Democratic Party of Kosovo	TDPK
United Serbian List	USL
Unity for Human Rights Party *Omonia	UHRP *Omonia
Vakat Coalition (BDS, NB, USB)	VK

INTRODUCTION

The Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research's Conflict Barometer implies that, in general, nonviolent conflicts prevail in Europe. In Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), between 1989 and 2014, majority of the conflict situations (62%), have been driven by autonomist or secessionist claims, 17.2% of which have been violent.¹

Secession, as a reference to all the movements seeking extensive self-government for their territories, whether or not they explicitly endorse full independence, is (extreme) type of certain groups' claims for self-government. Sorens (2012: 9) thinks of secessionism 'as a type of nationalism, where nationalism is ideology or set of practices emphasizing and promoting the unity, autonomy, and identity of the nation.'

On the other hand, Gellner (1983: 1) claims that 'nationalism is a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones, and, in particular, that ethnic boundaries within a given state [...] should not separate the power-holders from the rest'. Nonetheless, he (Gellner 1983: 62) points out to the weaknesses of nationalism, among which is the one of those 'entropy-resistant' cultures whose confrontation to assimilation convulses the comfort of the nation-states. The transition from agrarian to industrial society (which is the instigative process for the creation of the nations) has a kind of entropy quality, a shift from pattern to systematic randomness, from persisting regional, kin, professional and rank groupings to ad hoc territorial and work units, fluid membership, great turnover, and no general commitment to loyalty or identity of its members. (Gellner 1983: 65) For instance, irredentist nationalist groups (on behalf of a culture which was not that of their genuine origins, assimilating first, and then taking up political state of roof, for their new culture) can be considered as entropy resistant.

Those individuals who are characterized by the trait in question and tend to be concentrated in one part or another of the total society, i.e., the **entropy-resistant cultures**, are the focal point of this thesis.

Post-communist CEE, challenged by nation-state building and democratic transition parallel processes, has encountered a noteworthy reaction by those 'entropy-resistant cultures'; those nationalisms that have once

¹ See for more in Chapter 2.2.4.

failed to bark, but have eventually awakened.² Those national minorities awakened with the disintegration of the former federations of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia and the birth of the newly nationalizing states (Brubaker 2013) rise their nationalist appetites along with the rise of the nationalism by the titular ethnic groups. Consequently, the awakening of the entropy-resistant cultures in those newly nationalizing states makes the latter frail, and both minorities' and titular ethnic groups' nationalisms restless³.

While we have been witnessing bloody secessionist movements and inter-ethnic conflicts in several CEE countries, such as those of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Moldova, Ukraine etc., we have also observed democratization in the mobilization of these ethno-regionalist movements in the transitioning period, i.e., ethno-regionalist party (ERP) proliferation.

The territorial politics of Western Europe has revived in the past decades, along with increased scholarship attention to the ethno-regionalist party family (Urwin 1983; De Winter and Tursan 1998; Alonso 2012). In spite of the unbalanced, in scope and method, literature on the post-communist societies, the scholars have moved from the overly represented works on post-conflict societies and inter-ethnic conciliation, to addressing ethno-regionalism in CEE from the perspective of party politics. (Bugajski, 1994, 2002; Lewis 1996, 2000, 2007; Bochsler 2006, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012; Bochsler and Szöcsik 2013 a and b; Bernauer and Bochsler 2011; Zuber and Szöcsik 2013, 2015; Szöcsik 2012).

The main switch of scholarship attention in both Western and Eastern European ethno-regionalist politics, nonetheless, is the one from treating ethnic-regionalist parties as a 'zero-sum' game factors (power-sharing theory) (Lijphart 1977, 1984, 2002; Sisk 1995; Norris 2002) to seeing them as vote-maximizers and strategic players in the electoral competition (outbidding and nested competition theories). (Horowitz 1985, 1991; Tronconi 2006, 2009; Elias and Tronconi 2011 a,b,c; Zuber 2012)

² 'The numbers of potential nationalisms which failed to bark is far, far larger than those which did, though they have captured all our attention', says Gellner. (1983: 42)

³ Frckovski (2016:11-14) uses the term 'restless' nationalism to describe the Macedonian nationalism which is internally and externally questioned. Nonetheless, he points to the applicability of the term to a certain extent on a larger scale (albeit not suitable for any nationalisms), because nationalism 'is basically a schizophrenic condition of affection in individuals that express it collectively.' In this regard, he claims, nationalism is always 'restless' to some extent.

Nonetheless, claiming more self-determination for their regions, which is the principle appeal of ERPs (their *raison d'être*), not always follows a crescendo trend. ERPs decide to play the ethnic self-determination 'card' not always as a counter strategy to the mainstream parties, but as well as an outbidding tactic *vis-à-vis* other parties that claim to speak for the same ethno-regional group. And this is how the research question of this dissertation was born. We are interested in what explains the radicalism of those entropy resistant mobilized cultures?

What accounts for the radicalism of the self-determination claims of the ethno-regionalist parties of Central and Eastern Europe?

In this dissertation we will look primarily at the party competition strategies as possible explanatory factors of radicalism of ERPs, then we shall test the level of existent regional authority in a polity, the international factors (pressures/support from outside) and finally we shall look at several socio-democratic and economic potential explanations.

We initially target party manifestos from 90 ERPs coming from 17 CEE countries in the period of 1989-2015, and eventually analyze 72 of them. For the purpose of finding the answers to our hypotheses we shall use empirical/quantitative method for testing twelve hypotheses on the dependent variable 'radicalism of the self-determination claims of ERPs in CEE'. The dependent variable is initially measured through five ordinal categories: Protectionist, Autonomist_Municipal, Autonomist_Regional, Federalist and Secessionist ERPs.

The main argument of this thesis is that the intra-ethnic outbidding theory prevails when explaining the ERPs' strategies for ideological radicalism. We hereby infer that ERPs' size, electoral fragmentation, inclusion of competitive ERP in previous governments, party's age, and current level of regional government are statistically significant factors of radicalism of ERPs' self-determination appeals. On the contrary, we find the higher level of liberal democracy of a polity and the higher level of corruption to be significant moderators of ERPs' radicalism.

Nonetheless, there is space for future research in line with the implications of the 'nested competition theory' i.e. the competition beyond segmented market which might have the answers to the failure of this research

to straightforwardly prove that the high number of competitor ERPs provokes radicalism of their self-determination claims.

The plan for the thesis is presented below.

We shall start with Chapter 1 where we offer the working definition of the concept of Ethno-regionalist party, which is subject to analysis (the **'what'** question of the thesis). To be able to do so, we shall initially offer insights into the postulates of the concepts of ethnicity, region and self-determination. As we move forward with Chapter 1, Section 1.2. we elaborate other theoretical and analytical frameworks of analysis, and we give an overview of the existing literature on ERPs in Europe. We divide the emphasis on the literature according to two general perspectives, firstly, the scholarship across East-West European dimension and across research methodology and secondly, the scholarship according to the diversity of the research questions on the Ethno-regionalist parties (ERPs as dependent vs. ERPs and independent variable). We will then pose the Research questions and construct our Hypotheses (the **'how'** question), and we shall turn to the added value of this dissertation for literature (the **'why'** question) We shall approach the end of the first Chapter by explaining the research design, the data and the method (the **'when'** and **'where'** **questions**), where we include a short emphasis of the unit of analysis, the case selection and data, the operationalization of the dependent variable "**radicalism of the self-determination claims**", and the final specification of the method of categorization of the parties' manifestos.

The scouting of the Central and Eastern Europe, with two separate emphases on the entropy-resistant categories (the ethno-regional groups) and the frail nation states (the nationalizing states in between regime change, transition and stability) is to be done in Chapter 2. We shall see the cultural diversity of the potential ethno-regional groups in CEE and we shall map the territorial concentration of the ethnic heterogeneity of the CEE. Moreover, we shall put an emphasis on the political and electoral systems of the countries of CEE from a comparative perspective, their level of regionalization, socio-economic change and conflicts occurring due to inter-ethnic intolerance.

Once we map the potential for ethno-regionalist mobilization, we shall move forward and depict the actual manifestation of the social and political cleavages in the political life of the newly nationalizing states, i.e. ERPs mobilization. Therefore Chapter 3 will depict the origins of ERP in CEE (where, when and how many?)

by offering insights into the success and failure of the ERP in CEE through their lifespan, as well as a general picture of the electoral fortunes of the ERPs from today's comparative perspective.

We then go ahead with Chapter 4 where we thoroughly elaborate the definition and the measurement of the radicalism of ERPs from a comparative perspective. We shall understand the operationalization of the level of radicalism of ERPs' self-determination demands, we shall learn about the method and technique for coding ERPs' manifestos, and from the manifestos coding results we shall eventually compare the ERPs' radicalism in CEE. We shall conclude this chapter by elaborating a deeper analysis of the ERPs manifestos, which goes beyond their self-determination claims. Therefore, a gaze into the 'other' indicators of radicalism of ERPs, such as the issues of 'Sovereignty of nationalizing states', 'references to Kin States', 'favorable mentions for Russia', 'NATO', and 'the EU' is to be done.

In the concluding Chapter 5 we shall finally approach towards the empirical test of the radicalism of the ERPs in CEE. Before we present the results from the quantitative analyses of the radicalism of ERPs, we shall firstly specify the empirical method used for the purpose of this inquiry, identify once more the operationalization of the dependent variable, and finally elaborate the measurement of the independent variables which shall test the twelve hypotheses. We finally offer a glimpse into the results from the ordered logistic regressions with the dependent variable operationalized as an ordinal variable with three categories, the predicted probabilities for radicalism of the ERPs in CEE with changes on values of the independent variables, and additional diagnostics and predictions on restricted samples (exclusion of potential influential cases).

At the end we will offer some final concluding remarks, emphasis on the new puzzles and perspectives for future research.

CHAPTER 1. FROM ENTROPY-RESISTANCE TO POLITICAL MOBILIZATION: DETERMINING ETHNO-REGIONALIST PARTY FAMILY IN EUROPE

According to Gellner (1983: 62) what made the nation supremely important in the period of transition from agrarian to industrial society is “the erosion of the sub-groupings and the vastly increased importance of a shared, literary dependent culture“. Yet, the nation, as an imagined community, inherently limited and sovereign, where sub-groupings are partly eroded (Anderson 1993), is constructed of people who differ in all kinds of ways. Some of the classifications of people are of no interest, but some, the “entropy-resistant” ones, are socially and politically very important.

“A classification is entropy-resistant if it is based on an attribute which has a marked tendency not to become, even with the passage of time since the initial establishment of an industrial society, evenly dispersed throughout the entire society.” (Gellner 1983: 63)

Despite of his awareness of Gellner’s and Anderson’s beliefs that the self-evident success of nationalism means that nationalism is very strongly rooted in the thoughts or the behavior of people, Hobsbawm (1990: 192) argues that the political entities described as ‘nationalists’ such as ‘nation’ and ‘nationalism’ are no longer adequate to be analyzed. He enthusiastically suggests that it is not impossible that the nationalism will decline with the decline of nation-state and he even considered regionalist parties as relicts of the past. And yet, Hobsbawm’s assurance of the perspectives for decline of nationalism comes in the year of 1990, when the whole Eastern Europe is just about to be shaken. The communism has been just recently overthrown by ‘democratic transition’, and ‘new’ nationalisms have awakened in the post-communist societies.

Rogers Brubaker (2013: 11) would therefore state that at the same moment when Western Europe seemed to be moving beyond nation-state, Eastern Europe and Eurasia appeared to be moving back to the nation-state, entering not a post-national but a post-multinational era. This notion implies that those entropy-resistant classifications (cultures) in the nationalizing states (which I also call ‘frail nation-states’) have been heartened up.

Although the wars around the dissolution of Yugoslavia are two decades behind, the 2014, ethnically motivated, war in Ukraine reminds us that the awakening of those entropy resistant cultures in terms of sub nation-state nationalisms is not over yet.

Nonetheless, while the European Union (EU) imposes criteria on the EU Candidate Countries considering as well the protection of minority rights i.e. the Copenhagen Criteria (EurLex, 1993), in the past few years new independence initiatives ignited in Scotland and Catalonia. Having in mind this clear fact that Western Europe as well abounds with regions where territorially concentrated 'cultural' groups assert aspirations for some level of self-determination/government, we are reassured that the importance of the territorial cleavage has revived in the advanced democracies as well, and territorial politics is still in town.

The inter-ethnic turmoil succeeding the regime change in many CEE countries has instigated the issue of ethnic minorities' protection and their political integration. In many countries ethnic parties have been founded along with the establishment of the rest of the 'mainstream' parties participating in the multi-party elections of the democratizing societies. Some countries, such as Bulgaria or Albania, have gone so far as to ban ethnic parties in order to prevent ethnic conflicts, or further post-communist secession initiatives.

And here we come to the protagonists of this dissertation, the Ethno-regionalist parties (ERPs). ERPs have been widely viewed as unique organizations that hold the "ownership" over the center-periphery cleavage, (Lipset and Rokkan 1967a), parties that do not pursue integration into broader national identities; rather they limit their appeal to a certain constituency, and they aim at securing better self-determination of their region. (Kitschelt, 2001) Apart from the lack of information available for research, ERPs were found less interesting for academic observation mostly because of their small size. Moreover, it is a common observation that ethnic regions perform low electoral turnout at national level. (Muller-Rommel 1994, 1998)

The interest for studying radicalism of the self-determination claims by the ERPs in CEE is not limited to the ERPs' threatening capacity (for secession), or the fear of reemergence of violence in the post-communist societies, nor it is motivated by the possibility for reshaping of the European borders. While these fears might be reasonable to a certain extent, what makes this research question more interesting, if looking in the past two decades, is the influence ERPs have on the existing party politics within a country as well as at EU level.

To begin with, the ongoing trend of devolution of politics (Hepburn 2010) in Europe is mostly triggered by the ERPs. They challenge the structure of the political system in terms of organization and distribution of power between the center and the periphery. (De Winter, Gómez-Reino, and Lynch, 2006) Thus, the ERPs in the new EU Member States and the Candidate Countries would more and more try to reflect to this trend by shaping their ideologies in terms of demanding more regional authority. While, maybe not openly secessionist, ERPs in CEE have no obstacle for accommodating high level decentralization of power in their electoral campaigns. In this sense they are multi-level players, and their ethnic appeals vary across levels of government and regions, but their *raison d'être* is certainly grounded on the basis of identity, territory and self-government.

Secondly, the EU enlargement nowadays is unimaginable without the compliance with the Copenhagen Criteria (1993) which, among the other conditions, stipulate minority rights respect by the EU Candidate Countries. Thanks to these criteria ERPs are pushed into a position of policy-makers. Namely, the enlargement criteria give them open space for bargaining with its national governments and imposing conditions to the cabinets, which eventually means a direct impact on the policy making process at national level. Moreover, the power of the ERPs rises with their involvement in the European Parliament. As part of the EU Parliamentary Parties they have direct influence on the EU Regional Policy.

As we see ERPs' role in the national and regional government coalition building Europe-wide, increases every day. Yet, apart from their coalition bargaining power at elections, ERPs are crucial signatory partners of peace or other bilateral agreements addressing inter-ethnic relations. They are usually consulted when European or national laws affecting national minorities are drafted, and they are part of the European Parliament where legislations tackling devolution of power, minority protection, budgeting of cohesion funds and regional programs are made. And so, the potential for violent regional breakups from the nation-states, which ERPs might initiate, would be an 'extreme' justification of the importance of this topic, but the role ERPs' play at multilevel politics nowadays makes them increasingly interesting for the study of party politics. Their role as "advocates" of the ethno-regional groups' right for self-determination in the electoral competition, and in particular the level of radicalism of these demands, put ERPs in the spotlight of this research. I ask when do ERPs' self-determination demands radicalize (starting from culturally-linguistic

recognition of the group, ending with independence for the region)? ***What accounts for the level of radicalism of their self-determination claims? Do ERPs self-determination claims change, and if so, under which circumstances?***

When talking about radicalization of the ERPs' demands, we can talk in terms of ideologies, and in terms of planned actions of acquiring higher level of self-determination. This research does not comprise analysis of the movements, protests and other types of mobilization strategies that ERPs might have embraced in order to address their standing points and demands regarding self-government. The research question in this dissertation aims to understand the level of radicalism of ERPs' pre-electoral policy positions regarding self-government, which in effect is the dependent variable of the research.

The intention of this dissertation is to encompass ERPs from CEE, (which are usually understudied) in a quantitative analysis and test the existing theories regarding the factors that might influence radicalization of self-determination claims of ethno-regional groups.

Before entering into the quantitative comparative work, nonetheless, one has to bear in mind Sartori's fears (1970) that we are engaged in worldwide cross-area comparisons where statistical and research techniques sophistication is growing, and that this expansion of politics has produced a wide gap between the unconscious (empirical) and the over-conscious (theoretical) thinker. The wider the world under investigation, Sartori claims, the more we need conceptual tools that are able to travel. i.e., can be stretched or strained. Therefore it is very important that we answer two of his questions: "why" and "how" compare.

We ask why is it important to merge the cases from CEE under the same theoretical umbrella, and how can we best possibly measure the level of radicalism? This immediately imposes two challenging tasks: the first one is to define the concept of ethno-regionalist party, and the second one is to decide how to operationalize the radicalism of ERPs' self-determination demand. For the purpose of this thesis, these concepts and their measurements need to travel well at CEE level, moreover, the framework of analysis should hopefully be as much compatible as possible with the already existing typologies and classifications of Western Europe's ERPs.

The structure of this chapter is therefore based as a response to the two questions of "why" and "how" compare, but only after we clearly define "what" do we intend to compare.

This first chapter is comprised of three sub-chapters: the first one “Ethno-regionalist parties in Europe: Climbing up the ladder of abstraction of terminology and definitions of the concept”, answers the question “what”; the second one “Theoretical and analytical frameworks” answers the question “why” and “how”, and the third one “Research design: DATA and METHOD”, explains the questions “where” and “when”.

In this line, we shall first see an elaboration of the concepts of ‘ethnic’ and ‘region’, the notion of ‘self-determination’ (which directly affects the ideology of ERPS’ that on the other hand is the sole base of their typology), and we finally conclude with the definition of ‘ethno-regionalist party’ used throughout the pages of this dissertation.

The second sub chapter already reviews the existing literature on Ethno-regionalist Parties in Europe from two main perspectives: the East - West European scholarship dimension, and the research questions diversity on Ethno-regionalist parties. A closer look at the research questions will be taken, and more specific questions arising from it will follow, together with the relevance of the research question and the very field of study for the literature. The state of art at the end of the second sub-chapter shall lead to the three main clusters of hypotheses tested in the final chapter of this thesis and concludes with the added value for the literature of the dissertation. Finally, the chapter introduces the research design, the data and the method used, (unit of analysis and case selection) and at the end it offers an introduction into the theoretical postulates of the operationalization of the dependent variable “Radicalism of the Self-Determination Claims”.

Chapter 1.1. Ethno-regionalist parties in Europe: climbing up the ladder of abstraction of terminology and definitions of the concept. (What?)

As mentioned before, the first challenge when studying ethno-regionalist parties cross-nationally is the lack of a commonly shared definition. Some parties belonging to the “family” of ethno-regionalist parties have also been classified under the sets or subsets of other party families such as the autonomist parties, non-state wide parties, those representing stateless nations, national minority parties, ethnic parties, nationalist parties and even niche parties. And yet, most of the academic debate on the very concept of ethno-regionalist party comes from the scholarship on the Western (advanced) democracies. The post-communist

societies, albeit ethno-culturally very heterogeneous, seem to be using much more unified terminology for these parties. “Ethnic parties”, “ethno-minority parties” or “national minorities’ parties” are among the most commonly used concepts.

The debate over the name of this party family mainly comes from the very self-perception/identification of the ‘entropy resistant classifications’. For instance, the Catalan parties striving for greater autonomy or independence of the Autonomous Region (Comunidad Autónoma) of Catalonia from Spain (such as Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya or Convergència i Unió) are in conflict with the term ethno-regionalist parties due to their belief that Catalans are not an ethnic, nor regional minority within Spain, but a nation itself constructed at a civic principle. Thus, while putting strong accent on the civic Catalan, as opposed to the ethnic Basque nationalism, they claim they should be considered as nationalist Catalan parties. (Payne 1971; Conversi 1997; Guibernau 2006)

Another example, the parties from the Albanian block in Macedonia opposed the terminology of ethnic or national minority because they consider themselves as a constitutive people of Macedonia, equal to the numerically larger group of ethnic-Macedonians. Thus, with the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) in 2001, the Constitution of Macedonia was amended and the terminology of ‘ethnic minorities’ has been substituted with the concept of ‘non majority communities’. (OFA 2001) Albanian parties go further and seek to be recognized as constituent people in the “Bosnia and Herzegovina’s style”. Namely, in BiH the three main ethno/religious groups the Bosnian Muslims, Serbs and Croats are all recognized as equal constitutive parts/peoples, while the rest of the ethnic groups are classified under the commonly used concept of national minorities.

These notions raise the question of where are the limits of this party family, more so, what is the frame of the set of parties under analysis in this thesis. Conceptualizing the ethno-regionalist party family is closely related to ethnicity, nation, nationalism and regionalism. Thus, it firstly, depends on finding the proper definition of what “*ethnic group*” or “ethnicity” is, and then, of clarification of what do we mean by “region”. Further questions arise from here as well: “how much regional are ethnic parties?”, “how much ethnic are national minorities?” etc. Thus, by giving a short elaboration of the meanings of ‘ethnic’ and ‘region’ we would open the path for defining the family of ethno-regionalist parties in CEE.

Chapter 1.1.1. On concept of 'ethnicity'

Horowitz (1985) argues that ethnicity is based on a myth of a collective ancestry which usually carries with it traits believed to be innate. Nonetheless, in spite of the notion that ethnic identity is relatively difficult for an individual to change, change sometimes occurs. That is to say, individual origins count, but exceptions are made. If we want to understand the disparity between physical evidence and group conceptions, argues Horowitz, a somewhat elastic concept of ethnicity is required. He adds a minimal scale requirement to the Enid Schildkrout's minimal definition of an ethnic unit (that requires common provenance, recruitment primarily to kinship and a notion of distinctiveness), and to Max Webber's conception of ethnicity (the subjective belief in common descent whether or not an objective blood relationship exists). Namely, he requires that:

"ethnic membership transcends the range of face-to-face interactions, as recognized kinship need not,...and so conceived, ethnicity easily embraces groups differentiated by color, language, and religion; it covers "tribes", "races", "nationalities", and "castes". Horowitz (1985: 53)

In his search for the ethnic origins of nations, Antony D. Smith (1986), distinguishes two broad trends in the study of ethnicity, the "Parmenideans" and the "Heraclitans". While the first, represented by the 'primordialists' and 'perennialists', is largely essentialist and static, the second trend understands ethnicity as highly variable and dispensable resource. According to the first trend (which starts out from the postulates of Parmenides, that the state of existence is not subject to a change), "what is, is, and one cannot logically add to or subtract from 'being'." The second, (the Heraclitan trend) on the contrary claims that not only does everything flow, not only are particular '*ethnie*' subject to trends of emergence and dissolution, but under close inspection, it may vanish completely, or be found only in select coteries. Be that as it may, he is aware that no latter-day primordialists would subscribe to an unchanging '*ethnie*.' (Smith 1986: 210)

Smith (1986: 211) noticed the risk of treating ethnicity as something primordial and fixed if mainly fixing attention on the "great dimensions and 'fault lines' of religion, customs, language and institutions". Moreover, he is concerned with the other risk of concentrating solely on the attitudes and sentiments and political movements of specific *ethnie* or ethnic fragments, that we see them as dependent 'tools' or

'boundary markets' of other social and economic forces. Thus he argues that by eschewing these alternatives and attending to the complex of myths, symbols, memories and values that are handed down the generations of collectivities and which define them to themselves and those outside, we can treat *ethnie* as both mutable and durable at the same time, and ethnicity as both fluctuating and recurrent in history.

Roger Brubaker's "Myths and Misconceptions in the study of nationalism" (1998), offers six main illusions connected to the study of nationalism. Among them six is the so called 'illusion of the realism of the group', the illusion that nations and ethnic groups are real entities, substantial and enduring, sharply bounded collectivities (externally bounded and internally homogenous cultural blocks).

Finally, Chandra's definition of ethnic group (2011, 2012) introduces a subtle, but consequential change in the specification of the role of descent, contained in the distinction between 'attribute' and 'category'. It treats the term 'ethnic' as an umbrella term for a number of identities.

"An ethnic group is a subset of categories in which descent based attributes are necessary for membership. All ethnic categories require descent-based attributes,[...], although, all descent-based categories are not ethnic categories. The subset of categories that defines certain ethnic identity can include race, religion, sect, language family, dialect, caste, clan, tribe or nationality of one's parents or ancestors or one's physical features." Chandra (2012)

So, Chandra (2012) considers "nominal" ethnic identities to be the ones for which we possess the descent-based attributes for membership whether or not we actually profess to be members, and "activated" ethnic identities to be those in which we actually profess, or to which we are assigned membership. To refer to "ethnic identity", according to this rationality, only means to refer to ethnic "category" which is different from the attributes on which this category is based. Therefore, "ethnicity", by the constructivist theories, is considered to be not one, but many concepts which can be grouped into two logically connected families: one describing ethnic "structure" (which refers to any concept that describes nominal descent-based attributes that characterize individuals or populations or the nominal categories generated from attributes),

and other describing ethnic “practice” (referring to any concept related to the attributes and ethnic identity categories activated by individuals and populations in different contexts).

Disaggregating ‘activated’ ethnic identity categories matters in order to point out on the bases of the theoretical justification to treat ERPs as flexible categories as well. Namely, the disaggregation of the ‘Activated’ ethnic identity categories goes first with private and public; then the public can be non-institutionalized (which are manifested by violence or protest) or institutionalized (manifested in non-electoral politics, as in bureaucracies, militaries or other, or in the electoral arena, by voters and parties). Ethno-regionalist parties would thus, be an **institutionalized ‘activated’ ethnic identity** that is an ethnic “category” which can embrace different attributes such as religion, language, nationality and the like on which this category is based.

Chandra’s definition of ‘ethnic’ could therefore serve as an umbrella definition of those ‘debatable’ identities mentioned before. The Catalan ‘nation’ or the Basque ‘ethnic group’ within Spain, the Scottish or Welsh stateless nations within the UK, the Russian national minorities in Lithuania or Latvia, or the Russian speaking population of Ukraine, the Albanian national minority in Montenegro and the Albanian people of Macedonia, under this logic, can be all called ‘ethnic’. Consequently to this, those parties claiming to speak for the given group would have the prefix ‘ethnic’.

Finally, Zuber (2013: 191-207) asks the very basic question which any analysis of this party family should start from i.e. “whose mobilization are we talking about?” Explaining the mobilization of the national minorities in nationalizing states, which directly implies mobilization through ethnic parties, is possible after answering the question of “what ontological perspective allows us to assume that mobilized national minorities actually exist?”

And so, she offers a third approach, the so called “naturalized constructionism” that stands as a balance between the primordialists and the constructivists views on ethnicity. It stands between those views that consider ethnic groups to be naturally given, permanent, and easily merged into a collective action and those who postulate that there are no groups to start with, and that there are no essential categories that define the nature of an ethnic kind. This middle approach stands in between those claims that “once a group has ‘awakened’ to its identity and a conflict among ethnic groups emerges, it will inevitably recur throughout

history” (Lijphart 1977; Rabuska and Shepsle 1972; Horowitz 1985), and the ones (*constructivist theories*) which see groups as “rather socially constructed, by historical external processes, or by the ambitious elites, who create a sense of threat by ‘others’ to the conjured new identities they want to take power on.” (Chandra 2012; Brubaker 2004)

The naturalized constructionism operates at the intersection of culture and cognition and has the potential to account for the fact that, independent of the specific content of ethnic categories in a specific socio-historical and institutional context, people tend to naturalize ethnic rather than other categories. The ‘groupness variable’ (Brubaker 2004) takes on a higher value under conditions where other social categories have collapsed or are in a process of profound reconstruction. Thus it is able to explain why multinational states can be expected to remain somewhat special in the long run, since cognitively-predisposed shared ethnic perceptions ease the formation of collective interests and collective action. Ethnic elites representing the minority may in long run redefine the social categories they include/exclude through their appeals, since the content of the ethnic categories is not essentially fixed. (Zuber 2013: 202-3)

In nationalizing states the nation-building strategy of emphasizing the ‘native intuitions’ by the majority elites gets the boomerang effect by the minority elites who seek to mobilize support through draw on the local importance of ethnicity on the ground. In such scenario shared interests are presented (constructed) as crucial to the self-preservation of the ethnic minority in the face of central nationalism. This can explain why ethnic mobilization takes place under conditions of regime change across contexts without falling back on essentialist accounts of ethnic identity. The fact that we have a predisposition to resort to ethnic categories when other information is scarce is likely to be innate. (Zuber 2013: 202)

Later on, (in Chapter 2) we will see how national censuses treat the concept of identity of those minority groups in the CEE. Yet, this short introduction on the concept of ‘ethnicity’ shows that even if group’s identity might still be a subject to political debate within a nationalizing state, the term ‘ethnic’ has a great deal of elasticity. This characteristics of the concept offers a greater freedom for its use in defining the party family under research in this dissertation. But before we jump to the elasticity of the party family, it is necessary to catch a glimpse on the second attribute of the concept of ethno-regionalist parties, the region.

Chapter 1.1.2. On concept of 'region'

Once we settled the concept of 'ethnic', and we are reassured that all of the 'categories' we are going to address in this dissertation can be considered as such, we raise the next question: "are these ethnicities all territorially bounded, and if so, how much regional their territorial concentration is?"

Can we say that the Basque or the Catalan ethnic/nationalist parties, the Italian Lega Nord, the Serbian parties in Bosnia's Republica Srpska, the Hungarian parties of the Serbian province of Vojvodina, or the Albanian parties in Macedonia, for which we have settled the name 'ethnic', belong all to the same ethno-regional party family (given that the function and the size of the territories they bond to varies)?

Keating (1998) offers various useful arguments in this sense. He deems that the current era is witnessing not the end of territorial politics but their reconfiguration and re-emergence in new and potent forms.

"One reason why territory always seems to return is that it is intimately linked to identity and politics, although this too is often ignored because it is so fundamental. Political identities are complex and increasingly multiple, but do tend to be linked to a territory, a place, a homeland."

(Keating 1998: 8)

Keating (1998: 55) elaborates three competing concepts of regions as a level of government: the functional concept of metropolitan region (usually seen as a means of consolidating **local governments**), the larger-**provincial level of region**, (seen as the appropriate level of consolidating existing regional activities under political control, and for devolving functions from the central state), and finally the **cultural region**, or minority nation, defined by sentiment and history, (which could vary greatly in geographical scale).

One way to define the regional space is negatively, as intermediate between the state and municipal government. In some cases, whatsoever, the term region has been applied to units of local government. Even in the same country regions may exist in different levels and there is no consistent territorial definition of a region. So regions cannot be delineated simply by topographical criteria. Their extent and shape will

depend on their functions, and on the patterns of political mobilization which gave them a political meaning. Regions may also provide a space for the resolution of cultural and linguistic conflicts, through a territorial demarcation of language areas.

The nation-state has been a powerful force for cultural uniformity, through universal education, official language policy and administration, and since World War II, mass media have served to reinforce these national patterns. In recent years this have been changing, for instance, minority languages have been given new status in the historic nationalities of Spain, where they have a central role in the education.

Regional identity however is still more complex and not always linked to differences and values. There are three elements in the analysis of regional identity and its relationship to political action: the cognitive, the affective and the instrumental. The **cognitive** element means that people must be aware of such a thing as region, and of geographical limits, and have knowledge of the other regions. The **affective** element refers to the question of how people feel about the region and to what degree the region provides a frameworks for common identity and solidarity (possibly in competition with other forms of solidarity, including class and nation). Finally, the **instrumental** element looks whether the region is used as a basis for mobilization and collective action in pursuit of social economic and political goals.

If anything we learn from Keating is that the concept of region is not a given fact of life but a social construction. Regions are constantly being made and remade, and even if historic elements are often pressed into service, their meaning is shaped by contemporary forces. (Keating 1998: 86, 109)

The freedom to stretch the concept of region wider and the confidence to classify certain parties representing territorially concentrated ethnic minorities (no matter the size of the territory, the historic past of regional autonomy, or the current political regional function) under the same umbrella or ethno-regionalist, drives the wide understanding of the region in this dissertation as well.

If the concepts of 'ethnicity' and 'region' could be socially constructed, than the party family as well could stretch across the lather of abstraction. (Sartori, 1970)

Chapter 1.1.3. On 'Self-determination'

The studies on secession and federalization tackle the issue of self-determination *per se*'. Nonetheless, self-determination, just like the two previously elaborated concepts of 'ethnicity' and 'region', is a subject to debate.

The right to self-determination was established in the late 1950s and 1960s, when the major instances of decolonization had been complicated. Yet, Weller, M. (2005) argues that the existence of right of self-determination yield results that would favor the stability of the ensuing result over restorative justice in relation to colonialism. There are many different layers of meaning of self-determination in a legal sense: self-determination as an individual right, as a right related to members of groups and perhaps groups themselves, right for the indigenous peoples in cases of limited territorial change, right to external self-determination of peoples etc. Within the confines of the discussion of Weller's (2005) 'Self-determination trap' the principle focus lies in self-determination as an entitlement of 'peoples' freely to determine the international legal status of a territory. His critique, nonetheless, is that self-determination appears to offer a promise for independence to populations, which instead of ensuring peace and stability, after the establishment of the post-World War II international system, have instigated more self-determination conflicts.

This post- World War II self-determination era, according to Jenne (2007), is the very period of minority **empowerment**. This period of minority empowerment is nevertheless the third phase of national minorities treatment by international law, preceded by the period of minority **protection** (since the League of Nations), which was initially ran by the post Wesfalian (1648) period of minority **recognition**. So, the post WWII period, resulted with the founding of the United Nations, which endorsed the very principle of self-determination.

The US General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and peoples in 1960, asserting that all peoples had the right to self-determination and that all forms and manifestations of colonialism have to be brought to an end. (Janne 2007: 26) As the cold war began to wind down, argues Jenne, movements that had mobilized on the bases of class gradually changed their tactics in light of the decline of ideological conflict and the growing salience of self-determination. Some parties

such as the Parti Quebecois in Canada, or the Kurdish Workers Party in Turkey, have moved from socialist or anti-capitalist ideology towards secessionists. The indigenous peoples and other marginalized peoples also have mobilized in the 1970s in Panama, Peru, Paraguay, Colombia etc. The steady increase of the minority mobilization in the post-Soviet and post-Yugoslav nationalizing states led to predictions that nationalism would destabilize the entire Eurasian continent. As a reaction to the increased upheaval in the post-communist societies, the UN Declaration on Minority Rights in 1992 was ratified by the General Assembly.

Self-determination, thus, is a concept that in spite of the variability of uses it is associated to independence. Independence, secession, federalism, or some other sort of autonomy for the national minorities is still a different level of self-government for which ethno-regionalist parties strive. Sorens (2012: 8-9) argues that no country has complete independence in the sense of being free of all foreign political ties, influence, or obligations; "Self-government is really a sliding scale, from full centralization (complete lack of self-government), to full independence (complete self-government). Every governing unit falls somewhere between these two extremes. "

Thus the terms 'self-determination' and 'self-government' will be used interchangeably in this dissertation referring to ERPs' radicalism of the demands for regional authority which starts with the identity protection (or cultural autonomy) and ends with secession.

Chapter 1.1.4. On concept of 'ethno-regionalist party'

The minimal definition stipulates that "ethnic party is the one that champions the interest of an ethnic group." Nonetheless, as we have previously seen, the definition of the concept of ethnic group was challenging, which adds to the second challenge of defining the ethnic party when faced with the practical need of classifying actual political parties as ethnic. That is to say, while agreeing on the fact that ethnic parties are champions of the particular interests of an ethnic category or set of categories, the operationalization of the definition of ethnic party is much more complicated. Moreover, how do we tell whether a party represents certain groups' interests? (Chandra, 2011)

Other general consensus among the scholarship on ethnic politics is that ethnic parties are different from other types of party, they do not integrate local communities into the nation or the broader federation, but they rather limit their appeal to a particular ethnic or regional constituency and explicitly seek to draw boundaries between ethnic friends and foes. (Ishiyama and Breuning 2011). For Kitschelt (2001), ethnic parties do not pursue a universal programme, but rather seek to secure material and political benefits for the group. Horowitz (1985), sees ethnic parties as a political formation that varies between a classic political party and an interest group that receives support from a specific ethnic group which serves its interests. He moreover thinks that ethnic parties derive their support overwhelmingly from an identifiable ethnic group. (Horowitz 1985: 291) And while other scholars agree on the fact that unlike other type of parties, electoral mobilization is not intended to attract additional voters outside the group to support of the party (Horowitz, 1985:194-7; Gunter and Diamond 2003: 183; Mozaffar and Scarritt 1999) the question of how to operationalize the definition of an ethnic party needs a further due.

Ishiyama and Breuning (2011: 227) identify two basic dimensions that have been used for classifying parties: the extent to which their support is dependent on voting support of a particular ethnic group (unless the party vote relies on a particular ethnic group, that party is not an ethnic party), and whether the party portrays itself as representing a particular group (as Van Cott (2003:3) stipulates that the majority of the party's leadership and support comes from a 'non-dominant' ethnic group).

Chandra's definition (2011:155-168) does not impose Ishiyama and Breuning's (1998) additional condition that the ethnic party seek to impinge on the relative power or position of ethnic group, because ethnic parties may seek political power for many reasons, or they may even not seek political power at all, preferring to aim at influence instead. Thus, she adds few more indicators for classifying parties as 'ethnic', besides the composition of the votes and the groups who gave the votes for the party, and the leadership composition of the party, the name, the campaign message, and the issues they advocate forcibly and explicitly, need to be considered.

While all of these indicators, enabling the practical operationalization of the concept of ethnic group, help the selection of those parties that belong to the ethno-regionalist party family in CEE, the sub classification

of the ethnic groups offered by the scholars leads to the final issue of radicalism of these parties in their self-determination demands.

The nominal definition of ethno-regionalist party in Muller Rommel's (1998) theoretical overview of ethno-regionalist parties is that ethnoregionalist parties are defined as referring to the efforts of geographically concentrated peripheral minorities which challenge the working order and sometimes even the democratic order of a nation-state by demanding recognition of their cultural identity. Thus, they can be viewed as anti-sentiment parties (Poguntke, 1996).

The extent to which ethnic parties' leaders pursue radical claims for territorial and political change is used as a bases for sub-categorization of the ethnic (or ethno-regionalist) parties. Rokkan and Urwin in 1983 introduce the five dimensions of radicalism of the identity building: peripheral identity building, regional autonomy, federalism, confederalism and full independence. Later on, Muller Rommel, (1994) distinguishes protectionist, autonomist, left-libertarian federalist and separatist parties. Lieven de Winter (1998) distinguishes four kinds of ethnic parties: moderate protectionist, autonomist, national-federalist and secessionist.

This is a short introduction into the ethnic parties' typologies according to their radicalism of the self-determination stances. The operationalization of the dependent variable of this thesis 'the radicalism of parties' ideological stances on self-determination' (as we will see later on in Chapter 5) can probably be understood as another attempt for classification of the ethnic parties in CEE. Namely, some scholars make a clear distinction among the ethnic and the ethno-regionalist (regionalist) parties. While in the latter category the party is considered to claim a territorial autonomy for the region it represents, in the first category of parties includes those parties that only seek cultural protection for certain ethnic group.

Party ideology may change in time, nonetheless, if a party holds only protectionist ideologies today, that does not mean that this position is fixed and that it would not go up on the ladder of radicalism in certain period of time or go back to the starting position on radicalism. Therefore, we shall not exclude ethnic parties that have so far only advocated protectionism for their ethnic group from the family of ethnic parties as we are not sure those appeals and ERPs narratives would stay at the same level forever. Normally, they do

not. Even if we assume that protectionist appeals are related to lack of clear regional identity, (as we elaborated shortly before) these regions' meaning is shaped by contemporary forces, i.e. it might change in time.) (Keating, 1998: 86)

In conclusion, the operational definition of Ethno-regionalist party (ERP) within this dissertation would be:

'A political party would be considered ethno-regionalist if (stated in its name or within the electoral platform) it claims to represent certain ethnic, regional or ethno-regional group (numerously smaller than the titular ethnic group in a nationalizing state) in the national electoral arena.

In defining 'ethnic group' this definition coincides with Chandra's (2012) definition that 'an ethnic group is a subset of categories in which descent based attributes are necessary for membership. All ethnic categories require descent-based attributes, but all descent based categories are not ethnic categories. The subset of categories that defines certain ethnic identity can include race, religion, sect, language family, dialect, caste, clan, tribe or nationality of one's parents or ancestors or one's physical features.'

The definition of 'regional identity' holds to Keating's (1998) definition that regional identity and its relationship to political action has three elements: the cognitive, the affective and the instrumental. That is to say, people that live in a certain territory must be aware of such a thing as a region, and of geographical limits, and have knowledge of the other regions; the region should to a certain degree provide a framework for common identity and solidarity, possibly in competition with other forms of solidarity including class and nation, and finally, the region is used (to a certain degree) as a basis for mobilization and collective action in pursuit of social, economic and political goals.

In size and function, regions for the purpose of this dissertation can go from municipalities, to set of municipalities, forming autonomous or federal state regions. In addition all of the types of possible regions may be currently existing, may be a subject of historic experience of certain population living in the given territory, or they might be romantic ideals that certain groups have in certain point of time, but which ideals might have never before been realized in practice.

Chapter 1.2. Theoretical and analytical frameworks of analysis: overview of the existing literature on Ethno-regionalist Parties in Europe

Scholars have approached ethno-regionalist parties from various analytical perspectives, using different methodological tools. They have been analyzing origins, motivations, and typologies of ERPs, (De Winter, Gómez-Reino, and Lynch, 2006; De Winter and Tursan 1998; Ishiyama 2011; Dandoy 2010; Brancati, 2007; Candra 2011); they were as well concerned about ERPs' electoral fortunes and performances (entry, success, persistence and failure) (Candra 2004; Bernauer and Bochsler 2011); they have studied ERPs political behavior, competition strategies and ideology (Elias and Tronconi 2011 a,b,c; Bochsler and Szöcsik 2013 a,b; Massetti and Schakel 2013 a,b; Szöcsik and Zuber 2013 and 2015). ERPs have been mostly embraced under the "umbrella" fields of study of nationalism and ethnic conflicts, (Brubaker, 1996) regionalization and federalization of politics, (Brancati, 2009) secessionism and self-determination of ethnic groups, (Moore, 1988), and globalization and ethnic politics. (Deeg, 1996, Tossutti, 2002)

Institutional engineering contributes in large in terms of methodology and explanatory comparative power of the ERPs' behavior. In spite of the fact that scholars have been talking about the issue of ethno-regionalism for more than half a century, at the beginning the research was much more theoretical than it was comparative. Thus, the study of the ethno regionalism in Europe is uneven in method and scope. Firstly, there is unbalanced concentration of research in the study of the institutionally articulated ethno regionalism through party competition between the advanced Western democracies and the democratizing societies of Central and Eastern Europe, and even less cross-European comparative work on this party family has been done. Then, there is uneven methodological approach to the ethno regionalist party family in terms of qualitative and quantitative methods, with the first one prevailing. Finally, in spite of the diversification of the scope of research questions applied to the investigation on ERPs, the issue of ideology remains understudied.

This section addresses three main scholarship areas connected to the research on ERPs. Namely, the East-West European dimension, the discrepancies between the use of quantitative-qualitative method across studies, and finally the diverse literature treating ERPs as a dependent as well as an independent variable. The issue of ERPs' ideology will be elaborated in the introduction of the main hypotheses of the dissertation, later on in section 1.2.3.

Chapter 1.2.1. The scholarship across East - West Europe dimension and across used research methodology

ERPs' origins are considered to be set down on the grounds of the center-periphery cleavage, introduced in the literature by Lipset and Rokkan (1967a, b). In spite of the proliferation of regionalist parties in the 1970s and 1980s, the concept of ethnoregionalism remained a neglected phenomenon in the party studies subfield

De Winter's (1994) "Non-state wide parties in Europe" at the Barcelona Workshop sets the scene for comparative work in the field of ERP's, and later on the "Regionalist parties in Western Europe" by De Winter and Tursan's (1998) has been published. This work has offered a general analysis of almost all salient ERPs in Western Europe: Spain, Italy, France Finland, UK, The Netherlands and Belgium) and it is based on party case studies which tackle the history and origins of the ERPs, their electoral performance, ideology and autonomist goals, organization and leadership, coalition behavior and their positions in the European arena. In this volume De Winter and Tursan (1998: 5) endorse the position that parties sustain an identity that is anchored in the cleavages and issues that give rise to their birth, that is to say, political parties stand for something that defines their identity (empowering of the ethno regionalist group they claim to represent).

Huri Tursan (1998) claims that ethno regionalist organizations can take many forms, varying from terrorist groups to political parties, social movements and interest groups, and it can adopt a variety of strategies including the collection of votes, protest or violence.

Yet, in the advanced democracies of Western Europe the dominant organization representing ethnic identity is the political party, and the strategies predominantly peaceful, which distinguishes ethnicity in Europe from that in other parts of the world. Later on, in 2006, their work has been upgraded by the two volumes on "Autonomist parties in Europe" edited by De Winter, Gómez-Reíno and Lynch (2006) which include case studies of fifteen autonomist parties in Western Europe. These volumes although using the case study approach, have managed to comparatively present the revival of the territorial cleavage and the identity politics in the western democracies through autonomist parties' ideologies, political behavior, electoral performance and their policy impact.

With “From Protest to Power: Autonomist Parties and the Challenges of Representation”, Elias and Tronconi (2011b) made another comparative contribution to the field by endorsing analyses on fourteen party case studies. Eve Hepburn (2011) in “New Challenges for Stateless Nationalist and Regionalist Parties” explores the importance of nationalist and regionalist adaptation to the twin challenges of multi-level politics, and a multi-dimensional policy space which results with the need to re-conceptualize what these parties are fighting for, and the compromises they are willing to accept to achieve success. In this work, as well, a dozen of Western European stateless nationalist regionalist parties have been elaborated. Although party cases included in the previously mentioned volumes may be repeating, the passage of time makes the ‘replication’ of the case studies an extremely valuable track record on the changes of their behavior, electoral performance and ideology in time. The ‘time perspective’ on the same cases is not only important for the individual study of parties, but for the evolution of the very field of study as well.

We find fewer comparative works in terms of party case studies put under a same theoretical framework for the ERPs in post-communist Europe. Januz Bugajski (1994) “Ethnic Politics in Eastern Europe: A Guide to Nationality Policies, Organizations and Parties” covers 13 nations, and among the other questions he devotes some space for the ethnic parties. Bugajski’s (2002) “Political Parties of Eastern Europe: A Guide to Politics in the Post-communist Era”, on the other hand, is comprehensive one-volume guide to politics in Eastern Europe which provides plenty of information on the region and the emergent political spectrum of parties and coalitions. He describes parties from twenty Eastern European countries, classified across the political spectrum, and discusses each party, individually, in terms of programs, leadership, and political activity. His work on ethnic and regionalist parties is rich source of dates, parties’ ideologies and success, leadership etc. Nonetheless, twenty-five years later, much has changed in the ethno-regional party family, and his work needs an upgrade.

Lewis (2000) and Kostelecký (2002) address political parties in post-communist East-Central Europe, nonetheless, the attention put on the ethnic parties is limited. Stojarova and Emerson (2010), on the other hand make a thorough analysis of the party politics in the Western Balkans, including the ethnic party politics, yet in terms of extensiveness and scope of work it is still behind the scholarship on ERPs in Western Europe. Danero Iglesias, Stojanovic and Weinblum’s (2013) work on “New nation-states and national

minorities”, although covering significant number of national minorities in CEE, was not intended to be a thorough work on party case studies in new nation states.

Julian Bernauer’s (2015) study conducts a systematic analysis of ethnic politics in Central and Eastern Europe. Examining up to 130 ethnic groups and their parties in Central and Eastern European democracies, the book defines the key concepts of ethnic identity and partisan-descriptive ethnic minority representation. He applies a consistent analytical lens on party competition, voter behavior, political attitudes and group conflict, thus demystifies ethnic politics and offers a more unified theory of ethnic minority representation via ethnic parties.

We here come to the point of quantitative methodological approach and ethnoregionalist studies in Europe. Tronconi (2009) managed to combine contextual variables and variables related to the parties themselves in a Large N study on ERPs in Western Europe. He examined how cultural distinctiveness, the economic wealth, public access to media, access to the ballots and public finances, polarization, volatility and proportionality of the electoral systems influence the ethno-regionalist mobilization (entry and success of these parties).

Masseti and Schakel (2013b) single out the factors that increase the probability of adopting a radical (secessionist) as opposed to a moderate (autonomist) ideological stance, with a particular focus on the effect of decentralization. Thus, they make use of a large and original dataset, covering 11 countries, 49 regions, and 78 parties for the period of 1940-2000. Massetti and Schakel (2013a) contribute to the field with another analysis based on a novel dataset which includes regional and national vote shares for 77 regionalist parties in 11 Western democracies from 1950 to 2010, in order to see why regionalist parties’ ideology matters for their success i.e. why decentralization has a differentiated effect on regionalist parties’ fortunes in western democracies.

Going forward, Bernauer and Bochsler (2011) used a hierarchical model of electoral entry and success of 130 different ethnic minorities in 19 post-communist democratic countries of Central and Eastern Europe. They managed to contribute with a database using ethnic groups as a unit of analysis instead of ethnic minority parties. They argue that the electoral success of new (niche) parties is influenced by the cost of entry (determined by electoral threshold) and the potential of electoral support (depending on the reactions of political competitors and electoral demand i.e. the size of ethnic groups and the saliency of ethnic issues).

Thus, they claim that parties only run if they can expect electoral support sufficient to pass the electoral threshold.

Finally, Szöcsik and Zuber (2012) have created the Dataset on Ethnonationalism in party competition (EPAC) in 22 European Democracies. They use the methodology of expert survey analysis to cover all European democracies where ethno national identities are politically mobilized and where at least some parties advocate self-determination for ethno-regional groups on the bases of a traditional territorial homeland.

This dataset to a certain degree fulfils the gap that the project of Comparative Party Manifesto (CPM) (Volkens et al. 2010) created with the neglect of the ethno-regionalist party family. Namely, the CPM dataset mostly neglects the small parties that win insignificant number of seats in national parliaments, or even fail to win any. ERPs, unfortunately, due to the small size, most often are among the ones that are missing in the dataset. Moreover, even those ERPs that have been included in CPM data set lack a more thorough codification regarding the specificities of this party family (Protzik and Garas, 2011). Nevertheless, EPAC's in spite of the large number of cases (210 parties that have been assessed on ethno-national issues), this dataset does not cover a time-range but it only addresses the latest electoral campaigning issues, as of June 2011.

In conclusion, Central Eastern Europe, albeit abundant with ethnic parties, still lacks systematic and excessive comparative scholarship, qualitative as well as quantitative.

Chapter 1.2.2. The scholarship according to the research questions diversity on Ethno-regionalist parties (ERPs as dependent vs. ERPs as independent variable)

The research done in the field of ethnoregionalism treats ERPs as the cause for as well as the outcome of certain political phenomenons. The following section offers a short preview into the scholarship addressing ERPs as an independent as well as a dependent variable. The literature that treats ERPs as a dependent variable mostly explores ERPs' origins, electoral performance, political behavior and ideology (inseparably connected to their typology), while those works that treat ERPs as an independent variable mostly treat them as factor of in/stability, or ethnic conflict. We start here with the second case scenario.

Chapter 1.2.2.a. ERPs as independent variable (a cause)

When we think of the ERPs as an independent variable we posit that they may influence political regime change i.e. they can be actors of mitigation of a conflict or its instigators. Tursan (1998) agrees that ERPs play crucial role in mobilizing ethnic sentiments, but asks whether they lead or follow ethnic movements. The patterns of ethnic settlement can vary between territorial solution of the carving of land to non-territorial solutions of repression or accommodation. Separatism and irredentism are among the possible negative approaches of solutions for nations states, but autonomy or federalism (as strategies of official recognition of the rights of the ethnic population), are among the most often adopted strategies by the European ERPs. Brancati (2006, 2009) claims that regional parties increase ethnic conflict and secessionism by reinforcing ethnic and regional identities, producing legislation that favors certain groups over others, and mobilizing groups to engage in ethnic conflict and secessionism.

Alonso and Ruiz Rufino's (2007) cross-section time-series analysis shows that the ameliorative effect of parliamentary representation over ethnic conflict is stronger in those legislatures where the ethnic group has effective influence over decision making. Additionally, it shows that representation within national parliaments has no ameliorative effects over violent secessionist conflicts. When the ethnic minority's demands are too radical, parliamentary representation is simply an inadequate instrument. Therefore their theory is that parliamentary representation does not always allow for an effective representation of those who are not in government.

Birnir (2007:198) finds out that ethnic electoral behavior stabilizes party systems in the long run if ethnic groups are represented, that access to the cabinet significantly reduces a group's propensity for violence, and that increasing size of ethnic legislative representation decreases both violence and peaceful protest. Finally, Birnir and David M. Waguespack (2011) argue that the exclusion of mobilized ethnic groups from the policy process (and not just ethnic diversity per se) result with diminished economic growth due deleterious policy effects. Conversely, as more groups are included in the policy process with increasing access to cabinet, the more economic growth is expected.

In conclusion, as an independent variable ERPs mostly appear as potential de/radicalizer of an ethnic conflict, factor of political systems de/stabilization, or economic growth instigator.

Chapter 1.2.2.b. ERPs as dependent variable (an outcome)

As it has been introduced just shortly while ago, the scholarship on ERPs, which treats this party family as dependent variable, mostly explores ERPs' origins and electoral fortunes, political behavior and ideology and finally the typology of ERPs. In such cases ERPs attract various explanatory variables.

To start with, electoral engineering has a lot to do with representation of small parties, consequently of ERPs.

Lijphart (1984, 1997) and Horowitz (1985) hold two different positions regarding ethnic conflict prevention through institutional engineering. Lijphart suggests that Westminster (Majoritarian) Model of Government is in favor of the homogenous societies, while Consensus Model of Government is the model that best fits to the heterogeneous societies. While Majoritarian model is considered problematic for societies divided on religious, ethnic, linguistic, cultural, ideological or racial basis, the power-sharing school holds for proportional representation (PR), with large or specially designed districts for ethnic minorities. Horowitz, on the other hand, stands in the position that power-sharing regimes with PR as electoral system contribute to the segmentation of divided societies, and the majoritarian and multi-preference electoral systems contribute to inter-ethnic conciliation.

Montabes et al. (2004) have also analyzed the relationship between the electoral systems (the proportionality and the electoral colleague) and the electoral success of 26 ethno-regionalist parties from 19 European regions in the elections in the period of 1990-2002. They conclude that the electoral formula can determine with assurance the level of multipartism, but only at district level: the number of effective electoral parties is higher in the proportional systems than in the majoritarian ones. The second conclusion is that the PR systems do not favor in a particular way the ethno-regionalist parties, on the contrary the results from the quantitative analysis make evident that they obtain better electoral results in majoritarian systems.

Bochsler, (2006, 2009, 2010) argues that many Central and Eastern European countries introduced different models of special electoral rules for ethnic minority parties, and yet, they may have unwanted consequences, promoting ethnic segregation instead of giving incentives to mixed ethnic political parties. While previous research has held that social cleavages play a lesser role in post-communist democracies. Bochsler (2010) shows that party nationalization in post-communist democracies is closely related to the

territorial structure of social divisions, except for cases where the electoral systems provide for a high degree of nationalization, or where super-presidentialism hinders the creation of strong nationalized parties. He demonstrates that decentralization, the ethnic structure and national legal thresholds allow a very accurate explanation of the varying levels of party nationalization in post-communist democracies.

When trying to explain the electoral entry and success of ethnic minority parties in CEE, Brenauer and Bochsler (2011) consider the type of electoral system and the district magnitude as not very relevant for minorities that live concentrated in small area, they again consider the high legal electoral threshold as restrictive towards minority representation. Bernauer (2015) considers which factors influence the electoral entry and success of ethnic minority parties and the levels of groups' partisan-descriptive representation in parliament, and how these in turn impact on individual levels of satisfaction with democracy and the protest behavior of minority groups. By applying a consistent analytical lens on party competition, voter behavior, political attitudes and group conflict, this study demystifies ethnic politics and offers a more unified theory of ethnic minority representation via ethnic parties.

Brancati (2007) tries to explain the variation in regional party strength both within and across countries which traditional explanations of the origins of regional parties as the products of regionally-based social cleavages cannot fully account for. Her argument is tested with a statistical analysis of thirty-seven democracies around the world from 1945 to 2002. The analysis shows that political decentralization increases the strength of regional parties in national legislatures, independent of the strength of regional cleavages, as well as of various features of a country's political system, such as fiscal decentralization, presidentialism, electoral proportionality, cross-regional voting laws and the sequencing of executive and legislative elections. In the same direction, Piombo (2005), claims that if combined with federalism, PR with large multi-member district magnitude and no specified threshold for ethnic parties positively affects ethnic conflict prevention.

Thus, federalism is considered to be an instrument to reduce the conflict. Nonetheless, federalism should be also considered from the perspective of the nexus of electoral rules and the level (the tiers of power) on which parties compete (national, regional, local). Federal systems that genuinely devolve power will cause parties to compete for power at lower levels in political sphere, fostering the development of regional or

local political parties. Unitary systems, in contrast by focusing the competition on national level makes parties seek the median voter and it does not promote small parties entry in parliament.

Goodman and Moser (2012) from the other side show that district-level characteristics majority-minority districts, are more important than ethnic federalism for promoting minority representation in Russia. Majority-minority districts promote ethnic voting and to an extent minority voter turnout. They claim that federalism had no impact on that. The single member districts systems in this case provide very real benefits to geographically concentrated ethnic minorities, and promote ethnic voting and tend to increase the turnout of the minority in the majority-minority districts. The move from SMD to PR entailed certain costs for the political inclusion of certain ethnic minorities.

Tronconi (2009: 177) concludes that the cultural differentiation, the relative regional economic growth, the access to the lists and media and the disproportionality of the electoral system positively affect the presentation/entry of ethno-regionalist parties. The negative impact comes only from the access to public finances. On the other hand, variables that positively affect the success of the ERPs are the cultural distinctiveness, the relative economic growth, access to media, and the volatility, while the access to the lists, the access to public finances, the disproportionality of the electoral system, and the polarization of the electoral system affects success negatively.

Following the globalist–localist scholars that argue that the new localism – which encompasses the post-war resurgence of decentralist political movements – is linked to intensified international interdependence and changes in production and consumption modes, Tossutti (2002) explores whether ethnic, religious and regional parties in 21 advanced capitalist democracies are more likely to achieve political salience in systems which have been more exposed to the effects of globalization and post-industrialization. So the argument is that parties catering to particularist interests are more likely to participate in ruling coalitions to support minority governments, or to serve as the official opposition in countries that have been relatively insulated from transnational forces. While domestic economic conditions and a party's lifespan and programmatic orientation also influence the probability for success, domestic institutional arrangements such as electoral systems and the division of powers do not.

We have seen some of the theories on ERPs' entry and success and the explanatory variables within the analyses on ERPs, so far. The electoral engineering matters with the electoral system proportionality,

district magnitude, electoral threshold. Then we see the level of decentralization, the cultural territorial concentration/distinctiveness, the access to media and finances and the relative regional economic growth as explanatory variables.

While the interconnection between success and ideology is important, one crucial segment of the study of ERPs is the political behavior of the party family. Thus, party competition strategies are among the subfields of ethno regionalist studies, and with a good reason. Zuber (2012) claims that the real competition within ethno-regionally segmented market, can go beyond the logic of radical outbidding. She argues that the power sharing model of ethnic politics is a theory of competition avoidance (it does not accord a role to party competition) while the outbidding model, on the contrary, is a theory of ethnic competition that focuses on party competition in perfectly (ethnically) segmented markets, where polarized competition for radical voters lets outbidding parties prevail.

Van Houten (2001), Meguid (2005, 2008), Bocshler (2011), Elias and Tronconi (2011a), Zuber and Szöcsik (2012) have all tackled different perspectives of the party strategies as factors of ERPs success and failure. Among the many, are the risks autonomist parties have to take when included in government, the mainstream parties' positioning over issues in relation to the ERPs success, the regionalist party competition strategies etc. While competition strategies are used to explain vote gains, the same strategies may influence the ideology of ERPs. In return ideology may interfere in the competition strategies and coalition building. Thus we have finally approached the main research point of the thesis- the radicalism of ERPs' ideologies. Before we continue with the state of art and introduce the main hypotheses of the dissertation, the research questions arising from the general puzzle shall be introduced in the next section.

Chapter 1.2.3. Research questions and Hypotheses (How?)

As it has been revealed once before, in the past decades ERPs have increased their size, and consequently to that, their blackmail potential and coalition bargaining power. With the increased policy-making influence, the scholarly attention have increased as well. In Western Europe, ERPs' ideologies by default challenge the existing political system (Elias and Tronconi 2011a), so, the "concern" arising from the growing importance of these parties in national politics does not come from their threatening capacity (their electoral

strength), but rather from their threatening intention (their secessionist ideological position) (Masseti and Schakel, 2013b). The issue of national minorities' protection triggered political mobilization of the ethnic groups as well.

Ethno-minority parties compete at national elections almost in all of the post-communist European countries, and in some, like Bosnia, Macedonia, Turkey, Romania or Slovakia, they play a crucial role in the democratic stabilization of these countries. Peace agreements such as the *General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina* (known as the *Dayton Agreement*) in 1996, or the *Ohrid Framework Agreement* in Macedonia in 2001 could not be signed without inclusion of those parties that claim to represent minority ethnic groups. The post conflict societies, nonetheless, eventually enter the 'normality' of the party competition game which by large influences the intensity of the ethno nationalism salience and the degree of the self-determination demands of these parties.

Therefore, the puzzle of this thesis originates from the intensity and consistency of ERPs' threatening intention, and the influence that this intention has on the national electoral game. Understanding what accounts for the radical self-determination claims of an ERP, in the newly democratizing societies of CEE will be the main goal of this research. In line with the constructivist theories of ethnic politics (Chandra, 2012) this thesis does not treat ethnic identity, and ERPs' behavior as nature fixed and exogenous to human processes. Right on the contrary, the explanation of ERPs behavior shall be provided mainly through electoral party-competition strategies and constellations. Therefore, the main research puzzle as already introduced at the very beginning of this Chapter is **when do ERPs' self-determination demands radicalize? What accounts for the level of radicalism of their self-determination claims?**

The hypotheses arising from the general research puzzle are to be clustered in three main groups: the first one addresses electoral competition constellations in a polity and ERPs' positions accordingly, the second cluster puts the accent on the level of the existing regional government in a country and the external influence by the European Union in terms of decentralization/regionalization of the members and the aspiring countries, and finally the third cluster points out at the socio-political and economic environment in relation to radicalism of the ethno-territorial politics.

In this direction, the first cluster of questions aims to understand the effect that the electoral competition environment has on the radicalism of ERPs' self-determination claims.

- "How does electoral performance/size of ERPs affect radicalism of their ideologies?"
- "How does proportionality of the electoral systems/ fragmentation of electoral competition affect ERPs' radicalism?"
- "How does the fragmentation of the intra-group competition influence the radicalism of ERP?"
- "How does exclusion from government affect the radicalism of ERP?"
- "How does inclusion in government of a competitor ERP affect radicalism?"
- "How does ERPs' leadership change affect the radicalism of ERP?"
- "How does ERPs' age affect the radicalism of ERP?"

The second cluster of questions strives towards explanations deriving from the existing level of decentralization/regional government and the influence by external factors.

- "How does the level of decentralization affect the ERPs' radicalism?"
- "How does the European Union membership affect ERPs' radicalism?"

Finally, we look at the general socio-economic and democratic country conditions as factors of ERPs' radicalism of self-determination demands.

- "Could the level of liberal democracy be associated with radicalization of ERPs' ideologies?"
- "Could country's economic development explain radicalization of ERPs?"
- "Could corruption in a polity explain radicalization of ERPs?"

Many studies on ERPs assume that this party family has a 'special' role in territorial politics (Keating, 2011), and, in order to explain ERPs' behavior, focus mainly on country dependent variables, such as culture or economy. However, more recent work has challenged the proposition that niche parties (ERPs as well) have little incentive to behave strategically, (Meguid, 2005, 2008) due to the fact that these parties advance a very narrow set of issues and receive electoral support exclusively on that basis. Therefore, this dissertation is in fact based on the presumption of 'normality' of the territorial politics and shall contribute to the group of scholars that treat ERPs as vote-maximizers and office-seekers (Elias and Tronconi 2011a,

Zuber 2012, Bochsler and Szöcsik 2013; Elias, Zuber and Szöcsik 2015; Hepburn 2009; Gomez-Reino, De Winterand Lynch 2006), rather than assuming they are zero-sum political actors (Keating, 2011).

This novel literature highlights the strategic capacity of the ERPs, and the fact that they often choose to position themselves on issue dimensions beyond their core business, and that such choices are driven by more established partisan rivals for voters. Therefore, some of the hypotheses tested in the models view the ideological positions of the ERPs in national elections as electoral-game based processes, rather than phenomenon dependent on nation-state factors. Thus, apart from the cultural differentiation, the socio-economic factors, and the institutional engineering, there are factors of radicalization of the self-determination demands with direct provenance from the party competition strategies. And this is where the first set of hypotheses is constructed. The first group of hypotheses addresses **parties' electoral strategies** in the political space in a polity as factors of ERPs' ideology radicalism.

We shall therefore start with the essential meaning of the political parties' existence- representation and eventually power. Birnir (2007) argues that long term ethnic group propensity for peaceful participation in democratic politics is influenced by the representation of the group interest in state structures, where representation is defined as access to policy and/or office specific goods, through direct access to the executive and leverage in the legislature. The size of ERPs improves the odds of profiting from parliamentary or governmental inclusion provisions. Therefore, one might expect that large ERPs shall moderate their programs for the purpose of maximizing votes while, the small parties will try to compensate vote loss by opting for more radical stances (presenting themselves as the true representative of that very same ethnic group). (Hotowitz 1985; Bochsler and Szöcsik 2013a).

While party size is primarily measured through the count of the votes/vote share size, the share of seats depicts the real party strength in achieving representation. If looking at share of seats we get to see the real possibility for an ERP to access the legislative bodies in order to realize its policy stances. That is to say, in a diverse dataset of ERPs such is the one used for this dissertation, the vote share of party may be relevant party size indicator for some but not for other parties. Given the large diversity of the countries size as well as the variety of electoral provisions, the same vote share could be transferred in different number of seats. In some countries this very same party result might count more and in others less. Thus, we expect

that the share of seats measures ERPs' size/success better and we expect that smaller parties, in order to gain votes over the bigger ones, would be more driven by radicalism.

We hereby pose our first hypothesis, ***H1: The size of the ERPs is negatively associated with radicalism of their ideologies.***

We can expect that representation in legislative bodies mostly depends on party size i.e. their capacity to attract voters/seats, but as it has been introduced shortly before, in many instances parties have been taking advantage or have suffered seat losses as a result of the electoral rules. In order to improve the proportionality of the transfer of votes into parliamentary seats, electoral engineers do continuously work on the issues of electoral district size, threshold of representation, electoral formula, ballot shape etc. And yet, having in mind the fact that the ERP family is comprised of mostly small parties, we can be assured that they are among those parties that are most vigorously affected by the level of 'generosity' of the electoral provisions in terms of representation. In many cases, these parties do not overpass the most customary 5% threshold of representation, they are being discriminated by gerrymandered electoral unit or electoral formulas etc. Therefore, continuing in the same direction with H1 (the aspect of competition and representation), we come to the point of the electoral provisions as a factor of proportional representation, and consequently, electoral fragmentation.

Plurality systems tend to exaggerate the power of the strongest parties, whereas proportional representation is designed to produce what the name implies 'a distribution of seats proportional to the votes received'. (Lijphart 1994) The ethnic security dilemma suggest that plurality systems increase group insecurity, because political change can be quite dramatic, often resulting with exclusion. If groups cannot block objectionable policies, then they may be 'pushed' to engage in either protest or violence to have influence. In a PR system, on the other hand, coalitions can change, but ethnic groups may gain representation and could play a significant role either as a coalition partner or in opposition to the government. Saidemen, Lanoue, and Campenni (2002) therefore claimed that ethnic conflict is more likely to happen in systems characterized by plurality than those by proportional representation (PR). Cohen (1997) suggests that PR has mitigation power over extremism of ethnic elites thanks to the better possibility for representation in parliament of the ethnic parties and so, PR may be used as a tool for managing

conflicts. Newman (1996) as well, observed that regionalist parties emerging under majoritarian systems tend to adopt a radical position on the center-periphery dimension in order to properly distinguish themselves from the statewide competitors. In contrast, proportional systems can allow for the emergence and persistence of more than one regionalist parties in the same region with different ideological orientations in several dimensions, including self-government (Cox 1999; Bochslers 2009). Massetti and Schakel (2013b) have tested this theory on the regionalist parties in western democracies, and confirm that majoritarian electoral systems dramatically increase the probability of radicalization. Birnir (2007) joins to this group of scholars that sees PR as a conflict moderation factor, and finds plurality electoral system as associated with violent rebellion in contrast to the mixed electoral system (which is associated to only a non-violent protest). The increasing size of the ethnic party in the legislature is significantly associated with decreasing violence. Moreover, the larger the ethnic representation is in the legislature, the lower the level of protest.

Therefore, all these arguments stand for proportionality as a factor of better representation and in return lower ERP's radicalism.

Be that as it may, this logic of proportionality and electoral fragmentation can be questioned from the perspective of the intra-ethnic outbidding logic. The intra-ethnic outbidding theory suggests that as a result of proliferation of intra-ethnic competitor parties (eased by the proportional representation conditions in this case) parties would be led to a race to the extreme. (Horowitz 1985). Thus, unlike Newman's logic that the proliferation of parties will open space for varieties of ERPs' policy stances (beyond self-determination), the intra-ethnic outbidding says that on the contrary, the race to the extreme would rise as the number of ERPs grows. This is to say that the higher the electoral fragmentation the higher the number of ERPs, which affects the size of those parties, and implies that the more the number the smaller their size, the higher the radicalism could be expected. Therefore, we hereby challenge those views on the proportionality as conflict mitigator with the intra-ethnic outbidding logic.⁴

⁴ The post-communist societies in general turned towards adopting PR electoral systems (see Chapter 2, Figure 2.4.), and what differs is the size of the electoral unit, the provisions for the minorities or the like. Therefore, instead of addressing the type of electoral system, we would like to directly look at the results of the system in terms of 'proportionality' i.e. electoral fragmentation. Nonetheless, we need to point out that electoral fragmentation does not directly defines 'proportionality' as such, because in both cases of over or under representation of the small parties

Therefore, H2: The higher the electoral fragmentation the more radical ERPs.

With the previous hypotheses we have opened the space for the outbidding theory as opposed to the power-sharing. In the same fashion, we would like to test the competition strategies of ERPs in terms of radicalism as a reflection of intra-ethnic competition in national election.

Namely, the power sharing theory (Lijphart 1984, 2002; Norris 2002) avoids the inter-ethnic competition, by expecting that those parties representing ethnic minorities would be a reflection of the existing demand for ethnic appeals in election, therefore ethnic groups shall be represented in the institutions of power, which is the formula for avoiding inter-ethnic conflict. Nonetheless, the ethnic outbidding model (which until recently has been the sole theoretical response to Lijphart's power-sharing) assumes that (usually large) ethnic groups can be involved in party competition where intra-ethnic party competition strategies prevail and this model makes parties radicalize in order to win majority of their group's votes. The outbidding model reasons that competition between parties addressing the same ethnic group leads to a race to the extreme: each competitor will need to position itself as the most credible representative of minority interests, involving increasingly radical arguments. (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Horowitz, 1985). Therefore, the presence of other ethno-regionalist parties in the same region is likely to trigger an escalation in the radicalization dynamic. (Masseti and Schakel 2013b)

Be that as it may, recent studies have shown that ethnic outbidding is not an inevitable result of competition within the same group, i.e. given the imperfectly ethnically segmented voting behavior and party systems, electoral competition may provide incentives for the moderation of ethnic lines. This novel stream of literature (Candra 2005; Mitchell, Geoffrey and O'Leary 2009; Zuber 2012; Zuber and Szöcsik 2013, 2014; Van Houten 2001; Meguid 2005; Tronconi and Elias 2011; Bocsler and Szöcsik 2013a) begins with the assumption that radical stances are not always triggered by intra-groups outbidding, but there is more than that in the electoral strategies which influence ERPs' behavior.

(ERPs included) we do not speak about proportionality. Thus, we take electoral fragmentation as a proxy to proportionality which shall indicate better odds for representation of the small parties in election.

In this direction, Zuber (2012) presents the theory of nested competition which stands on the premises of party competition in an imperfectly segmented market where some, but not all, parties make offers across ethnic divides and where competition in intra-ethnic arenas is nested within an intra-ethnic arena of party competition. Zuber claims that ethnic politics is an open ending story- not always, in order to maximize votes, ethnic parties should be expected to choose radical over moderate strategies in intra-ethnic competition. Where ethnicity is mobilized, voters' preferences are not intransigent and homogeneous, and in those not perfectly segmented markets at least some parties make offers across the ethnic divide.

This novel theory on 'nested competition' argues that its structure of competition beyond totally segmented market holds incentives for ethnic parties to moderate their positions and can therefore reduce the likelihood of ethnic outbidding, in particular if large mainstream parties which accommodate the demands of ethnic minorities are electorally successful. Ethnic minority parties gain a signal that votes can be gained on moderate end of the spectrum of minority demands. If ethnic parties begin to see mainstream parties as their primary competitors for votes, ethnic outbidding is unlikely to appear as an attractive strategy to regain votes from those willing to vote for a mainstream party.

Zuber's (2012: 940) argument is not to disqualify the conventional theories of ethnic politics, but to show that their empirical applicability to party competition in contemporary democracies where ethnicity is mobilized is limited.

In similar fashion goes Van Houten's argument (2001) that political factors need to be taken into account when explaining variation in the particular nature of demands in assertive regions. Regional party competition is crucial variable in this sense. If a regional politician competes mostly against nationally organized parties, autonomy demands are likely to be restrained, and if competing against regionally organized parties demands will be stronger and possibly include demands for regional tax powers. Behind the logic of the argument that when there is a dominant regional party that competes with national parties, there is an incentive to only demand more control over how to spend revenues obtained from the center, because the demands for tax powers pose problems for maintaining inclusive voter support in the region and undermine the regional party's goal of politicizing a territorial cleavage. By contrast, when there is no

strong national party but only several regional parties in a region, the demands for tax powers are more likely.

Both theories (Van Houten's and Zuber's) go alongside and claim that the competition constellations, or more precisely the type of the main competitor, matters for the radicalization of the party programs of ERPs. The direction is the same, if the main ERP's competitor is a mainstream party, the radicalism of the ERPs is lower than in case of ethnic outbidding. And yet, both recognize that intra-group competition shall instigate radicalism.

Therefore, if the outbidding theory (supported with the nested competition one) holds, we shall expect that intra-group competition shall cause extremism. Given the empirical limitations to directly test the main competitor of each party in election, we opt for testing the intra-ethnic party segregation as an indicator of strong intra-ethnic outbidding.

Consequently, H3: The higher the number of competitive ethno-regionalist parties in election, the more radical ERPs.

Moving forward, when talking about parties' strategies, there is one other very important decision that ERPs, as electoral players, have to make i.e. the coalition bargaining. The decision over the entry in a governmental cabinet is most of the times not theirs to make, as mainstream parties that win absolute votes, do not 'need' them or do not 'want' them as part of their cabinets. In some cases, nonetheless, the very power sharing constellation of political system stipulates that ERPs have to take part of the government, as a conflict prevention. ERPs moreover, appear as coalition partners in governments that do not need, and yet do want them. In spite of the key ideal of political parties to gain votes/seats, parties do not only stop there with their ambitions, but they appear as well as office seekers and have policy making interests. So do ERPs (Strom 1990; Bochslers and Szöcsik 2013b) Nonetheless, at national level, very often ERPs are not strong enough to dictate their policies in a governmental coalition, and therefore the government participation makes them accountable for government policies failures. (Gomez Reino, De Winter and Lynhc 2006: 258)

Bochsler and Szöcsik (2013) claim that the inclusion of minority parties into national governments produces an inherent conflict between pragmatic office-seekers and radical partisans. In minority parties that have governmental responsibilities, the pragmatist view overwhelms, whilst in those parties in opposition, radical voices dominate. So, they show that government inclusion, as the most important element of power sharing arguments, can destroy the political unity of the ethnic minorities and contribute to their radicalization. Tronconi and Elias (2011c) assess that the risks autonomist parties have to take when included in government are just as present as in many coalition building practices that do not necessary involve ERPs. ERPs, whatsoever, lower the secessionist rhetoric when in government. Birnir (2007) as well have tested representation of ethnic groups (the access to government, and the size of the ethnic party in legislature) in relation to extremism expressed through violence. The longer the group has been out of the cabinet, the higher the levels of violence, she proves.

Thus, the next hypotheses, ***H4: ERPs excluded from cabinet tend to radicalize more than those participating in governmental cabinets.***

As an extension to this hypothesis, we would like to see how ethnic outbidding would reflect on ERPs' radicalism when the focus is put on the competition for office rather than simply legislative representation. Therefore, we assume that in cases of an ERP inclusion in government, other parties react more radical than in times where such competitor included in government does not exist. ERPs' inclusion in government provokes radical reaction from other ERPs' competitors. This goes in line, once more, with Birnir's (2007) argument that exclusion from government provokes extremism (even violence). In order to add to the H4 a competitive (outbidding) element, we shall see whether inclusion in government of other ERPs provokes radical reaction from its competitors. The difference between this and the variable in H4 is that in H4 we only consider the inclusion/exclusion from government of the party X (which might be a result of power-sharing agreement, soft-power sharing arrangements (for instance the Macedonian case of gentlemen agreement that the most represented Albanian group in parliament shall be governing coalition partner as well) or any other minority or majority government coalition agreement, while this later variable should measure the competition's inclusion or exclusion in government, which measures in a certain sense outbidding for power rather than for representation.

Therefore, H5: When other ERP competitor has been part of the previous government, ERPs tend to radicalize.

ERPs' internal matters are very often a reason for radicalism of their self-determination demands. In this sense two additional variables shall be added: the leadership change and the age of ERPs.

Party's leadership has much to do with the course a party takes, and the changes it will make accordingly. Personification of politics might be less empirically testable, but very intuitive, nonetheless. We have witnessed dramatic changes in parties' rhetoric as parties' leaders change. Leaders usually change after membership's dissatisfaction with the party's electoral success or policies' direction. We shall therefore expect that these changes might influence changes in ERPs' ideologies as well. It is more likely that the level of radicalism should rise when the party leadership has changed due to electoral failure of the party or failure to be included in government. We could therefore expect that the change of the leaders might explain the change of radicalism between elections.

We pose H6: The change of party's leadership/President triggers radicalization of ERPs' ideology.

In addition, the age of the party might give an insight of the ERPs' behavior. Parties might be able to change their rhetoric due to many reasons, and successful ERPs on the political scene (bigger parties) are more likely to opt for moderate strategies due to the logic of vote maximizing. Nonetheless, the long lasting ERP on the political scene might not even be the ones to have the highest vote/seat share from the ERPs in election, but their raison for existence (claiming higher self-determination for the group they represent) pushes them into radicalization in order to stay true to its cause of existence, and to be able to maintain themselves alive. As many of the policies of the long lasting ERPs have probably been already accomplished, there is no other way but to ask for more self-government for the ethnic group and the region they stand for. In order not to lose its reason of existence, the party might opt for more radical stances in order to keep its electorate. (Massetti and Shackel 2013b)

Bottom line, H7: ERPs tend to radicalize in time.

We have hereby concluded the first set of hypotheses tackling the electoral strategies, provisions and internal-parties' changes as feasible explanatory factors of radicalism. We shall now move to the next set of hypotheses which (together with the final one) shall look at how democratization, marketization and integration processes in the post-communist countries influence ethnic politics.

The second cluster of hypotheses is constituted of two separate variables: **the level of regional authority and the external EU influence/pressure on the Candidate Countries for minority rights respect and decentralization.**

Given the nature of this party family, multilevel politics is of much importance for understanding ideologies and radicalism of its self-determination claims. While the very *raison d'être* for ERPs is the 'region', as a territory where ethnic groups live, the existing level of regional self-government may in large determine ERPs' rhetoric and strategies as well.

Decentralization according to Brancati (2006) has been better ethnic conflict mitigation factor in some democracies than others. While it prevented secession of Quebec from Canada and Basque country from Spain, it did not succeed in countries such as Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia or Nigeria. However, a wide literature is at the position that decentralization helps reducing ethnic conflict and perhaps secession by giving territorially concentrated minority groups control over their own political, social and economic affairs (Lijphart 1977; Horowitz 1991; Kaufman 1996; Stepan 1999). Be that as it may, joining Brancati's (2006) aforementioned suspicion on the alleviative force of decentralization in terms of conflicts prevention, extensive scholarship as well offers counter-arguments suggesting that decentralization fails when it comes to holding countries together. Some, claim that decentralization fails to offer a sense of unity and commitment to decentralized governments (Narang, 1995), others see conflict intensification as a result of the reinforcement of the ethnic identities that are regionally concentrated (Kymlicka 1998).

Then, there is the argument that decentralization fosters secessionism by encouraging groups to desire more and more autonomy until they finally demand complete independence from the state (Hechter 2000) etc. Here, Brancati (2006) adds that the crucial failure of decentralization to reduce ethnic conflict is indeed the boost of the regional parties which further on increase ethnic conflict and secessionism by reinforcing ethnic and regional identities. They produce legislation that favors certain groups over others, and mobilize groups to engage in ethnic conflict and secessionism. Sorens (2012) tests the economic self-rule and the political self-rule as factors for secessionist vote and proves the first one to be negatively related to the secessionism, the latter is positively associated with secessionist vote.

As a sort of continuation to the previous framework of analysis for the introduced hypotheses, Massetti and Schakel (2013b) rely on the 'institutionalist' but also to the 'party competition' perspective and test

decentralization as an explanatory variable of secession. They have tested decentralization both in terms of level of regional authority and in terms of reform, and have then shown that decentralization indirectly fuels secessionism. They, in fact, show that decentralization has differentiated effect on regionalist parties depending on the electoral venue, it radicalizes ERPs at regional level, while it has no effect on ERPs' radicalization in the national electoral arena. The reforms on the regional authority have positive effect on radicalization in both regional and national arenas.

The accommodation thesis have highlighted the strategic nature of decentralization reforms implemented by state-wide parties as a means aimed at, among other things, weakening of the electoral challenge posed by regionalist parties (Rudolf and Thomson 1985; De Winter 1998). ERPs live their *raison d'être* once the most characterizing demands of regionalist parties are accommodated. And yet, if accommodation of regionalist appeals by mainstream parties affect ERPs at national level, they might even gain strength at regional level, as they gain votes as a reward for the success to gain higher level of self-governance. At national level, moreover, accommodation undermines autonomist more than secessionist parties, due to the uneasiness for the mainstream parties to accommodate secession. Therefore Massetti and Schakel's expectations were to find more radical regionalist parties in strongly decentralized context because they considered that there is no reason for regionalist parties to make mild demands if they already enjoy strong degree of decentralization. Moreover, they were expecting the more radical ideologies to unfold immediately after a decentralization reform. Therefore we have two contrasting hypotheses.

H8a: Decentralization moderates ERPs' claims by giving them control over their own political, social and economic affairs.

H8b: Decentralization triggers radicalization of ERPs due to the reinforcement of the ethnic identities through strengthening of the ERPs, whose raison d'être shall only push towards more radicalization.

Decentralization for CEE has been an inseparable process from the European Union enlargement policies. The regional policy has been considered one of the most important policies of EU for the 'old' member states, but the policy itself has been substantial hook for the aspiring countries as well.

Keating (2001) argues that 'the emerging European space provides a new context to the articulation and pursuit of national demands. In a Europe where there is no majority, all nations are in a sense 'minorities', allowing those who are minorities within their own states to project their concerns as part of a wider issue.' Under the slogan 'The Europe of the Peoples', nationalists strive to achieve other ways of realizing nationhood, by circumventing the nation-state. European integration and regionalism are both forces that undermine the nation-states but also represent attempts to create new political arenas at the supranational and subnational level. And while regional interests have found the channel for influence into Europe,⁵ Europe itself makes use of regions for its own policies. ERPs' therefore are considered to be among the least Euro-skeptic ones. (De Winter 1994)⁶.

In relation to the force and the extremism of the regionalist ideologies of ERPs there are two parallel steams of influence coming from the EU accession; one causes extremism in the ethno-regionalist appeals and the other moderation.

Gomez Reino, De Winter and Lynch (2006: 263), conclude that the Europeanization can be conceived as a process of widening the gap between decision makers and regional beneficiaries of European public policies, and thus easily translated into the core argument of autonomist parties of empowering regional communities. The European Integration enhances the political opportunity structure for autonomous parties and offered an opportunity for building up a truly 'European' party family from scratch. It moreover provided an opportunity to overcome large ideological differences, by defining 'traditional' center-periphery grievances as modern European ones. While this 'radical' perspective of the EU integration could be very much applicable to the Western European ERPs, another EU influence, especially targeted towards the post-communist Europe opposes this positive direction between the relationship EU-ERPs' radicalism.

⁵ Keating (1995, 1998, and 2001) elaborates the mechanism of EU which might be used by the autonomist/regionalist parties in the Western European democracies in order to achieve greater self-determination for their regions.

⁶ While some remote peripheral regions were mostly those who opposed the European project in the 1970s, (predominantly the euro-skeptic Scandinavia), already in the mid-1980 there has been a transformation of this opposition into a positive engagement due to the tangible EU mechanism to regions' benefit. Apart from the structural funds aimed at regional development, the Maastricht Treaty for the first time explicitly allows regional (sub-national) ministers to represent their respective states in the Council of Ministers, and moreover with later establishment of the Committee of the Regions. For more on the channels of access see Keating 1995: 1-22, and 1998: 161-183.

Namely, the end of the Cold War forced the Council of Europe's first real foray into the issue with the Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and later on the Charter on Regional and minority languages. (Keating 2001) The EU has intervened more effectively in Candidate Countries making treatment of minorities a condition for membership, stipulated with the Copenhagen Criteria. (Keating, 1998) Even if there is no single binding regime mechanisms for national minorities' protection, there is a great deal of European activity on minority rights. Every EU Progress Report on the Candidate Countries contains special section devoted to the country's progress in minority rights treatment. This could be understood as a pressure for democratization through implementation of human and minority rights in the aspiring countries. Moreover, there is a constant emphasis on the achieved level of decentralization by a polity, which is considered as another indicator of democratization of the candidate country. Decentralization together with minority rights respect are always the right way towards the EU family.

This notion is a breaking point in the reasoning of the EU as ethno-regional radicalizer which shall be sustained by the Jenne's ethnic bargaining theory (2007). Namely, Jenne (2007: 46-7) claims that when a national minority is certain that lacks outside support it is more likely to accommodate the majority, even if it knows that the majority is repressive. On the other hand, if the minority is reasonably confident of outside support, it is likely to radicalize, even if it knows the majority is nonrepressive. These hypotheses imply that external factors have a greater impact on minority behavior than host governments. This is where we presume that the EU pressure on candidate countries in line with minority rights respect (including decentralization) might motivate ethnic minorities to radicalize their claims for self-determination much more in the pre-accession period than after. Ethno-regional minorities see the International Community as an advocate of their rights which support gives them a bargaining potential in the relations with the national governments.

Having in mind that the EU does not monitor those processes after a Candidate Country enters the EU family, we assume that in the pre-accession period (even in the period of stabilization and association) Candidate Countries are under more international pressure which ERPs can use for the purposes of achieving greater self-determination. This expectation could be also supported by the fact that regionalist lobbies are rarely powerful in Brussels on their own, and that when they can work with their governments

they can achieve more. (Keating 1998:170) Thus democratized member states would leave less space for radical inter-ethnic disputes, especially territorial ones. Let alone the fact that the EU tries to resolve those issues before the country gets accepted.

So we expect that the EU membership should have a pacifying role in the inter-ethnic issues, whilst ERPs should make use of the pre-accession period of pressure on nationalizing states, and therefore radicalize.

Finally, H9: ERPs from EU Member States have less radical self-determination claims than those who are not members yet.

We finally reached to the last cluster of hypotheses that have to do with **socio-economic and democratic practices** in the country. We have talked about electoral competition strategies, electoral provisions for representation, decentralization and external pressures, and yet we cannot neglect one crucial aspect of the multi-party free elections- the democratic provisions in a polity for free elections and inclusion of all the interested parts.

Even if we have not included the previous variable in the final set of hypotheses, there is a close connection between the next variable and the EU membership. As it was argued shortly before the very post-communist transition is always under the EU influence, monitoring and pressure. Due to the democratization role we have expected that ERPs would be less prone to radicalization once in the EU. The same logic should follow in constructing the next hypotheses.

Tronconi (2009) concludes that, among other factors, the access to the lists and the media positively affect the ethno-regionalist parties' entry in the legislatures. Therefore we might expect that the very provisions for representation (similar to the logic of proportionality- Lijphart 1994; Newman 1996; Cohen 1997); might mitigate ethnic conflict. And yet, following the very same opposed theory on proportionality, the well-known dynamic of intra-ethnic outbidding in ethnically divided democracies (Horowitz, 1985; Rabushka & Shepsle, 1972; Rothschild, 1981) we should as well expect that such inclusion might instigate radical ideologies in the race to the extreme.

In addition, Saidemen, Lanoue, and Campenni (2002) argue that ethnic protests and rebellions are more likely in democracies than in authoritarian regimes. Again, the logic behind it comes from the intragroup competition that interacts with intergroup competition and causes groups to fear one another and thus to

throw their support behind the most nationalist politicians. They claim that democracies make this kind of process more likely because of the necessity to play to a larger audience, while in authoritarian regimes, leaders may compete with each other for the support of the relevant constituency, but because this constituency is smaller, it is easier to target more specific inducements to prevent the defection of supporters and to attract the other officials' constituents. Appealing to ethnic identities in the second scenario is less necessary, if bribing or coercing a few people is easier to do.

Therefore we have two contrasting expectations for this variable.

H10a: ERPs from liberal democracies at higher level are less radical due to the higher possibility for ERPs' representation.

H10b: ERPs from liberal democracies at higher level are more radical due to the intra-ethnic outbidding possibility for ERPs.

In addition to democracy, we shall look at the classical variable tested as a factor for ethno-regionalist extremism- the economy. Nonetheless, while very much discussed and obviously important element of party politics, the economic variable seems to be failing many scholars that have made attempts to test it quantitatively. Tronconi (2009) have demonstrated that in Western Europe, the more dynamic regional economy (measured as better GDP per capita) goes in favor of ERPs' success. That is to say, the relatively rich regions are in favor of successful ERPs. Sorens (2009), on the other hand, failed to prove that economic differentials have explanatory power of regionalist vote at world level. He nonetheless, proved as well that in advanced democracies secessionism comes from minority identity plus economic interest in robust autonomy or independence, while regionalism comes from minority identity without economic interest in robust autonomy or independence. That is to say, economically more advanced regions boost radicalization.

While the two opposing theories on economic growth and ERPs proliferation depend on the regional relative prosperity (Deutsch 1953; Hechter 1975; Rokkan and Urwin 1993; Connor 1994) we shall test another aspect of the economic growth which is country level economic fortune.⁷

⁷ The reason for us to omit testing the relative regional growth as factor of ERPs's radicalization is the difficulty of acquiring regional level economic data for CEE. The reasons are twofold. Firstly, the different nature of the ethnic regions under analysis for this dissertation (starting from municipalities, set of municipalities, autonomous regions,

Saidemen, Lanoue and Campenni (2002) test the GDP per capita at country level in order to find an explanation of the higher level of ethnic protests or violent conflicts. They agree with (Lipset, 1991) that conflict may be more severe in poorer countries than in rich ones. Rich countries may be able to buy off ethnic conflict; poor countries are less able to accommodate demands. Conflict is also more likely when the economy is in decline. Economic downturns cause people to lose their jobs, put pressure on politicians, and force the government to divide a smaller pie. Consequently, in bad economic times, people are more likely to blame other ethnic groups for their problems, and we should expect more strife during such periods. Saidemen, Lanoue and Campenni (2002) empirically test this hypothesis and discover that economic development reduces ethnic conflict and that a country's level of economic development matters much more than how well that country has been doing lately. Although the wealth of a host country (GDP per capita) does not influence the level of protest, groups in richer countries engage in less violence. These factors whatsoever do not distinguish between groups within a country, because they account for how well the country is doing as a whole. Birnir (2007), in line with Lipset (1959 a,b, and 1991) joins the previous arguments and supports the idea that modernization alleviates violence, and that wealthier countries are able to buy off ethnic conflicts. That is to say, the increment of the GDP per capita is significantly associated with lowering violence.

Therefore, H11: The economic development of a country decreases the radicalism of the self-determination claims by ERPs.

We finally reach the point of closing the third set of hypotheses by adding a variable which shall measure the level of corruption and test it against the odds for ERPs to be radical. For the purpose of building the theoretical bases for this final hypothesis we will hold to Nye's (1967) cost-benefit analysis on corruption

federal units or the like) prevents us from gathering comparable data, as such statistics are not always available, nor existing in all the countries. But even if we are willing to elaborate regional data and derive information for the relative growth of all the types of territorial entities under analysis we come to the obstacle of lacking such regional economic data. The EUROSTAT data bases for instance only have such regional information for the EU Member States, and the time-range is only after 2000. Our initial attempt to gather such relevant regional data ended up with cutting our regressions cases to only 35. Therefore, we shall exclude the variable relative regional economic wealth from the analysis.

and political development which is built in order to react against the purely moralistic approach on corruption that sees the phenomenon as 'evil'.

Nye (1967) elaborates arguments that judge corruption as beneficial for developing countries. The improvement of the governmental capacity is among the three main possible benefits from corruption he offers. The assumption is that a society's political structures will be more able to cope with change and preserve their legitimacy if the members share a sense of community from the perspective of elite integration seems. Corruption may help overcome divisions in a ruling elite that might otherwise result in destructive conflict. In addition, Nye argues that the weakness of the institutions in developing countries, as well as the fragmentation of power in a country reduces the governmental capacity. At the local level patronage and corruption was factor of decline of governmental capacity in East Africa, but corrupt material incentives may provide the glue for resembling sufficient power to govern.

Corruption can bridge the gap between the groups based on power and those based on wealth that appeared in the early nationalist period. He adds that the governmental capacity can be increased by creating of supporting institutions such as political parties. Financing political parties tends to be a problem in developed as well as less developed countries, and therefore corruption in financing of political parties may help governmental capacity.

Nye concludes that in developing countries it is probable that the costs will exceed benefits of corruption except for top level corruption involving modern inducement and marginal deviations and except for situations where corruption provides the only solution to an important obstacle of development. (Nye 1967: 427)

Holding to the previously introduced argument that ethno-regionalist parties deal with the same challenges as other mainstream parties when in government (Elias and Tronconi 2011c), we can expect that ethno-regionalist parties in government might as well be more prone to corruption and thus eventually be less radical in their self-determination demands.

And yet, while we could test this variable under the first cluster of hypotheses (where we search for answers from the electoral strategies), the lack of precise empirical indicators of ethnic corruption forces us to put this variable in the general country level variables cluster.

The final hypotheses testing whether corruption might be the glue for ethno-regionalist cleavages follows:

H12 is: Corruption decreases the level of radicalism of ERPs.

While along with economic development culture is considered to be one of the classical explanatory variables of ethnic conflict/ secession, cultural variables (such as language or religion) are not included in the quantitative part of the dissertation. The reason for that is the fact that this dataset already addresses exclusively ethno-regional groups culturally different one from each other. Be that as it may, Chapter 2 contains a descriptive comparison of the cultural characteristics (linguistic and religious in particularly) of the national minorities in CEE.

In conclusion, this dissertation can be put under the theoretical umbrella framework of party competition/rational choice analysis. Therefore three main sets of factors have been included: the ERPs' party competition strategies, the effect of decentralization and the external factors, and finally the socio-economic and democratic country constellations.

The literature review on ERPs is certainly not exhausted with this introductory part. What we can use from this glimpse into the state of art of the ethno regionalism in Europe is the notion of diversification in research questions and perspectives on the conceptualization of the family as such. ERPs in Europe can be considered as one whole family, no matter the perspective we take to analyze them later on (as niche, mainstream or anti-regime parties) only after we have stretched the two concepts of 'ethnic' and 'regional'. That is to say, the previously elaborated conceptualization of both of them have demonstrated that 'ethnic' and 'regional' are socially constructed categories and they are elastic enough to offer us some reassurance that the 'entropy resistant categories' may all be named as ethnic while they may all be constructed by different attributes (Chandra 2012). Moreover, they may aspire different level of self-determination and governance from group identity protection to independence, but they shall all be territorially concentrated in 'a region' which does not always fulfil the same function across country cases (Keating 1998).

While this elasticity of the conceptual lather of abstraction is welcomed for the moment, further on in this thesis we shall go back to addressing the variation of the terminology used for CEE ethno-regional groups, the function of the regions and the level of self-determination demands they have in each country, with the latest being the main dependent variable of the thesis.

Chapter 1.2.4. The added value for the literature (Why?)

Not much quantitative comparative research covering contextual explanatory variables and ERPs' ideology extremism has been done. Masseti and Schakel (2013b) and Zuber and Szocsik, (2015) offer large N analyses in order to explain the territorial dimension of ERPs' radicalization, but, only the later includes parties from CEE in the models of analyses. Several data bases offer information on the ERPs ideologies in terms of spatial politics, and some more in depth reference to issue salience Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) (Hooghe et al. 2010), the Minorities at Risk (MAR) (2009), the Comparative Party Manifesto Project (CMP) (Volkens et al. 2006 and 2010), or the **EPAC-dataset on Ethnonationalism in Party Competition** (Szöcsik and Zuber 2012), yet, they all lack either ERP cases, or issues coding of specific ERPs' relevance (Protsyk and Garaz 2011). Therefore, the added value of this work will be in several instances.

Firstly, this work will embrace parties that have never been taken into consideration in previous works mostly due to their small size. This means that parties that have been omitted by the CMP or CHES, due to the small number of seats in national legislature or failure to win any, will be considered.

Secondly, the time span of elections for each country is the same. All available data on ERPs' ideological positions since the first democratic elections of the new nation-state up until 2015 will be taken into observation. The EPAC dataset unfortunately, no matter how reliable in terms of expertise and inclusive in terms of Europe-wide cases and countries, is restricted in the time-span for which it provides information; it is limited to the most recent elections as of 1 June 2011. Therefore, we do not have information on eventual radicalism change of ERPs' ideology in time. Although not all electoral cycles can be covered for some parties (due to lack of available documents) and we cannot rely on a time-series analytical tools, the final number of party/elections cases is still higher than the EPAC dataset.

Thirdly, even before combining all the variables in quantitative models, this work shall offer a wide descriptive analysis of the post-communist ERPs proliferation, electoral success, leadership changes, and radicalization of ideology of ERPs within a country, which some authors had already addressed in works on post-communist party politics, (Kostecky 2002; Lewis 2000; Stoyarova and Emerson 2010) but they are now outdated.

Fourthly, the very operationalization of the concept of radicalism of the self-determination demands by the ERPs in CEE, together with the description on the parties life span and history, shall offer not only a better picture on the positions and success of the ERPs within countries, but a general comparative framework on CEE ethno-regionalism as well. Finally, the quantitative models shall test already existing theories on ideology extremism of ERPs with, so far, most extensive cross-national and cross-temporal analysis at CEE level. Again, this should not be confused with the empirical method used in this dissertation which does not rely on time-series cross-section analysis because of the lack of consistency in time measurement for most of the party cases.

Chapter 1.3. Research design: Data and Methodology (when and where?)

While the main goal of the thesis is to empirically test already existing theories on radicalism of the self-determination claims of the ERPs in CEE, a large descriptive work shall be done on the party family itself as well as on several democratization determinants in 19 countries of CEE. This sub-chapter covers the unit of analysis, the level and the timespan, the case selection process, data and operationalization of the dependent variable.

Chapter 1.3.1. Unit of analysis: the election level and timespan

The unit of analysis in this dissertation is party's ideology in a given election. The measurement of the dependent variable 'radicalism of the ERPs' self-determination demands' shall be done through assessing the extremism of ERP's position towards self-determination in the party manifesto used for that particular election. The empirical comparative work shall be done for national level elections in the time frame of twenty five years post-communism of CEE (1990-2015).

Multilevel-politics brings the necessity to look at parties as multidimensional players. In this sense it would be reasonable to compare ERPs' self-determination claims at national and regional level due to their very nature of being representatives of a certain territorial unit within nation-state borders. Yet, although Central

and Eastern Europe has been going through institutional changes for the purpose of democratization and one of these processes has been decentralization, not all CEE countries have middle (regional) level of government. This fact limits the preferable multilevel elections comparison between country-cases for the whole set of CEE countries.

Comparing local level elections between countries, and even among ethnic groups in a country, is also very problematic because local level elections focus primarily on the election of Mayors, and then on the Local Councils. More so because the campaign usually apply single party's different strategies across different local units. Even if we ambitiously try to make such a large data base and analyze local level campaigns we will encounter two challenges: firstly, the lack of existing electoral programs at local level, to a greater extent due to the common personification of local politics, and then is the issue of having mostly local level issues campaigns which will probably diminish the self-determination rhetoric of ERPS. Therefore, party ideology change at different levels, while very important and extremely interesting subject, it is not what this dissertation aims to look at.

Thus, national elections shall provide us with the information on the 'ownership' of the ethno-regionalist issue for the certain party and the level of extremism in demanding greater self-government powers from the central government. This also suggests that the ERPs reason of existence is justifiable at national level, which reassures us as well of the justifiability of our decision to do national level analysis of ERPs' self-determination claims.

The time span for the national elections under study is from the CEE's first free multiparty elections to the year of 2015 (25 years) (see Table 1. Chapter 2). The number of elections varies between countries and the number of cases per party and per country as well.⁸

⁸ A notion to the number of selected cases: the first independent elections of Czechoslovakia are taken into consideration separately, i.e. the Moravian parties of Czech Republic and the Hungarian parties of Slovakia are assessed at national level (not at Federal). Moreover, Montenegro and Kosovo (under the 1224 resolution), on the other hand are included since the declaration of independence of these countries from Federation of Yugoslavia (later on Serbia and Montenegro).

Chapter 1.3.2. Case selection and Data

The case selection for this comparison follows two criteria: the first one is that the party is an ERP (according to the operational definition introduced previously in this chapter), and the second one is that this party has gained at least one seat in national Parliaments in the period of 25 years of democratic elections in CEE. The analysis encompasses 17 from the 19 CEE countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, and Ukraine. The Hungarian and the Italian representatives in national legislature in Slovenia have been excluded from the analysis due to the special units of individual candidate competition arranged by the Slovenian electoral system, which hampers the possibilities for manifestos' assessment in terms of ideology. Hungary's unique ethnic parties in national parliament are the Roma parties but, due to their non-territorial ethnic appeals, they are being excluded from this models as were from all the rest of the Roma parties in CEE.⁹

Why party manifestos? Party manifestos clearly determine the position of a party at each election, the estimation based on information that comes from an "internal" document that was approved by the party is considered as valid indicator of the positions of parties regarding certain domains of public policy at given point of time. It is an official position of the party that in spite of the fact that the source of the policies are in the party elite, it is usually approved by the membership, and it is not even unusual that before elections the document should be formally approved by the majority of the party members. (Budge at all. 2001) Therefore, programmatic changes can be observed over parties' lifetimes. (Alonso, Volkens, Gomez 2012; Alonso 2012)

In spite of the suspicions coming from some scholars who argue that no voter ever reads a program, we know that the mass media communicate the contents of programs during election campaigns and inform

⁹ Roma ethnic group, as Kymlica (2001) and Auer (2004:43) pointed out, is unique and its position in the societies of Central Europe is difficult to classify. They do not fit into established categories, some argue that they do not constitute an ethnic, let alone a national minority, because they have no common homeland, and are widely dispersed throughout the world. This has direct political consequences, since many states are only willing to grant certain rights to national minorities rather than ethnic groups. Auer (2004:43) also points out the problem of classification of ethnic (or any other) groups. Moreover, Minorities at Risk (2016) dataset classifies Roma people as ethno class, while the most minority groups in the countries of the post-communist states are named national minorities.

voters on subsequent actions deviating from programmatic pledges, moreover the public debates are usually based on the initial party programs. (Alonso 2012) And this fact offers reassurance of the validity of the sources used for measuring radicalism of ERPs' radicalism of self-determination demands for this research.

In total, 328 cases of party manifestos make the population of the ERP family for the purpose of this dissertation (the parties that comply with the two criteria mentioned previously for case selection); 61% of them have been analyzed here. Those 328 cases come from 90 ERPs in 17 countries, out of which 72 parties (80%) have been analyzed through at least one manifesto/electoral year.

From Figure 1.1. we can see that among the parties with highest number of ERPs are Bosnia and Herzegovina (13), Ukraine, Montenegro, Kosovo (11) and Macedonia (10). From the other side Bosnia and Herzegovina (11), Ukraine (10) and Macedonia (9), are among those whose party cases have been coded in this work. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Ukraine and Serbia together make somewhat more than 50% of the party cases population, and 47% of the coded sample. From Figure 1.2. we can see the frequencies of the party manifestos included in the final analyses in this study as opposed to the total cases that ideally make the population.

From Figure 1.3. it is clear that 11 out of 17 countries are 100% coded regarding ERPs. That is to say, all of the ERPs within a country have been coded for at least one electoral manifesto/election. Kosovo, Estonia, Montenegro, Albania, Lithuania, and Czech Republic are represented with less than 50 % of the ERPs within a country. Figure 1.4 on the other hands shows that cases from Slovakia, Latvia and Croatia are 100% included in the dataset, while 65% from the cases of Kosovo, 67% from Estonia, 64% from Montenegro hasn't been included.

The principal issue when trying to gather data from this party family is the small party size. The fact that these parties have small membership and elite, makes them mostly dependent on their leader's public rhetoric that may stay undocumented, especially in the first decade of post-communism when the internet was in its dawn. While the western democracies may have regular intervals of issuing electoral programs, this is not always the case in the democratizing societies, especially for the small parties such are ERPs.

Worth mentioning is that many of these parties have been campaigning in conflict or post-conflict periods (such as the Serbian parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina, or Croatia after the dissolution of Yugoslavia). Therefore, in spite of the ideological position one could assume obvious for a party, there is no written proof of its official positions.

By usually entering in pre-electoral coalitions, these parties very often 'go with the flow' of a mainstream party platform and neglect to issue their individual party program at election. While the original party platforms might stay unchanged the electoral party platform of the joint coalition campaign is normally a reflection of the biggest party in the coalition. Sometimes ERPs do not even have the assumed coalition bargaining power because of their insufficient power to overcome certain electoral provisions (such as high threshold, numerous electoral etc.) and obtain representation individually. In cases such this ERPs only adopt the political platform of the grand coalition and do not present special party program at election.

Be that as it may, assessing the radicalism of the parties from the party manifestos has still higher analytical value than, for instance, content analysis of media reports or interviews from party representatives. To begin with, the leaders' statements may in many cases be driven by the inertia of the 'daily politics', and they may not even be in line with the party elite or the membership's stances. Secondly, assessing all the campaign rhetoric from the media is a vast project that for the time period of twenty five years is nearly impossible to be done due to lack of data kept for this period. Then, this party family (usually due to the small size) attracts less media attention in comparison to the mainstream parties, which makes any kind of analysis based on media documentation somewhat less worthwhile and methodologically unjustifiable.

Finally, manifestos' can be assessed in terms of issue salience and ownership, as well as spatial theory. (Budge, Crewe and Farlie 1976) This type of analysis can disclose important elements in terms of party 'rhetoric' which may go beyond the direct indication on the dependent variable, yet it may indicate positions that cannot be found in public speeches or media reports or interviews and can be read as indicators of their radicalism.

Figure 1.1. ERPs in CEE by country: included (sample) vs. population of party cases.




Figure 1.2. ERPs' manifestos in CEE: included vs. population of party*election cases.




Figure 1.3. Percentage of the coded (included) party cases by country.





Figure 1.4. Percentage of the coded (included) party manifesto cases by country.



For instance (as we will later on see in the analysis) a party manifesto, while maybe not radical in terms of explicit self-determination claims, may disclose certain autonomist or irredentist aspirations within the positive references to ethno-regional groups' kin-states, certain international organization, or by the avoidance of making unequivocal reference to the territorial sovereignty of the nationalizing state.

Thus, if only focusing on the explicit determination of the word secession, independence, federalization or autonomy, one may get deluded and make inferences on the party manifesto's positions towards self-determination extremism which could be misleading and sometimes very wrong.

Chapter 1.3.3. Operationalization of the dependent variable “Radicalism of the Self-Determination Claims”

The (level of) radicalism of ERPs' self-determination claims in national elections' campaigns is the dependent variable of this empirical comparative research. But what do we mean by radicalism. How do we operationalize this concept?

When talking about radicalism of ERPs' self-determination demands, we indirectly talk about typologies of ERPs. Therefore, the very process of operationalizing the dependent variable would start with the existing typologies of ERPs, by climbing up (or going down) on the ladder of abstraction.

Sartori (1970) points out that the logic of graduation belongs to the logic of classification. Classes are required to be mutually exclusive. Two items being compared must belong first to the same class, and either have or not have an attribute; and only if they have it, the two items can be matched in terms of which one has more or less of it. More precisely put, the switch from classification to graduation basically consists of replacing the signs “same-different” with the signs “same-greater-lesser”, i.e., consists of introducing a quantitative differentiation within a qualitative sameness (of attributes). Clearly, then the sign “same” established by the logic of classification is the requisite condition of introducing the sign “plus-minus”. Be that as it may, we need to be aware that the more we enter the stage of quantification, the more we need uni-dimensional scales and continua. Dichotomous categorizations serve precisely the purpose of

establishing the ends, and thereby the uni-dimensionality, of each continuum. The higher the discriminating power of a category the better the information.

Thus, the variable constructed to measure the level of radicalism of the ERPs radicalism will rely on categories that are already used in the literature. We will recognize them when explaining ERPs typologies and ideological positions. The variable is categorical/ordinal and indicates whether a manifesto contains party aspirations for secession, federalization, regional autonomy/wide decentralization, municipal autonomy/local self-government or protectionism towards certain cultural identity. The highest level of radical stances is the level of seeking independence/secessionism/irredentism, and the lowest is protectionism of the groups' identity.

Despite of the vast literature on ethnic conflicts and the increasing scholarship on ERPs, not many authors have really addressed the notion of "ethnic appeal". Gadjanova (2012) suggests a typology of political demands made on behalf of ethnic communities in multicultural democracies. She detects ethnic appeals to: centralization, rejection of multiculturalism and minority rights/strong central government, reconciliation with other groups, strong minority, language rights, affirmative action in representation or employment, multiculturalism, group equality, protest/boycott, decentralization, strong autonomy, territorial rights, political autonomy, group rights, violent opposition, and secession. We can notice that the typology of 'identity' party rhetoric in political campaigns goes in a certain sense from pro-system to anti-system.

Nonetheless, the dependent variable's operationalization is driven from a careful literature review on ideology and extremism. Figure 1.5. (In Appendix I) contains chronologically presented summary of the typologies and measurements of ERPs' appeals regarding self-determination. Here a short elaboration shall be made.

Rokkan and Urwin (1983) offered five types of ERPs, based on ERPs self-determination constitutional autonomy goal: peripheral protest to a concern for peripheral identity building, regional autonomy, federalism, confederalism, and full independence. Similarly, Muller-Rommel (1994), distinguishes four types of ERPs according to the strength of their relative nationalist tendencies (ranging from high to low). To start with, Separatists (explicitly reject the authority of the political institutions of the nation state and ask

for national self-determination on the grounds of an own government within an independent state); Left-libertarian (their ultimate goal is independent region within the framework of a federal Europe of Peoples and not of the existing (political) states); Autonomists (they demand sufficient recognition of the historic rights of the people in the region, but subsequently accept the state of autonomy within a nation state on the understanding that their historic rights would be re-asserted when practicable; They favor integral federalism and seek the fullest application of their autonomous status within the framework of the nation-state without calling for revolutionary changes). And finally, Protectionists, they need to maintain the link between minority or even majority ethnic groups in the periphery and the nation state (the center). They are against separatism and isolation but instead support the mainstream political life of their community.

For De Winter (1998) the defining characteristic of the ERPs' programmes is undoubtedly their demand for political recognition of existing power structure for some kind of "self-government". His classification is based on the radicalism of the demands made for self-government. The first class of parties which do not demand independence are the Protectionist: parties argue that the segment of population they represent is of unique character. Thus, they demand from the center that measures that can guarantee the preservation and development of this cultural identity within the framework of the existing state be taken. Claims such as: recognition of regional language as the official language of the region, bilingual status for the region, quotas for members of minorities to be employed in the state offices etc. can be heard. The second class is the so called Autonomist Parties. They accept power-sharing between the existing central government and their region, provided that theirs is threatened differently from other territorial entities within the state; they demand greater autonomy for their region only.

National-federalist Parties on the other hand want to acquire a degree of self-government through the recognition of the unitary state into a federal state. This is more radical because the power is devolved all regions in the country. And then there are another two classes of parties who seek separation of the region from the existing state: the Independentist parties (seeking full political independence of their region) and the Irredentist Parties (aiming at breaking away from the state to which they belong, but also favor annexation of their region to another nation-state with a similar cultural identity.) The centrality of this demand distinguishes this type of party from other party 'families'.

Janne (2007) considers ERPs' ideologies on a scale which has the "inside of the state framework" and the "outside of the state framework" as two extremes of the scale. Under the two clusters of ERPs' ideologies, five types are classified: those who struggle for affirmative actions, those who fight for cultural autonomy, those who claim territorial autonomy, and finally the ones that want secession or have irredentist ideology.

Dandoy and Sandri (2008) admit that the problem of the empirical comparison of ethno-regionalist parties with parties belonging to other party families is the one of the existence and the coherence of the regionalist family. Thus, they speak of six types of ERPs classified on bases of the dimension of the autonomy: protectionist, autonomist, national-federalist, independentist, irredentist, and rattachist. Partly relying on previous attempts at building typologies,

Dandoy (2010), suggests a renewed classification of ethno-regionalist parties in Western Europe. He investigates the nature and variety of the demands and claims that ethno-regionalist parties all over Europe articulate, and offers classification of these demands into larger and common categories. Focusing particularly on the two extreme types when positioning the parties on a dimension of the strength of the demands regarding the preferred state structure, he demonstrated the importance of the protectionist parties (soft demands) and secessionist parties (strong or radical demands) in such typology. Nonetheless, the purpose of these typologies stays the same: to facilitate the understanding of a party 'family' that looks very diverse and whose members have sometimes opposite electoral and political destinies.

The analysis of the electoral manifestos reveals that the centrality of these claims and this vision, ideology or the radicalism of their demands is the best division line between the ERPs. The seven types of parties he speaks about at this point, (protectionist, autonomist, federalist, confederalist, independentist, irredentist, and rattachist) derive from ERPs' demands for recognition, preservation of access, participation authority, powers for one region authority, powers in a federal framework authority, powers in a confederal framework, independence, independence (including neighboring territories) or joining neighboring state.

In this trend, Massetti's (2009) categories of regionalist parties' ideologies go from "Non secessionist" on one side to "secessionist parties" on the other. From the Figure 1.5 (In Appendix I) we can see how all of the concepts, measurements and classifications presented in the literature review section sum up with

Masseti and Schakel's classification of moderate vs. radical classification which is used as a first operationalization of the dependent variable. Under the two types of Moderate parties and Radical parties, Massetti (2009) does another sub-classification of: Moderate autonomists, Assertive autonomists, Ambiguous, Strongly committed, Extremists (by violent means). In their empirical analysis on how decentralization reforms influence the ideology radicalism, Massetti and Schakel (2013 a,b) use the four categories of: Protectionist (demanding regional autonomy to preserve regional language and culture), Federalist (seeking to enhance a maximum level of regional self-government), Ambiguous (when they are ambiguous in its formulation) and Separationist parties (when they openly and clearly formulate that they are separationists).

It intuitively comes in mind that the first classification is born just from looking at the extremes of the demands of ERPs for self-determination. The lowest level of demand for those ethnically/nationally concentrated groups living within borders of a nation-state (or nationalizing state) with ethnic majority different than the one we are talking about would be to claim the right to be recognized as different cultural/ethnic/regional group. The highest level of demand would be to break away the territory and live in another nation state. The manner in which they want to realize this ideal varies, and moreover gives them another attribute for typology. Namely, those parties might have ideals to just split from the nation-state and form a new one, they might want to join to another state or to include another neighboring state to its territory.

For Hepburn, (2010) the autonomy strategies spread parties on a scale from unitarism to separatism. Unitarism is claimed when full integration of a territory within a state, where no recognition of cultural, political or economic distinctiveness is aimed at (none of the sub-state parties advocates it). Unionism- means that the unity of the state shall be maintained, the power is to the center, no constitutionally recognized identities of minority nations to prevent them of threatening the integrity of the state exist, but, administrative or educational recognition can be accepted. In Devolution, decentralization of administrative or legislative powers to a specific sub state territorial unit, but purely for a certain region is present. Federalism in terms of transforming a unitary or devolved state into a federal state, and Independence when full separation of the region from the rest of the country is demanded.

Szöcsik (2012) as well offers a measurement of positions political actors have on ethnic issues along sub-dimensions. She puts the minority language use, the education in and of the minority language, and the territorial subnational authority as the most important sub-dimensions parties refer to. The minority language can vary from the one extreme where it can only be used in private space to where it is an official second state language; the positions on education can go from education of and in the minority language, from one side, to separate university for the minority from the other side; Unitary, centralized state versus Secession or irredentism can be seen in the positions regarding territorial dimension.

Zuber and Szöcsik (2015) on the other hand, are trying to explain the extremism of ethnonational minority parties in Europe position parties according to how much congruence they seek between the boundaries of the ethnonational group and the boundaries of the political unit. The most extreme position a minority party can occupy is a position in favor of separating the minority region from the common multinational state through secession, constituting a new nation state where the former minority would gain the status of the titular nation. The other extreme is where majority nationalists seek hegemony within the current state they define as their nation-state. Moderate parties of the middle ground seek a common state, in which no single ethno-national group dominates over another.

If looking carefully again in the Figure 1.5. (Appendix I), we come to the conclusion that the sharpest division of categories that might be also considered in an ordinal scale are: protectionist, autonomist, federalist and secessionist. While the protectionist one includes the appeals for cultural autonomy, the federalist one includes those who prefer symmetrical federalization, ethnically asymmetrical one, and the confederation appeals, so to finally encompass all the regional independence ideals for the purpose of secession, irredentism or rattachism what so ever.

There is, nonetheless, a need for a further fine tuning of this operationalization. Namely, after the first attempt of categorization of the party manifestos, the category of autonomist becomes problematic from the perspective of regional assertiveness and function. That is to say, the very category of autonomists considers two slightly different appeals towards a territorial autonomy. The first one is the one that can be easily compared with the region of a western type of conceptualization, a region which may have the territorial, human and functional capacity for middle level of self-government, and eventually independence.

The second one is the aspiration for territorial changes in order for a national minority to obtain power at local level, which may assume new municipal borders, or simply more functional decentralization before de-concentration of power and resources. Thus, in the scale of radicalization we will introduce two separate categories of autonomist parties, the ones that seek for a municipal autonomy and the ones that seek for a regional autonomy.

In conclusion the dependent variable in this thesis shall be measured by five ordinal categories: Protectionist, Autonomist-Municipal, Autonomist-Regional, Federalist and Secessionist. Given the fact that the modeling of the empirical research of categorical variables is usually through logistical regressions of the separate categories as dichotomous variables, we can conclude that each category may serve as a separate dummy variable. This operationalization also allows us to 'play' with the categories and construct wider categories such the "moderates" constructed of the protectionist and the two autonomist (municipal and regional) categories, and the "radicals" where the federalist and the secessionist parties will stand together.

Chapter 1.3.4. Specification of the method of categorization of the party manifestos

Unlike the Comparative Party Manifesto Project (Volkens, 2010), the Regional Manifesto Project (Alonso, Gomez, Cabeza and Volkens 2012), or Basile's (2016) coding of the party manifestos, in this dissertation 'coding' does not mean a quantitative content analyses i.e. coding quasi-sentences and calculating the percentage of representation of a certain issue within a party platform. A rather denominative coding will be used in this thesis, which shall indicate whether the narrative of a given party manifesto belongs to one of the five categories measuring the dependent variable. Therefore, when we say coding, for the purpose of this dissertation, we in fact mean categorization.

What has been done so far regarding data gathering with respect to radicalism? Why not using already existing measures and coding?

Datasets, such as the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) (Hooghe et al. 2010), the Minorities at Risk (MAR) (2009), the Comparative Party Manifesto Project (CMP) (Volkens et al. 2006 and 2010), or the **EPAC-dataset on Ethnonationalism in Party Competition** (Szöcsik and Zuber 2012), all contain quantitative data on national minorities, and political parties. Nevertheless, The CHES and MR do not contain the necessary data (questions) to measure radicalism of ERPs' self-determination demands, moreover there are countries of interest for this thesis that are lacking in these datasets.

The CMP on the other hand might seem compatible with my work's direction. It analyzes party manifesto's diversification of policies and it provides us with the information of the intensity of the issues. But the fact that the choice of the relevant ethno-regionalist parties included in the dataset is left to the responsibility of the national coding team, affects directly the representation of the ERP family, i.e. many ERPs of importance for my research has been excluded from the dataset due national team's decision that they lack importance.

So, the improved proposal for measuring ethnic appeals in this dataset by Protsyk and Garaz (2011) or the already provided Ethnoregionalist Index by Gadjanova (2013), albeit very useful in terms of methodology, turn to be of a low value for this research due to lack of representation of the important ERPs in Europe.

The EPAC by Zuber and Szöcsik (2012) is consisted from questions tackling different dimensions of the ethnic-minorities appeals, from education to territorial autonomy, but the latest is the one closest to the previously seen classifications in literature. The territorial question has seven possible levels of radicalism starting from the lowest level unitary state, to gradually measure up to claims for annexation of the national minority region. The dataset covers positions on ethno-nationalism of 210 parties in 22 European democracies, and the (gradual) operationalization of the territorial dimension is very useful for empirical testing, and yet the invariance in time of the cases limits its benefit for the purpose of this dissertation.

Masseti and Schakel (2013a,b) contribute with an original dataset on regionalist parties as well. They only consider regionalist parties, excluding 'ethnic non-territorial' and 'territorial but not regionalist' parties and independent candidates. Therefore they focus exclusively on those political actors that make demands for more devolution of powers from the center to the periphery. The focus of this dataset is on established

Western democracies, where the ethno-regionalists' "struggle" has been conducted almost exclusively in the ballot boxes.

Therefore, the method of analysis of the manifesto and its coding/categorization is by reading the whole content of the document, underlining all the notions on the issue of self-determination and seeking for the appeals of a highest level; that is to say, categorizing a party platform as protectionist, autonomist municipal, autonomist regional, federalist or secessionist according to the appeal of the highest rank. When no higher degree of self-determination claim is present in the manifesto's content, we can conclude that it is party X's position. So, if a party X does not claim any form of territorial self-government pretensions, we can classify the party in the given election as protectionist. If party X claims some sort of self-determination from a territorial perspective, we shall see whether these appeals refer to a local level of government/municipal self-government, some historic region's autonomy, federalization or secession.

Thus, in an imagined case of a party claiming federalization appeals for a certain historic region where the group it claims it represents lives we categorize that party as federalist. In case the same party manifesto contains other references to decentralization, regional or local, we 'neglect' the fact and we stick to the higher level of self-determination, in this case federalization. This is, nonetheless, only an introduction to the method used to 'code' manifestos, or better said to 'determine' ERPs' level of radicalism for self-government. In Chapter 4 a much thorough elaboration regarding ERPs' ideology will be presented.

We hereby conclude this first introductory chapter hoping that we have been able to offer an introduction into the research questions and hypotheses, the State of Art and a glimpse into the literature review on ERPs in general, in addition, we have been presented to the data and the method of analyses, the case selection and the basis for the operationalization of the dependent variable 'the radicalism of the self-determination demands' by the ERPs. The concrete analysis of the manifesto's and the quantitative analysis testing the hypotheses of this dissertation will be connected to the next Chapter 2 where a more closer look into the concept of Central and Eastern Europe will be offered, and the issue of the frail nation states *vis a vis* the entropy resistant cultures will be tackled (including the issues of democratization of the CEE, post-communist legacy in terms of ethno-cultural diversity, and visual mapping of the potential self-government initiatives by regionally concentrated national minorities).

CHAPTER 2. SCOUTING CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE: IDENTITIES BETWEEN NATION-STATE BUILDING, DEMOCRATIZATION, MARKETIZATION AND INTEGRATION

'Tva' vla'da, lide se k tobe navratila!' (People, your government has returned to you!)

(Va'clav Havel 1990)

Quarter of a century has passed since Eastern Europe left communism behind. "How far behind communism has stayed" is just another way of asking "at what stage of democratization are those countries today".

In the aftermath of 1989, as socioeconomic modernization advanced, the 'end of history' in the meaning of inevitable democratization of the world (Fukuyama, 1992) seemed certain. The fall of the communist rule in Eastern Europe was mostly done by popular action or by changes initiated by the very communist regimes that have eventually led to their own demise. (Gros and Steinherr 2004). Within two or three years, the project of democracy building, albeit very optimistically accepted in the first years of the communism collapse in Eastern Europe, gave away to greater realism about the complexity of the process. (Hill 1994:267) The fragile democratic institutions were to withstand the everyday pressures they were subject to, the market economy was to be restored, and the rule of law was expected to become the new game in town.

In order to overcome the economic crisis the post-communist governments manifestly looked to the West for economic aid and assistance. (Hill 1994:179) Post-communist Europe started 'transiting' accepting either the 'big-bang' shock therapy or the 'gradual' approach towards economic restructuring. (Gros and Steinherr 2004) Political and social transformations went hand in hand with the restoration of the market economy. Houghton (2007) argues that politics in the CEE entered a new era after meeting the challenges of post-communism (nation state building, democratization, marketization and integration).

Be that as it may, the fall of the Berlin Wall, for some ethno-cultural groups offered an opportunity to achieve its “own nation-state” goals, while for others, the numerically minor groups, it raised new barriers to their goals for self-determination. In most cases the titular ethno-cultural group claimed ownership over the newly nationalizing state, while national minorities and their national homelands (kin states), from the other side, engaged themselves in demanding state recognition of the collective rights to their ethno-cultural nationality, different from the numerically or politically dominant ethno-cultural nation. (Brubaker 1996).

In the middle of this radical restructuring of the nation-state borders, and the socio-political and economic systems, other factor of reformation appeared to be very important. Namely, the Euro-Atlantic integration as a foreign policy objective had direct impact on many other domestic policies of the aspiring countries. The EU accession conditionality for the post-communist countries, in particular, have focused on the human and minority rights protection. (Grabbe 2007) Brubaker's (1996) famous triadic nexus model which explains the relationship between the nationalizing state, national minority and the external national homeland has been questioned from several points of view, but the failure to include the International Community (mostly referring to the EU's influence) is probably the mayor scholarly critique to the model. (Kuzio 2001)

There have once been a much clearer political concept of post-communist Eastern Europe, thus a much clearer east-west distinction of polities. While the concepts “Eastern Europe”, “Eastern Europe and Eurasia”, “Central Europe”, “Central and Eastern Europe” etc., are all crosscutting, the conceptual sub-sets deriving from them are also prone to debate and an eventual disintegration. Once again, the main factor of ‘disintegration’ of the set of countries forming political and geographical concept of Eastern Europe is the most important international organization in Europe, the European Union (EU). Firstly, in 2004, eight of the post-communist countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia) joined the EU, and shortly after in 2007 Bulgaria and Romania were accepted. The EU accession implied higher level of democratization for the new member states compared to the rest of the countries (which were not yet being reformed towards democracy and free market). Therefore the very EU integration, albeit, in its early stages, invoked new narratives and theoretical frameworks for studying post-communist societies. Analysts have already started to group these democratically more advanced post-communist countries under the category of ‘Central Europe’, ‘New (EU) Members States’ or the like. In addition, the

acceptance of Croatia as EU member in 2013 have 'obstructed' the academically well accepted term of 'Western Balkans' referring to all the former Yugoslav countries, minus Slovenia, plus Albania. (Stojarova and Emerson 2010a; Batt 2007) The EU enlargement policy, therefore, made an irreversible impact on the political concept of "Eastern Europe", i.e. it have lost its clear boundaries. (Brubaker 2004; Hill 1994:280) The name used to refer to the set of seventeen countries under study in this dissertation is Central and Eastern Europe.¹⁰

The aim of this chapter is to introduce the constellation of the post-communist democratization processes in CEE as a basis for ethno-regionalist potential. It is consisted of two sections, one which poses the bases for entropy-resistant cultures' awakening and the second one that depicts the situation with the democratization of the frail nation states in CEE, as we consider that there is a close relationship between the processes of democratization, marketization and integration and ethnic mobilization in the processes of state and nation building.

Section 2.1. deals with the '**entropy resistant categories**', i.e. national identities in CEE and the territorial concentration of the ethno-regional groups. The latest available census data for each CEE country is being used for the purpose of this section, which shall offer a glimpse into the heterogeneity of the CEE, and map the territorial concentration of the larger ethno-national groups within each country. The sub-section concludes with a short comparison of the cultural (religious and linguistic) differentiation between the titular groups and the national minorities within a country. The intention of the second part of this Chapter 2, therefore, is to postulate the potential for ethno-regionalism in CEE, by depicting ethnic heterogeneity, which in Chapter 3 will be addressed from the perspective of political mobilization, i.e. formation of ethno-regionalist parties.

Section 2.2. addresses the '**frail nation-states**' and the institutional and economic change that nationalizing states have underwent in the past 25 years. This sub-section introduces comparative data on CEE countries' current position regarding European Union integration and, without any intention to thoroughly

¹⁰ The countries forming the family of Central and Eastern Europe are those that after the World War II were occupied by the Soviet communist Union, or adopted communism or socialism as political regime: Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia (Czech Republic and Slovakia), Moldova, Ukraine and Yugoslavia (Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Slovenia, Macedonia, and Kosovo).

analyze the process of transition, it introduces several potential explanatory factors for the radicalism of the ethno-regionalist movements in certain countries such as: CEE countries' political and electoral systems, decentralization level, economic growth, corruption etc. In addition the relative regional economic growth of the ethnic regions versus the rest of the regions of CEE countries, for which such data exists. will be added to the general country economic growth elaboration. Finally, a short emphasis of the nature of the European conflicts in the post-communist period will be made.

Chapter 2.1. Entropy Resistant Cultures: mapping ethno-regionalism in CEE.

The Treaty on European Union sets out the conditions and the principles, to which any country wishing to become an EU member must conform.¹¹ However, for EU accession negotiations to be launched, a country must satisfy the first criterion: stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities. (Hughes and Sasse 2003, 2004) The concept of minorities in this sense includes not only the ethnic, national or cultural minorities, but also marginalized groups that face discrimination in everyday life especially in terms of economic and social rights (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex - LGBTI, disabled persons, religious minorities etc.)

It is not in the focus of this research to discuss nationalism, albeit the field of ethno-regionalism is inextricable from it. Yet it is important to stress that there are forms of nationalism that have been considered as contributive to the success of political transition.

Stefan Auer (2004) for instance, suggests that by allowing the development of multiple identities, liberal nationalism could prove to be conducive to the project of European unification as well as to the emerging liberal democratic order. He does not suggest that liberal nationalism can solve all the problems in the ethnically diverse environment of Central Europe, on the contrary, he demonstrates that there are no

¹¹ Certain criteria must be met for admission in the EU. These criteria (known as the Copenhagen criteria) were established by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993 and strengthened by the Madrid European Council in 1995. Those criteria are threefold: stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; a functioning market economy and the ability to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU; and ability to take on the obligations of membership, including the capacity to effectively implement the rules, standards and policies that make up the body of EU law (the '*acquis communautaire*'), and adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union. [Available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/accession_criteria_copenhagen.html]

universally valid answers to the conflicting demands of different groups. The two liberal counter positions regarding identities are the one of recognition (an active state support and protection of various cultural and ethnic identities) vs. the one of indifference (to any demands for special treatment).

The first position (Taylor 1992) is grounded on the vital human need for recognition, and thus it justifies affirmative actions for minorities. The later (Kukathas 1998), on the other hand, stands for 'no action' due to the acknowledgement of the fact that division, conflict and competition would always be present in human society, but instead of putting this issues in the spotlight of the political agenda, political institutions should be indifferent to them. Thus, stressing and celebrating the importance of different histories in Central Europe can contribute paradoxically to a more division than to mutual understanding. (Auer 2004: 40). While this notion of indifference is validated, the question arising is whether this proposition offers a realistic option for Europe which does not relay to migrant experiences (such were Kukathas' case studies of Canada and Australia used to prove this position).

Just as Kymlicka (1995, 1998) argued that the moral claims for preservation of migrants' identities were different from claims of people living in the countries of their birth who constitute national minorities, Auer (2004:41, 42) argues that the 'indifference experience' cannot be easily 'exported' to Europe. He argues that a harder version of multiculturalism is needed in the Central European context, one that does not only allow for a minority culture to simply exist, but actively provides for some of its basic needs. Language and cultural policies in favor of national minorities, and adequate political representation which can articulate and persuasively follow ethnic minorities' interests is crucial. (Auer 2004:41, 42)

In this direction Brubaker (2004) speaks of two 'ethnicities', the first one is the so called 'immigrant ethnicity', characteristic mainly of Western Europe, and the second one 'territorial nationality', characteristic of East and Central Europe (acknowledging that there are exceptions from the rule whatsoever). The immigrant ethnicities are generally territorially dispersed, while the territorial nationalities, are indigenous (or at least make claims to be so), and they are in many cases generated by movement of borders across people, rather than that of people across borders. The political claims, therefore, differ sharply in the two cases. Immigrant ethnicity evokes politics of antidiscrimination, civic inclusion and soft multiculturalism (claims to recognition, resources, and sometimes immunities and exemptions), while territorial nationality involves

claims for national self-determination, for symbolic recognition as a state-bearing nation rather than as a mere 'minority', for extensive language rights, territorial autonomy or even full independence, and sometimes rapprochement with a neighboring 'kin' state or a 'homeland' state. (Brubaker 2004: 148-149)

While, protection of minorities' rights have been a very 'popular' trend in the democratizing societies, it went hand in hand with the potential for violent disruptions of the nationalizing states' borders. National minorities in some cases have mobilized at a much higher extent and asked for more than just a recognition of collective rights, which Linz and Stepan (1996) have called 'stateness' problem i.e. the problem of integrity of the boundaries of the state. Take for instance the short war for the independence of the Transnistria region from Moldova in 1992, the relatively short violent conflicts in Slovenia and Croatia after their intention for independence from the Yugoslav Federation, or the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, that is remembered as the bloodiest violent conflict in Europe in recent history. Nonetheless, Bosnia's war is not an isolated case of violence in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), nor in Western Europe, and we see no end to the secessionist and autonomist conflicts in Europe yet. The 2014 Ukrainian war just reminds us that the ethno-national minorities are far from being settled within the current borders of the post-communist nationalizing states' borders. And this threat of violence and potential for border changes, as it has been mentioned in the theoretical part (Chapter 1), is the extreme justification of the importance of the literature on ethno-regionalism.

All CEE countries have signed the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Moreover, the European Charter of Local Self-Government, directly connected to the self-determination claims of national minorities regionally concentrated in the CEE, is signed by each CEE country by 2005. Nonetheless, there are still pending countries when it comes to signing of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the European Charter of Regional and Minority Language. As of January 2016, only Serbia and Bosnia and Montenegro have not signed the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, whereas the European Charter of Regional and Minority Languages have not been signed by any of the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), Albania and Bulgaria. (European Council, 2016)

The ratification and the full implementation of these International Conventions varies among the countries of CEE, but the very fact that most of them are being signed by the national governments means that most of the CEE countries have decided to follow the European path which is paved with the conditions that were already mentioned. EU Candidate Countries are constantly being reminded, within the EU Progress Reports, of the importance that the signing of those International Conventions has for the countries' fulfilment of the enlargement criteria.

In spite of the fact that democratic regimes offer much wider protection of human and minority rights and thus lower down the potential of violence, they also offer legal space for mobilization of the ethnic, regionalist, and autonomist intentions of different groups. Some countries, even openly protect the right for secession (Sorens, 2012) and some groups aim to achieve their rights for self-determination with democratic means. The referendum for Independence of Scotland from the UK, or the Catalan 'consulta' (a consultative referendum initiative for independence of Catalonia from Spain) are just two recent examples of secessionist attempts with democratic means, but the way to achieve independence from a democratic society usually is initiated by the political parties representing ethno-regional groups that oppose entropy and seek greater self-determination/government. Before jumping to the mobilization factors for national minorities self-determination struggles in or out of the electoral battlefield, we need to ask whose mobilization we are talking about. Where in CEE do we locate such ethno-regional groups that oppose cultural assimilation by majority groups, strive for greater self-determination, or even 'fight' for it?

Chapter 2.1.1. Naming and counting identities: ethnic heterogeneity in the Censuses of CEE

Here we come to the paradox of the fair treatment of minorities, which term for the purpose of this research refers to the ethnic, national or cultural minorities only. Namely, while its fair representation, positive discrimination policies and legislative acts depend on the percentage of the very minority group and in many cases on their territorial concentration, the declaration of individuals' belonging to such a group, is non-obligatory in many heterogeneous countries. The analysis of the last available Censuses for the 19 CEE

countries of interest¹² shows clearly that in more than a half of the census questionnaires the question of ethnic/national/cultural belonging, mother tongue and religion is optional (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Kosovo, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, and Slovenia). (See Table 2.1 in Appendix II).

Seven out of 19 countries offer a list of given choices of communities to which a person can feel affiliated to in terms of ethnic/cultural/national belonging. Nonetheless, in spite of the given possible answers there is usually an option to declare affiliation to other group than the ones offered in the interview. The rest ten censuses (the majority) offered a possibility for the individual to define its own ethnic belonging without suggesting possible answers or an exhausted list of answers.

The most crucial practical aspect in terms of belonging to a certain minority i.e. identity, is the question wording in the census data gathering. The majority of the countries (14 in total) use the term ethnic in reference to national belonging that is narrower than the citizenship. Moreover 'ethnic' can be met as ethnicity, ethnic group, ethnic or cultural group, or as ethno-national affiliation. The other term used to address this aspect of citizens' identity is nationality or national affiliation. (see Table 2.1. in Appendix II)

The concept of ethno-national minority is still far from being settled, given that the very ethno-national groups in different countries perceive themselves in a different manner.

History, size and the ideology of the majority governing elites might influence the way ethnic minorities are being named. As it has been mentioned in Chapter 1, since 2001 the Constitution of Republic of Macedonia (the Ohrid Framework Agreement text) refers to the national minorities as non-majority ethnic communities, with a sole purpose of avoiding the term minorities, as it was advocated by the Albanian parties. The Albanian community, nonetheless, still opposes to this naming and prefers to be called 'constitutive people'. This term implies that Macedonian Albanians are equal constitutive people/nation of Macedonia with the ethnic Macedonian community, rather than a large minority in the country. This terminology of "constitutive peoples" is used in Bosnia and Herzegovina where the titular Bosnian Muslim community and the somewhat smaller Serbian and Croatian communities are recognized as equal constitutive peoples, while the

¹² The Census data gathered for this analysis is from the 2011 Census for Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, and Slovakia, 2001 for Ukraine, 2002 for Slovenia and Macedonia, 2004 for Moldova and 2013 for Bosnia and Herzegovina. (see Table 2.1 in Appendix II)

terminology of national minorities is used when refereeing to the other ethnic groups. In Latvia and Estonia, the Russian community is also a large group that have been so far referred to as national minority, in spite of some complains and initiatives by their political parties that prefer that Russian community in these countries is also treated as constitutive peoples, such the titular ethnic groups.

The historic factors and the socio-political constellations under which some groups have been splinted or reshaped, and the causality for the ethnic heterogeneity of the CEE countries goes beyond the focus of this research. Therefore only a short reference to the latest demographic constellation in CEE will be offered in Figure 2.1. and Figure 2.2. The percentages of the total population for the titular ethno-national group of each country (Figure 2.1.a) and the minority ethno-national groups' percentages for the biggest minority groups in the CEE countries (Figure 2.1.b.).


From the Figure 2.1.a. we can clearly see that among the most heterogeneous countries (meaning countries with smallest percentage of the titular group) are Montenegro (45% Montenegrins), Bosnia and Herzegovina (50.1% Bosnian Muslims), Latvia (62 % Latvians), Macedonia (64% Macedonians) and Czech Republic (64% Czechs)¹³. Poland, Kosovo and Croatia, on the other hand, are countries with a titular ethno-national group that surpasses 90%. Nonetheless, the real heterogeneity does not depend only on the percentage of the titular ethno-national group in proportion to the rest, but also on the heterogeneity within the rest of the population.

In Figure 2.1.b. we can have a clear picture of the largest minority groups in the countries of CEE. We see that countries with ethno-national minority groups overpassing 20% are Bosnia and Herzegovina (Serbs), Montenegro (Serbs), Latvia (Russians), Macedonia (Albanians) and Estonia (Russians). Nonetheless, it is also visible that Montenegro has three ethno-national groups above 4.5% (Serbian, Bosnian/Bosniak, and Albanians), and there are four countries with two ethno-national groups above 4.5%, Bosnia and Herzegovina (Serbian and Croatian), Bulgaria (Turkish and Roma), Lithuania (Polish and Russian) and Moldova (Ukrainian and Russian).

¹³ The important note regarding the Czech Republic's ethno-national constitution is that somewhat more than 25% refused to declare their ethnicity, which can explain the low percentage of the titular ethnic groups. In Albania the percentage of undeclared ethno-cultural affiliation is somewhat lower than the one of Czech Republic (14%), but it is also one of the largest among the countries of the CEE; moreover, the percentage of the share titular vs. other groups is not accurate given the Census boycott by the Serbian community in Kosovo (in Mitrovica region in particular).

Figure 2.1. Ethno-national groups in the CEE

a. Titular ethno-national groups by country.



b. Ethno-national minority groups (above 4.5 %)




Figure 2.2. provides a more detailed perspective of the ethno-national constitution of each CEE newly nationalizing state. While each country has plethora of smaller ethno-national groups, the most commonly found minorities are those that have once constituted the majority of a larger state: the Russians in the post-Soviet states, the Hungarians in those countries that once belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Serbs after the dissolution of Yugoslavia, and the remaining Turkish population (from the Ottoman Empire) on the Balkans. The Albanians of former Yugoslavia are also spread through several countries such as Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia (in Kosovo which declared independence in 2008).

Among the most represented ethno-national minorities in the Baltic States and Poland are the Russian, Belarusian, and Ukrainian groups. In addition there are ethno-national minority groups which are titular groups in the neighboring countries such as Poles in Lithuania, Germans in Poland, and Fins in Estonia etc. Naturally, in the former Yugoslav countries, most of the national minorities are titular groups of the independent states of today and their neighboring countries.

The Muslim community is also 'recognized' as ethno-national group in couple of countries. Muslims as a special ethno-national category were met in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Slovenia and Serbia. While we talk about the Bosnian Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina, we can also see that the same community (a community that speaks Bosnian language and practices Islam) in Macedonia, Montenegro, Slovenia, Kosovo, and Serbia is referred to as Bosniak ethnic group. The Minorities in Risk data classifies Sandjak Muslims as a religious sect instead (Minorities at Risk 2016).

The census option for citizens to declare regional affiliation among the ethno-national categories was present only in the questionnaires of Croatia, and Serbia. Most people from Croatia that declared regional affiliation before any other ethno-national identity were those living in the Istria Region, while the ones from Serbia referred mainly to the Vojvodina or Sandjak Regions. Serbia's and Montenegro's Censuses still count those individuals who feel as Yugoslavs (0.3% and 0.2% respectively). Not all of the minorities in the CEE countries have their kin nation states, for instance, the Aromanians/Vlahs, the Tatars, the Gorani, and the Gagauzian communities have no mother kin country. Moreover, there are regional identities such as the Moravian and the Silesian whose national identity refers to territories from other countries where the same group is also a minority.

Figure 2.2. Ethno-national composition of the CEE countries (groups above 0.1%)




Figure 2.2. Ethno-national composition of the CEE countries (groups above 0.1%) (continuation)





Figure 2.2. Ethno-national composition of the CEE countries (groups above 0.1%) (continuation)



Finally, there are the Roma/Askali/Egyptian/Gypsi ethnic groups which according to the consulted national Censuses are not present only in several countries such as the Baltic States and Ukraine. As it has been mentioned previously, the Romani people are very specific and their general territorial instability and dispersion worldwide without a sense of a common homeland makes this community incomparable with the rest of the ethno-national groups whose self-determination claims are closely related to a certain territory. (Kymlica 2001, Auer 2004) Thus, the later analyses will exclude parties representing the Roma communities in the post-communist countries of CEE.

Be that as it may, these indicators of the size of ethnic groups within a country, which indicates countries' ethnic heterogeneity are not enough to predict the emergence, the strength and the radicalism of the ethnic groups in the party-competition field. Thus, the following chapters will go deeper into the factors of

radicalism and the very intensity of electoral competition. Besides the general ethnic heterogeneity of the CEE, this chapter aims to introduce the territorial concentration of the ethno-national minority groups, their cultural distinctiveness against the titular groups and the socio-economic conditions of the specific ethno-national regions.

Ethnic heterogeneity (identity) in democratizing states has been subject to various disputes over the Census data gathering and elaboration. For instance, the Macedonian Census attempt of October 2011 has failed as a result of the unresolved political issues, violent disputes in Tetovo, and other ethnic confrontations which resulted with a resignation of the Census Commission's team. (Marusic 2012) The Serb-majority municipalities in North Kosovo have boycotted the 2011 Census, and there was partial boycott by Serbs and Roma in southern Kosovo. Having this in mind one needs to be very careful when using the 2011 census statistics of Kosovo. That is to say, the boycott of the Serbian majority municipalities from Kosovska Mitrovica District (Leposavic, Zubin Potok and Zvezdic) distorts the picture of the real number of Serbs at country level. Namely, the three municipalities that have boycotted the Census according to the 2008-09 estimations are the ones with 94% of Serbs in Kosovo. Nonetheless, this number is excluded from the general number of Serbian minority in Kosovo.

Further on, the 2013 census of Bosnia and Herzegovina had issued only general statistics of the population and housing of the Bosnian Federation, while the details over the ethnic composition of the Federation, due to disputes over the reliability of the data among the three constitutive nations, have been revealed three years later (in July 2016). The Albanian 2011 census results were disputed by the Greek minority. The Census data from Ukraine and Moldova date from 2001 and 2002 respectively. Finally, the census data on Slovenia is from 2002 because it was the last census that offers data on the distribution of the ethno-national groups by regions and municipalities. Nonetheless, there is a 2011 population and housing data available for Slovenia as well. This only proves that the initial challenge of defining the concept of 'ethnic', presented in the theoretical part, is justifiable from both theoretical and practical reasons.

As it can be expected the administrative-territorial units where certain ethno-national groups are concentrated will indicate potential for self-determination claims. And so, in order to be able to 'visually' detect some potential for ethno-regionalist mobilization, we make an effort to map the regional concentration of the ethnic groups in the CEE.

Figure 2.3.¹⁴ contains country maps illustrating the ethno-national minorities' concentration at Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics (NUTS) 3 level for all NUTS 3 applicable countries, but for Poland (for which NUTS 2 is used instead). For those NUTS non-applicable countries, the available data on ethno-national groups' concentration by municipal or regional units have been used (depending on the Census available data).¹⁵ From the maps, nonetheless, the territorial concentration of only selected 'important' national minorities in all CEE countries can be seen.¹⁶ In Bulgaria, Estonia, Romania, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Ukraine we see regions with ethno-national group concentration above 50% (For more detailed information on the ethnic regional concentration see Table 2.2.a. and b. in Appendix II).

Mapping the ethno-national minorities' concentration by regions or municipalities can help understand the possibility for regional interaction between people belonging to the same ethno-national community living in bordering regions of two or more countries, which eventually might be a self-determination radicalization factor. The Silesians in Czech Republic and in Poland, or the Sandjak Muslims (Bosniaks) from Montenegro

¹⁴ The graphic design of the maps is by MA Marija Koneska

¹⁵ Clustering procedure of the ethno territories.

At first the results for the ethno-national declaration by the relevant administrative-territorial units has been gathered from the official Census data sources of all the countries. Censuses in the EU countries have been very much compatible with the NUTS (which is very helpful for the map drawing and clustering of the regions with high vs. those with low ethno-regionalist concentration), and in those countries that have not yet applied this nomenclature, the most compatible administrative-territorial divisions were considered. In other words, I use the NUTS 3 for the EU Member States or the Candidate Countries that have applied the NUTS, and the available (municipal/regional) units that are considered also in the Census gathering of data.

The clustering has been made by calculating the regions that belong to the first cluster of ethno-regions or the second cluster of other regions. Once the decision has been made, the maps have been produced to present how much integrated in terms of ethno-national concentration the existing administrative-territorial units are.

Regions were split in two groups, corresponding to regions with high and low minority percentages. To achieve a meaningful division, the following simple clustering algorithm was used. First, regions were ordered by decreasing minority percentage. For each region, two values were calculated: the average minority percentage of the regions above it (A) and the average minority percentage of the regions below it (B). In most cases, there was a clear splitting point such that all the regions above it had a minority percentage close to their A value than to their B value, while all regions below the splitting point were clearly in the opposite case (closer to their B value than to their A value). The regions above the splitting point made up the high minority percentage group, and the rest made up the low minority percentage group. In those rare cases in which there were two or more possible splitting points, the most reasonable of them was selected by visual inspection of the data.

¹⁶ Two important aspects of selection are important to be clarifying. The first aspect is the criteria for selection used for mapping the territorial concentration of the ethno-national minorities. Namely, only those ethno-national minorities that have ever won parliamentary representation at national level are presented. Here, an exception is made regarding the parliamentary represented ethno-national minorities of Romania where only the Hungarian minority is presented. The reason for this is that the excluded (18) ethno-national groups do not overcome 0.5% of the population, yet thanks to the special Romanian electoral provisions are represented in national parliament through political parties. In addition the Roma minority is excluded in all country cases but Hungary because in this country it is the only ethnic group ever represented in the Hungarian National Parliament. This shall not be confused with the later selection criteria for the units of analysis of the thesis, the political parties. In the latter case no Roma party will be included due the previously elaborated reasons.

and Serbia, indeed form bordering regions that take parts of two nationalizing states and their potential for independence is not to be underestimated.

If 'visually' assessing the irredentist potential due to ethnic minorities' bordering regions with kin states, all but few cases of ethno-regional groups in CEE have that secessionist/ irredentist instigator. The Turkish ethnic minorities in Macedonia and Kosovo have no real bordering kin state, and yet the irredentist potential shall not be discarded if having in mind the historical role of the Ottoman Empire, as well as the today's economic influence of Turkey in the Balkans.

Bosniak communities, in spite of being widespread in all the post Yugoslav countries and having their kin state, are sometimes emulated with the Muslims (such is the case of Montenegro). The Moravians are the only ethno-regionalist group that might be considered as a nation without a state, from ideological point of view comparable with the Scots or the Catalans, but from a perspective of current political power they are far behind them in realizing its goals for autonomy. The Gorani people in Kosovo, albeit very small in size and with no kin-state relation, make references to the Serbian state as their homeland and ask for self-government in a concrete municipality.

Be that as it may, visualizing the potential of secessionism/irredentism due territorial concentration is not a clear indicator of the possibility for ethnic mobilization. While size, does matter in terms of potential for ethnic groups' mobilization, other factors are in game as well. Therefore, this visual presentation of the ethnic minorities' regional concentration in nationalizing states shall not be a clear indication of the level of radicalism these groups might have towards self-government/determination.

Figure 2.3. The territorial concentration of national minorities in CEE (part 1)




Figure 2.3. The territorial concentration of national minorities in CEE (part 2)




Figure 2.3. The territorial concentration of national minorities in CEE (part 3)




Figure 2.3. The territorial concentration of national minorities in CEE (part 4)




Figure 2.3. The territorial concentration of national minorities in CEE (part 5)





Figure 2.3. The territorial concentration of national minorities in CEE (part 6)



Chapter 2.1.2. Cultural diversity and ethno regionalism (language and religion)

The immediate collapse of the communist regimes was most disastrous for the Yugoslav states where it dragged along nationalistic confrontations, and a dissolution of the federation itself. Several armed conflicts emerged from the dissolution of Yugoslavia, in Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia. Later on, in 2001, the Albanian minority got involved with armed conflicts in Macedonia, after it has already been a subject to violence in the Serbian province of Kosovo. In 2012 the situation was reverse, the Serbian minority in the self-proclaimed Independent Kosovo was involved in violent riots against the predominantly Albanian government. In 1992 a war for independence from Moldova occurred in the Transnistria region, which ended in 1993. The Russian national Minority in Estonia as well has caused violence in 2007, and in 2014 a war, caused by the Russian separatists, escalated in Ukraine. (HIIK 1998) Overall, the Conflict Barometer have registered ten country cases of violent crisis in CEE since 1998 (Table 2.3.). Nonetheless, each of the rest of the cases are considered as non-violent issues, disputes, conflicts or crisis that has occurred in certain period of time after communist regimes collapsed in the countries of CEE. Some are ongoing, some maybe passive, but the potential for national minorities' mobilization is feasible in each of them.

Language and Religion are two of the most important cultural characteristics that make ethno-national groups diverse. Table 2.3. contains information on the distinction between the titular ethnic group and the selected national minorities regarding the use of different language and different language group, and the practice of different religion and the different religious denomination. Table 2.4. (Appendix II) contains a more thorough elaboration of the variables and the more detailed emphasis on the heterogeneity in terms of language and religion, but from Table 2.3. we can clearly see that ethno-national minorities in CEE in general differ linguistically much more than religiously from the titular ethnic community in the country. The biggest communities practicing Islam in CEE are the Turkish national minorities in Bulgaria and Macedonia, and the Bosniak/Muslim community and the Albanians in the countries of former Yugoslavia. The rest of the ethno-national minorities are Christians, but some differ by the denomination (Roman Catholics, Lutherans, Orthodox, etc). The ethno-national minorities in CEE in all but one case (the Moravians in Czech Republic whose language is not yet recognized as more than a dialect) have their language as an important identity characteristic.

Table 2.3. The cultural differences and history of post-independence violent crisis among them.

Country	Titular Ethnic Group	Ethno-National Minority	Different Language	Different Language Group	Different Religion	Different Religious Denomination	Violent Crisis
ALBANIA	Albanian	Greek	Yes	yes	Yes	Yes	No
BIH	Bosniak	Serbian	Yes	no	Yes	Yes	1992-1995
		Croatian	Yes	no	Yes	Yes	1992-1995
BULGARIA	Bulgarian	Turkish	Yes	yes	Yes	Yes	No
CROATIA	Croatian	Italian-Istrian	Yes	yes	No	No	No
		Slovenian-Istrian	Yes	no	No	No	No
		Serbian	Yes	no	no	Yes	1992-1995
CZECH REPUBLIC	Czech	Moravian/Silesian	No	no	no	yes	No
ESTONIA	Estonian	Russian	Yes	yes	no	yes	2007
KOSOVO	Albanian	Turkish	Yes	yes	no	No	No
		Bosniak	Yes	yes	no	no	No
		Gorani	Yes	yes	no	no	No
		Serbian	Yes	yes	yes	yes	2012
LATVIA	Latvian	Russian	Yes	yes	no	yes	No
LITHUANIA	Lithuanian	Polish	Yes	yes	no	no	No
MACEDONIA	Macedonian	Russian	Yes	yes	no	yes	No
		Albanian	Yes	yes	yes	yes	2001
MOLDOVA	Moldovan /Romanian	Turkish	Yes	yes	yes	yes	No
		Russian	Yes	yes	no	yes	1992-93
MONTENEGRO	Montenegrin	Serbian	Yes	no	no	no	No
		Bosniak/Muslims	Yes	no	yes	yes	No
		Croatian	Yes	no	no	yes	No
		Albanian	Yes	yes	yes	yes	No
POLISH	Polish	German	Yes	yes	no	yes, no	No
		Silesian	Yes	yes	no	yes, no	No
ROMANIA	Romanian	Hungarian	Yes	yes	no	yes, no	No
SERBIA	Serbian	Hungarian	Yes	yes	no	yes	No
		Bosniak	Yes	no	yes	yes	No
		Albanian	Yes	yes	yes	yes	1989-2012 (2000)
		Croatian	Yes	no	no	yes	No
		Muslims	Yes	no	yes	yes	2007
SLOVAKIA	Slovak	Hungarian	Yes	yes	no	yes	No
SLOVENIA	Slovenian	Italians	Yes	yes	no	no	No
		Hungarian	Yes	yes	no	no	No
UKRAINE	Ukrainian	Russian	Yes	no	no	yes	2014- ongoing

While the language is different, the language group stays the same, so communication in its essence is not a problem. For instance, the Bosniak, Serbian and Croatian constitutive peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina have no problems of communication between each other due to the same language group origins of the vernaculars. The same counts for the Serbian and Croatian minority in Montenegro, or the Croats, Montenegrins and Bosniaks in Serbia. The Albanians living in Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro though, have completely different language and language group, which makes communication problematic. While all the Baltic languages differ from the Russian in its origins, there is a significant part of the population of these countries that have no problem understanding Russian due to the recent Soviet history. The level of understanding Russian by the Ukrainians in Ukraine is nonetheless much higher, and some even claim that Ukraine is a bilingual country. (Wydra 2013)

The violent crisis occurred in countries whose titular and minority community differed by religion, as well as in those where such difference was not present, nevertheless, the difference in religious denomination was present in all of the listed violent conflicts, which makes religion a strong identity factor.

Chapter 2.2. Frail nation-states: CEE nationalizing states in between regime change, transition and stability.

Joining the EU requires profound transformation of aspiring countries' laws, institutions, policies and foreign policy orientations; moreover EU accession is a much complex and difficult process than the one of joining the NATO, especially after the creation of the Single Market and the establishment of the common currency. It was not easy for the new Candidate Countries from CEE to join the EU as it was for Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain in the 1980s. (Grabbe 2007: 117). Precisely the Copenhagen Criteria (Commission of the EU 2005, 4) are general criteria imposed by EU that aim to boost economic development in a parallel process with human rights respect, democracy building, and rule of law within the Candidate Countries. These criteria, are not only in favor of what non titular ethno-cultural groups ask from the nation-states, recognition and protection, but are also in a direct relation with conflict prevention.

Table 2.5. contains information of the current status (as of January 2016) of each CEE country in the EU integration process, i.e. whether a country is a Candidate Country, a Member State, a potential Candidate Country (signatory of the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with EU) or an Eastern Partnership country (signatory of the Association Agreement (AA) with EU), and the year it received such a status. The first wave of new Member States from the post-communist countries were accepted in 2004. As of January 2016 there were four EU Candidate Countries (Macedonia, Albania, Montenegro and Serbia), and two potential Candidate Countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo). Moldova and Ukraine, as part of the Eastern Partnership program have signed the Association Agreement with EU in 2013.

Some of the countries have grasped the democratization process rapidly and unfearfully joined the Western Europe's progress dynamics. Poland and Hungary lead in terms of reform-minded politicians (Balcerowicz in Poland and Klaus in Hungary), which have resulted with higher economic development (already much favorable during the communism), compared to the rest of the CEE countries. Estonia's drive to a market economy was motivated, in part, by the desire to distance itself from the Soviet past and demonstrate rightful place among the European mainstream. And yet, Slovakia, led by Vladimir Meciar, was appearing to go away from democracy, which have consequently slowed down its integration processes. Among other critiques, the European Commission highlighted concerns about the treatment of minorities of Slovakia in the 1997 progress report. The 1998 brought change of government, and Slovakia (led by Dzurinda), returned to its path towards integration. (Houghton 2007: 57) In spite of the debatable readiness of Bulgaria and Romania to join the EU, they accessed the family in 2007 and Croatia joined not long after (in 2013) leaving the issue over the sea borders with Slovenia temporary behind.

Macedonia, if compared to the rest of the Western Balkan countries, at first appeared to be the frontrunner in the EU integration processes, (receiving its Candidate State status in 2005); nonetheless, the negotiation process has not been opened yet for this country. The main reason for it could be located at the unresolved name issue with Greece, which despite of the positive Progress Reports for Macedonia by the EU Commission, from 2009 until 2015, it blocks the negotiations process opening. In the meanwhile Albania, Montenegro and even Serbia (famous for its EU and NATO skepticism) went ahead of Macedonia in the process of integration.

In addition, the integrationist role of the EU enlargement might be overstated if two post-Soviet countries of Moldova and Ukraine, where state building and nation building process appears as a dialectic foreign policy issue, are being neglected from analysis. To start with, political parties 'played' the Moldovan identity as strategic tool for voter support in the past two decades. To be identified as Moldovan could mean either being Romanian (thus being pro EU integration oriented) or being a Moldovan (meaning being pro Russia oriented). Namely, the communist vision of the nation prevailed between 2001 and 2009 in which period being Moldovan meant being different from neighboring Romanians justifying the inclusion of Moldova in the Soviet Union. After 2009, a new narrative prevailed with the loss of power by the communist party. The 'Moldovianism' is contested by the 'Romanianist' Moldovan Nation concept by Alliance for European Integration, which considers Moldovans to be Romanians who were separated artificially by the Tsarist Empire and the Soviet Union. These two oppositional visions of the Moldovan nation are backed by the pro-Russian or pro-European vision for the Moldovan future by the contesting parties. (Danero Iglesias, 2013)

The case of the Ukrainian EU integration as well was subject to political struggle among the pro-Russia and pro-Europe forces, which sustained by the corruption and foreign intervention have reflected instability in the country only two decades after the first independent democratic elections. (Wydra 2013) In both cases the influence of the EU and Russian factor can be noticed, which makes us put under question the integrationist character of the EU integration for those post-Soviet countries where Russian minorities, or the Russification of the very identity of the nation is in game.

While to state that EU integration settles for good issues such as rule of law and protection of human and minority rights would be an overstatement, to omit recognizing that the process of integration itself requires that significant attempts are made in the direction of democratization of the Candidate Countries, would be nonscientific.

A short comparison between the electoral and political change, the socio-economic indicators of well-being, and conflict management in CEE will follow in the next sections of this Chapter 2. The following sections aim at introducing the socio-political constellations that might in effect be taken as factors for radicalization of the ERPs' self-determination claims.

Table 2.5. Central and Eastern European Countries' first post-communist free competitive elections and EU Integration Stage¹⁷

	1990-1995	1996-2000	2001-2005	2006-2010	2011-2015
ALBANIA	FE91				CS14
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA	FE90	FE96 (independent)		SAA_EU08	
BULGARIA	FE90			MS07	
CROATIA	FE90				MS13
CZECH REPUBLIC	FE90	FE96 (independent)	MS04		
ESTONIA	FE90		MS04		
HUNGARY	FE90		MS04		
KOSOVO			FE01	FE10 (independent)	SAA_EU15
LATVIA	FE90		MS04		
LITHUANIA	FE92		MS04		
MACEDONIA	FE90		CS_EU05		
MOLDOVA	FE90 *free/FE94* competitive				AA_EU13
MONTENEGRO	FE90			FE06 (independent)/	CS_EU10
POLAND	FE91		MS04		
ROMANIA	FE90			MS07	
SERBIA	FE90				CS_EU12
SLOVAKIA	FE90/FE94 (independent)		MS04		
SLOVENIA	FE90		MS04		
UKRAINE	FE90* partly free/FE94(independent)				AA_EU13

FE-First direct competitive post-communist parliamentary elections; **SAA_EU** Stabilization and Association Agreement signed; **AA_EU** Association Agreement Signed; **CS_EU** Year of granted candidacy status for EU membership; **MS_EU** First year as an EU Member State.

2.2.1. Political and electoral systems in CEE from a comparative perspective

Central and Eastern European countries vary in terms of population, area and population density. EUROSTAT's estimation for 2014 provides information of a great deviation in terms of population within the family of CEE countries. With more than 45 million people Ukraine is on top of the list, followed by Poland (38 million). Already the third country Romania, has more than double less population than the first one (almost 20 million). The average country has almost nine million citizens, and the standard deviation of

¹⁷ Source: European Commission, European Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations; Parties and Elections in Europe.

population between the nineteen countries is 12.4 million which counts approximately twenty times the population of the smallest country of Montenegro. To illustrate better the group of CEE countries we are taking into observation, Table 2.6. (Appendix II) presents their general characteristics in terms of area, population, and population density.

Ukraine is also the largest country in terms of territory with an area of approximately 604 hundreds of sq. km, while Latvia, as the territorially smallest country, has something less than 11 hundred sq.km. On average countries are ten times territorially larger than Latvia but again, the standard deviation is high (143 hundred sq.km difference from the mean). The average density of the population is nearly 90 persons on sq. km, where Kosovo, with 167 people in sq. km, is the most densely populated of all CEE countries. Czech republic (136 p/km²), Poland and Moldova (each 124 p/sq.km) are the next on the high population density list of CEE. In Estonia only 31 people live on 1 sq.km and in Latvia 32 persons on sq.km, which makes these two countries the least densely populated in CEE.

Today, almost all of the CEE countries have parliamentary political systems, but Ukraine, Romania and Lithuania whose systems are considered to be of a semi-presidential nature. The number of Members of Parliament at national level naturally depends of the country's population. Among the most numerous parliaments in CEE¹⁸ are the ones of Ukraine (460), Poland (450), Bulgaria (400) and Romania (396). With the independence Bosnia and Herzegovina have lowered the number of Members of Parliament (MP) from 130 to 42, Latvia cut the MPs by more than a half (from 201 to 100) and Montenegro lowered the number from 125 to 81 MPs.

In established democracies, elections are a reasonable, reliable and acceptable way of selecting representatives who command the respect of the citizens in whose name they adopt laws. Therefore competitive elections were introduced quickly after the collapse of communism in the new regimes and political parties emerged. (Hill 1994, Lewis 1996) Logically, most of the elections happened in the 1990-1991. Since countries of CEE have overthrown the socialist/communist regime, 153 competitive elections

¹⁸ The number of parliamentary members in the first post-communist elections are as follows: Poland 460, Ukraine 450, Bulgaria 400, Romania 396, Hungary 386, Albania 250, Serbia 250, Latvia 201, Check Republic 200, Slovakia 141, Bosnia and Herzegovina 130, Montenegro 125, Kosovo 120, Macedonia 120, Estonia 105, Moldova 104, Croatia 80 and Slovenia 80.


(140 if only counting elections in independent states) and 254 (241) government composition changes have happened. Kosovo, naturally, has the minimum elections and governmental changes of all, five in Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (since 2003 Serbia and Montenegro), and two in the self-proclaimed independent Kosovo Republic. Serbia on the other hand holds the record in largest number of competitive elections (10), while Ukraine and Latvia had the most governmental changes (17 each) in a period of 25 years. It should be pointed out that the term government composition change refers to the changes in the composition of the ministries and parties, which does not necessarily mean guaranteed change of the main governmental party. The average number of elections per country in the period of (1989-2015) is eight, and the average of government composition changes is thirteen. (Parties and Elections, 2016)

The selection of an electoral system is never purely a technical decision. Duverger (1951) claimed that the plurality rule favors a two-party systems while the majority rule (with second ballot and proportional representation are conducive to multipartism. Riker (1986) concludes that, while Duverger was basically right, the relationship between the plurality and a two party system is much stronger than the probabilistic assumption of relationship between proportional representation and multipartism.

The delegated communist elections experience, in some countries was reflected in decision for electoral system immediately after the communism collapsed, i.e. the Majority systems of persons in single constituencies have been considered as appropriate. But very shortly after this system have shown to be preventing the proliferation of parties which has motivated another round of reforms of the electoral systems in many CEE. It is obvious from the Figure 2.4. that the Majority system is mostly used in the first five years of post-communism (1989-1994), so to be completely substituted by one of the other two major possible electoral systems (mixed or PR). While the PR systems prevail, the trends across five-year time period clusters, through both Mixed and PR types, move in similar fashion. The highest pick for both is in the period of 2006-2010. Thus, 97 out of 140 elections were held under Proportional Representation formula, 34 times under a mixed system and only 9 times the majority electoral system has been used.

Political elites tried to avoid two party systems in order to reflect the heterogeneity of the populations and thus, turned to mixed formulas or pure PR.

Figure 2.4. Type of electoral systems uses in all CEE elections from 1989 to 2015.



Be that as it may, apart from reforming its electoral system in order to offer a wider space for ‘multi’ instead of ‘bi’ party systems, some of the countries, offered variety of electoral provisions for the national minorities in the national electoral race at such as the abolishment or decrease of the electoral threshold for the ethno-regionalist parties or providing guaranteed seats for national minorities in national legislative bodies. Among those countries that have offered some sort of provisions for better representation of the minorities are Romania, Serbia, Kosovo, Slovenia, Lithuania and Poland.

Bulgaria and Albania on the other hand have a legislative ban for the ethnic parties, but it is no secret that the biggest electoral support for the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (DPS) in Bulgaria comes mainly from the Turkish community, and that Greek ethnic community is the main electorate of Unity for Human Rights Party (PBDNJ) in Albania. Nonetheless, due to the ban, both DPS and PBDNJ officially claim they are parties for human rights protection, rather than ethnic parties.

While electoral rules might have influenced the party systems’ formation and change, the level of party institutionalization in the society might imply an ideal-type of successful transitional democracy. As Lewis (2007) would state “the development of a range of reasonably effective parties was the first indicator of democratization of the former communist countries”. And while it is important that the electoral system

provides space for party competition including for ethno-regionalist parties we can have a better idea of the electoral systems' proportionality if we look at electoral vs. parliamentary fragmentation.

Disproportionality of the electoral system could provoke radical reaction from the ethno-regionalist parties if underrepresented in Parliament. This is also related to ERP' size and the logic that ERPs of a larger size would most likely moderate rather than radicalize due to the possibility to take part of a governmental coalition. Moreover, it can be expected that the less disproportional the system is the more opportunity for office and government inclusion it offers, and therefore more opportunity for vote-maximizing is given to ERPs. This in effect might cause moderation of ERPs.

Nonetheless, if proportionality is measured as electoral fragmentation i.e. in election there is more electoral supply due to the expectations that representation is feasible, we might find an opposite direction to the causality of radicalism of ERPs. Namely, the proportionality/electoral fragmentation might cause competition which reflected in the ethnic outbidding could lead to radicalizations of ERPs.

Therefore Figure 2.5. provides information on the parliamentary vs. electoral fragmentation¹⁹ which in effect suggests how much difference there is between the parties participating and parties being elected in the national electoral competition. While it does not directly measure disproportionality in translating votes into seats in national Parliaments it might give us an approximate idea of which countries are more and which less disproportional in this aspect as well. The most fragmented national legislative bodies on average are the ones of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ukraine, Kosovo, Slovenia, and the three Baltic States. As for the electoral fragmentation we also see a very fragmented on average electoral race in Poland, Czech Republic, and Slovakia etc.

¹⁹ Parliamentary Fragmentation, is a variable that weights parties by size and it is obtained by first taking the seats share of each party as a decimal, squaring this value, and summing these values for all parties. Independents are ignored. The figure obtained is then subtracted from 1 to produce the figure for electoral fragmentation. I take the measures from Siaroff's (2000) dataset, and these figures may serve as proxy for the proportionality of the system. Consequently, the higher the value, the more fragmented the parliament is, and the more proportional the system is. The Electoral fragmentation is obtained in the same way as Parliamentary Fragmentation, except that instead of the percentage of filled seats won the percentage of votes is used. Likewise than, the higher the value, the more fragmented the Parliament.

Figure 2.5. Average Parliamentary and Electoral Fragmentation in CEE





Figure 2.6. Freedom House 'Freedom' and 'Democracy' scores for CEE



Finally, we come to the aspect of democratization of CEE.

Albania, Moldova and Macedonia have always been assessed as partly free according to the Freedom House scores for the freedom in the world. Bosnia and Herzegovina has been assessed as 'not free' during the war times, and as 'partly free' ever since 1996. Ukraine can join to the group of partly free countries with only one free period in 2010. Figure 2.6 contains the joint scores for freedom in the world and democracy scores for the CEE countries according to Nations in Transit Indexes. It is very obvious that the scores of freedom and democracy (the lower the score the more freedom and democracy) can be connected to the stages of EU integration of the countries.

Here again it is obvious that those countries that became EU Member States in 2004 are clearly the ones indexed closest to free and democratic societies, then Romania and Bulgaria (a member since 2007), and Croatia (since 2013) follow, and the rest are lagging behind.

Chapter 2.2.2. Regionalizing ethnicities: territory, administration, decentralization

Autonomist or secessionist claims by ethno-regionalist parties are motivated by the need for self-governance as opposed to centralization of power. The high delegation of power from the center to the lower level territorially administrative units is considered to be an indicator of democratization. Especially for the countries with communist history, the decentralization of power is considered to be a step forward into the formation of participative political culture and democratization.

Therefore, after having presented the ethno-national minority groups in CEE, we come to the point of their territorial concentration. As Brubaker (2004) rightly suggests nationalism and self-determination claims coming from ethno-minority groups in Central and Eastern Europe are mostly driven by territory. It is no surprise that the territorial concentration of a certain ethnic community empowers the very group in terms of mobilization. Several factors for radicalism lay in the territorial concentration, organization, and history of some type of territorial autonomy. The decentralization level in many countries has been 'gerrymandered' according to the ethnic structure of the population, and in some, there have been conflicts (even wars) for the purpose of gaining more territorial autonomy for the territorially concentrated ethno-national minorities.

The causality of the ethnic groups' empowerment and territorial organization and decentralization will be subject to analysis later on (in Chapter 5). Yet, in order to be able to map the regional concentration of the ethno-national minority groups within a country, a glimpse into the way new nation states are territorially organized is needed.


In all CEE countries the lower level of territorial units (municipalities) naturally exist, while there are four out of nineteen countries that have never had a regional tier of territorial organization (Kosovo, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Slovenia); Slovakia have introduced the two regions in 1996. In Table 2.7. (Appendix II) all the names of the middle and local level territorial organization in CEE can be found. Yet, the administrative territorial organization at regional level does not in fact mean a regional tier of government. In some cases regions might be only administrative divisions, in other there might not exist a plebiscitary election of the Council and the Chief Executive of the Region, or even if it does exist, the powers of the regional governments might be very limited. Therefore besides this information on the actual administrative territorial organization we can make use of a qualitative indicator of decentralization of power and see how much actual self-government power minority ethnic groups possess in a polity.

The Regional Authority Index (RAI) (Hooghe at all, 2010 and 2015) is therefore introduced in this sub chapter for the purpose of giving the reader a more thorough information on the level of decentralization/regional authority in the countries of CEE. RAI measures regions' authority level and it is constituted from two main components: the self-rule and the share-rule component. While the first component 'self-rule' is calculated in five dimensions: institutional depth, policy scope, fiscal autonomy, borrowing autonomy and representation, the 'shared-rule' component evaluates the law making, the exclusive control, the fiscal control, the borrowing control, and the constitutional reform dimension of the regions' authority.

The most decentralized countries of CEE are Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia (Serbia and Montenegro before 2006). (Figure 2.8) If compared to the other countries for which there are available scores in the RAI dataset, these two countries have the highest values on the 'shared-rule' component. Even after 2006 Serbia and Montenegro dissolution, Serbia remains second country in the shared-rule dimension. Nonetheless, it is important to note that Ukraine and Moldova has not been included in the RAI data, thus it is difficult to compare their scores with the ones of the countries that have been taken into consideration.

Nonetheless, Ukraine has been highly decentralized country, divided into several levels of territorial entities. On the first level there are 27 regions: 24 oblasts, one autonomous republic, and two cities with special status. Since the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in March 2014, Ukraine's control of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol is disputed.²⁰ Moldova, on the other hand, is divided into 37 first tier units. Apart from the 32 raions (districts), Moldova has three municipalities, one autonomous region (Gagausia), and one territorial unit (Transnistria).

Figure 2.8. Regional Authority Index in CEE, by country and year.



(Source: Hooghe, Marks and Schakel 2010)

²⁰ Ukraine's administrative divisions are divided as follows: By geographical characteristics Ukraine's units are divided on regions (such as autonomous republic, oblasts, districts, cities with special status) and places of settlement (cities, towns, villages). By their status they can be administrative-territorial units (oblasts and districts), self-governed territorial units (cities, towns, villages). In addition, the Autonomous Republic has a unique status of territorial autonomy, while districts in cities combine both characteristics of administrative territorial as well as self-governed territorial units. By position in the system of administrative division of Ukraine, the units divided into territorial units of prime level (cities, district division, districts in cities, towns, villages), of middle level (districts, cities with district division), and of higher level (autonomous republic, oblasts, cities with special status). (<http://www.statoids.com/yua.html> , <http://ukrainetrek.com/regions-by-alphabet> , <http://www.minregion.gov.ua/decentralization/>).

Among the countries with highest RAI (apart from the above mentioned Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro) thus, are Hungary, Romania, Poland and Croatia. While the highest general RAI positive change has been for BiH in 1995 and Croatia in 1992, Serbia and Montenegro in 2006 had the biggest negative change in RAI, for both self-rule and shared rule components, due to the dissolution of the Federation of Serbia and Montenegro.

The level of regional authority may cause ethno-regional mobilization as well as the other way around, mobilized ethno-regionalist claims may cause changes in regional authority level. And yet, we shall not directly correlate RAI with ethnic mobilization, because decentralization, albeit very important democratization factor, is not always modeled at ethnic lines.

As it has been presented in section 2.1., to be able to map the territorial concentration of the ethnic minority groups, we made use of the Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics (NUTS) of the EU.

NUTS were made by the EU initially for the purpose of statistical data gathering, but it plays a greater role in the whole economic and social development of the countries through EU's Regional Policy. While there are three levels of territorial and administrative divisions known as NUTS 1, NUTS 2 and NUTS 3, the division does not necessary reflect a self-governing region, especially due to the three levels of division. The Cohesion funds, the Cross Border Cooperation grants, the Instrument of Pre-Accession Assistance of the EU, all use this nomenclature when planning of the programs and distributing the funds. (Jones and Keating, 1995) This direct effect on the country's economy has also a direct effect on the regions where ethno-national minorities live.

Among the many programs that could be used for social cohesion, and integration of national-minorities in the society, there is the Cross Border Cooperation Programme which offers a unique opportunity for the national minorities to cooperate with regions from neighboring countries, which in many instances turn to be the kin countries of the ethno-national group, or regions from other countries where the same ethno-national minority group is concentrated. Through socio-economic cooperation, exchange of cultural, traditional and social value, and opportunity to work with peoples that use the same language these national minority groups have been given unique opportunity for empowerment by the EU.

Candidate Countries, therefore, face pressure from the EU Commission for establishing of the NUTS regions for the purpose of better pre-accession funds planning, which eventually leads towards a post

accession Cohesion Funds absorption. NUTS shall also provide a great variety of statistical information for the regions itself that shall be used for the regional programs planning.

Among the most 'decentralized' countries (in NUTS terms) are Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and Serbia (which is not yet in EU) who have territorial division at three NUTS levels, including the highest NUTS 1 (see Table 2.8. Appendix II). The rest of the countries have only NUTS 3, and some (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Poland, Slovenia, and Slovakia) have NUTS 2 classification. Serbia and Albania, as well, in spite of the fact that there are not yet EU Member State, have planned NUTS 2 nomenclature.

While Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ukraine, Moldova and Kosovo are not yet applicable for such nomenclature, (due its current status as potential candidates, or eastern partners) we can surely expect that such NUTS 1 division is feasible for BiH and Ukraine. Countries that have no NUTS 2 divisions are all the Baltic States, Macedonia and Montenegro, while Montenegro's territorial division most probably will satisfy the Local Administrative Units -LAU division (lower level classification from NUTS 3) but it stays at one territorial unit of Montenegro at NUTS 3 level.

Although positively correlated with the RAI (NUTS 3 and RAI 0.52.; NUTS 2 and RAI 0.56) these two indicators measure different aspects of the territorial organization of a country. The NUTS classification refers to the territorial-administrative organization of the country, while RAI does not end with the level of territorial-administrative organization of the country but it goes deeper into the levels of decentralization of power.

2.2.3. Socio-economic change in transiting CEE

In spite of the fact that democracy is an important goal of itself, North (1990, 1993), argues that democracy is a precondition for sustained prosperity. Gros and Steinherr (2004: 136) demonstrate that countries that were most successful in establishing democracy were most successful in economic liberalization as well. In addition Fidrmuc (2001) tested the relationship for causality and considered that it runs unambiguously from democracy to economic liberalization. His result shows that in transiting economies democracy has been significantly positively affecting growth. However in the initial years, when liberalization had not progressed enough, democracy was a hindrance to growth.

The Gross Domestic Product Growth of all CEE countries in 1991 had its worst performance. Normally this can be immediately associated with the period of regime change and complete reorganization of the economy. In 1996 all the CEE had their pick of high GDP growth. Albania and Bulgaria, nevertheless, for a long time have demonstrated much lower level of GDP growth compared to the rest of the CEE countries; moreover, just one year after its pick they had their serious fall of GDP growth in 1997 due to severe political crisis. The world economic crisis of 2008 have also negatively affected the CEE's economy and in 2009 all but two countries (Albania and Poland) have obtained negative GDP Growth. (Figure 2.9. Appendix II.)

Slovenia, Lithuania, Czech Republic and Estonia are the four countries with GDP per Capita above 10 000 USD\$ at current prices. Obviously the Central European Countries and the Baltic States in economic terms are much more advanced than the rest of the CEE countries, especially the post Yugoslav countries where in the first post-communist decade there were processes of war and reconciliation. Nevertheless the two post-Soviet countries Moldova and Ukraine, are at the bottom of the GDP per capita list (lowest average of GDP per capita in the last 25 years.) (Figure 2.10.a. Appendix II.)

Yet, Macedonia (33%) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (26%) (Figure 2.10.b. Appendix II.) are the countries with the highest average unemployment rate in the period between 1995 and 2014. Among the countries with highest average rates of inflation are Ukraine (286), Croatia (166) and Bulgaria (76) (Figure 2.10.c. Appendix II) Again, for Bulgaria, 1997 was the economic crisis year when the sustained increase of the current prices for goods and services reached above 1000%, while in 1992 the annual inflation of Ukraine reached above 4000%. (World Bank Country Data)

Poverty itself is a worrying indicator for smooth transition towards democracy, nevertheless, when poverty and social inequality meet together, it is time to ring the alarm. The World Bank estimations on the GINI coefficient pointed, once more, at Macedonia as the country with the average highest coefficient of social inequality (38), Moldova is the next one with 34.3. Nevertheless, the three Baltic States Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania are just below these two countries standing on top of the list for inequality. (see Figure 2.10.d. Appendix II) Again the best coefficients go to the countries of Central Europe (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary), and Slovenia. In 1988 the average GINI was estimated the lowest (22.14) and in the 1995 the highest (33.93).

Finally, we come to the level of corruption within a country. While data on this matter is very difficult to gather since corruption is such a complex social phenomenon (very challenging to measure) we accept the Corruption Perceptions Index data by Transparency International as a reliable image of the citizens' perceptions about corruption (as one segment of democratic development within each country). Namely, since 1995 the most firmly high index of low corruption within the country can be noted in Estonia and Slovenia, with average Index of 62 and 61 respectively. No surprise, the rest of the Baltic States and the Central European country go far ahead of the post-Yugoslav and Soviet countries. (Figure 2.11. in Appendix II) Ukraine (24), Moldova (29), and Albania (29) explain again what is repeatedly seen throughout the numbers so far, that post-Soviet countries are usually on the bottom of the democratic development.

In order to react against the purely moralistic approach on corruption that sees the phenomenon as 'evil', Nye (1967) elaborates arguments that judge corruption as beneficial for developing countries. His cost-benefit analysis on corruption and political development stresses three main possible benefits from corruption: the economic development (through capital formation, fast development, and entrepreneurship and incentives), the national integration and improvement of the governmental capacity. Yet, the costs can be traced as opposed to these three possible benefits as: waste of resources, instability and reduction of governmental capacity.

Corruption may help overcome divisions in a ruling elite that might otherwise result in destructive conflict, i.e. bridge the gap between the groups based on power and those based on wealth that appeared in the early nationalist period. Nye argues that the large gap between the literate official and illiterate peasant (often a characteristic of the countryside), may be bridged if the peasant approaches the official bearing traditional gifts or a money equivalent. Corrupt material incentives may provide the glue for resembling sufficient power to govern and governmental capacity can be increased by creating of supporting institutions such as political parties. Financing political parties tends to be a problem in developed as well as less developed countries, and therefore corruption in financing of political parties may help governmental capacity.

Going back to economic growth and corruption, Nye (1967) expected that corruption may benefit in the capital formation, cutting the administrative barriers to economic growth, and incentivize entrepreneurship.

Yet, on the other hand, it may cause waste of resources as a capital outflow through foreign banks, investment distortion (for instance investments in construction due to the better possibility to hide corruption rather than due to benefit for the economy), it may cause waste of skills and donors withdrawal from the developing countries. Nonetheless, albeit in an indirect correlation to the ethno-regionalist radicalization, the effect corruption has on economic growth has been controversial also in the literature. For instance, Podobnik et al. (2013) find that increase of corruption leads to increase of the annual GDP per capita in all countries in the world for the period 1999-2004. Right on the contrary Pak Hung Mo's (2001) provided quantitative estimates of the impact of corruption on the growth and importance of the transmission channels to find that a 1% increase in the corruption level reduces the growth rate by about 0.72%. The most important channel throughout which corruption affects economic growth is political instability, he claims, which accounts for about 53% of the total effect. Moreover, he finds that corruption reduces the level of human capital and the share of private investment.

Having in mind that we are much more interested in whether corruption causes ethnic radicalization rather than economic growth/decline, we shall not underestimate this final notion of Mo (2001) that political instability is the channel through which corruption affects economic growth. This notion suggests that the political development of post-communist countries is affected by corruption and economic performance. The causality might still be puzzling, but the fact that economic performance and corruption are related to national cohesion shall not be neglected.

If one benefit of corruption in post-communist societies is the initial capital formation, we shall not neglect the fact that marketization (with corrupt practices) causes social inequality, which mostly happens in peripheral regions and eventually might trigger radical ethno-regionalist mobilization.

Chapter 2.2.3.a. Regional socio-economic position of CEE

Socio-economic power of regions is definitely a factor of ethno-regionalist mobilization, and yet the direction is not easy to prove. Horowitz observed that poor groups in poor regions are early frequent secessionists, while advanced groups in advanced regions are late, rare secessionists. Gourevitch, suggests that economically growing, but potentially weak, regions develop secessionism because of a decline in the legitimacy of the center. (Sorens 2012:34)

Territorial grievances are frequently based on perceptions that the region is a net loser from the existing political union. When a region pays more in taxes than it receives it is likely that it will trigger demands for autonomy or even independence, and when it receives more than it contributes in taxes, the eventual loss of subsidies coming with autonomy would leave limited space for secessionism. (Sorens 2012: 32)

The study of Treisman (1999) of the interregional redistribution in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, and Russia proves that Croats, Slovenes in Yugoslavia, the Czechs in Czechoslovakia, and the Baltic republic, Russia and Ukraine in the Soviet Union were net losers, while Macedonia, Serbia, Bosnia and Kosovo in Yugoslavia, Slovaks in Czechoslovakia and the Central Asian republics of USSR were net winners in the fiscal game.

Nonetheless, fiscal considerations are not the whole story in the study of secessionism. For instance, Kosovo Albanians and Bosnian Muslims in Yugoslavia eventually set their pro-independence agenda very firmly despite their fiscal benefits from the existing system. Be that as it may, Sorens (2012: 32) claims that in democracies, economically better off regions are more secessionist than economically worse off regions; in autocracies, this relationship could be weaker or nonexistent. In this direction, he claims that relatively affluent regions (in democracies only), mineral resources, population, geographic separation, sea access and economic globalization should promote popular demands for secession.

Data on regional economic performance for the CEE countries is very difficult to find, especially for those that are still lagging behind in the EU integration process. Nonetheless, from the EUROSTAT data available for the economic performance of the NUTS regions we have managed to present the relative wealth of the ethno-regions and see whether 'ethnic regions' perform better or worse than the 'other regions' (Figure 2.12).

While we cannot yet speak of correlation between secessionism and economic wealth of regions, if looking at Figure 2.12. we notice that there is no clear answer to this question. Ethno-regions of Poles in Lithuania, Russians in all Baltic countries, Silesians in Poland and Czech Republic, and Italians and Istria's in Croatia perform on average better GDP than the rest of the regions' GDP. On the other hand, Turkish regions in Bulgaria, Hungarian in Slovenia, Romania, and Slovakia, Germans in Hungary, Italians in Slovenia, Serbian in Croatia and Moravians in Czech Republic perform average worse GDP than the 'other' regions. And yet, this analysis is limited in space and time, to only EU countries since the year of 2000.

Post communism as a trigger of new state and national building processes offers examples where poor regions, as a reaction to historic injustices would now oppose nationalizing states and ask for autonomy or secession. For instance, the Albanian community of Macedonia, have organized an Independence referendum in 1992 (that was not recognized by the Macedonian authorities) which was a reaction to the subjugated position of the Albanians during Yugoslav times. A decade after the independence of Macedonia this hostility among the titular Macedonian and minority Albanian community resulted with an eight months armed conflict.

Ethno-regionalism in the party politics is considered to be born from the center-periphery cleavage (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Whitefield, 2002). Following this perspective it is not irrelevant whether minorities are mostly situated in rural (peripheral) areas or in center (urban regions). From the NUTS 3 data available at regional level we can conclude that 70% of the ethno regions are rural, 27% are intermediate and only 3% are urban. This is indeed an indicator that the ethno-regionalism is a center-periphery social cleavage in its essence. In addition, from all the NUTS 3 regions (or the closest equivalent to the NUTS 3 for the NUTS non-applicable countries) 78% do not have sea exit. Those who are maritime regions (22%) can be found in Ukraine, Montenegro, Latvia, Estonia, Croatia, Albania and Bulgaria.


Chapter 2.2.4. Conflicts in nationalizing states of Central and Eastern Europe

We conclude this section by offering a glimpse into the map of conflicts in Europe with a special accent to the Central Eastern Europe and an emphasis on the reason behind those conflicts.

The Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIK) analyses political conflicts in the world since 1991, by focusing on conflict processes rather than e.g. purely quantitative thresholds of casualties of war. In particular HIK's 'Conflict Barometer' (CB) is concerned with the concrete actions and communications between conflict parties, which gives the analysis of political conflicts²¹ a broader and a more detailed empirical foundation.


²¹ "A political conflict is a positional difference, regarding values relevant to a society - the conflict items - between at least two decisive and directly involved actors, which is being carried out using observable and interrelated conflict measures that lie outside established regulatory procedures and threaten core state functions, the international order or hold out the prospect to do so." HIK definition, available at: <http://www.hik.de/en/>

Figure 2.12. Average difference between the ethno-regions²² and the other regions' average national Gross Domestic Product for NUTS 3 in the period of 2000-2013.



Source: EUROSTAT (2016)

Figure 2.13. Conflicts in Europe by item: territory, secession, autonomy or other (2003-2014)



Source: Conflict Barometer Reports, Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research

²² By 'ethno region' hereby I understand a NUTS 3 (for Poland only NUTS 2) region, or a set of regions which have been clustered as the ones with higher concentration of a certain ethno-regional minority than the rest of the regions (called 'other regions' in this sub-chapter). The decision which region or a set of regions is going to be called 'ethno region' is made after the clustering procedure used for mapping of the territorial concentration of ethnic groups (introduced in the previous sub-chapter).

CB's data implies that nonviolent conflicts prevail in Europe in general, as well as in the countries of CEE²³. Moreover, in the period between 1989/1992 and 2014 although the trend of the total number of conflicts both in Europe in general and in CEE is rising, the rising number is clearly much higher for the non-violent conflicts than the violent ones.

In addition, HIIK's Conflict Barometer differentiates between ten conflict items, defined as material or non-material goods which are claimed by the direct conflict actors through constituent conflict measures. Two of these represent exclusively interstate items (Territory, International Power) while five are solely subjects of internal conflicts (National Power, Secession, Autonomy, Subnational Predominance, and Decolonization). The remaining items, System/ Ideology, Resources, as well as the residual item "Other" may be part of both intra and interstate conflicts. In the past decade, conflicts driven from internal autonomist or secessionist intentions of ethno-regionally concentrated groups, and conflicts driven from territorial pretensions from other external party have relatively stable and lower trend if compared to the rest of the conflict items (conflicts for international power, system or ideology issues, for natural resources, national power etc.) (See Figure 2.13.)

In Central and Eastern Europe, between 1989 and 2014 (HIIK) almost 500 conflict cases (conflict per country and per year)²⁴ were summed up, where majority of the conflict situations (62%), have been motivated by achievement of 'autonomy or secession', 29% were driven for 'territory' and the rest 9% have been motivated from 'other reasons'. The 'territory' item, as previously mentioned refers to the inter-country territorial pretensions, where the conflict party is external to the country's government. The 'autonomy or secession, on the other hand is an internally motivated conflict by certain ethnic or regional group which

²³ The conclusion is made after gathering all the data available from HIIK's Conflict Barometer Reports on annual bases since 1992 until 2015, and only the European conflicts were extracted. The summary of the European conflicts is made as a count of total cases for the period of 1992-2015, where more than one conflict annually might occur in a single country. CB's political conflicts' intensity levels are classified under the ordinal categories of: 'disputes', 'non-violent crisis', 'violent crisis', 'limited war' and 'war'. The first two categories belong to the group of 'non-violent conflicts' and are labeled as 'low intensity' conflicts, while within the second group of 'violent conflicts' two levels of intensity according to the categories of conflict are met: 'violent crisis' marked as 'medium level' intensity conflict, and 'limited war' and 'war' categories are considered to constitute the 'high level' intensity conflicts. The extracted conflicts are being classified as violent or non-violent, and summaries again within a single category.

²⁴ The conflict*country*year conflict case refers to all the conflicts that the Conflict Barometer counts within the annual report. Some of the cases can be repetitive for many years. For instance, the conflict between the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina (living in the region of Republica Srpska) has been counted 24 times since 1991. The very conflict between the Serbian community of Republica Srpska and the Bosniak-Muslims and the Croats in the Federation of BiH has changed intensity various times: from 'war' to 'dispute' in the latest years. This means that a conflict situation is counted can change intensity in time or it can disappear.

might be also supported by an external country, but it does not have to. In addition, from the same data a conclusion can be made that 17.2% from the conflicts for 'autonomy or secession' were violent, 7.7% in the "other" conflict items used violent means, and only 2.2% from the conflicts for 'territory' used violent means.

Brubaker in his 'Ethnicity without groups' in 2004 argued that in spite of the often national and nationalistic form of ethnicity taken in East and Central Europe, and despite its potentially explosive configuration of the collapse of communism, ethnic violence have been less widespread, ethnic mobilization less strong, and ethnic identity less pervasively significant than ordinarily assumed. He claims that the discussions of the region has been widely ethnicized with a potential for crowding out the other more important theoretical and practical perspectives. He argued that ethno-nationalist violence has been limited to a relatively small part of Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, overwhelmingly concentrated in Yugoslavia, Transcaucasia and the North Caucasus. He would have expected at least some of those 25 million Russians stranded as minorities in nationalizing successor states by the breakup of the Soviet Union to be the flashpoint of ethno national conflict and violence. While initially acknowledging the self-proclaimed 'Dnester Republik' in Moldova, part from that he concludes that Russians were neither an object nor the perpetrators of nationalist violence. And yet, only a decade later, Crimea declared independence from Ukraine, and the Russian majority in the eastern parts of Ukraine self-declared Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republic.

Brubaker, nonetheless, was not wrong in concluding that violence in post-communist societies of CEE was concentrated mainly in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union successor nationalizing states. This, once more, proves that 'entropy resistant categories' might sleep longer than expected, but they eventually could wake up. Predicting their 'morning mood' is challenging, moreover, it is the main puzzle of this research. It is too soon to exclude the feasibility that the threat of violence, as a result of unresolved inter-ethnic relations, might rise up again. More so in the countries of CEE where for some countries the democratic transition is not finished yet, where for some states borders are still unmarked, where foreign countries still have strong internal influence, and where religiously motivated terrorism (under the latest new global threats) might ignite again. Be that as it may, while threat of violence is undeniably important aspect for this topic in general, it is the democratic means used by the ERPs' in the party competition game that is of our interest here.

Chapter 2.3. Instead of a conclusion

By 'scouting' Central and Eastern Europe, albeit finding it diverse in many respects, we could finally come to conclusions regarding democratization, marketization and integration across country cases. Therefore we can go back and try to answer the question of 'how far behind communism have stayed for the CEE?'.

Fortunately for the Czech Republic, as part of the successful Visegrad Group of countries, Vaclav Havel seem to had been right when claiming that government have returned to the people. Czech Republic, has been categorized as third most free country, only behind Slovenia and Estonia. Poland, Hungary and Slovakia are among the first eight countries in terms of freedom and democracy. The three Baltic States Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia as well are among the six on average most free countries of CEE. Kosovo, Moldova, Ukraine, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Albania on the other hand score on average above 4 in democracy, which makes them (on average) partly free countries. Macedonia, Croatia, Romania and Bulgaria are in the center with average scores between 4 and 3, which sends a mixed signal regarding freedom in the society in different periods of time.

The Corruption Perception Index as well follows almost the same trend. From 1995 to 2015, the New EU Members are at the positive end of the scale and the Ukraine, Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia at the negative end of the scale. While Bulgaria has been listed closer to the negative examples of corrupt countries, Macedonia, Romania and Croatia stand firm at the center.

How much this freedom, democracy and corruption situation reflects the economic picture? As for the low democracy, freedom and high corrupt countries, the correlation with low GDP per capita stands. Moldova, Ukraine, Albania, and Macedonia score lowest GDP per capita, and the Visegrad, the Baltic States and Slovenia are in the top economic performers. Slovenia, is the leader in terms of democracy, freedom, low corruption and economic growth. The opposite of that are Moldova and Ukraine.

While, we cannot speak of statistical correlations between ethnic diversity, economic performance and freedom and democracy level in this chapter, we can take a look at the ethnic heterogeneity of the CEE countries and make an attempt to see whether there is such correlation from the first view. If looking at the titular ethnic groups we can see that five countries that score low democracy, freedom scores, but high

corruption and low GDP per capita performance (Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Moldova and Ukraine) are among the eight countries with smallest titular group percentages from the total ethnicities. Moreover, among the 18 country/cases of minority ethnic groups that are above 4.5% within a country, 8 cases belong to some of these countries, with Montenegro repeatedly three and Moldova two times. From this five countries only Montenegro hasn't experienced violent ethnic conflict in the post-communist periods, while Ukraine, Moldova, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia have.

And yet, instead of concluding that ethnic heterogeneity is usually accompanied with violence, conflicts, economic underperformance, high level of corruption and low level of freedom and democracy, we can take these insinuations as a challenge from another angle. We can ask whether all of those indicators of democratization, marketization and integration may influence radical self-determination demands in the electoral battlefield by the mobilized ethno-regional groups, and in general, whether they could influence ethnic mobilization at all.

That is to say, do we expect ethno-regionalist parties to naturally mobilize in countries where titular groups are small? Do we expect a correlation between ethnic mobilization and democracy, economic performance, or corruption within a polity, and if there is one, what is the direction of this relationship? The answers to the first question will be given in Chapter 3 where mobilized ethno-regional groups will be elaborated through all ethno-regionalist parties that have ever entered national legislative bodies in CEE. Offering answers to the later question would be the challenge of the final Chapter 5.

CHAPTER 3: MOBILIZED ETHNO-NATIONAL MINORITY GROUPS IN NEWLY NATIONALIZING STATES: POLITICAL PARTIES AND SOCIAL CLEAVAGES IN POST-COMMUNIST POLITICS

After having mapped the regional concentration of national minorities in the CEE countries, a fundamental question arises: is ethnicity a relevant polarizer among the social cleavages²⁵ in a polity? Moreover, is ethno-regionalist potential in CEE mobilized everywhere accordingly? Are those regionally concentrated ethnic groups mobilized through political parties in the national electoral field?

The partisan expression of the four cleavage models (Lipset and Rokkan 1967) obviously have varied internationally. Given all the transformations in Western society over the twentieth century, formal party systems have changed little, in spite of their different programmatic contents. (Lipset 2001). Although the Lipset-Rokkan model emphasizes the institutionalization and freezing of cleavage alignments, the model also has dynamic properties. It views social alignments as emerging from the historical process of social and economic developments. New alignments develop in response to major social transformations such as the National and Industrial revolutions.

With the emergence of so-called post-materialistic issues (clean environment, use of nuclear power, better culture, equal status for women and minorities, quality of education, international relations, greater democratization, and more permissive morality, particularly as affecting familiar and sexual issues), the Western world appears to have entered a new political phase which roughly dates from the mid-1960s. (Inglehart 1997) Issues and cleavages derivative from those of industrial society, however, remain the more

²⁵ Lipset and Rokkan (1967a,b) suggest that the crucial cleavages and their potential expressions can be ordered within the two dimensional space: the territorial and the functional dimension of the national cleavage. On the territorial axis we can find the strictly local oppositions to encroachments of the aspiring or the dominant national elites and their bureaucracies (the reaction of peripheral regions, linguistic minorities, culturally threatened populations to the pressures of the centralizing, standardizing, and rationalizing, machinery of the nation-state). The functional axis encompasses the conflicts over the control, the organization, the goals, and the policy options of the system as a whole. From the conflicts born out of the political (national) revolution and the economic (industrial) revolution, four critical lines of cleavage arise: center- periphery, church- state, land-industry, and capitalists-workers. Two of those cleavages are direct product of the National Revolution: the conflict between the central nation-building culture and the increasing resistance of the ethnically, linguistically, or religiously distinct subject populations in the provinces and the peripheries, and the historically established corporate privileges of the Church. The other two cleavages are product of the Industrial Revolution: the conflict between the landed interests and the rising class of industrial entrepreneurs and the conflict between owners and employers on the one side and workers on the other. (Lipset and Rokkan, 1990: 95-101)

important source of policy division and electoral choice, since the materialistically oriented workers and the self-employed constitute much larger strata than the intelligentsia. (Lipset, 2001.)

Political parties established after or during the first democratic elections in CEE were not prominent, and they did not channel the pressures that helped end the communist rule. Instead, the newly formed opposition groups and infant democratic forces entered the newly liberated political arena within a social movement or under an umbrella organization. (Lewis, 2007)

As we have already seen, democratic, liberal and market transformations have proceeded at widely different paces across Eastern Europe. Moreover, this diversity has appeared in many indicators that are directly relevant to the question of the cleavage structures of the region. Support for parties may vary as a result of many factors that are not connected to cleavages, i.e. even if partisanship appears to be rooted in ideological and social differentiation, this may not result from social and ideological divisions in the population, but rather from parties' strategies.

In the newly nationalizing states communists were the only institutionalized national party, while other groupings were rising and falling from election to election. For the most part the non-Communist efforts have been unable to tie into basic cleavages. (Lipset, 2001).

Be that as it may, Whitefield (186: 2002) shows that the post-communist societies contain structured social and ideological divisions, which social factors, especially age, education, religion, ethnicity, and occupation class-significantly shape ideological perspectives, and that voters choose parties that in high degree programmatically reflect their interest. Moreover, he argues that there is no clear Leninist legacy in the region. The apparent cleavage structures of many countries in Eastern Europe can be compared to those countries in Western Europe without communist past. For instance, he claims that Central Europe resembles France, Austria or Germany in the character of their political divisions much more than they resembles Russia or Ukraine. The most notable area of difference between East and West, nonetheless, results from the strength of ethnic divisions in many states- Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia (which results from the ethnic structure of these countries). (Whitefield 2002: 197)

While ethnicity happens to be a strong cleavage in many CEE countries, there is one important notion regarding social cleavages' reflection in the political scene of CEE, the presence of high volatility.²⁶ Namely, given that the term cleavage is meaningful only if divisions are persistent, stability needs to be established if the term is to be properly applied to the post-communist context. Therefore, the social cleavages reflection in the party systems can be argued if taken into consideration that in CEE elite interests are dominant and fleeting and the parties itself are so unstable. (Whitefield, 2002: 195).

Kostelecky (2002:1975) claims that organizational weakness is often regarded as the principle reason for the volatility of post-communist party systems. Birnir's (2007: 83) noteworthy argument in this respect is that ethnic diversity stabilizes initial vote behavior in heterogeneous new democracies everywhere above and beyond that of homogeneous countries. This goes in the same direction with the social cleavage theory (Lipset and Rokkan 1967 a, b; Bartolini and Mair, 1990), which argues that cleavages are associated with vote stability.

Namely, while the previous studies show a general relationship between the existence of social cleavages and vote stability, Birnir's study is the first one to differentiate the effect of ethnic cleavages from other types. Thus, through a statistical analysis Birnir (2007:98) finds that increasing ethnic fractionalization decreases initial electoral volatility. Nonetheless, what is of a great importance for this dissertation, Birnir (2007:28-9) argues that rather than fostering loyalty to a particular party, ethnic socialization fosters individual loyalty to the ethnic group, and we should expect that the members of the group would support a party in a stable manner as long as the party represents the group's interests. Any divergence of interest of the group and the party, determined by the group's leadership or the members themselves, may result with rapid change in the group members' party support.

This notion is important for this study because it is based on the naturalized constructionism, which this dissertation embraces. That is to say, while assuming that ethnically heterogeneous countries of CEE are more prone to stable vote distribution, we also assume that ethno-regionalist groups may distant

²⁶ In Figure 3.1. (Appendix III) presents data proving that average total volatility in CEE is high (much higher than 12.5 in advanced democracies Webb and White 2007:350).

themselves from parties claiming to represent their needs, when members of that group assess that they do not do that anymore; even more so, when new parties offering more appealing platform to ethnic groups is established.

Therefore, within the scope of this analysis is not only the center-periphery cleavage, which mobilizes ethno-regional conflicts into a party competition at national level, but the internal ethno-regional groups' outbidding, which usually relies on the individuals' perceptions on which party, is the real representative of their group's interests).

Whether we see ERPs in CEE coming from the classical center-periphery cleavage or we claim they are a niche party (Meguid, 2005), we definitely need to treat them as important players in the national elections' arena due to the fact that they represent important strata of the society that shall not be neglected.

The goal of this Chapter is not to give a normative judgment on whether ethnicity should or should not be mobilized, rather there is a comparatively-descriptive purpose behind it. The aim of this Chapter 3 is to address the mobilization of ethno-national minority groups in newly nationalizing states through the political parties claiming to be exactly that – representatives of certain ethnic self-determination demands. Chapter 3.1. will introduce the origins of the ERPs in CEE: where, when and how many of them are there. Section 3.1.1. will more thoroughly tackle their emergence by country and ethnic group, their leadership change and inclusion in government. Chapter 3.2. addresses the electoral success and failure of the ethno-regionalist parties in CEE through their vote and seat share at national level elections. This chapter will address the variability of ERPs' electoral performance, and the intra-group competition by assessing the ethno-regionalist vote share by countries, and by ethnicities in CEE. Finally, in Chapter 3.3. the ethno-regionalist potential in today's CEE will be assessed, by looking at the representation of ERPs in the latest composition of the National Parliaments of all the countries.

Chapter 3.1. The origins of ERP in CEE: where, when and how many?

The latest available countries' Censuses data, elaborated previously in Chapter 2, have provided information on the size and the territorial concentration of ethno-national groups living in nineteen CEE countries. We have seen how some countries were more heterogeneous than others in terms of number of ethno-national groups that constitute the population of the nationalizing state. Moreover, we have been able to compare the size of national minorities and the one of titular ethnic groups in a country, which allowed us to see the level of ethnic heterogeneity of CEE nationalizing states. To be able to visually detect the ethno-regionalist potential for mobilization of ethnic groups, the maps depicting regional concentration of ethno-national minorities were drawn. (see Figure 2.3 in Chapter 2)

Moving forward, we pose the question of how many of those ethno-national groups have been mobilized, or more precisely, how many of those groups have been presented by political parties in the national electoral arena since the first multi-party elections in a polity? The answer to this question in a certain sense is connected with the case selection criteria for this comparison: firstly, the party should be an ERP, and secondly, as a result of party competition, the party should have gained at least one seat in national Parliaments in the period of 25 years of democratic elections in CEE.

To remind, the operational definition of the ERP in this thesis is: 'a political party would be considered as ethno-regionalist if (stated in its name or within the electoral platform) it claims to represent certain ethnic, regional or ethno-regional group (numerously smaller than the titular ethnic group in a nationalizing state) in the electoral arena.

In defining 'ethnic group' this definition coincides with Chandra's (2012) definition that 'an ethnic group is a subset of categories in which descent based attributes are necessary for membership. All ethnic categories require descent-based attributes, but all descent based categories are not ethnic categories. The subset of categories that defines certain ethnic identity can include race, religion, sect, language family, dialect, caste, clan, tribe or nationality of one's parents or ancestors or one's physical features.'

The definition of 'regional identity' holds to Keating's (1998) definition that regional identity and its relationship to political action has three elements: the cognitive, the affective and the instrumental. That is

to say, people that live in a certain territory must be aware of such a thing as a region, and of geographical limits, and have knowledge of the other regions; the region should, to a certain degree, provide a framework for common identity and solidarity, possibly in competition with other forms of solidarity including class and nation, and finally, the region is used (to a certain degree) as a basis for mobilization and collective action in pursuit of social, economic and political goals.

Regions for the purpose of this dissertation can vary, in size and function, from single municipalities/communes or set of municipalities, towards autonomous region, and finally a federal state region (with a potential for independence from the nationalizing state). In addition, each of these types of regions may be currently existing, may have existed in a certain time in the past, or may only be a romantic ideal of certain groups (which have never been realized so far throughout history).

Once defined the concept of ERP, a clarification of the second condition of representation is needed. The selection criteria 'cuts' the borders of the ERPs' set for the purpose of these thesis in the parliamentary representation at national level. Namely, only ERPs that have independently ever gained a minimum of one seat in National Parliament in the period of 25 years of competitive elections will be considered for analysis. Given the small size and the instability in the political arena of the family of ethno-regionalist competition, this criterion shall ensure that we have selected only the relevant electoral players. Nonetheless, those ERPs that have competed at national elections independently, but have never gained any seats, are to be considered when counting the total regionalist vote share and be eventually used as an independent variable, depicting the intra-group electoral competition (more on this in Chapter 5).

Following these criteria the population of this analysis encompasses 90 ethno-regionalist parties from 17 CEE countries (see Table 3.1. Appendix III).

Although the two criteria introduced before may seem simple and clear, there are some exceptions in the case selection that need further clarification. Firstly, the Italian and Hungarian ethnic communities' **voting rights** for the election of their deputies in the National Assembly of Slovenia (*Državni zbor Republike Slovenije*) are specially regulated. Members of the communities only, and not citizens in general, have the right to vote and stand for election as deputies of the Italian and Hungarian communities in Slovenian national elections. Each community sends one deputy to the National Assembly, while voters in those communities also vote on other National Assembly deputies. Therefore, due to these special units of

individual candidate competition arranged by the Slovenian electoral system, which hampers the possibilities for manifestos' assessment in terms of party ideology, the Hungarian and the Italian representatives in national legislature in Slovenia have been excluded from the general analysis.

Hungary's unique ethnic parties competing at national elections, to no avail, are the Roma parties. The six Roma parties proliferating at national elections in Hungary, nonetheless, have been excluded from analysis just as all other Roma parties from all other CEE countries. The reason for this is the non-territorial ethnic appeal of Roma community, which is considered to be an ethnic class (Minorities at Risk Data 2016) rather than an ethno-regional group. Therefore, Slovenia and Hungary fail to be included in the further analysis.

While the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania has been selected and analyzed, twenty parties representing different ethnic minorities²⁷ have been excluded from the quantitative analysis. The electoral system of Romania encourages the participation of ethnic minorities in parliamentary elections, and in spite of the very small vote share (none of the twenty parties have ever exceeded 0.7% vote share), almost always at least one party from each ethnic group gains one seat in parliament.

In the case of Macedonia, those parties representing the Bosniak, the Serbian, or the Vlach ethnic minority are excluded from analysis. In spite of the fact that several parties representing these communities are usually being represented in national parliament, they have never presented their political programmes as independent parties and have never won at least one seat independently. These ERPs instead, always present their candidates within a large coalition of parties (under the umbrella coalition of one of the biggest mainstream/Macedonian parties).

On the other hand the Moldovan Republican Socio-Political Movement Equality (SPMER) is the only exception to the rule of 'one seat won in national parliament' due to an arbitrary assessment of its importance as an advocate of the minorities' appeals at national level. SPMER have failed to win seats in National Parliament of Moldova at three elections, although in 2005 it have won 2.85% of the total votes.

²⁷ Democratic Forum of Germans in Romania, Democratic Union of Turkish-Muslim Tatars of Romania, Democratic Turkish Union of Romania, The Bulgarian Union of Banat-Romania, Bratstvo Community of Bulgarians in Romania, Hellenic Union of Romania, Democratic Union of Serbs and Carasovenians of Romania, Democratic Union of Serbs and Carasovenians of Romania, Union of Serbs in Romania, Union of the Ukrainians of Romania, The Union of Poles of Romania, The Union of Croatians of Romania, The Union of Armenians of Romania, The Cultural Union of Albanians, The Democratic Union of Slovaks and Czechs of Romania, Cultural Union of Ruthenians of Romania, The Association of Macedonians of Romania, The Association of Italians of Romania, Italian Community of Romania, Lipovan Russians Community in Romania, and The Federation of the Jewish Communities in Romania.

Nonetheless, given the specific identity building constellation of Moldova which is reflected in the party system as well, the SPMER is probably the most ERPs of all. It is party that clearly advocates the rights of the national minorities as a prior ideology together with the pro-autonomist stances on the region of Gagauzia and Transnistria.

In conclusion, the country with most parties per ethnic minority (see Table 3.1. in Appendix III) are Ukraine (eleven Russian), Bosnia and Herzegovina (ten Serbian), Macedonia (seven Albanian), Kosovo (six Serbian) and Montenegro (five Albanian). There is a positive relationship between the size of the ethno-regional groups and the total number of parties they have been represented by in Parliament in the past two and a half decade of democratization. Nonetheless, size cannot be the only driver of ethno-regionalist mobilization. If we look at for instance the Albanian parties in Montenegro (with population share of 4.9% and yet five parties), the Russians of Latvia (26.9% and four ERPs), the Russians in Estonia (24.8% and three ERPs), and the Turks in Bulgaria (8.8% and a single party) it is clear that size is not the final determinant of the intra-party competition/ ERPs proliferation. Therefore, variables such as territorial concentration, electoral rules, parties' strategies etc. might have better explanatory power regarding ethnic mobilization.

Not all relatively big in size ethnic groups have been mobilized through ERPs in the national electoral arena though. Ethno-national minorities which constitute at least 1% of total population and fail to politically mobilize themselves at ethnic lines are: Latvia's Belarusians (3.3%), Ukrainians (2.2%), Poles (2.2%) and Lithuanians (1.2%); Lithuanian's Belarusians (1.2%), and Ukrainians (1.2%); Hungary's Germans (1.3%); Czech Republic's Slovaks (1.4%); Slovenia's Serbs (2%), Croats (1.8%) and Bosniaks (1.1%); Estonia's Ukrainians (1.7%) and Belarusians (1%). Finally, some of the Albanian or Bosniak parties in Montenegro appeal not strictly for their communities, but to the Muslim community (3.3%) as well. Therefore no ERPs representing the religious community can be found in spite of the many variations of Muslim identities appearing in the report of the Montenegro's Census.

From Table 3.1 (in Appendix III) we could see the list of all those parties (or coalitions) that represent certain national minority's interests at national level elections, together with their names written in the language

used by the ethnic group of interest, and the English version of ERPs' acronyms.²⁸ As it has been mentioned before, since 1990, only in 17 out of 19 countries had ever had Ethno-regionalist parties winning at least a single seat at national elections. Ninety parties/coalitions²⁹ are found to be at least once represented in national parliament on the basis of independent (individual) electoral competition (excluding the already mentioned 20 Romanian national minorities' parties). Albania has one party representing the Greek national minority; Bosnia and Herzegovina has three Croatian and ten Serbian parties; Bulgaria has one Turkish party; Croatia has one Istrian and three Serbian parties; Czech Republic has two Moravian parties; Estonia has three Russian parties; Kosovo has two Bosniak, two Gorani, two Turkish and six Serbian parties; Latvia and Lithuania have four and two Russian parties consequently; Macedonia has three Turkish and eight Albanian parties; Moldova has four Russian parties; Montenegro has one Bosniak, one Croatian, five Albanian and four Serbian parties; Poland has one German and one Silesian party; Romania has one Hungarian party; Serbia has two Hungarian, one Croatian, two Bosniak and two Albanian/Muslim parties; Slovakia has two Hungarian and finally, Ukraine has eleven Russian parties.

Table 3.2. contains information on the period of existence, the year when ERPs first won parliamentary seats and the year they were included in government for the first time and the total period of governmental participation.

Seventeen parties of all the selected parties for this thesis do not exist anymore. The shortest period of existence had the Serbian coalitions of Montenegro (Serbian List and SNP, NS and DSS) of only 3 years and the Russian party/coalitions Our Home is Estonia in Estonia and For Human Rights in United Latvia of Latvia (four years). The longest period of existence among them all has For Human Rights in United Latvia (18 years), Communist Party of Ukraine (11 years) and Serbian National Alliance and the New Croatian Initiative (9 years each). These parties have all 'died' as a process of transformation into other parties or coalitions, and only the Communist Party of Ukraine has been banned in 2014 by the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, due to allegedly separatist intentions for the pro-Russian separatist regions.

²⁸ To avoid confusion among the acronyms which in some countries are mostly used in the language of the ethno-regional minority, and in others are better known under the titular group's language (usually the official national language), the acronyms used in this thesis are all made out of the English version of ERPs' names.

²⁹ Only ERPs' coalitions are considered for analysis. That is to say, coalitions that for the purpose of gaining more seats are constructed of existing ERPs, speaking for the same ethnic group, are considered as a case of ERP/Coalition in this dissertation.

Table 3.2. Parties representing ethno-national minorities at the political scene

Parties representing ethno-national minorities at the political scene					
COUNTRY	PARTY NAME	PERIOD OF EXISTENCE	FIRST YEAR IN NATIONAL PARLIAMENT	FIRST YEAR OF PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNMENT	PERIOD OF GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATION
ALBANIA	Unity for Human Rights Party *Omonia	1991/1992-	1991	1997	1997-2009 ; 2013-present
	Croatian Democratic Union BiH	1990-	1990	1990	1990-2001; 2002-present
	New Croatian Initiative	1998-2007	1998	2001	2001-2002
	Croatian Democratic Union 1990	2006-	2006	2007	2007-2010
	Srbian Demokrtic Party of BiH	1990-	1996	1997	1997-1999; 2002-2007
	Serbian Radical Party (later Sheshelji)	1991	1996	/	/
	Radical Party of the Republic of Srpska	1998	1998	/	/
	Serbian Radical Party of Republic of Srpska	1992	2002	/	/
	Party for Democratic Progress	1999	2000	2001	2001-2010; 2015-present
	Alliance of Independent Social Democrats	1996	2000	1999	1999-2001; 2007-2010
	SLOGA- UNITY	1998	1998	1999	1999-2001
	Socialist Party	1993	2000	1999	1999-2001;
	Democratic People's Alliance	2000	2006	2015	2015-present
Srbian National Alliance	1997-2006	2000	1999	1999-2001	
BULGARIA	Movement for Rights and Freedoms	1990	1990	1992	1992-1994; 2001-2009; 2013-2014
CROATIA	Serbian Democratic Party	1990-1995/6	1990	/	/
	Serbian People's Party	1991	1992	/	/
	Independent Serbian Democratic Party	1997	2003	2009	2009-2011
	Istrian Democratic Assembly	1990	1992	2000	2000-2002; 2011-present
CZECH R.	Moravane	1990-1996	1990	1990	1990-1992
	Moravian National Party	1990-1997	1992	/	/
ESTONIA	Our Home is Estonia	1995-1999	1995	/	/
	Estonian United Left Party	1994-	1995	/	/
	Russian Party in Estonia	1994-2012	1995	/	/
KOSOVO	Vakat Coalition (BDS, NB, USB)	2004-	2010	/	/
	Bosniak Party of Democratic Action of Kosovo	2010-	2010	/	/
	Civic Initiative of Gora	1990-	2010	/	/
	Coalition for Gora	2014-	2014	/	/
	Turkish Democratic Party of Kosovo	1999-	2010	/	/
	Independent Liberal Party	2006-	2010	2010	2010-2014
	United Serbian List	2010-	2010	2014	/
	Serb Democratic Party of Kosovo and Metohija	1990-	2010	/	/
	New Democratic Party	2010-	2010	/	/
	Progressive Democratic Party	2010-	2010	/	/
Srbian List	2014-	2014		2014-present	
LATVIA	Harmony Centre	1994-	1993	/	/
	Latvian Russian Union/ For HRUL	1994-	1993	/	/
	Socialist Party of Latvia	1994-	1995	/	/
	For Human Rights in United Latvia	2002-2006	2002	/	/
LITHUANIA	Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania	1994-	1992	2012	2012-present
	Lithuanian Russian Union	1995-	2000	2001	2001-2004

MACEDONIA	Democratic Party of Turks	1990	1994	/	/
	Movement for National Unity of the Turks in Macedonia	1996	2011	/	/
	Party for Movement of the Turks in Macedonia	1999	2002	/	/
	Party for Democratic Prosperity	1990-	1990	1992	1992-1998
	People's Democratic Party	1990-1997	1990	/	/
	Party for Democratic Prosperity of Albanians in Macedonia	1994-1997	1990	/	/
	Democratic Party of the Albanians	1997-	1998	1998	1998-2002; 2006-2008
	Democratic Union for Integration	2002-	2002	2002	2002-2006; 2008-present
	National Democratic Party	2002-2006	2002	/	/
National Democratic Revival	2011-	2011	/	/	
MOLDOVA	Socialist Party-Unity Movement	1992-	1994		
	Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova	1993-	1998		1999-2009
	Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova	1997-	2014	1999	
	Social-Political Movement "Equality in Rights"	1998-	never		
MONTENEGRO	Bosniak Party	2006-	2006	2009	2009-2012
	Croatian Civic Initiative	2002-	2006	2006	2006-present
	Democratic Union of the Albanians	1993-	2006	2006	2006-2012
	New Democratic Force - FORCA	2005-	2009	2012	2012-present
	Albanian Coalition Perspektive	2009-2012	2009	/	/
	Albanian Alternative	2006-	2006	/	/
	Party of Democratic prosperity	2006-	2006	/	/
	Srbian List	2006-2009	2006	/	/
	Coalition: SNP NS DSS	2006-2009	2006	/	/
	Socialist People's Party of Montenegro	1998-	2009	/	/
New Serb Democracy *Democratic Front	2009-	2009	/	/	
POLAND	German Minority	1991-	1991	/	/
	The Silesian Autonomy Movement	1991-	1991	/	/
ROMANIA	Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania	1989-	1990	1996	1996-2000; 2004-2008; 2009-2012; 2014-present
SERBIA	Democratic Fellowship of Vojvodina Hungarians	1991-	1990	2000	/
	Alliance of the Vojvodina Hungarians	1994-	1997	2014	2000-2004; 2014-present
	Democratic Alliance of Croats in Vojvodina	1990-	1990	2008	2008-2012
	Party of Democratic Action of Sandzak	1990-	1990	2008	2008-2014
	Bosniak Democratic Party of Sandzak	1996-	2000	2000	2000-2004;
	Party for Democratik Action	1990-	1990	/	/
	Democratic Reform Party of Muslims	1990-1993	1990	/	/
SLOVAKIA	SMK-MKP Hungarian Coalition	1990-	1990	1998	1998-2006
	Bridge	2009-	2010	/	/
UKRAINE	Communist Party of Ukraine	1993-2014	1994	2006	2006-2007; 2010-2012
	Party of Labor	1992-2000	1994	/	/
	Party of Regional Revival of Ukraine	1997-	1998	2010	2010-2014; 2014, 2015
	Opposition Bloc	2010-	2014	2014	2014-2016
	People's Democratic Party	1996-	1998	1997	1997-2002
	Party Union Soyuz	1997-	1998	/	/
	Civil Congress of Ukraine (Slavic Party)	1992-	1994	/	/
	Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (Burduhan)	1990-	1994	/	/
	Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (united) (Zbitnev)	1990-	1998	2002	2002-2005
	Socialist Party of Ukraine	1991-	1994	2005	2005-2007
Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine	1996-	1998	/	/	

Regarding the participation in national parliaments only 13 parties have been existing more than five years in the political scene before winning any seat in national parliaments. The record for longest period between first parliamentary entry and years of existence goes for the Party of the Socialists of the Republic of Moldova (PSRM) which have been established in 1997 and have waited 17 years before it was first represented in national parliament (in 2014). The Social-Political Movement "Equality in Rights" (as it was mentioned previously an exception to the rule) is the only one existing longer than the PSRM and have not yet being represented in national parliament.

While ERPs differ in the duration of parliamentary participation, less than 50% (44.9%) of the parties have ever been represented in government coalitions. Table 3.2. provides more detailed elaboration of the first year an ERP have been included in government as well as the total period in which a party have been participating in a certain governmental coalition. Twelve parties have had to wait more than five years before included in national governments. Four of them are ERPs from Serbia (Democratic Fellowship of Vojvodina Hungarians (10), Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians (17) Democratic Alliance of Croats of Vojvodina (18) and Party of Democratic Action of Sandzak (18)).

Parties that have been included in government for the longest time are the Albanian Democratic Union for Integration in Macedonia (in the period of 2002-2006; 2008-ongoing), the Unity for Human Rights Party in Albania (1997-2009; 2013-ongoing), the Croatian Civic Initiative of Montenegro (2006-ongoing), the Party of Communist of the Republic of Macedonia (1990-2009), the SMK Hungarian Coalition of Slovakia (1998-2006), the Istrian Democratic Assembly of Croatia (2000-2002;2011- ongoing), the Democratic Union of Hungarians of Romania (1996-2000; 2004-2008; 2009-2012; 2014-ongoing), and the Movements for Rights and Freedoms of Bulgaria (1992-1994; 2001-2009; 2013-2014). The Croatian Democratic Union of BiH (1990-2001; 2002-present), and Party for Democratic Progress of BiH (2001-2010; 2015-ongoing) are also among the ERPs that have been included in government for a significant period of time, but the measurement of the years in government need to be considered carefully given the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina that lasted until the 1995 (only in 1996 the first post-war BiH federal elections happened).

Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia have practiced power sharing or soft power sharing system consequently, and it is thus logical that ERPs from BiH and Macedonia would be included in government during all the period of free multiparty elections. On the other hand, countries such as Estonia, Latvia,

Poland and Czech Republic have a history of governments with low (or no) practices of ethno-regionalist parties' inclusion. It can be argued that the small size of the national minorities, and thus parties representing ethnic cleavages, might be the main reason for it. Nonetheless, there are countries such as Albania or Lithuania whose national minorities do not exceed 10% of the total population³⁰ and their parties have still been included in governments in certain periods of time. This notion suggests that there can be explanation of the ERPs' inclusion in governments that goes beyond size of ERPs. In addition, only two Serbian parties participated in government coalition in Kosovo (Independent Liberal Party 2010-2014 and the United Serbian List since 2014), while in Bosnia and Herzegovina only the three radical Serbian parties have not been part of a government.

If counting all the cases of ERPs participation in national elections in CEE (in total 347), we find out that in 92 out of 347 cases (26.5%) ERPs compete in national elections in a pre-electoral coalition, almost 50% (48.91%) of those 92 coalitions have been made with a non ERP, 34.8% were coalitions among ERPs, and 16.3% of the cases are ERPs that are being constituted as a coalition of ERPs representing the same ethnic group. (see Table 3.3.)

Table 3.3. Coalitions of the ERPs

Coalition of the ERPs		
Coalition type	Number	Percentage
The party is a coalition of ethno-regional parties	15	16.30%
Coalition with other ERP	32	34.79%
Coalition with non ERP	45	48.91%
Total number of coalition cases	92	
Total number of cases of parties*year*country	347	
Ratio/Total number of coalitions and total number of cases		26.51%

³⁰ Greek minority of Albania constitutes less than 1%, and in Lithuania the Polish minority constitutes less than 7% and the Russian minority less than 6%.

Finally, ERPs' elite and leadership may influence not only their electoral success but their ideology as well. That is to say the level of radicalism of the self-determination claims may in large vary with the elite change, as some leaders might see moderation as a more democratic and pacific way of asking greater self-determination vs. others who deem radicalization is inevitable stage of the process of ERPs' life.

Table 3.4 (in Appendix III) contains the list of all leaders that have shaped and led ERPs of CEE. One interesting information from this table is that 43 out of 90 parties had never have a change of leadership. Some, nonetheless, are very young parties, such as the Kosovo's ERPs that have competed only in two electoral cycles since the 'independence', or Montenegro's parties since its independence. Nonetheless, the very percentage of almost 50% of parties having a single leader during its whole existence is an indication of at least two strong assumptions: firstly, the ERPs of CEE are not yet democratized, thus like the other post-communist parties are very dependent on the personality of the leaders (therefore often pejoratively named as 'sultan' parties), and secondly, ERPs are more personalized than programmatically ideologized.

And yet, ERPs that have arose from leadership disagreement or change of an older party, are not that often as one would expect to find. Such case is for instance the case of the establishment of party 'Bridge' by the former SMK Hungarian Coalition leader Bela Bugar who did not agree with the radical nationalistic rhetoric by the new SMK leadership and thus established the more moderate 'Most-Hid' party, that eventually overtook SMK's electorate. Apart from this case many of the repetitions in leadership numbers are those of party leaders that in certain periods appear to be leading an ERP coalition such as the BiH' s Serbian SLOGA-UNITY leaders Milorad Dodik and Biljana Plavshic that were at the same time leaders of their parties Alliance of Independent Social Democrats and Serbian National Alliance consequently.

Chapter 3.1.1. ERP in CEE, by country

Chapter 3.1.1.a. Albania and Bulgaria, the countries with a legal ban on ethno-regionalist parties

Both, Albania and Bulgaria, have banned parties established on ethnic, religious or regional bases. Therefore, the Greek minority in Albania and the Turkish minority in Bulgaria established political parties that promote general human rights protection rather than promote one specific ethnic minority's rights.

Omonia (Ομόνοια - Democratic Union of the Greek Minority) is a Greek social, political and cultural organization in Albania that promotes minority rights for the Greek minority in the south of the country. (HRW 1996, WDM 1997) It was formed in January 1991 and contested the first Constitutional elections of Albania the same year, winning five seats in the Albanian National Parliament (Kuvendi i Shqipërisë). It was subsequently barred from political participation as a result of a new law that prohibited the "formation of parties on a religious, ethnic and regional basis".

Thus, the creation of the Party of Human Rights Union (PHRU) (Lansford 2014), founded as a separate political organization, albeit facilitated by Omonia, was permitted by the Albanian Ministry of Justice (HRW 1996). Ever since PHRU is being represented in the national legislative body. In 1997 it reached maximum representation of four seats, in 2009, running in the coalition Unification for Change with the Socialist Party, it won only one seat, and again, one seat in 2013 election, running as part of the Alliance for a European Albania (again headed by the Socialist Party).

In 1997, the first Chair of PHRU, Vasil Melo, has outlined that that PHRU was not the same as that of 1992 and in the course of the last few years, the PHRU has created a new image as an Albanian political party accepted across the country. In 2002 party Congress the leadership has changed, with Vasil Gule as Chair, and he would be the sole representative in the National Parliament of Albania since 2009.

In March 2010 "Party for the Future of the Greek Minority" emerged from several OMONIA and PHRU former members. It contested the 2013 National Elections, but it did not win a single seat.

The Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), is a centrist (liberal) political party in Bulgaria, whose main goal is to protect the interests of the Muslims, especially Turks. However, its principal electorate are also

the Pomaks (Muslim Bulgarians) and the party relies on the biggest share of all the Romani voters. The party was officially established in 1990, but its roots can be traced back to the 1983 when an illegal terrorist group Turkish National Freedom Movement was established, which committed fire-raising, bomb attempts and murders on regular citizens until 1989, as a rebellion against the assimilation policies of Zhivkov's communist regime. Ahmed Dogan established MRF shortly after he has been set free out of the prison in 1989, and he was the leader of the party from its official establishment in January 1990 until January 2013, when an assassination attempt against him failed.

Parties of ethnic and religious nature are nominally forbidden by the Constitution of Bulgaria. On 8 October 1991, ninety-three members of Bulgaria's National Assembly (Народно Събрание), virtually all of them affiliated with the former Communist Party, asked the constitutional court to declare the MRF unconstitutional citing Article 11.4 of the Constitution which explicitly stipulates that "there shall be no political parties on ethnic, racial or religious lines, nor parties which seek the violent seizure of state power" (Constitution of R. Bulgaria, 1991). On 21 April 1992, the court rejected the petition and affirmed the constitutionality of the MRF. (Ganev 2004) The statute of the MFR states quite clearly that it "is an independent public and political organization, founded with the purpose of contributing to the unity of all Bulgarian citizens". (Constitution of DPS 1990)

On 19 January 2013, Lyutfi Mestan was elected as the second chairman of the MRF. Nonetheless, on the 24 December 2015, the Honorary President Dogan, dismissed Mestan from the position of Chair due to his supportive statement for Turkey regarding the downed Russian warplane, made in Parliament. (SNA 2015) On 24 April 2016, at the IX National Conference, Mustafa Karadaya was elected President of MRF.

Three other small Turkish political factions opposing MFR's politics exist today, but none of them managed to ensure elected representatives in Parliament.

Chapter 3.1.1.b. The post-Yugoslav states, an abundant spring of ethno-regionalism

Bosnia and Herzegovina

As one of the most ethnically divided countries of CEE, Bosnia and Herzegovina's new (Dayton) Constitution encourages power-sharing in the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Moreover, the Federal Parliament counting 42 representatives is always constituted of parties representing the three constitutive peoples. Ten Serbian and three Croatian parties have been represented in the House of Representatives Bosnia and Herzegovina (Predstavnički dom Bosne i Hercegovine) so far.

To start with the Croatian parties, the first one to be participating in the political life of BiH is The Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (CDU BiH), formed in August 1990, in Sarajevo. The party has had two splinter factions so far, the New Croatian Initiative and the Croatian Democratic Union 1990, nevertheless it has been the biggest parliamentary Croatian party in the House of Representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina up until now.

The New Croatian Initiative was founded in 1998 after Krešimir Zubak disagreed on the newly elected leadership during CDU BiH's 5th Congress. Zubak proposed Bozo Ljubic, whom he deemed moderate politician, unlike the previous leadership of CDU BiH, but Ljubic dropped the candidature, and the elected President Jelavic was not supported by CDU in Croatia (Tudjman). Zubak founded the Bosnia-Herzegovina's Croatian Democratic Union, composed of mainly liberal politicians unsatisfied with the CDU BiH's work, which shortly after changed its name to the New Croatian Initiative (NCI). After succeeding to win one seat in couple of Federal elections, in 2007, NCI merged into the Croatian Peasant Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but it never won any seat at federal level BiH.

The Croatian Democratic Union 1990 (CDU 1990) was founded in 2006 by another CDU BiH's dissident Božo Ljubić. Ljubic failed to win over Chovic at the 2005 CDU BiH's Congress, who he accused of stealing votes, driving the party at the political margins and isolation. CDU 1990 has been the leading party of the 2006 coalition Croats Together, later in 2010 the Croatian Coalition, and in 2014 competed independently at federal level.

Under the leadership of Martin Raguz, formerly moderate politician, CDU 1990 called for a federalization of BiH after opposing the Travanjski package, which he deem will drive the Croatian community in BiH at a

level of national minority. (Morrison 2009) After he merged the CDU 1990 with the Croatian Peoples Union BiH (former Croatian Peasant Party- New Croatian Initiative) in 2014, many members, including the founder Ljubic, left the party. At the next Party congress CDU 1990 revoked this merger and the party restructured; the new leader Ilija Cvijanovic was elected.

Finally, the Croatian Christian Democratic Union, which have usually competed in a coalition with NCI, the Croatian Peasant Party, and the Croatian Party of Rights will be examined from the analysis because they have never won Federal seats independently.

Thanks to Ljubic's initiative, the leaders of the main Croatian political parties in BiH (HDZ BiH-Dragan Čović, HDZ1990-Božo Ljubić, HSP Đapić-dr. Jurišić-Zvonko Jurišić, HSS BiH-Marko Tadić, Narodne stranke Radom za boljitak- Jerko Ivanković-Lijanović, HKDU-Ivan Musa) have gathered in Kreshevo in 2007 and signed the so called Kreshevo Declaration (2007). This declaration calls for new functional and legislative organization of BiH. The new BiH Constitution shall be based on several principles among which is the abandoning of the two entity organization of BiH and implementing a new functional and legislative organization under which none of the three constitutive nations of BiH will be privileged nor discriminated. Moreover BiH shall be a decentralized three level country with state, middle and local level of government and Sarajevo City should have special status. (KD 2007)

The Serbian parties in BiH are even more diverse. One of the most successful parties among the Serbian ones, has been the Serbian Democratic Party BiH (SDP) which was founded by Radovan Karadjic in 1990 and aimed at unifying the Bosnian Serb community, and staying part of Yugoslavia (as the "Third Yugoslavia" with Serbia and Montenegro) in the event of secession by BiH from the federation.³¹

In the parliamentary elections of 2006, the SDS gave away its status of 'leading party' to the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (AISD), led by the Prime Minister of Republika Srpska, Milorad Dodik.

³¹ After Radovan Karadjic who stayed at the leadership position until 1996 four other leadership changes have occurred: Aleksa Buha (1996-1998), Drgan Kalinich (1998- 2004), Dragan Chavich (2004-2006) Mladen Bosic (2006-ongoing). Among the notable former members of the party are Radovan Karadžić, Momčilo Krajišnik and Biljana Plavšić, all impugned for crimes against humanity and genocide during the Bosnian War, and went on trial at the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Due to a failure to arrest and turn over war crimes suspects to the international tribunal, the party is under sanctions which prohibit any transfer of funds and material from the United States.

Further on, there is “a trio” of radical parties in Republic of Srpska that were based on the Chetnik pan Serbian ideology of Vojislav Šešelj, who on allegation of war crimes, was awaiting a verdict for more than 11 years by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the Hague. On 31 March 2016, he was found not guilty of all charges. The Serbian Radical Party (SRP) was formed in February 1991 by the merger of Vojislav Šešelj's Serbian Chetnik Movement and the National Radical Party of Tomislav Nicolich. The Serbian Radical Party of Republica Srpska (SRP RS), on the other hand, was founded by Nikola Poplashen and its current leader Milanko Mihajlica. In 2004 this have distanced itself from any relations with the Belgrade Headquarter of the party and Sheshelj's ideology. The rest of the members who were supporting the ideological father of the party founded the Serbian Radical Party "Dr. Vojislav Šešelj" and ever since its foundation failed to win federal seats. The Radical Party of Republika Srpska also contested against the SRP RS in 1998 winning one seat, but it lost it already in the next 2000 elections.

The Party of Democratic Progress (PDP) is the third-largest party in Republika Srpska. PDP was established in Banja Luka in September 1999, with Mladen Ivanić elected as the president of the party. The new leader since November 2015 is Branislav Borenovic.

The Socialist Party (SP) founded in 1990 (June 1993 according to the official web page of the party) was a branch of the Socialist Party of Serbia, the Miloshevic party. Its leaders, who were officers of the Serbian Army would claim otherwise though. (Bugajski 2002) The party joined Plavshic and Dodik's Sloga coalition in 1998. In spite of the equal ideological stances on the position of Republica Srpska (joining Yugoslavia), the SP was the main political opponent of the SDP BiH. The current leader of the party is Petar Djokic, since 2002, and the party has social democratic ideology, and moderate positions on cooperation with the international community.

The Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (AISD) grew out of several mergers led by the Independent Social Democratic party (founded in February 1992 in Banja Luka, by Milorad Dodik). Its President, Dodik, is the current President of the Republika Srpska and he is famous for his secessionist claims for Republika Srpska. The party got the name AISD in 2002. It was the initiators of the coalition Sloga-Unity with Plavshic and the SP. They became the main opposition in the nationalist bloc of SNP and SRP RS in the Serb entity.

After being suspended in 2011, in September 2012, the party was expelled from Socialist International for continuing to "espouse a nationalist and extremist" line.

The Serb National Alliance or Serbian People's Alliance of Republika Srpska (SNA) was the party established by Biljana Plavšić in 1996. It stop functioning ten years later due to the fall of the political career of its leader who was indicted in 2001 by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia for war crimes committed during the Bosnian War. The party was part of the Sloga coalition in 1998 with AISD and SP which won 4 seats in Federal Parliament.

Finally, the Democratic National Alliance or Democratic People's Alliance (DNA) was established in 2000 and its first leader was Dragan Kostic, to be substituted by Marko Pavic, after the merger of Pavic's conservative party Alliance of National Rebirth with DNA in the fall of 2003.

Similarly to the Croatian Kreshevo Declaration, in 2010, the AISD and SDP have signed a Platform for coordinated action of AISD and SDP in the joint organs of BiH. They thereby declare that in all joint state organs, especially in the Federal Parliament of BiH they will adjust all the positions regarding issues of a vital interest for Republika Srpska and protect the Constitutional Position of Republika Srpska in the best possible way. They declare they will protect its territorial integrity and constitutionally-lawful sovereignty, based on the Constitution of Republika Srpska and the Annex IV from the framework agreement for peace in BiH, the Dayton Peace Agreement. They agree on the EU future for Republika Srpska and declare that all the Constitutional changes of BiH should be agreed by the citizens at a referendum. Finally, they stipulate that BiH cannot unilaterally recognize Kosovo.

Croatia

Three Serbian ethnic minority parties and one party from the Istria region have been represented in National Parliament of Croatia (Hrvatski Sabor).

The first Serbian party to enter the Parliament of Socialist Republic of Croatia in 1990 was the Serbian Democratic Party (SDP). (Bugajski 2002) In spite of the fact that most of the Serbian votes went to the Union of Communist (Party of Democratic Reform), SDP won five seats, one of which is the Socio-Political Council. Founded in 1990 by the psychiatrist Jovan Rashkovic in Knin, SDP's main goal was protection of

the interests of the Serbs in Croatia. It was considered as a nationalist, separatist party from the Croatian Serbs due to the post parliamentary elections events. An association of Serb municipalities was already established in Knin ahead of the elections. On 25 July 1990, hours after the parliament adopted the amendments, Serb National Council (SNC) was set up at a political rally in Serb and the Declaration on sovereignty and autonomy of Serbian nation was adopted.

On 1 August 1990, the SNC met in Knin, elected Milan Babić (the extreme fraction of the SDP) as its president and announced a referendum on Serb autonomy in parts of Croatia with Serb-majority populations. It was scheduled for the period from 19 August to 2 September 1990. Croatian authorities declared the plan illegal on 3 August 1990. Nonetheless, the SNC referendum went ahead and produced support for an "independent status" of Croatian Serbs. Babić consolidated power over the region, which soon became the Serbian Autonomous Region Krajina (Srpska Avtonomna Oblast (SAO) Krajina). As SAO Krajina gradually consolidated and expanded areas under its control, armed clashes in Pakrac and Plitvice Lakes ensued by March and April 1991, sparking the Croatian War of Independence. By that time, 28 of the 37 ethnic Serb members of the Croatian parliament, including all five SDS representatives, had left the parliament. (Barić 2005) SDP stopped existing with the end of the War for the Fatherland (Domovinski Rat) and the end of the so called Republika Srpska Kraina.

The Serbian People's Party (SPP) is the second party representing the Croatian Serbs in Croatian National Parliament (Hrvatski Sabor), since 1992. SPP was founded in 1991 by Milan Đukić, one of the leaders of SDP which was expelled by the party because he opposed its extremist politics.

Until the 2003 parliamentary elections the SPP was the only Serbian party in National Parliament of Croatia, but then it was overthrown by the Independent Democratic Serbian Party (IDSP) which was founded by Vojislav Stanimirovic in the year of 1997, as a continuation of the political activity of the previous Serb parties in Croatia. Part of the SDP members continued its political activity in ISDP which has ever since 2003 been represented by 3 members in the National Parliament.

Due to the specific provisions for national minorities which hamper 'normal' competition, the Hungarian, the Italian, the Czech and Slovakian, the German, the Albanian etc. national minorities that have been included in National Parliament of Croatia will not be analyzed. Moreover some regionalist parties such as

the Alliance of Primorje-Gorski Kotar, the Slavonia-Baranja Croatian Party or the Croatian Democratic Alliance of Slavonia and Baranja are also examined of the analyses due to its non-ethnic roots.

The one ethno-regionalist party that has been represented in Parliament since 1992 is the Istria Democratic Assembly (IDA) which is a regionalist and liberal political party in Croatia operating in the Istria region and representing the special Istria identity (a mixture of Croatian, Italian and Slovenian cultures). It has been founded by Ivan Pauletta, Elio Martinčić and Mario Sandri in February 1990. The party was led by Ivan Jakovčić between 1991 and 2014, and it is currently led by Boris Miletić.

Serbia

Beside the Vojvodina Region where most of the Hungarian and Croatian communities of Serbia are concentrated, the Bosniak community concentrated in the Sandjak Region and the Albanians from the Preshevo Valley are being represented in National Assembly (Народна Скупштина) of Serbia through their political parties.

The Hungarians of Vojvodina have been represented at national level elections through various parties; the Democratic Fellowship of Vojvodina Hungarians (DFVH) from 1990 to 2000 (and then in 2012 again won 1 seat in the All Together Coalition) and the Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians (AVH) since 1997 onwards. In the year of 2003 the Hungarian parties lost their representatives in the National Parliament and in 2008 they went in a joint Hungarian Coalition (HC) which was composed of these two parties plus the Democratic Party of Vojvodina Hungarians (DPVH) but it was led by István Pásztor (the AVH leader).

The DFVH was founded in 1989 in Bečej and it was led by Sándor Páll until his death in 2010 when Áron Csonka came at the leadership position and it is the current President of DFVH. The AVH is currently led by István Pásztor, while the former party chairman József Kasza was the President of AVH until 2007, and then was proclaimed an honorary president of the party until his title was revoked because of various disagreements on party issues. AVH is the leading parliamentary party of the Vojvodina Hungarians since 2000.

The most successful Croatian party from Vojvodina has been the Democratic Alliance of Croats in Vojvodina (DACV) founded in July 15, 1990. Since 2003 DACV is led by the President is Petar Kuntić, and

his predecessor since foundation has been Bella Tonkovic. The party has won one seat in National Assembly in 1990 independently, but later has always being included in wider coalitions to be able to win no more than one seat. Over time, several parties emerged from the DACV, but none of them managed to gain more support than DACV.

The Party of Democratic Action of Sandjak (PDAS) founded in 1990 (led by Sulejman Ugljanin) and the Bosniak Democratic Party of Sandjak (BDPS) founded in 1996 (led by Esad Djurdjevic) are the two parties representing Bosniak minority in the region of Sandjak. On couple occasions these parties allied and formed a joint coalition List of Sandjak.

Finally the Albanian minority in the Valley of Preshevo have also been represented in the Serbian National assembly through the Party for Democratic Action (PDA) founded in 1990 and led since its foundation by Riza Halimi. In 2007 the PDA led a coalition named the Albanian Coalition from Preševo Valley but in 2014 the party again competed independently. The party wins one or two seats in all but the 2000 elections at national level.

Kosovo

National minorities in Kosovo have 20 reserved seats in the National Parliament of Kosovo (*Kuvendi i Kosovës*). Since the declaration of Independence in 2008 there has been two national elections. In each of them twenty seats have been distributed to parties representing national minorities (ten seats are reserved for Serbs, four seats for the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians, three seats for the Bosniaks, Montenegrins, Croats, Hungarians, two seats for the Turks, and one seat for the Gorani people), and several extra seats were won due to larger support for the parties representing the Serbian, Turkish and the Bosniak Community.

Parties from the Roma (Ashkaly and Egiptian) community are examined from analysis due to the already elaborated reasons, Eleven different parties have been represented in the Kosovo's Parliament: the Bosniak parties (Vakat Coalition, and Bosniak Party of Democratic Action of Kosovo), the Gorani parties (Civic Initiative of Gora, and Coalition for Gora), the Turkish Democratic Party of Kosovo, and the six

Serbian parties (Independent Liberal Party, United Serbian List, Serb Democratic Party of Kosovo and Metohija, New Democratic Party, Progressive Democratic Party, and Serbin List).

Some parties such as Serb Democratic Party of Kosovo and Metohija, or Civil Initiative for Gora date back to the 1990s, when Kosovo was independent region in Yugoslavia, and some such as Bosniak Party of Democratic Action of Kosovo, the United Serbian List, the New Democratic Party, the Coalition for Gora and the Serbian List, are parties/coalitions established after 2010.

Macedonia

The Serbian, Vlach and Bosniak national minorities of Macedonia, although represented in National Assembly (Собрание) by ethnic parties, have never managed to win any seat independently. These parties, which have so far never presented independent electoral program, will be examined from analysis. The Turkish and the Albanian national minorities, on the other hand, have been represented in national parliament by several parties in the twenty five long multiparty parliamentary elections and are going to be analyzed.

Three Turkish parties in Macedonia won support from the electoral in national elections. The Democratic Party of Turks (DPT) was founded in 1990 by Kenan Hasipi and it has been the most successful one. The Movement for Turkish National Union (MTNU) was founded in 1996 by Erdogan Sarac (DPT dissident), and the Party for Movement of the Turks in Macedonia (PMTM) was founded in 1999 by Adnan Kahil. MTNU and DMTM are being represented by only one MP, while DPT managed to win three MP seats in 2002 and two in 2006. None of these parties have changed their leaders so far.

The first Albanian Party, founded in 1990, was the Party for Democratic Prosperity (PPD) lead by Abduladi Vejseli. The People's Democratic Party (PDP), with Iljaz Halimi as its first president, and the Party for Democratic Prosperity of Albanians (PDPA), (funded in 1994 by Tachi and Dzaferi), were both founded by more radical PPD's dissidents. In 1990 and 1994 these two groups allied in pre electoral coalitions so to finally merge in one party in 1997. The new part was named the Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA) and it is currently led by Menduh Thaçi who was the Vice President of the party until 2006, when the President

Arbën Xhaferi resigned. The most successful Albanian party in Macedonia currently is DPA's main opponent, the Democratic Union of Integration (DUI). DUI was founded after the 2001 armed conflict in Macedonia by the members of the Former National Liberation Army of the Albanians, and led by Ali Ahmeti.

The charismatic Mayor of Gostivar, Rifi Osmani, managed to win seats in the last two national elections with the National Democratic Revival (NDR), founded in 2011. National Democratic Party (NDP) first participated in 2002 elections, winning one seat. After the majority of the party leadership (including the party leader Kastriot Haxhirexha) abandoned the party to merge with DUI, in 2003 Basri Haliti overtook the leadership, but in the 2006 elections failed to win any seat, thus never competed national elections again.

Montenegro

The Bosniak and the Croatian national minority in Montenegro are being represented with one party each since Montenegro's independence in 2006. The Bosniak Party (BP) was founded in 2006 by Rafet Husović. It was formed by unification of the Slavic Muslim oriented parties in Montenegro: International Democratic Union, Bosniak Democratic Alternative, Muslim-Bosniak Alliance and Party of National Equality. The Croatian Civic Initiative (CCI) was formed in 2002 with Marija Vučinović as the party's current president.

The Albanian minority of Montenegro has five reserved seats in national parliament and more than six parties have competed for them so far. The Democratic Union of Albanians (DUA) took part in the campaign prior to the Montenegrin independence referendum, promoting Montenegro's independence alongside DPS, SDP, GP and LP. Its leader (known for being against same sex marriage in Montenegro) is Ferhat Dinusha. New Democratic Power-FORCA, led by Nazif Cungu, was founded in October 2005, as a local minority party representing the Albanian population in Ulcinj.

There are three other parties representing the Albanian national minority which have won one seat at national elections: the Albanian Alternative (AA), led by Gjergj Camaj, the Party of Democratic Prosperity (PDP), and finally there is the Albanian Coalition "Perspective" (AC-P).

There are more than ten Serbian parties representing Serb community in Montenegro, nevertheless only four had succeeded to win at least one seat in National Parliament (Skupština) independently.

Srpska Lista (SL) was a political alliance in Montenegro between 2006 and 2009. SL was not simply a coalition of parties, but an entity on its own; for instance, the MPs elected on its list are not considered to represent the party they originally come from, but genuinely SL. The Serb People's Party (SPP) was the strongest part of the coalition, and in 2009 it merged with New Serbian Democracy (NOVA).

Besides the Serb People's Party of Montenegro, the coalition consisted of various organizations and individuals which present themselves as protectors of the Serbs of Montenegro: Party of Serb Radicals, People's Socialist Party of Montenegro, Democratic Party of Unity, Serbian National Council of Montenegro, and Academic Alternative. While the Serb People's Party and the People's Socialist Party of Montenegro merged into the New Serb Democracy, in 2009, those who did not accept the merger gathered around the Serb National List, claiming to be the original heir of *Srpska Lista (Serbian List)*.

A new party named *Srpska Lista* was established again on 5 January 2012, but it never won any seat in national parliament. The New Serb Democracy (NSD-NOVA) or NOVA, which was formed in January 2009, is led by Andrija Mandić, leader of the former Serb People's Party. Mandić sought to transform the *Serb List* coalition into a more civic-oriented party, in order to boost the party's coalition potential, and even the dropping the "Serb" prefix from the newly formed party's name was considered. This idea was met with strong resistance during the merger talks.

The Socialist People's Party of Montenegro (SPPM) has its origins back to 1997, but the party's change of leadership meant also a change of ideological course. In December 2006, Srđan Milić became its president, which meant that the excessively pro-European Unionist program of the party won. The SPPM joined the Coalition with People's Party (PP) (led by Predrag Popović), and Democratic Serb Party (DSP) (led by Božidar Bojović, and then by Ranko Kadić) in 2006 elections, to later abandon the People's Coalition and run independently. The People's Coalition, did not win seats afterwards.

Chapter 3.1.1.c. Ethno-regionalism in the Visegrad three: Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland

Czech Republic

The Moravian and Silesian regionalist parties achieved representation in Czech Parliament (*Parlament České republiky*), only in the national elections of 1990 and 1992; Yet a turmoil in the Moravian party system occurred in the post-communist period. To start with, two main parties appeared right after the liberation of the communism in Czechoslovakia, the Movement for Autonomous Democracy–Party for Moravia and Silesia (HSD-SMS) and the Moravian National Party (MNP). HSD-SMS was established in April 1990, and was initially led by Boleslav Bárta. The party was part of Peter Pithat's coalition government in the period of 1990-1992, but its position within the government was assessed as semi opposition and semi coalition. (Strmiska, 2000) HSD-SMS was more of a catch all Moravian movement with main objective to create a federal state system with Moravia and Silesia as the third country within the Federation of Czechoslovakia.

The MNP was formed in 1990 and adopted the principle of Moravian ethno-territorial identity as a national identity, and its leader was Ivan Drimal. The slogans calling for equal status of Moravia and Silesia were accompanied with claims for independence and self-determination of the Moravians and Silesians and for the revival of the Moravian state, sometimes involving provocative declarations of some leaders suggesting separation of Moravia from the Czech Republic and internationalization of the "Moravian issue" (Pernes 1996: 244-245; Dallago 1999: 28).

A turmoil of events 'defines' the following years of the Moravian and Silesian parties evolution, explained carefully by Strmiska (2000), so to end up with the merge of the Movement of Self-Governing Moravia and Silesia - Moravian National Unification (HSMS-MNSj) and the Moravian Democratic Party (MDP) in the Moravané (Moravians) party with Pavel Dohnal, (a former communist) becoming the Party Chairman. Moravané advocates for the independence of Moravia via restoration of the Moravian legislative parliament within the territorial scope of the Moravian ecclesiastical province. In March 2009, party leadership passed to Jiří Novotný. The party's independent participation in the 2006 and 2010 national elections did not bring any new success to the Moravian regionalist parties what so ever. (Landsford 2004)

Because of a traceable connections between the party elites from several established parties in the period of more than two decades, the original HSD-SMS and Moravane, these parties are going to be considered as one party representative from the Moravians in Check Republic, and the MNP as its opponent.

Slovakia

The Hungarian minority in Slovakia shortly after the Velvet Revolution has organized itself in various political parties of different ideological provenance. The first to contest national elections was the alliance between Coexistence and the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement in 1990 and in 1992 Slovak elections, each time winning fourteen seats in the Slovak National Council (*Národná rada*).

Coexistence (Együttélés) was a political party established in February 1990 by Miklós Duray, and although largely a Hungarian minority party, its membership also included Germans, Poles, Ruthenians and Ukrainians. The Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement (Magyar Kereszténydemokrata Mozgalom-MKDH) was founded by a group of Catholic Hungarian intellectuals in January 1990, firstly chaired by Kalman Janics and very shortly, in 1991, substituted by Béla Bugár.

In 1994 the Hungarian Civic Party joined the alliance between Coexistence and the MKDH to form the Hungarian Coalition (HC) umbrella platform. The HC won 17 seats in the National Council of the Slovak Republic that year. In response to an anti-coalition law passed by the Mečiar government, which prevented parties from forming electoral cartels at election time, which small parties had used to overcome the 5% electoral threshold, the HC officially merged into one party in 1998.

The Party of the Hungarian Community (Strana maďarskej komunity-Magyar Közösség Pártja -SMK-MKP) was founded in March 1998 and won 15 seats in the Slovak national legislative body that same year. SMK-MKP was led by Béla Bugár until March 2007, when Pál Csáky was elected for Chairman by the Assembly of Party, thus succeeding the more moderate Bugár. As a reaction to this, Bugár established the party Most–Híd in June 2009, stating that Csáky was too nationalist.

The new party, whose name Most–Híd means "bridge", emphasizes the cooperation between Hungarians and Slovaks. Because of Most-Hid, SMK-MKP failed to acquire 5% of the popular vote, the threshold necessary for entering the National Council of the Slovak Republic in 2010, while the new Bugar's party

won 14 seats. In response, Csáky and the whole party leadership resigned, and József Berényi came on the chairman position. In September 2012, SMK-MKP changed its name to The Hungarian community - Magyar Közösség Pártja, but failing to win a single seat in 2012 national elections made it extra-parliamentary political party. Most–Híd received 6.89% of the popular vote in the 2012 elections, winning 13 seats and so it is the only parliamentary party representing the interest of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia.

Poland

The Germans and the Silesians are the largest minority communities in Poland actively involved in the political and cultural life of Poland. In 1989 Germans began to form associations of socio-cultural, including dozens of associations of the German minority supported (financially) by the Federal Republic of Germany. German Minority (GM) is the electoral association that represent the German community in Poland in the lower house of Polish parliament (Sejm). Candidates of the GM are proposed by the Social-Cultural Association of Germans in Silesian Opole (TSKN) and the Social-Cultural Association of Germans in Silesian Voivodeship (SCAGSV).

Currently, the largest association of German minority in Poland is the TSKN, and it is the only organization of the German minority in Poland, which is not financed by the German government. Since 1991 the GM has been represented in the Polish Parliament (Rabagliati 2001), starting with seven MPs in 1991, but since 2007 there is a single member in the Sejm, Ryszard Galla, who was selected from a list of German minority in the constituency of Opole.

Silesian Autonomy Movement (Ruch Autonomiję Śląska - RAM) is a bipartisan association that aims to recover pre-war autonomy of Upper Silesia in modern form. RAM was founded by Rudolf Kołodziejczyk in Rybnik and after three more changes of its leadership, the current Chairman is Jerzy Gorzelik. RAM has not been electorally successful as the GM, and it is currently not represented in the Sejm. In 1991, SAM gained two seats in the Sejm; in 2001 Parliamentary Elections, two activists of RAM competed in the list of the Civic Platform, and in 2005 activists of the association were included on the electoral lists of the Polish Peasant Party. In 2015 under the Union of Upper Silesians-RAM again failed to win Parliamentary representation.

Chapter 3.1.1.d. The Baltic States' post USSR ethno-regionalism mobilization

The term “the Singing Revolution”, referring to the spontaneous mass night-singing demonstrations at the Tallinn Song Festival Grounds in 1988, is a commonly used name for the events between 1987 and 1991 that led to the restoration of the independence of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Moscow’s reaction to the independence movements of these countries was reflected in the support it offered for the autonomist claims by some national minorities from the newly nationalizing states. In Estonia, for instance, several demonstrations by the Russian community, supported by Soviet bureaucracy and security services occurred. An autonomous Russian Republic in the northeastern Estonia with its capital in Narva, and some militants even demanded the secession of this heavily Russified region and its attachment to Russia. There was also a Moscow ignited Russian and Polish minority support for the anti-independence “Edinstvo” (Unity) movement in Lithuania. A pro-soviet grouping declared a Polish Autonomous Region of Lithuania in the southeastern part of the country. Once the independence in all of the Baltic States became de jure as well as de facto (especially after the Coup from Moscow on Latvia in August 1991), and Moscow’s support was missing, these autonomists and secessionists movement disappeared. The protection of the national minorities was seen through the democratic ethnic parties claiming to speak for them. (Bugajski 2002)

Estonia

Only in 1995, a party claiming to represent the Russian community in Estonia managed to win seats (six out of 101) in the Estonian Parliament (Riigikogu). “Our Home is Estonia” was in fact a coalition constituted by two parties, the conservative Russian Party in Estonia (RPE) and the leftist Estonian United People's Party (Русская партия Эстонии) (EUPP) and led by Viktor Andrejev, EUPP’s Chair. Already in 1999 the alliance was broken and both parties presented separate lists for the legislative elections where the RPE lost its parliamentary representation.

The Russian Party in Estonia, founded in 1994, Chaired by Sergei Kuznetsov, originates from the right-of-centre party Russian National Union (from 1920). It advocated stronger political and social rights of ethnic minorities in Estonia and saw itself as a representative of the Russian Orthodox Church in Estonia as well.

After uniting with various other minor parties³² but with no success in the national legislature, the RPE in 2012 merged with the much more successful Social Democratic Party-SDP (Sotsiaaldemokraatlik Erakond).

The main RPE's competitor, the Estonian United People's Party, although it took all of the seats from its previous ally in 1999, and despite the active promotion campaign by Russian special services it lost parliamentary representation already in the 2003 legislature with the new chair Georgi Boshrov. In 2006 it has changed its name into the Constitution Party (Konstitutsioonierakond), and it finally merged with the Estonian Left Party, in June 2008, forming the Estonian United Left Party.

The Estonian Left Party (Eesti Vasakpartei - EVP), a socialist political party, originating from the Communist Party of Estonia (EKP) it had changed its name and leaders more than five times in twenty years itself.³³

The new Estonian United Left Party (EULF), led by Valek Kald, has socialist characteristics, and also seeks to represent the Russian minority in Estonia, but in the 2015 national elections did not achieve parliamentary representation.

The Russian community in Estonia, thus, although a large community, it is appealed by the more ideologically rather than ethnically oriented parties. The Social Democratic Party is one such party (currently chaired by an Estonian Russian, which includes the Russian issue within its electoral program. Moreover, given the historical parties' mergers, many of the minor Russian parties, have already merged with the SDP.

Latvia

In Latvia the Russian national minority have predominantly voted for three parties: the National Harmony Party (NHP), For Human Rights in United Latvia (FHRUL) and the Socialist Party of Latvia (SPL). These three parties, nonetheless, have changed their party names on several occasions, moreover, they have presented themselves at elections for the Latvia's National Parliament (Saeima) in joint coalitions with each

³² Those other minor parties were: The Russian People's Party (in 1996), Vene Balti Erakond Eestis (VBEE), vein Ühtsuspartei (PGT) and Erakond Eestimaa Ühtsus (EÜ) in 2003.

³³1990 was registered the independent Estonian Communist Party (EKP);1992 the congress of EKP renamed party to the Estonian Democratic Labour Party (EDTP); 1997 the party was renamed the Estonian Social Democratic Labour Party (ESDTP); December 2004 Estonian Social Democratic Labour Party changed the name to Estonian Left Party (EVP).The party has been chaired by: Vaino Väljas (1992-1995) Hillar Eller (1995-1996) Tiit Toomsalu (1996-2004)Sirje Kingsepp (2004-2007)

other. In addition, the Party of Russian Citizens in Latvia, the Light of Latgale and the Russian Party have competed in several legislative elections, but without gaining seats.

The National Harmony Party's roots can be found within the moderate wing of Popular Front of Latvia (Latvijas Tautas Fronte), the Latvian independence movement of late 1980s and early 1990s. Its leader, Jānis Jurkāns, was the first Minister of Foreign Affairs of newly independent Latvia, from 1990 to 1992, when he had to leave the government for his stance on the Estonian relations with Russia. Together with other activists, Jurkāns founded the Harmony for Latvia (Saskaņa Latvijai - Atdzimšana Tautsaimniecībai) alliance, which won 13 seats (out of 100) in the 1993 parliamentary election. The alliance split in 1994, with the free-market liberal wing becoming the Political Union of Economists and the social-democratic wing becoming the National Harmony Party. Until 2005 Jānis Jurkāns was its leader.

Equal Rights (ER) was founded on the basis of the "Equal Rights" faction (founded in April, 1990) of the Supreme Soviet as an NGO in 1993. The NGO transformed into a party in 1996. Its leaders were MPs Tatjana Ždanoka and Sergejs Dīmanis. The organization participated in the 1995 legislative election within the LSP. The LSP was formed in 1994 as a successor party to the Communist Party of Latvia, which was banned in 1991. The president of the party Alfrēds Rubiks, was imprisoned for six years in 1991 on charges of participating in a coup d'état against the Latvian authorities in August 1991. While in the 1995 legislative elections the ER and LSP jointly presented their list, NHP was their competitor. The ER and LSP leaders, while very popular among the Russian community in Latvia, were very unpopular among the Latvian community. The moderate NHP, on the other hand was also popular among the rest of the Latvian community.

In 1998, the alliance FHRUL, was founded by the three parties ER, NHP and LSP, with Tatjana Ždanoka, Jakovs Pliners and Miroslav Mitrofanov as co-chairpersons of its Ruling Board. During this period, ForHRUL's most prominent leaders were Jānis Jurkāns (NHP), Alfrēds Rubiks (LSP) and Tatjana Ždanoka (ER). The NHP lost from its popularity because of the coalition with the more radical pro-Russian positions of ER and LSP. After the 2002 legislative elections where the three parties presented a joint list once more, the alliance split (in 2003), with the National Harmony Party and the Socialist Party abandoning the coalition.

The newly founded party Free Choice in People's Europe (made up of dissident LSP and NHP members) and ER transformed their block FHRUL into a unified party in 2007. The party failed to win any seats in the 2010 legislative election.

In 2005, the NHP and LSP entered the alliance Harmony Centre (HC) and competed jointly against the FHRUL in 2010, 2011 and 2014. Since then, the support for FHRUL has declined as ethnic Russian voters have switched allegiance to HC and in the Latvian parliamentary election, 2010, the party lost its representation in the Latvian Parliament. HC coalition continued to be the dominant party representing the Russian speaking minorities in Latvia. In February 2010 the NHP merged into the Social Democratic Party „Concord”, together with New Centre and the Social Democratic Party and the Daugavpils City Party (in 2011). The new Chairman was Nils Ušakovs, while Janis Urbanovics distanced himself from politics since 2005. In January 2014 FHRUL changed its name to the Latvian Russian Union (LRU). The Co-chairpersons of the party are Tatjana Ždanoka, Jurijs Petropavlovskis and Miroslavs Mitrofanovs. No seats in legislative elections were won neither in 2014.

Lithuania

Lithuanian Russian Union (LRU) was founded in October 1995 in Vilnius, and its leader Sergei Dmitriev is still the Chair of the party. The party had never achieved more than three seats in the national legislative body of Lithuania (Seimas) and it has lost its representation in 2009 elections, thus in 2012 the leaders of the party presented themselves in Labor Party's list. In 1996 there a parallel initiative to bring together the Lithuania's largest minorities under the Alliance of Ethnic Minorities (AEM) chaired by R. Lutinovic, but the 2.44% national support did not win the AEM any seat in the Parliament.

The Russian community according to the polls (Bugajski 2002) is more left oriented, and thus it is most likely appealed by the social-democratic parties in Lithuania.

The only ethnic party currently represented in the national legislative body of Lithuania is the Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania (EAPL) officially registered in October 2014. Its first Chair, Jan Senkevič, stayed

on that position until 1999, ever since Waldemar Tomaszewski is the party's leader. The Association of Poles in Lithuania (LLA) (a public-political organization founded in 1990), was EAPL's antecessor which contested the first democratic elections in Lithuania in 1992 and won four seats to the Polish community in Latvia. The parties primary aim is not ideological, but the protection and enhancement of the rights of the Polish minority in Lithuania. It supports a more influential political role for the Roman Catholic Church, mandatory religious education in schools, and a reduction in the number of Lithuanian parliamentarians from 141 to 101 coupled to an increase in the number of local councilors.

In 2004 the EAPL and the LRU had cooperated running within a common list in 2004. The number of EAPL's MPs is in a rising trend since 1996.

Chapter 3.1.1.e. Romania: the generously inclusive ethno-regional party politics

A specter of parties representing national minorities have their seats in the Chamber of Deputies of Romania (*Camera Deputaților*) of the National Parliament of Romania. The Constitution of Romania and the Election Law grant to legally constituted organizations of citizens belonging to national minorities the right to a Deputy mandate, in case these could not obtain at least one Deputy or Senator Mandate at the election. The Hungarian minority is the only one whose political party actually achieves more than one percent of votes, all the rest have never won more than 0.67% electoral support in twenty five years of competition for national parliament.

The main political organization representing the ethnic Hungarians of Romania is the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (DAHR). DAHR was founded on the 25th of December 1989, immediately after the fall of the Communist dictatorship in the Romanian Revolution of 1989. In spite of the fact that it is officially organized as a national minority organization (not as a party) it nevertheless acts as one of the main parties of Romania.

The first president of DAHR was Géza Domokos, in office from 1990 to 1993, and succeeded by Béla Markó until the Party Congress in 2011 when today's president Hunor Kelemen was elected. Kelemen was re-elected for president in 2015. The DAHR has been a parliamentary party since 1990 when it also had its

biggest success and won 29 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. In 2012 DAHR's number of Parliamentary representatives fell to 18. Hungarian People's Party of Transylvania, a more radical fraction from DAHR, founded in 2011 have 'stolen' 47955 votes from DAHR. In spite of the fact that the new party did not win any seat, the vote share of DAHR in 2012 was one per cent less than in the 2008 elections.

Twenty more parties (non-governmental organizations, or cultural associations) representing the smaller communities have been represented in the lower house of Romania: the German, Turkish-Tatar, Italian, Bulgarian, Macedonian, Lippovan Russian, Albanian, Serbian, Croatian, Slovakian and Czeck, Armenian, Jewish, Ruthenian, Hellenic, Ukrainian, and Polish.³⁴

Chapter 3.1.1.f. Identity building post-communist states and the issue of ethno-regionalism: Moldova and Ukraine

Moldova

The Moldovan national elections campaigns in the past twenty five years of independence have usually been driven around the most important question: "what is the Moldovan nation?" The main national political opponents at the national Parliament (*Parlamentul Republicii Moldova*), the Party of the Communists of the Republic of Moldova, and the parties of the Alliance for European Integration seem to be constantly struggling over who constitutes the core nation of the Republic ethnically (Danero.I. 2013) are Moldova's citizens Moldovans or are they Romanians?

Parties such Partidul Popular Creștin Democrat, Partidul Reformei (later Partidul Liberal), the Partidul Național Liberal etc. have claimed intentions for unionism of Moldova with Romania. Nonetheless, these

³⁴ Parties that have been represented in Romanian National Parliament but are examined from analyses for this purpose are: Democratic Forum of Germans in Romania, Democratic Union of Turkish-Muslim Tatars of Romania, Democratic Turkish Union of Romania, The Bulgarian Union of Banat–Romania, Bratstvo Community of Bulgarians in Romania, Hellenic Union of Romania, Democratic Union of Serbs and Carasovenians of Romania, Democratic Union of Serbs and Carasovenians of Romania, Union of Serbs in Romania, Union of the Ukrainians of Romania, The Union of Poles of Romania, The Union of Croatians of Romania, The Union of Armenians of Romania, The Cultural Union of Albanians, The Democratic Union of Slovaks and Czechs of Romania, Cultural Union of Ruthenians of Romania, The Association of Macedonians of Romania, The Association of Italians of Romania, Italian Community of Romania, Lipovan Russians Community in Romania, and The Federation of the Jewish Communities in Romania.

parties do not represent the Romanian national minority in Moldova, rather they represent those citizens of Moldova that consider Moldova to have Romanian ethnic identity. Thus, those parties will not be included in the analysis.

The pro-Russian parties such is the Party of Communist of Republic of Moldova, the Party of Socialist of Republic of Moldova, on the other hand, fight for Moldovianism of the country in ethnic sense, but they also protect the Russian and the Russian speaking national minorities in Moldova (as well as the Gagauzian national minority in Gagauzia).

Right after the Moldavian independence two regions, the Transnistria region, and Gagauzia, have rebelled the initiative of Moldovan independence. Both regions have special status today. The Transnistria autonomous territorial unit with special legal is a formal administrative unit of Moldova established by the Government of Moldova to delineate the territory controlled by the unrecognized Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic, and the autonomy of Gagauzia is guaranteed by the Moldovan constitution and regulated by the 1994 Gagauz Autonomy Act, which stipulates that if Moldova decided to unite with Romania, Gagauzia would have the right to self-determination. (Law on the Special Legal Status of Gagauzia 1994).

The War of Transnistria followed armed clashes on a limited scale which broke out between Transnistrian separatists (the Russian speaking minority), and Moldova as early as November 1990 at Dubăsari. A ceasefire agreement was signed in July 1992 and has held to the present day. Transnistria has a multiparty system and a unicameral parliament with 43 members. Parties competing in this regions are not related to the Moldovan national elections, they are regional parties, but none of them participates in national elections due to the unrecognized independence of the so called Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic.

Due to a ban on establishing local political parties, there are no Gagauz parties in Gagauzia either. Instead, most local politicians are members of local civic movements. Individuals seeking a seat in the Gagauzian People's Assembly, run as independent candidates, and only later form factions, which are often also joined by members running from party lists.

Gagauz Khalky (GKh), also known as the Gagauz-Khalky People's Movement (GKPM), is a former Gagauz separatist political party in Moldova. It was led by S. Gulgar fromed in 1989. The Moldovan government

outlawed the party two days after declaring such secession movements to be unconstitutional. (Bugajski 2002: 910-911)

After 1995, the most popular party in the region has been the Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM), which apart from the fact that it is the most successful party in the Gagauzian Assembly it also accounts for nearly all Gagauz deputies in the Moldovan parliament. The governor represents the Gagauzia in Moldova and abroad, and is therefore an ex officio member of the Moldovan government with the rank of minister. (Bugajski 2002; Georgievich and Arbatov, 1997)

Thus the first party to be included in this analysis would be the Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova which is a communist party in Moldova, led by Vladimir Voronin. It is the only communist party to have held a majority in government in the post-Soviet states, and apart from being the main pro-Russian actor in Moldovan politics, it is also claims to represent the national minorities in Moldova (especially the Gagauzians). The party was in power from 2011-2009, but its most successful year was 2001 when it had 50.07% of vote share and 71 out of 101 seat in national legislature.

The Republican Socio-Political Movement Equality is one of parties that could be considered as a Russian national minority protector party. Republican Social-Political Movement "Ravnopravie" was officially registered in October 1998 to represent the interests of Russian speaking population, by the party leader Valery Klimenko. The party sympathizes with separatism in Transnistria. The Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova (known as the Party of Socialists of Moldova-Motherland between 2005 and 2011), was founded in 1997, and led by Igor Dodon. Finally the Socialist Party, founded in 1992, that managed to secure seats at national level in 2001 with the Braghis Alliance will be taken into consideration.

Ukraine

In spite of the fact that today 78% of the Ukrainian population are ethnic Ukrainians, the significance of the Russians living in Ukraine is beyond regional. The two diverse standing points on what is the Ukrainian nation (promoted by the political parties) only prove that Russian community in Ukraine is not to be considered as a simple national minority because the Russian language crosscuts both the ethnic Ukrainians and the Russian community in different regions. Thus, here as well, when talking about the Ukrainian cases of parties representing national minorities we will talk about parties that have opposite

views on the core of the Ukrainian nation. The Communist Party and the Party of Regions stood for the idea that the Ukrainian nation is strongly rooted in the common soviet past, while the pro-European parties such as the Our Ukraine, or the Bloc Julia Timoshenko trace the roots of the Ukrainian nation back to Kiev Rus and see the Russians as the “others”. (Wydra 2013)

Thus one can even argue that the views on the foreign policy of the country defines the ethnic or the ethno regionalist family better than the name of the party or parties' appeals on protection of minorities. Ukraine's ERPs manifestos contain the issues of identity and foreign strategic policy much more than any minority protection policy.

Eleven political parties supported mainly by the Russian speaking Ukrainians will be analyzed, in spite of the fact that the number of parties for which Russian speaking community in Ukraine votes is somewhat larger, or some of the parties included in the analyses have been constituted of some smaller parties.

Today's Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (SDPU) is one of the two parties emerging from the initial SDPU founded in 1990. The SDPU' crisis split the party into Buzduhan-wing (left) and Zbitniev-wing (center). The two wings separated in 1990, so to merge again in December 1992 into one party SDPU. Nonetheless, in 1993 they split again. The Buzduhan left wing registered as SDPU, while Zbitniev's right wing was refused registration and only later in 1994 registered as the Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (united)-SDPU(u). Since the last split SDPU never become as popular as its sister party the SDPU(u). The SDPU(o)'s first party chair was Andrew Nosenko, then since 1998 until 2007 it was Viktor Medvedchuk so to finally in 2007 Yury Zahorodny gets elected as Party Chair.

The Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU), one of the oldest parties of Ukraine, was created by the former members of the Soviet-era Communist Party of Ukraine in late 1991 when the Communist Party was banned. It was part of the Verkhovna Rada (Ukraine's parliament) from 1994 to 2007 and was for long the fourth biggest party of Ukraine. Since 2007 the election results of the party have been extremely marginal. Oleksander Moroz led the party for more than 20 years. In 2010 Vasily Tsushko came to the chairman position, in 2012 Mykola Rudkovsky and finally in 2015 Nikolai Ilyich Garden.

The Slavic Party (SP) is a political party of Ukraine, previously known as Civil Congress of Ukraine (Civil Union). In March 1992 in Kharkiv the consultative meeting of some politicians from eastern regions of

Ukraine took place. At this meeting the decision for creation of the new political power was made, and soon in Donetsk, under leadership of Mykola Azarov, the name of the future organization - Civil Congress of Ukraine (CCU) was adopted. Later that year, under the leadership of Pavlo Khaimovych, CCU was officially created. In June 1993 the Civil Union was officially registered as a political party under the name of Civil Congress of Ukraine.

The Party of Labor (PL) was founded, in December 1992, as well in Donetsk. Its leader became Valenyn Landyk until 1993 when he left the position to Mykola Azarov. This party laid foundation to several other big parties later in time such as the Slavonic Party of Ukraine and the Party of Regions. The Party of Labor merged into the Party of Regions in 2000.

The Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) was founded in 1993 as the successor to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in Ukraine, which was banned in 1991. Petro Symonenko has been leading the party since its foundation. The most successful year for the CPU was 1998 when the party won 121 out of 445 seats. Until the aftermath of the Orange Revolution in 2004 it was continuously the largest single party in the Ukrainian parliament, but it is no longer represented in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine because it came into conflict with the Ukrainian government due to its support for the ousted President Yanukovych in February 2014. Moreover the party demonstrated support for the separatist movement in Eastern Ukraine and a pro-Russian agenda. The charges against the CPU party, by both the General Prosecutor of Ukraine and the Security Service of Ukraine, include supporting the annexation of Crimea by Russia and "financing terrorism" (i.e. providing support to separatists in Eastern Ukraine), both acts of treason against the Ukrainian state. Consequently, in May 2015 laws that ban communist symbols came into effect in Ukraine. Because of these laws the Ukrainian Interior Ministry stripped the party of its right to participate in elections in July 2015, and in December 2015, Kiev District Administrative Court validated the claim of the Ministry of Justice in full, (banning the activities of the party in Ukraine). The party appealed this ban at the European Court of Human Rights.

The Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine (PSPU) was created by Nataliya Vitrenko, a then dissident member of the Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU), in April 1996. She led a group of more radical SPU

members who opposed what they regarded as revisionist tendencies in the Socialist Party. In October 1995 they had left that party.

The People's Democratic Party (PDP) was established in February 1996 in Kyev through a merger of three political parties: Party of Democratic Revival of Ukraine, Toiling Congress of Ukraine, Union of Support for Republic of Crimea, two public organizations Union of Students of Ukraine and the New Wave and two political clubs the New Ukraine and the Association of young Ukrainian politicians and political scientists. The new Party Chairman, Anatoliy Matviyenko, was elected. At the time of the election the party's key member, Valeriy Pustovoitenko, was prime minister. Pustovoitenko became the party's leader in May 1999 until April 2006. In September of 2001 into the party was merged the Interregional Bloc of Reforms. At the parliamentary elections 2002 the party was part of the For United Ukraine alliance. After the 2006 election defeat Valeriy Pustovoitenko resigned as leader of the party Lyudmyla Suprun, the current Chairman, came in his place.

"Soyuz" Party Union (PU "Soyuz") was registered in June 1997 and its first leader was Svitlana Savchenko. The party is mostly based in Crimea, and it was formed on the basis of the prohibited *Crimean party*. Since 2005 Lev Myrmysky is the party Chair.

The Party of Regional Revival of Ukraine (PR) was founded at the congress held in October 1997 in Kyev. The first leader of the party was the mayor of Donetsk, Volodymyr Rybak. In November 2000, the 3rd Extraordinary Party Congress adopted the merger of five political parties: For Beautiful Ukraine, All-Ukrainian Party of Pensioners, Party of Labor, Party of Solidarity of Ukraine, and Party of Regional Revival of Ukraine into a new one under the name of Party of Regional Revival "Labor Solidarity of Ukraine". The co-leaders of the new political polity became Valentyn Landyk, Petro Poroshenko, and Volodymyr Rybak. In March, 2001, at the 3rd Party Congress, the party changed its name to Party of Regions.

During the 2014 Ukrainian revolution on February 20, several party members called for the disintegration of Ukraine and a union with the Russian Federation. Oleksandr Yefremov, leader of the Ukrainian parliamentary faction in full support of these proposed actions, and Vladimir Konstantinov, chairman of the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea went to Luhansk to support these decisive actions. On 23 February 2014 the Party of Regions condemned and disassociated itself from Victor Yanukovich for

corruption, "criminal orders", his escape, and "cowardice". The following months more than 120 MPs left the party's parliamentary faction. The party did not participate in the 2014 parliamentary elections. In the following months, the majority of its representatives continued their political careers predominantly with Opposition Bloc, Revival or Our Land.

Opposition Bloc (OB) was founded in 2010 and it took part in the 2014 Ukrainian parliamentary election to unify political forces that did not endorse Euromaidan. In the election it won 29 seats. The party was registered at the Ukrainian Ministry of Justice on 23 April 2010 as "Leading force". The party was led by Anatoly Kornienko, and it did not participate in the 2012 parliamentary elections. The Opposition Bloc does not represent parties, but it is consisted only of individual politicians. Five members of Party of Regions were in the top 10 of the Opposition Bloc's electoral list, after the Party of Regions refused to participate at the 2014 elections because many Ukrainian citizens were unable to vote due to the War in Dombas.

In conclusion, ethno-regionalism in the CEE countries varies in terms of regional size and justification of identification of the group with the region, parties' size, their nature of self-determination claims, parties' names (excluding or including the name of the ethnic group) etc. There are parties who claim to speak for large ethnic groups (the Serbian parties of Bosnia and Herzegovina or Montenegro that speak for 30% of the population), and those (such as the Greek party of Albania) that speaks for a population of less than 1% of the total. There are parties who claim to speak of nations rather than ethnic groups, such as the Serbian and Croatian community of BiH which are all recognized as constitutive peoples of BiH together with the numerically larger group of Bosnian Muslims. Then, there are the Albanians of Macedonia who have been considered as an ethnic minority, so to be later on named as non-majority community, while still claiming that their status within the Macedonian Constitution should be equal to the titular ethnic group of Macedonians. The regional nature of the Istria community of Croatia makes the ethno-regional party representing Istria region at national elections unite Croats, Slovenians and Italians living in Istria under the same regional identity of Istrians, which IDA itself claims to be a special Istrian identity (with deep historical roots for all the population living in that region). The Moravian and the Silesian identity is probably best described as a stateless nation from the perspective of the parties claiming to represent the community and claim for autonomy from Czech Republic or Poland.

Chapter 3.2. Success and failure of the ethno-regionalist parties in CEE: strength and variability of the ERPs' vote and seat share;

There is a fairly large deviance in size among minority ethno-regionalist groups in CEE, which goes from below 1% of the total population up to 30% (the Serbian of Bosnia and Herzegovina). Therefore, it can be easily assumed that mobilized ethnic groups would naturally offer diversification in party sizes as well. The minimum votes that an ERP has won since 1990 is 277 (the Albanian Party for Democratic Prosperity in Macedonia's 2011 national elections), while the maximum is 8 148 745 votes (the Party of Regions is a pro-Russian party in Ukraine, in 2006).³⁵ Thus the mean vote for an ERP is 298431, and the standard deviation is 929202 votes.

As for the vote share variation, it goes from zero for several parties to 50% vote share for the Party of Communists of Moldova. The mean is 5.5% and the deviation from the mean is 8%. The number of seats received and consequently the seat share may vary from zero to maximum 186 seats (for the Party of Regions in Ukraine), and a maximum of 70.3% of vote share for the Communist Party of Moldova.

The large size of the Communist Party of Moldova, and the Party of Regions of Ukraine, seen through both number of votes and vote share from total, and number of seats and seats share arises the question of how much regional these ethnic parties actually are. Moreover, as it has been introduced before, given the specificities of the nation-building processes which directly tackles the identity building discourse, the very ethnic part of their identity is questionable. Be that as it may, the ideology orientation of the selected parties will be a subject to analysis in Chapter 4.

From Table 3.5, in continuation, we can see the best and the worst vote share of each party initially observed in this research and the absolute difference between the worst and the best year of electoral performance (for those that have competed more than once). In absolute values the difference between the best and the worst years of elections varies from 0.04% to 33.47%.

³⁵ The argument is based only on the party cases that are considered for analysis within the dissertation, excluding those parties that have probably won a certain vote and seat share in national elections but are excluded from observation due to failure to please the condition of 'one seat won at national level'.

Table 3.5. Parties representing ethno-national minorities' success at national level

Parties representing ethno-national minorities' success at national level							
COUNTRY	PARTY NAME	BEST YEAR*	VOTE SHARE	WORST YEAR	VOTE SHARE	ABSOLUTE DIFFERENCE	RELATIVE DIFFERENCE (Best Year/Worst Year*100)
ALBANIA	Unity for Human Rights Party *Omonia	2005	4.1	1991	0.73	3.37	-82.20
	Croatian Democratic Union BiH	1990	16.1	2006	4.58	11.52	-71.55
	New Croatian Initiative	1998	2.4	2002	1.1	1.3	-54.17
	Croatian Democratic Union 1990	2006	3.38	2014	2.46	0.92	-27.22
	Srbian Demokrtatic Party of BiH	1996	24.1	2006	7.17	16.93	-70.25
	Serbian Radical Party (later Sheshelj)	1998	6.9	1996	2.6	4.3	-62.32
	Radical Party of the Republic of Srpska	1998	1.6	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
BIH	Serbian Radical Party of Republic of Srpska	2002	2	2000	0.3	1.7	-85.00
	Party for Democratic Progress	2014	7.54	2006	1.88	5.66	-75.07
	Alliance of Independent Social Democrats	2006	17.8	2000	5.1	12.7	-71.35
	SLOGA- UNITY	1998	12.4	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
	Socialist Party	2000	2.5	2010	0.89	1.61	-64.40
	Democratic People's Alliance	2014	2.27	2006	1.33	0.94	-41.41
BULGARIA	Srbian National Alliance	2000	1.9	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
	Movement for Rights and Freedoms	2014	14.8	1994	5.4	9.4	-63.51
CROATIA	Serbian Democratic Party	1990	1.61	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
	Serbian People's Party	1992	N/A	2000	N/A	N/A	N/A
	Independent Serbian Democratic Party	2003-2015	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
CZECH R.	Istrian Democratic Assembly	1995	4.2	2011	1.48	2.72	-64.76
	Moravane	1990	10.03	2010	0.22	9.81	-97.81
ESTONIA	Moravian National Party	1992	N/A	1996	0.27	N/A	N/A
	Our Home is Estonia	1995	5.9	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
KOSOVO	Estonian United Left Party	1999	6.1	2015	0.1	6	-98.36
	Russian Party in Estonia	1995	N/A	2003-07	0.2	N/A	N/A
	Vakat Coalition (BDS, NB, USB)	2014	0.89	2014	0.76	0.13	-14.61
	Bosniak Party of Democratic Action of Kosovo	2014	0.1	2010	0.26	0.16	-61.54
	Civic Initiative of Gora	2010	0.11	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
	Coalition for Gora	2014	0.16	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
	Turkish Democratic Party of Kosovo	2010	1.22	2014	1.02	0.2	-16.39
	Independent Liberal Party	2010	2.05	2014	0.05	2	-97.56
	United Serbian List	2010	0.86	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
	Serb Democratic Party of Kosovo and Metohija	2010	0.14	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
	New Democratic Party	2010	0.39	2014	0.35	0.04	-10.26
	Progressive Democratic Party	2010	0.82	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Srbian List	2014	5.22	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	

LATVIA	Harmony Centre	2011	28.36	1995	5.6	22.76	-80.25
	Latvian Russian Union/ For HRUL	2006	6.1	2011	0.78	5.32	-87.21
	Socialist Party of Latvia	1995	5.6	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
	For Human Rights in United Latvia	2002	19.1	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
LITHUANIA	Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania	2012	5.83	2000	1.95	3.88	-66.55
	Lithuanian Russian Union	1996	1.71	2004	0.2	1.51	-88.30
MACEDONIA	Democratic Party of Turks	1998	4.7	1990	0.3	4.4	-93.62
	Movement for National Unity of the Turks in Macedonia	2014	0.8	2006	0.1	0.7	-87.50
	Party for Movement of the Turks in Macedonia	2002	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
	Party for Democratic Prosperity	1990	15.4	2011	0.02	15.38	-99.87
	People's Democratic Party	1994	2.97	1990	0.4	2.57	-86.53
	Party for Democratic Prosperity of Albanians in Macedonia	1998	19.3	1990	5.8	13.5	-69.95
	Democratic Party of the Albanians	2008	8.26	1998	4.8	3.46	-41.89
	Democratic Union for Integration	2008	12.82	2011	10.24	2.58	-20.12
	National Democratic Party	2002	2.2	2006	0.5	1.7	-77.27
National Democratic Revival	2011	2.67	2014	1.59	1.08	-40.45	
MOLDOVA	Socialist Party-Unity Movement	1994	22	2001	1.58	20.42	-92.82
	Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova	2001	50.07	2014	17.48	32.59	-65.09
	Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova	2014	20.51	2001	0.47	20.04	-97.71
	Social-Political Movement "Equality in Rights"	2005	2.83	2010	0.1	2.73	-96.47
MONTENEGRO	Bosniak Party	2009	6	2006	3.76	2.24	-37.33
	Croatian Civic Initiative	2006	1.14	2012	0.4	0.74	-64.91
	Democratic Union of the Albanians	2009	1.5	2012	0.79	0.71	-47.33
	New Democratic Force - FORCA	2012	1.45	2006	0.65	0.8	-55.17
	Albanian Coalition Perspektive	2009	0.8	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
	Albanian Alternative	2012	1.05	2006	0.78	0.27	-25.71
	Party of Democratic prosperity	2006	1.29	2009	0.2	1.09	-84.50
	Srbian List	2006	14.68	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
	Coalition: SNP NS DSS	2006	14.07	2009	2.9	11.17	-79.39
Socialist People's Party of Montenegro	2009	16.8	2012	11.6	5.2	-30.95	
New Serb Democracy *Democratic Front	2012	9.13	2009	9.06	0.07	-0.77	
POLAND	German Minority	1991	1.18	2011	0.2	0.98	-83.05
	The Silesian Autonomy Movement	1991	0.4	1997	0	0.4	-100.00
ROMANIA	Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania	1992	7.5	2012	5.14	2.36	-31.47
SERBIA	Democratic Fellowship of Vojvodina Hungarians	1992	2.98	2012	0.63	2.35	-78.86
	Alliance of the Vojvodina Hungarians	2003	4	1997	1.23	2.77	-69.25
	Democratic Alliance of Croats in Vojvodina	1990	0.47	2014	0.32	0.15	-31.91
	Party of Democratic Action of Sandzak	1990	1.67	2012	0.71	0.96	-57.49
	Bosniak Democratic Party of Sandzak	2000	1.1	2003	0.34	0.76	-69.09
	Party for Democratik Action	1993, 2014	0.68	1997	0.34	0.34	-50.00
	Democratic Reform Party of Muslims	1992	0.13	1990	0.07	0.06	-46.15

SLOVAKIA	SMK-MKP Hungarian Coalition	2006	11.7	2010, 2012	4.3	7.4	-63.25
	Bridge	2010	8.1	2012	6.9	1.2	-14.81
UKRAINE	Communist Party of Ukraine	1998	25.4	2006	3.66	21.74	-85.59
	Party of Labor	1998	2	1994	0.4	1.6	-80.00
	Party of Regional Revival of Ukraine	2007	34.37	1998	0.9	33.47	-97.38
	Opposition Bloc	2014	9.43	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
	People's Democratic Party	1998	5.2	2007	0	5.2	-100.00
	Party Union Soyuz	2002	0.8	2012	0	0.8	-100.00
	Civil Congress of Ukraine (Slavic Party)	1994	0.3	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
	Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (Burduhan)	1994	0.4	2006	0.3	0.1	-25.00
	Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (united) (Zbitnev)	2002	6.5	1998, 2002	0.3	6.2	-95.38
	Socialist Party of Ukraine	1998	8.8	2012	0.46	8.34	-94.77
	Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine	1998	4.2	2007	1.32	2.88	-68.57

* Best year for those parties that have only once participated with success at national level is taken from the very successful year. Those that have two very similar or equal years vote shares as well are taken with one year and no value for ratio.

There is no clear pattern in this regard among countries or ethnicities. Nonetheless, the parties with the highest absolute difference between the best and the worst year of electoral performance come from Ukraine, Moldova, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which are countries with large size national minorities. Thus, the Party of Regional Revival variation of vote share is 33.37%, which in fact is an increase of votes in the period of 1998-2007. The Party of Communists of Moldova, again, shows the second largest absolute difference between the best and the worst electoral performance, which is a drop of 32.59% in the period of 2001-2014.

The following highest absolute differences in electoral vote share go for Russian Harmony Center in Latvia (increase of 22.76%), the Communist Party of Ukraine (drop of 21.74%), the Socialist Party Unity Movement in Moldova (drop of 20.42%), the Party of Socialist of Republic of Moldova (increase of 20.04%), the Serbian Democratic Party of BiH (drop of 16.93%) and the Albanian Party for Democratic Prosperity in Macedonia (drop of 15.38%).

Further on, we can take a look at the relative vote share change, calculated as a percentage of the worst result from the best result. Here we see that The Silesian Autonomy Movement in Poland, the Party Union Soyuz in Ukraine and the Peoples' Democratic Party of Ukraine have the highest percentage of vote share

change between the worst and the best electoral year (which is a 100% of vote share drop). The New Serb Democracy (Democratic Front) of Montenegro had 0.8% of vote share change (an increase between 2009 and 2012), the New Democratic Party of Kosovo only 10.3% of change (decrease of vote share between 2010 and 2014), the Vakrat Koalition of Kosovo has 14.6% of change (an increase in the period of 2010-2014) and Bridge of Slovakia has 14.8% of vote share decrease in the period of 2010-2012.

Figure 3.2. on the other hand contains information on the general ethno-regionalist vote share from the total in each country (a joint measure for all national minorities). Among the countries that have had the greatest minimums of regional vote-share in the period of 1990-2015 is Montenegro (30.5%), Moldova (22%), Macedonia (14.3%) and Ukraine (13.3%), while the smallest minimums can be found in Serbia, Estonia, Poland, Czech Republic and Albania, less than 1%. (Figure 3.2.a.) On the other hand, the greatest maximums of vote-share in the same period of 1990-2015 are in Ukraine (59.1%), Moldova (53.8%), BiH (47.3%) and Montenegro (43.4%). The smallest maximums in a country are in Poland, Albania and Croatia, which are below 5%. (Figure 3.2.b.)

In sum, the highest averages of ethno-regionalist vote shares are in Moldova (40.8%), Ukraine (40%), Montenegro (37.1%) and BiH (37%), Macedonia and Latvia have average of around 21%, while the smallest averages are for Poland, Croatia, Albania, Czech Republic, Estonia, and Lithuania (below 5%). (Figure 3.2.c)

Chapter 3.3. ERPs today from a comparative perspective


Only 39 out of 90 parties/coalitions participate today in national legislative bodies in CEE. Bosnia and Herzegovina has currently six ERPs in Federal Parliament, representing the Croatian or the Serbian people, Kosovo and Montenegro as well have six ERPs each, and Macedonia has five parties in national parliament. (Table 3.6) Albania, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Ukraine have a single ERPs in national parliaments. Latvias Harmony Center, The Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova and the Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova have the highest vote share of all current ERPs in CEE, 23%, 21.51% and 17.48% consequently. Twelve ERPs have below 1% vote share.

Table 3.6. ERP in CEE currently in national Parliaments


COUNTRY	ETHNICITY	PARTY NAME	CEE ERP Today						
			YEAR/LAST ELECTIONS	VOTES	VOTE SHARE	SEATS	SEAT SHARE	TOTAL VOTESHARE OF ENMP	% OF TOTAL ENMP VOTESHARE
ALBANIA	Greek	Unity for Human Rights Party	2013	14722	0.85	1	0.71	1.04	81.73
BIH	Serbian	Alliance of Independent Social Democrats	2014	255156	15.64	6	14.29	40.27	38.84
	Serbian	Srbian Democratic Party of BiH	2014	211603	12.97	5	11.90	40.27	32.21
	Croatian	Croatian Democratic Union BiH	2014	123023	7.54	4	9.52	10.63	70.93
	Serbian	Party for Democratic Progress	2014	123023	7.54	4	9.52	40.27	18.72
	Croatian	Croatian Democratic Union 1990	2014	40113	2.46	1	2.38	10.63	23.14
	Serbian	Democratic People's Alliance	2014	37072	2.27	1	2.38	40.27	5.64
BULGARIA	Turkish	Movement for Rights and Freedoms	2014	487134	14.8	38	15.83	14.8	100.00
CROATIA	Serbian	Independent Serbian Democratic Party	2015	N/A	N/A	3	1.99	N/A	N/A
	Istrian	Istrian Democratic Assembly, Our Own Right	2015	42193	1.83	3	1.99	1.83	100.00
KOSOVO	Serbian	Serb List	2014	38199	5.22	9	7.50	6.48	80.56
	Turkish	Turkish Democratic Party of Kosovo	2014	7424	1.02	3	2.50	1.34	76.12
	Bosniak	Vakat Coalition	2014	6476	0.89	2	1.67	1.26	70.63
	Gorani	Coalition for Gora	2014	1193	0.16	1	0.83	0.26	61.54
	Serbian	New Democratic Party	2014	2837	0.39	1	0.83	6.48	6.02
	Serbian	Progressive Democratic Party	2014	5973	0.82	1	0.83	6.48	12.65
LATVIA	Russian	Harmony, SPDS	2014	209887	23	24	24.00	24.58	93.57
LITHUANIA	Polish	Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania	2012	79840	5.83	8	5.67	5.8	100.00
MACEDONIA	Albanian	Democratic Union for Integration	2014	153646	13.71	19	15.45	21.25	64.52
	Albanian	Democratic Party of the Albanians	2014	66393	5.92	7	5.69	21.25	27.86
	Turkish	Democratic Party of Turks	2014	7705.84	0.8	1	0.81	1.6	50.00
	Turkish	Movement for National Unity of the Turks in Macedonia	2014	8518.65	0.8	1	0.81	1.6	50.00
	Albanian	National Democratic Revival	2014	17783	1.59	1	0.81	21.25	7.48
MOLDOVA	Russian	Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova	2014	327910	20.51	25	24.75	37.99	53.99
	Russian	Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova	2014	279372	17.48	21	20.79	37.99	46.01
MONTENEGRO	Serbian	Socialist People's Party of Montenegro	2012	40131	11.06	9	11.11	22.5	49.16
	Serbian	New Serb Democracy	2012	33109	9.13	8	9.88	22.5	40.58
	Bosniak	Bosniak Party	2012	15124	4.2	3	3.70	4.2	100.00
	Croatian	Croatian Civic Initiative	2012	1470	0.4	1	1.23	0.4	100.00
	Albanian	New Democratic Force – FORCA	2012	5244	1.45	1	1.23	3.44	42.15
	Albanian	Albanian Alternative	2012	3824	1.05	1	1.23	3.44	30.52
POLAND	German	German Minority	2015	27530	0.18	1	0.22	0.18	100.00
ROMANIA	Hungarian	Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania	2012	380656	5.14	18	4.37	5.79	88.77
SERBIA	Hungarian	Alliance of the Vojvodina Hungarians	2014	75294	2.1	6	2.40	2.21	95.02
	Bosniak	Party of Democratic Action of Sandzak	2014	35157	0.98	3	1.20	0.98	100.00
	Albanian	Party for Democratik Action	2014	24301	0.68	2	0.80	0.68	100.00
	Croatian	Democratic Alliance of Croats in Vojvodina	2014	11401	0.32	1	0.40	2.21	14.48
SLOVAKIA	Hungarian	Bridge	2012	176088	6.9	13	8.67	11.2	61.61
UKRAINE	Russian	Opposition Bloc	2014	1486203	9.43	29	6.44	13.31	70.85

Figure 3.2. ERP competition (other competitors), regionalist vote by country 1990-2015


a. Minimum regionalist vote in CEE



b. Maximum regionalist vote in CEE



c. Average regionalist vote in CEE



The highest absolute number of seats are for the Ukraine's Opposition Block (29), the Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova (25), and Latvia's Harmony Center (24). And yet, while Latvia's Harmony Center (24%), the Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova (22.8%), Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova (20.8%) and Bulgarian Movement for Rights and Freedom (15.8%) have the greatest seat share from all parties in CEE, there are several others that have seat share greater than 10% (the Democratic Union for Integration in Macedonia (15.5%), the Serbian Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (14.29%) and Serbian Democratic Party of BiH (11.9%) of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Socialist People's Party of Montenegro (11.11%)).

ERPs that count a hundred per cent of the total ethno-regionalist vote share in a country are: Movement for Rights and Freedoms of Bulgaria, Istria Democratic Assembly, Our Own Right of Croatia, Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania, Bosniak party and Croatian Civic Initiative of Montenegro, the German Minority of Poland, Party of Democratic Action, and Party of Democratic Action od Sandjak in Serbia. Thus, eight parties out of 39 have no competitors in the electoral arena, and 17 parties compete with other parties and have below 50% of the total ethno-regionalist vote share.

Figure 3.3. above provides a summarized picture on the ethno-regionalist vote and seat share by country. Among the countries with the least ethno-regionalist vote share are Poland, Albania, Croatia, and Serbia, (below 5%), while the countries with least seat share for the ethno-regionalist parties are Poland, Albania, Croatia, Romania and Serbia (also below 5%). Bosnia and Herzegovina is the leader in ethno-regionalist vote and seat share (48.8% and 50%). Moldova, Montenegro, Latvia, and Macedonia follow with seat and vote share above 20%.

If we look at the numbers defining ethno-regionalist groups' mobilization of today in CEE, we can confirm what has been already expected that the Russian people from the former USSR are the largest community in the post-communist countries that is considered as minority. Four countries today have parties speaking about the Russian national minorities, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova and Ukraine. Estonia's Russian party did not win enough seats to be represented in national parliament.

Table 3.7. contains the numbers of total votes given by each community in CEE for their parties which are of the ethno-regionalist nature. The Russian parties won 2383212 votes and 107 seats in CEE national

parliaments. The Serbian national minorities in BiH, Kosovo, Croatia and Montenegro have won 47 seats thanks to the 673863 votes. The Hungarian national minorities in Romania, Serbia and Slovakia have been voted by 632038 and won 37 seats, while the Turkish parties have been voted by 510782 people and won 43 seats. The Albanians, the Croatian, the Bosniak and Istrian parties follow, and finally with only a single seat in national parliaments the Germans in Poland, the Greeks in Albania and the Gorani people in Kosovo are represented at national level.

To sum up, the highest ethno-regionalist mobilization today can be found in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, Montenegro, Latvia and Macedonia. That is to say, the highest level of vote share and seat share consequently, can be found in the above mentioned countries where except for Latvia (where only one ERP appeals to the Russian population) the rest of the countries have more than two ERPs. More precisely, Moldova has two, Macedonia has five, and finally, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro have six ERPs represented in national Parliaments of today.

The most represented ethnicities which constitute national minority in other countries are the Russian people which count 107 seats in national legislative bodies of CEE. The Serbian national minorities in the former Yugoslav countries are represented with 47 MP seats, the Turks on the Balkans are represented with 43 seats, the Hungarians in the countries of Romania, Slovakia and Serbia are holding 37 MP seats in national Parliaments, and the Albanians in Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia are being represented by 31 national representatives in Parliament.

The Ukrainian crisis of 2014, as it has been already mentioned, have caused a significant change in national level elections, and therefore the pro-Russian parties such as the Party of Regions or the Communist Party of Ukraine have not offered lists in 2014 elections. Instead the several Russian representatives that have decided not to boycott the national elections of Ukraine have presented themselves within the Opposition Block, and the Communist Party of Ukraine have been banned by the Constitutional Court due to the allegedly pro secessionist and pro 'war' stances on the Russia-Ukraine question.

Figure 3.3. Total vote and seat share for parties representing ethno-national minorities in CEE last elections, by country




Table 3.7. Ethno-national minorities in national Parliaments in CEE

ETHNO-NATIONAL MINORITIES IN NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS IN CEE			
ETHNICITY	TOTAL VOTES	TOTAL SEATS	COUNTRIES
Russian	2383212	107	Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Ukraine
Serbian	673863	47	BiH, Kosovo, Croatia, Montenegro
Hungarian	632038	37	Romania, Serbia, Slovakia
Turkish	510782	43	Bulgaria, Kosovo, Macedonia
Albanian	271191	31	Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia
Croatian	176007	7	BiH, Montenegro, Serbia
Bosniak	56757	8	Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia
Istrian	42193	3	Croatia
German	27530	1	Poland
Greek	14722	1	Albania
Gorani	1193	1	Kosovo

CHAPTER 4: ETHNO-REGIONALIST PARTIES' IDEOLOGY IN SPACE AND TIME: DEFINING, MEASURING AND COMPARING 'RADICALISM' OF ERPs

Regionalist parties are more disparate in their policy demands than any other party genre; emphasis on different policy fields vary considerably, religious affiliation is important for some and not important for some other parties, language as well, [...] the only thing such parties have in common is their territorial identity.

(Urwin: 1983)

The previous pages introduced the concept of 'ethno-regionalist' party family, used for the purpose of this dissertation, as well as the set of parties that is considered to constitute this party family in the countries of CEE. If only looking at the names of the 90 parties constituting the set of ERP family of CEE, we could notice that their ideologies differ. For instance, we could see that some parties are defined as communist, others as socialist or social-democratic, some claim they are national or radical nationalist etc. From the name of the parties it is intuitive, for instance, that the Communist party of Ukraine, or the Communist party of Moldova would belong to the left side of the 'spatial theory ideology scale'. Nonetheless, some parties' names do not contain a denominator of ideology (communist, socialist or social-democratic, nationalist etc.) but they might as well be ideologically put in some of the ends of the left-right scale. Moreover, some (in spite of their clear position on the spatial ideology spectrum), might demonstrate inconsistent policy positions to the ones presumed by the ideological denominator contained in the parties' names.

The salience theory (Budge et al. 2001) suggests that parties compete with each other by putting forward their political priorities rather than contest on the same political issues. Therefore, they try to promote 'ownership' on some key issues and priorities. Ethno-regionalist parties are usually considered to behave according to the salience/issue ownership theory (which states that parties are trustful and credible on a certain range of issues, and not to all of the issues), as they have few important issues they speak about in comparison to others. The principle ethno-regionalist issue associated to the ERPs is the territory/decentralization issue. Nevertheless, because of their sometimes combined ideological identity that mixes territory/decentralization with socio-economic issues, the ERPs may easily be associated with

'traditional' parties and located on the left-right axis as well, which reduces their ideological specificity. (Dandoy and Sandri, 2007)

Dandoy and Sandri (2007) therefore have proven that the content of the manifestos of the ethno-regionalist parties from Spain, Italy and Belgium is different from the ones of the other parties, and that the decentralization or the autonomy issue is clearly a theme that 'belongs' to the ERP's. And yet, they found that other mainstream parties are also 'contaminated' by the decentralization issue, while the space dedicated to this issue within ERPs' manifestos, after decades of growth, is stagnating. As for the left-right dimension, data could not prove general trend in the behavior of the ERPs of Spain, Italy, Finland and Belgium, although a center-left tendency has been observed (especially in Italy and Spain). Finally, ERPs of Western Europe dedicate more positive attention to Europe than other parties all together. Be that as it may, the final conclusion is that it cannot be proven that ERPs in Western Europe are homogenous and that they constitute a distinct ethno-regionalist family.

Using the EPAC dataset, Szocsik and Zuber (2012) have made a preliminary test of the issue of ethno nationalism in party competition in Western and Eastern Europe, and concluded that the cultural and the ethno national dimension of party competition is linked more consistently in Eastern than in Western Europe. In Eastern Europe, nationalists (whether representing majorities or minorities) tend to occupy conservative, traditionalist positions on the cultural dimension, and in some cases, also leftist positions on the economic dimension. In Western Europe this is not the case.

Understanding the diversity of ERPs' ideology is another step forward to answering the research question of this thesis. Ideology on one hand is used for the typology of the ERPs, and on other, it gives a general indication on the direction and the level of radicalization an ERP may achieve in its life span. While territory/decentralization postulates the bases of the issue of ERPs' ownership, there is also the 'ethnic part' of their ideology that is inseparably related to the issue of multiculturalism.

As it has been also mentioned in Chapter 1, not many authors have addressed the notion of "ethnic appeal", and therefore Gadjanova's (2012) suggested typology of political demands made on behalf of ethnic communities in multicultural democracies is a good starting point for the ERPs ideology analysis. (see

Chapter 1.3.3.) These appeals are summarized in the shape of four issues constituting Gadjanova's Ethno-regionalist party Index (2013): support for decentralization, rejection of a national way of life, multiculturalism and cultural autonomy. Gadjanova's Index of Ethno-regionalist party appeals uses the Comparative Party Manifesto's (Volkens et al. 2001) already established categories, after carefully running a factor analysis which strongly correlated these issues with the ethno-regionalist party family, as opposed to the ethno-nationalist party family that has been defined by other three issues (support for national way of life, traditional morality, and rejection of multiculturalism).

Protsyk and Garaz (2011) have nonetheless, proposed content analysis framework for textual analysis of programmatic documents with the goal of better identifying party positions on the ethnic dimension of political competition. In addition to the party stances on the issue of multiculturalism positive and multiculturalism negative, new issues that would better define the ethno-regionalist party family were proposed: identity preservation (claims and demands aimed at preserving minority language, culture, demographic position and economic welfare), political representation (minority group based), territorial autonomy (special administrative-territorial arrangements for minority groups), constituent nation (claims of minority group entitlement to the same political status and role in constructing a state as enjoyed by a titular ethnic group), multiculturalism neutral and titular ethnic group related claims. The country cases on which these empirical tests were made and found to be salient for the ERPs', come all from Eastern Europe: Bulgaria, Moldova, Ukraine and Romania.

The very process of operationalization of the dependent variable of this thesis (the radicalization of the self-determination demands by the ERPs of CEE) would be, consequently, based on the existing typologies of ERPs, presented shortly in section 4.1. The section 4.2. will thoroughly elaborate the manifesto coding process and section 4.3. will present the summary of the results from the analysis. Finally, section 4.4. covers the 'other' issues enclosed within the ERPs' manifestos, which might as well imply radicalism of these parties towards self-determination: the issue of sovereignty of the nationalizing state, the relationship with a kin-state, the influence of NATO, Russia and the EU. A more thorough comparison of the 'other' issues with the 'ideology' categories of ERPs will be presented in this section. A short conclusive remarks shall be given in section 4.5.

The main goal of this chapter, therefore, is to propose an analytical framework for explaining radicalism of ERPs in CEE from a multi-dimensional perspective. It goes beyond the left-right ideological spectrum and initially focuses on the center-periphery one and beyond it.

Chapter 4.1. Defining radicalism: operationalization of the level of radicalism of ERPs' self-determination demands;

To repeat once more, when talking about radicalism of ERPs' self-determination demands, we indirectly talk about typologies of ERPs. Thus, to find the measure of this concept we need to rely on categories that are already used in the literature. As it intends to shortly introduce the justification for the categories used to measure the level of radical claims by the ERPs, this section will contain a short repetition of some of the methodological explanations introduced in the final pages of Chapter 1. For that purpose, the reader might find useful to look again at Figure 1.5 (In Appendix I) which contains a chronological summary on the typologies and measurements of ERPs' appeals regarding self-determination.

To start with the two extremes, Letamendía (1998) differentiates pro-system and anti-system parties, while Ishiyama and Breuning (1998:5-6) have gone even further in differentiating two different anti-system actions: 'anti-regime' and 'anti-community' parties. Jenne (2007) considers 'inside of the state framework' and the 'outside of the state framework' as two extremes on the ideological radicalism scale. For Hepburn (2010) the autonomy strategies spread parties on a scale from unitarism to independence, for Massetti (2009) from 'non-secessionist' on one side to 'secessionist parties' on the other, and for Zuber and Szocik (2015) the most extreme position is the one in favor of separating the minority region from the common multinational state through secession, and the other extreme is where majority nationalists seek hegemony within the current state they define as their nation-state.

Rokkan and Urwin (1983) offered five types of ERPs, based on ERPs self-determination constitutional autonomy goal: peripheral protest to a concern for peripheral identity building, regional autonomy, federalism, confederalism, and full independence. Similarly, Muller-Rommel (1994), distinguishes four types of ERPs according to the strength of their relative nationalist tendencies (ranging from high to low) separatists, left libertarian, autonomists, and protectionist. De Winter's (1998) classification follows this

same logic of typology and adds two classes of parties who seek separation of the region from the existing state: the independentist parties (seeking full political independence of their region) and the irredentist Parties (aiming at breaking away from the state to which they belong, but also favor annexation of their region to another nation-state with a similar cultural identity.)

Jenne (2007) talks about five typologies: parties who struggle for affirmative actions, those who fight for cultural autonomy, those who claim territorial autonomy, and finally the ones that want secession or have irredentist ideology. Dandoy (2010) talks about seven types of parties: protectionist, autonomist, federalist, confederalist, independentist, irredentist, and rattachist. Massetti (2009) adds another sub-classification of: moderate autonomists, assertive autonomists, ambiguous, strongly committed, extremists (by violent means). Massetti and Schakel (2013 a, b) use the four categories of protectionist, federalist, ambiguous, and separationist parties for their empirical studies. Szöcsik and Zuber (2012) rely on these already elaborated typologies as well, but they also thoroughly measure the radicalism within the 'protectionist' category, by looking in the positions parties take in terms of minority language use, diameter of the cultural autonomy etc. Zuber and Szöcsik (2015), thus, explain the extremism of ethnonational minority parties in Europe according to how much congruence they seek between the boundaries of the ethnonational group and the boundaries of the political unit.

The first straightforward classification is born just from looking at the extremes of ERPs' demands for self-determination. The lowest level of those claims are for recognition of its different cultural/ethnic/regional group, and the highest level of demand would be to break away the territory they live in, and eventually to live in another nation-state.

The 'sharpest' division of categories (which might also be considered in an ordinal scale) derived from the state of art previously presented are: protectionist, autonomist, federalist and secessionist. While the protectionist one includes the appeals for cultural autonomy, the federalist one includes those who prefer symmetrical federalization, ethnically asymmetrical one, or confederation. The secessionist group encompasses the appeals for independence, irredentism or rattachism.

There is, nonetheless, a need for further fine tuning of this operationalization with regards the 'autonomist' category which considers two slightly different appeals towards a territorial autonomy when applied to the ERPs from CEE. The first one is the one that can be easily compared with the region of a western type of conceptualization, a region which may have the territorial, human and functional capacity for middle level of self-government. The second one is the aspiration for territorial changes in order for a national minority to obtain power at local level, which may assume new municipal borders, or simply more functional decentralization before de-concentration of power and resources. Thus, in the scale of radicalization we will introduce two separate categories of autonomist parties, the ones that seek for a municipal autonomy and the ones that seek for a regional autonomy. The 'municipal autonomy' shall be distinguished from the concept of 'cultural autonomy' as it usually requires certain type of territorial 'gerrymandering' in order to provide those ethnically concentrated groups with a higher level of self-government.

In conclusion we offer a classification/typology of five ordinal categories: **Protectionist, Autonomist-Municipal, Autonomist-Regional, Federalist and Secessionist**. Nevertheless, the properties out of which each category is constituted could also be put on a scale of radicalism. For instance, the properties that constitute the 'protectionist' category (i.e. the appeals for minority language use, education, culture, religion etc.) may also vary in terms of graduation of their own level of radicalism. They can go from recognition of certain identities in some places to cultural autonomy in others. Moreover, the same level of radicalism of certain property can be received differently in different counties. A law on minority language use can be welcomed in some and discarded as very radical in other countries. Nonetheless, the category 'Protectionist' will always be considered as less radical than the other four categories introduced in this article, because the comparison has been made on the bases of territorial self-governing autonomy and we do not offer a measure for the radicalism of the features that constitute each category.

This is not to say that there is no clear distinction between the categories which aim to depict certain level of radicalism of ERPs, but rather to signalize the possibility that one nation-state may perceive certain minority parties' claims as much more radical than others would do, mostly depending on the current self-government level (position) of the national minority within a nationalizing state.

While some authors decide to exclude those 'only ethnic parties', from large N comparisons of regionalist parties that are territorially and ethnically bounded (Masseti and Schakel, 2013b), this work does not exclude those parties that do not explicitly refer to an already established, concrete and defined region, but they only seek protection of rights and identity for their ethnic group. The decision to not exclude such national minorities, such is for instance the Turkish minorities in Macedonia or Kosovo is due to the fact that, albeit in region's size and function not comparable to those of Catalonia, Basque Country, Northern Italy, South Tyrol, Sicily, Scotland, Wales, Corsica or any other region of Western Europe with a potential for secessionist threats, these groups are indeed territorially concentrated. Therefore, the category 'Autonomist_Municipal' may explain the future potential for autonomist claims by those ethnic groups that have been territorially displaced in the turbulent 19th and 20th century in CEE.

Given the fact that the modeling of the empirical research of categorical variables is usually through logistical regressions of the separate categories as dichotomous variables, we can conclude that each category may serve as a separate dummy variable. This operationalization also allows us to 'play' with the categories and construct wider categories such the 'moderates', constituted from the protectionist and the two autonomist categories, and the 'radical' where the federalist and the secessionist will belong. We can also create another dichotomous operationalization of the variable by simply stating whether a party manifesto obtains appeals for secession or it does not, and so on. Finally, in the next section, we can move on to the way and the method of categorization used in the party manifestos' coding for the purpose of this thesis.

Chapter 4.2. Measuring radicalism: method and technique for coding ERPs' manifestos;

Datasets such as: the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) (Hooghe et al. 2010), the Minorities at Risk (MAR) (2009), the Comparative Party Manifesto Project (CMP) (Volkens et al. 2006 and 2010), or the EPAC-dataset on Ethnonationalism in Party Competition (Szöcsik and Zuber 2012), all contain quantitative data on national minorities and their political parties. Nevertheless, The CHES and MR do not contain the necessary questions to measure radicalism of ERPs' self-determination demands, moreover a significant amount of country/party cases of this family are absent in these datasets.

CMP generally solid ground for comparable measurement for ERPs issues (such as de/centralization, multiculturalism or acceptance/rejection of national way of life) have been used by Protsyk and Garaz (2011) in order to propose an improved theory on the categories which measure more effectively parties' positions on certain ethnic appeals, and by Gadjanova (2013) for the Ethnoregionalist Index. These two contributions, albeit being theoretically and empirically very useful, drag the initial CMP dataset problem with themselves, the poor coverage of important ERPs. Zuber and Szöcsik's (2012) EPAC covers positions on ethno-nationalism of 210 parties in 22 European democracies, and the (gradual) operationalization of the territorial dimension is very useful for empirical testing of ERPs' radicalism, and yet the restriction in time for the party cases limits its benefits for this type of framework for analysis. Massetti and Schakel (2013a, b) wide (largely time and cases inclusive) dataset, based on Massetti's (2009) framework for analysis of regionalist parties, covers only Western European regionalist parties.

From these weaknesses of the already existing categories and datasets, we draw our inspiration to contribute with this adjusted classification of ERPs of CEE, and then, a novel dataset. The unit of analysis in this contribution is ERP's manifesto in a given national elections year. We use ERPs' manifestos as a source for information because they clearly determine parties' positions at each election, and the estimation based on information that comes from an "internal" document that was approved by the majority of the party members is considered as valid indicator of parties' public policy positions at given point of time. (Budge at all. 2001) Moreover, programmatic changes can be observed over parties' lifetimes. (Alonso, Volkens, Gomez 2012; Alonso 2012) The fact that the mass media communicate the contents of programs during election campaigns and inform voters on following actions deviating from programmatic pledges, once more, assures us over the chosen source of information. (Alonso 2012)

Unlike the quasi sentence 'issue salience' coding method (Volkens at all, 2006, 2010; Alonso at all, 2012; Basile 2016), the 'coding' within this work is rather a 'nomination by deduction' technique. This 'denominative' coding method indicates whether according to the party manifestos' text, one can detect claims/appeals that classify the party as belonging to one of the five established categories of ERPs. This process of determination/classification of the exact category for each manifesto is shown in Table 4.1. where the questions used for the graduation/classification are presented.

What determines party electoral programs to belong to certain category of radicalism is not the frequency by which a reference to certain phenomenon is made, but the existence of that phenomenon within the party platform as such. In spite of the direction of the scale (the more right/up on the scale the more radical), the classification of the party manifesto's followed the reversed order of coding i.e. by exclusion of qualities corresponding to a category. Therefore, the manifestos categorization is a process of descending on the scale of abstraction rather than climbing up (Sartori, 1970). We only take the highest level appeal of the very manifesto to determine the category of that ERP in spite of the fact that the same manifesto might contain references which also can define other (lower level) categories as well.

The case selection for this comparison, as already noted, follows two criteria: the first one is that the party is an ERP as defined previously in this article, and the second one is that this party has gained at least one seat in national Parliaments in the period of 25 years of democratic elections in CEE. In total, 328 cases of party manifestos coming from 90 ERPs make the population of cases that comply with the two criteria, while the sample for this analysis covers 61% of them (199 cases) from 72 (80%) of the ERPs.

Among the parties with highest number of ERPs are Bosnia and Herzegovina (13), Ukraine, Montenegro, Kosovo (11) and Macedonia (10) (Table 3). From the other side Bosnia and Herzegovina (11), Ukraine (10) and Macedonia (9), are among those whose party cases have been coded in this work. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Ukraine and Serbia together make somewhat more than 50% of the party cases population, and 47% of the coded sample. (see Chapter 1.3.2)

Eighteen parties³⁶ have been forcefully excluded from this analysis due to lack of data³⁷, which might be taken as a ground for criticism of the method used to analyze radicalism of ERPs' self-determination claims, i.e. coding party manifestos.

³⁶ Those parties are: the BiH's Sloga-Unity Coalition, and the Serbian National Alliance, the Russian Party in Estonia, Kosovo's Vakaf Coalition, Bosniak Party of Democratic Action of Kosovo, Coalition for Gora, United Serbian List, Serb Democratic Party of Kosovo and Metohija, New Democratic Party, Progressive Democratic Party, Serbian List, Macedonia's National Democratic Party, the Montenegro's Democratic Union of the Albanians, Albanian Coalition Perspective, Albanian Alternative, Party of Democratic Prosperity, and finally the Ukraine's Soyz, Union Party.

³⁷ Several reasons can explain the lack of published party manifestos among the parties of the ERP family. Firstly, the fact that small parties usually compete in grand coalitions, whose political platform mainly depends on the biggest parties' programmes, explains why policies presented within those documents may even completely exclude issues of ethno-regional importance. Moreover, ERPs often campaign their programs on the field, without 'bothering' to put down on paper their stances and ideology. This can be assigned to the regional/local nature of electoral support for this party

Yet, one shall be aware that a quantitative comparative model of this sample size would find even more difficult to measure 'radicalization' through content analysis of campaign speeches, interviews or public appearance of the party elite. Such analysis would require a large archives of newspapers, TV channels, and internet sources, and it will require fluent knowledge of all the titular and minority languages which parties might have used for spreading messages to their electorate.

Table 4.1. Questions to be answered when categorizing ERPs' general positions on self-determination.

CATEGORIZING SCALE FOR RADICALISM OF ERPS' SELF-DETERMINATION CLAIMS	
Question 1. Does a manifesto contain any open reference to any sort of regional secession (independence, rattachism, and irredentism) or any statement for embracing a possibility in future for evolution towards secession?	If YES to any of both options, the party is SECESSIONIST If NO, answer Question 2
Question 2. Does a manifesto contain any open reference to any sort of federalization (symmetric, asymmetric or ethnically asymmetric), or confederation?	If YES, the party is FEDERALIST If NO, answer Question 3
Question 3. Does a manifesto contain any open reference to any sort of regional autonomy (fiscal or institutional)?	If YES, the party is AUTONOMIST_REGIONAL If NO, answer Question 4
Question 4. Does a manifesto contain any kind of reference to autonomy of a smaller region (i.e. municipality or couple of municipalities that do not necessary belong to the same middle level (regional) government) or to local autonomy on an ethno-regional basis (local-self-government of a specific existing municipality where ethnic groups live concentrated, or ask for municipal borders changes in order to obtain higher ethnic concentration in the municipality i.e. higher level of ethnic self-government)?	If YES to any of the options, the party is AUTONOMIST_MUNICIPAL If NO, answer Question 5
Question 5. Does a manifesto contain references to any of the following ethnically related issues: financial allocation from central budget to certain ethnic region for the purpose of further development of the region; policies for improvement of the ethnic group's integration at national and local level; cultural autonomy; language, cultural and religious rights for the national minorities; multiculturalism?	If YES, the party is PROTECTIONIST If NO, the party is disqualified from the Set of ERPs.

family. While, scarce finances may be a very reasonable explanation for avoiding written propaganda materials (especially before the internet era), the main reason to rely mostly on 'spoken' electoral campaigns has different nature. Namely, parties depend on its charismatic leaders who adjust their pre-electoral promises according to the local/regional needs. The electorate, in these cases, is promised some local/regional appeals, which may even be inconsistent along different local units, and therefore it could be very difficult for a party to define these promises as coherent policies. Finally, the so called 'sultan' parties, in many occasions depend on the leader's clientelistic habits for obtaining votes which would be counter effective if put in words and written as a manifesto/electoral platform. One additional challenge for finding a written prove of ERPs' manifestos (just as for many other parties) in the post-communist period is the lack of written party manifestos in times of revolution and regime changes along with the lack of existing archives for those parties that in spite of the social environment provided written manifestos.

Albeit, the number of coded party manifestos would be much lower than any other analysis based on other sources, two main advantages may be assigned to this model. Firstly, party manifestos are more than just a personal standing point of the political leadership, rather they communicate the official party stances who is mostly approved by the party elite and membership. (Alonso 2012) Secondly, party manifestos contain the stances on all those issues considered as important for the party in general, unlike campaigns, interviews or meetings with the public which rely on variety of methodologies, are time restricted and mostly locally adjusted. Therefore a general cross county and in time comparison shall rely rather on data that is more affected by the party coherent ideology than by individual voices.

Chapter 4.3. Comparing radicalism: results from coding ERPs' manifestos

At least thirty separate national minority groups have been 'advocated' by ERPs at national elections in 17 CEE countries (see Table 4.2). Russians in the Baltic States, Poland, Moldova and Ukraine, Hungarians in Slovakia, Romania, and Serbia, Albanians in Macedonia, Serbia, and Montenegro and Serbian in Croatia, Bosnia, and Montenegro are among those with most ERPs. In particular, the Russian community in Ukraine has been represented by 10, The Serbian community of Bosnia and Herzegovina by 7, and the Albanian community in Macedonia by 6 ERPs.

We see that there is a great variety of ideologies among all these parties, but we can clearly conclude that the category with highest number of cases in the dataset is the one of 'Autonomist_Regional' with a share of 35.7% of the total cases, the second largest category is the 'Autonomist_Municipal' with 26.1%, and third is the 'Federalist' category with 19.1% The two extremes have least share among the total number of cases: the 'Protectionist' (14.6%), and the 'Secessionist' (4.5%)(see Table 4.3/ left part).

Yet, in order to have a better understanding of how the categories of 'radicalism of ERPs ideology' are spread throughout each country Table 4.4. provides cross-tabulated information on the frequencies and the percentages of all coded cases by category for each country. Macedonia is the most diverse: 50% of them are appealing for Autonomist_Municipal ideals, 26.9% are Protectionist, 11.5% are Federalist, 7.7% are

Autonomist_Regionalist and the rest 3.1% is Secessionist. Moldova also shows diverse ideologies of ERPs, with the only difference that there is no Secessionist case among the 16 cases.

From the Table 4 (left part), on the other hand, we can have a better look in the share that each country's cases make within each of the five categories of radical. Country which has the highest share of all Protectionist cases in the database is again Macedonia, with 24.1% of all Protectionist parties coming from there. Ukraine follows with 20.7%, Albania, Latvia, Moldova and Serbia each have 10.3% share from the category of Protectionist parties, Bulgaria, Estonia, Kosovo and Lithuania each have 3.4%. Macedonia leads also in the category of Autonomist_Municipal, with 25%, Latvia follows with 17% share, then come Montenegro and Croatia with 13.5% each, Kosovo, Lithuania, Slovakia and Ukraine with 5.8% each and Estonia and Moldova with 3.8% each.

Serbia leads in the category of Autonomis_Regionalist parties/cases with 23.9% out of the total, Poland has 15.5%, Croatia, Slovakia and Ukraine, each with 9.9%, Bulgaria 8.5%, Moldova and Romania with 7%, Latvia and Macedonia each 2.8% and finally Czech Republic and Montenegro with 1.4%. Bosnia and Herzegovina leads both Federalist and Secessionist ideology categories, with a share of 52.6% and 66.7% consequently. Moldova and Ukraine each has 15.8% share from the total of Federalist cases, and then follows Macedonia (7.9%), Czech Republic (5.3%) and Montenegro (2.6%). As for the rest of the Secessionist category, Croatia, Czech Republic and Macedonia have each 11.1% from the total.

We finally come to the question of how much change is there within the five categories determining the radicalism of ERPs' self-determination appeals if looking at time. What is obvious from the Table 4.2 (in Appendix IV) is that 75% of the ERPs (54 parties) have never changed their position towards self-determination, some due to a short period of campaigning and others due to other factors.

Among those parties that have changed their position towards self-determination are: Moravane' from Czech Republic (from Federalist, to Autonomist_Regional, and to Federalist again); Harmony Party of Latvia (from Protectionist to Autonomist_Municipal, and to Autonomist_Regional); Party from Democratic prosperity of Macedonia (from Protectionist to Secessionist, to Autonomist_Municipal and to Federalist); Party of Communist of Republic of Moldova (from Protectionist to Autonomist_Regional, to Federalist and to Autonomist_Regional), and Social Political Movement "Equality in Rights" of Moldova (from

Autonomist_Regional, to Autonomist_Municipal, to Autonomist_Regional), and finally Ukraine's Communist Party of Ukraine (from Protectionist to Autonomist_Municipal, to Protectionist and to Federalist), and Socialist Party of Ukraine (from Protectionist to Autonomist_Regional, and to Autonomist_Municipal). Obviously, the trend of change usually is from lower to higher level of radicalism for almost all but for the Russian ERPs in Moldova and Ukraine. There, we see certain fluctuation.

In order to see the general trend of change among the categories of radicalism through certain periods of time we have summed up the party/cases within each category in five time-categories: 1990-1995, 1996-2000, 2001-2005, 2006-2010, and 2011-2015 (Figure 4.1). If we start with the least radical category of 'Protectionist' there is a visible decrease of parties that belong to this group, from 14 cases in the first time category of 1990-1995 to only 2 cases in the period of 2011-2015.

Parties belonging to the Autonomist_Municipal category are in a rising fashion especially since 2006, and Federalist parties are in a rising trend in the two final time-categories where their number rises dramatically if compared to the first three time-categories. The Autonomist_Regional, albeit the category with most of the cases throughout the years (especially in the last period of time 2011-2015), have showed fluctuating trends in time. The most radical group of Secessionist parties, on the other hand, is the smallest category and although it is stably the smallest category of all it had its highest level in the first six years of post-communism.

It is very curious to conclude that not only secessionism is the least represented self-determination appeal in parties' manifestos, it is the one with a declining trend if compared to the first six-year democratization period. One may then simply conclude that secessionism is no longer the game in town for ERPs of CEE. And yet, a more careful glimpse into the data may direct our attention to the less radical and yet 'threatening' appeals to the nationalizing states' unitary. Namely, the category of 'Federalist' in the post 2006 period has raised up from the total of 13 before to 25 cases, which could also suggest that ERPs with secessionist intentions on a long run, might 'hide' their official secessionist claims behind the concepts of Federalism.

Federalism, as the new game in town, may be the predictor of future secessionist claims of ERPs (as secessionism per se' has been 'a taboo' in the processes of EU integration processes), or it might be the mitigation tool for deeply divided societies (Brancati 2006).


Table 4.3. Ideology and other categories share from total cases, by country

	IDEOLOGY CATEGORIES SHARE FROM TOTAL COUNTRY CASES						'OTHER' CATEGORIES SHARE FROM TOTAL COUNTRY CASES				
	IDEOLOGY						OTHER ISSUES				
	Protectionist	Autonomist Municipal	Autonomist Regional	Federalist	Secessionist	Total	Sovereignty	Kin State	RUSSIA+	NATO+	EU+
Albania	3	0	0	0	0	3	3	1	0	0	3
	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%	100%	33.3%	0%	0%	100%
BIH	0	0	0	20	6	26	8	13	3	4	14
	0%	0%	0%	76.9%	23.1%	100%	30.8%	50%	11.5%	15.4%	53.8%
Bulgaria	1	0	6	0	0	7	2	1	0	3	7
	14.3%	0%	85.7%	0%	0%	100%	28.6%	14.3%	0%	42.9%	100%
Croatia	0	7	7	0	1	15	10	4	1	2	14
	0%	46.7%	46.7%	0%	6.7%	100%	66.7%	26.7%	6.7%	13.3%	93.3%
Czech R.	0	0	1	2	1	4	0	0	0	0	3
	0%	0%	25%	50%	25%	100%	0%	0%	0%	0%	75%
Estonia	1	2	0	0	0	3	0	1	1	0	1
	33.3%	66.7%	0%	0%	0%	100%	0%	33.3%	33.3%	0%	33.3%
Kosovo	1	3	0	0	0	4	0	2	0	0	1
	25%	75%	0%	0%	0%	100%	0%	50%	0%	0%	25%
Latvia	3	9	2	0	0	14	8	10	5	0	10
	21.4%	64.3%	14.3%	0%	0%	100%	57.1%	71.4%	35.7%	0%	71.4%
Lithuania	1	3	0	0	0	4	1	1	0	1	4
	25%	75%	0%	0%	0%	100%	25%	25%	0%	25%	100%
Macedonia	7	13	2	3	1	26	11	16	0	17	20
	26.9%	50%	7.7%	11.5%	3.8%	100%	42.3%	61.5%	0%	65.4%	76.9%
Moldova	3	2	5	6	0	16	7	10	14	0	4
	18.8%	12.5%	31.3%	37.5%	0%	100%	43.8%	62.5%	87.5%	0%	25%
Montenegro	0	7	1	1	0	9	4	7	0	2	6
	0%	77.8%	11.1%	11.1%	0%	100%	44.4%	77.8%	0%	22.2%	66.7%
Poland	0	0	11	0	0	11	4	6	0	0	8
	0%	0%	100%	0%	0%	100%	36.40%	54.50%	0%	0%	72.70%
Romania	0	0	5	0	0	5	2	1	0	1	5
	0%	0%	100%	0%	0%	100%	40%	20%	0%	20%	100%
Serbia	3	0	17	0	0	20	7	11	0	6	14
	15%	0%	85%	0%	0%	100%	35%	55%	0%	30%	70%
Slovakia	0	3	7	0	0	10	3	8	0	5	9
	0%	30%	70%	0%	0%	100%	30%	80%	0%	50%	90%
Ukraine	6	3	7	6	0	22	14	13	17	1	7
	27.3%	13.6%	31.8%	27.3%	0%	100%	63.6%	59.1%	77.3%	4.5%	31.8%
TOTAL	29	52	71	38	9	199	84	105	41	42	130
	14.6%	26.1%	35.7%	19.1%	4.5%	100%	42.2%	52.8%	20.6%	21.1%	65.3%

Table 4.4. Countries share from the ideology and other categories

COUNTRIES' SHARE FROM 'IDEOLOGY' AND 'OTHER' CATEGORIES										
COUNTRIES	IDEOLOGY					OTHER ISSUES				
	Protectionist	Autonomist Municipal	Autonomist Regional	Federalist	Secessionist	SOVEREIGNTY	KIN STATE	RUSSIA+	NATO+	EU+
Albania	10.3%	0%	0%	0%	0%	3.6%	1%	0%	0%	2.3%
BIH	0%	0%	0%	52.6%	66.7%	9.5%	12.4%	7.3%	9.5%	10.8%
Bulgaria	3.4%	0%	8.5%	0%	0%	2.4%	1%	0%	7.1%	5.4%
Croatia	0%	13.5%	9.9%	0%	11.1%	11.9%	3.8%	2.4%	4.8%	10.8%
Czech R.	0%	0%	1.4%	5.3%	11.1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	2.3%
Estonia	3.4%	3.8%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	2.4%	0%	0.8%
Kosovo	3.4%	5.8%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1.9%	0%	0%	0.8%
Latvia	10.3%	17.3%	2.8%	0%	0%	9.5%	9.5%	12.2%	0%	7.7%
Lithuania	3.4%	5.8%	0%	0%	0%	1.2%	1%	0%	2.4%	3.1%
Macedonia	24.1%	25%	2.8%	7.9%	11.1%	13.1%	15.2%	0%	40.5%	15.4%
Moldova	10.3%	3.8%	7%	15.8%	0%	8.3%	9.5%	34.1%	0%	3.1%
Montenegro	0%	13.5%	1.4%	2.6%	0%	4.8%	6.7%	0%	4.8%	4.6%
Poland	0%	0%	15.5%	0%	0%	4.8%	5.7%	0%	0%	6.2%
Romania	0%	0%	7%	0%	0%	2.4%	1%	0%	2.4%	3.8%
Serbia	10.3%	0%	23.9%	0%	0%	8.3%	10.5%	0%	14.3%	10.8%
Slovakia	0%	5.8%	9.9%	0%	0%	3.6%	7.6%	0%	11.9%	6.9%
Ukraine	20.7%	5.8%	9.9%	15.8%	0%	16.7%	12.4%	41.5%	2.4%	5.4%
TOTAL	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Figure 4.1. Radicalism of ERPs' ideology in time (from 1990 to 2015)



In Chapter 2 we had the opportunity to see that in post-communist CEE 62% of the counted conflict situations (in a period of 25 years) have been motivated by autonomist or secessionist goals, and that 17.2% from those conflicts were violent. Brubaker (2004) claimed these often national and nationalistic form of ethnicity taken in CEE to be less widespread in a violent manner, ethnic mobilization less strong, and ethnic identity less pervasively significant than ordinarily assumed.

4.3.1. Shy secessionism or pretentious federalism among the ERPs of CEE?

With the previously elaborated results driven from the ERPs' manifestos coding, we find a confirmation to this allegation, i.e. only nine out of 199 cases of coded written manifestos contain references to secessionism or any other statement regarding a future possibility for eventual secessionism. On the other hand, the claims for Federalism have raised from 13 cases in the period of 1990-2005 to 25 in the period of 2006-2015. And these two findings lead us to the question 'is secessionism an out of game strategy for ethno-party politics?' Why, in spite of all the expectations that ethnic heterogeneity would represent a 'threat' to the political systems of the new democracies, we find out that there is so little aspiration for secessionism in CEE?

The answer to the last question cannot be elaborated shortly within the scope of this dissertation and it is most probably a research question of its own, suitable for further research. Nevertheless, we can switch that question towards the phenomenon of rising number of cases in the category of Federalist ERPs, and ask 'how thick is the dividing line between these two categories'? Is it possible to clearly state that Federalist and Secessionist parties are categories whose attributes are completely mutually exclusive? Is the climbing on the ladder of abstraction clear and unquestionable when it comes to these two categories?

The answer to these questions can be found within the parties' manifestos and elaborating it here is feasible. The simple answer to the questions is that the line between the two categories of parties is thin, and that the very Secessionist category is ambiguous due to the unstraightforward language used in order to describe parties' endeavors towards secessionism.

We could see in Table 4.1. that the Question 1 whose positive answer puts party X in the secessionist group of parties was constructed of two parts: 'does a manifesto contain any open reference to any sort of regional secession (independence, rattachism, and irredentism)', and 'or any statement for embracing a possibility in future for evolution towards secessionism'. From the content analysis of the manifestos, we could witness that secessionist parties mostly positively answer to the second part, but not the first part. That is to say, parties do not openly claim secessionism to be their *raison d'être*.

To start with the manifesto of Croatian Democratic Union BiH in 1990, it openly claims close affiliation to the Croatian HDZ (Hrvatski Demokratska Zajednica) and its leader Franjo Tudjman, and it reminds that in the CDU BiH's Statute under Article 10 the party stipulates that Croatian people of BiH have to ensure their right for self-determination up to secession. And yet, in the same time the manifesto speaks of reviving of the statehood of BiH as a democratic, parliamentary and multi-party state, which could be done by warranting the fundamental rights and freedoms of all its citizens no matter of racial or national belonging, political views or religious beliefs, gender or social status. (HDZ 1990). Further on, the document contains a reference to the 'confederation' nature of BiH where Muslims, Croats and Serbs cohabit because it is a historical fact. Moreover, the document confirms that Croats of BiH have no reserve state because BiH is they homeland.

These couple of statements within the party manifesto of CDU BiH only demonstrate that while this party wants to maintain the right for secession for the Croatian people of BiH, its priority is to keep the state as a whole. Therefore while secessionist on a long run, the party claims to be (Con) federationist at the given election. Which one of these claims is the real 'identity' of this party? Can we say there is an exclusive identity for CDU BiH in 1990? The answer is no. The party CDU BiH is rather ambiguous.

Further on, the 2014 party manifesto of Democratic People's Alliance in BiH is much more ambiguous in this sense. We can read an open declaration of support for the territorial sovereignty of BiH by this party, moreover an open devotion to the Dayton nature of complex state governance of BiH. But then, there is a large proportion of the programmatic claims which directly address the unique, constitutionally and lawfully indivisible entity of Republica Srpska whose territory is inalienable and an eventual change of the inter-ethnic lines can be made by an agreement confirmed by a referendum. By using a referendum, Republic

of Srpska can decide upon its future constitutional and lawful status, independent or in the frame of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The program stresses the endeavors of this party to encourage bi and multilateral (international) relations among Republic of Srpska directly and other countries.

Here again, we see how thin and understated the secessionist claims are, while on the other side so many references in that direction are being said. The openly opposed stands regarding the past practices of delegation of powers from Republika Srpska to the BiH authorities (17 times so far, as it is written in the 2014 manifesto of DNA) is just another indication that this party's 'red lines' when it comes to (con)federation cohabitation is so easily crossable.

In a similar fashion, the Serbian Radical Party (later on Dr. Vojislav Sheshelj) in BiH openly stresses the importance of pan-Serbianism, but it does not openly state that secession is what defines this party *raison d'être*. Finally the Serbian Democratic Party of BiH devotes a significant space for a historical preview of the injustices that the Serbian people of Yugoslavia had suffered, aiming at victimization of the Serbian people of BiH especially. SDP as well strives for the Dayton Arrangement for Republica Srpska which, as the text puts it, 'gave the international recognition of Republica Srpska'. And while this allegiance to the Dayton's BiH is openly expressed throughout the program's text, it also stresses out that nobody has the right to renounce the right to self-determination and self-declaration. To this, a reference to the 'homeland war' is given. That is to say, this party claims that the rest of the peoples of Yugoslavia were secessionists whose claims for secession was up to Serbia's soldiers to resolve. Republic of Srpska, therefore, is considered to be unquestionable and unchangeable category, and only the citizens of Republica Srpska can decide upon a higher or a lower level of independence of it. The most radical statement towards self-determination is that nobody has the right to prohibit the right for referendum upon the reformation and the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Once more, we witness how ambiguous the language towards independence or secession these parties use.

Bottom line, the BiH's ERPs whose manifestos contain references towards secessionism do that in a very wrapped up form, and this ambiguity makes us question the secessionist over federalist nature of these ERPs on a short term, which is of our much more interest within this thesis (given our interest in the change of radicalism in time as well).

Macedonia's single case of secessionist ERP, i.e. the 1994 Party for Democratic Prosperity is questionable as well because the party claims a past reference to its support for secession rather than appeals for it in future. The party emphasizes its supportive role for the unsuccessful independence referendum by the Albanian community in Macedonia in 1992. Nonetheless, it does not offer any further comment on the future pledges for achieving that independence. Therefore, we cannot be sure whether this party's long term program leads towards achieving that unrecognized 'successful' referendum or not.

The Serbian Democratic Party of Croatia, and the Moravian National Party of Czech Republic are the pioneers of the idea of secession but given the context of the competition we can finally classify these two cases as ambiguous. Namely, these two parties competed in times of restructuring of the state settlement, Yugoslavia was still trying to keep the Federation alive, and the Moravians were deciding whether their region should be an independent state within Czechoslovakia or a separate region from Czech Republic. Therefore, in these two cases as well, we could assume that the line between secessionism and federation is thin, and that although not necessarily false, secessionist ERPs are more of a 'Plan B Secessionist' parties rather than a short term 'independentists' per se.

The fact that the rhetoric used by CEE ERPs is so smooth does not exclude secessionist claims by these parties because we can now trigger the opposite course of the reasoning and look at the federalist parties in order to see how smooth federalist ERPs' intentions are indeed. For this purpose we shall directly look at the most clear example of soft written rhetoric *vis a vis* radical public appearance of the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats of BiH and its leader Milorad Dodik. We have been witnessing a very strong pro-secessionist rhetoric by the president of Republic of Srpska Dodik which lead to a probe referendum for independence, the so called 'National or Statehood Day', in September 2016 (Balkan Insight 2016) While the AISD is Federalist according to the written party's manifestos, the rhetoric by the President Dodik sometimes sounded as a securitization of the BiH special Confederationist status. He claimed that never before has Republika Srpska had the danger of disappearing as it had it 'now'. (Kurir, 2016).

We can point out several other Federalist parties whose public rhetoric is/was secessionist in the essence such as the Party for Democratic Prosperity or even the Democratic Party of the Albanians in Macedonia whose latest public appearances were usually radical. Their words may not stay written or taped but the

official standing points and those 'on the field' may differ. This is said in order to face light on the hidden intentions behind those 'smooth' federalist claims by the parties' manifestos whose real intentions may not be always openly expressed in a consistent written manner.

Is the pressure from the international community for a friendlier and inter-ethnically more constructive party politics the reason for doing so, or it is just a matter of party strategy, is of a marginal relevance in this sub-section. The main argument here is that Secessionist and Federalist ERPs are sometimes very hard to distinguish and unless, we strictly claim that the parties that construct the set of Secessionist ERPs are those whose manifestos' contain the words secession, independence, self-government or the like, we do not have two separate categories to work with, but rather only one.

In the following sub-sections the five initial categories will be used in order to, as we will see shortly after, be able to intersect the most radical category of 'Secessionist' with the direct statements of the parties for protection of nationalizing states' sovereignty and territorial integrity. Yet, in the final Chapter 5, the two categories would be taken as a joint one, in order to avoid overestimation of the eventual change in those cases when such change may just be a question of wording rather than a real intention or radicalization.

Chapter 4.4. Beyond ERPs' self-determination claims: the issues of 'Sovereignty of nationalizing states', 'Kin States', 'Russia', 'NATO', and 'EU';

Radicalism of ERPs, whatsoever, is not exclusively framed within the direct measure of the territorial question. We hereby go beyond this narrow focus take another angle in observing ERPs' self-determination radicalism. In line with Brubaker's triadic nexus (1998), ERPs often make direct references to the need or the intention to collaborate, or stay in close ties, with their kin states (homelands). While the explicit positive statement for protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the nationalizing state (Brubaker 2013) could indicate that an ERP is willing to claim less extreme level of autonomy for its region (inside of the state framework), positive statements regarding the willingness of the party for closer cooperation with group's kin state happens to ring the alarm for the opposite.

In continuation, Jenne's (2007) theory, states that minorities that perceive an increase in their bargaining power will tend to radicalize their demands, (from affirmative action to secession) in an effort to attract ever greater concessions from the central government. One way to increase their bargaining potential is to obtain support/pressure on the nationalizing state by the international community. According to the 'quadratic nexus' (Smith 2002), i.e. the scholarly critique to Brubaker's triadic one, the references made by ERPs to certain international organization are taken under observation. That is to say, the two very important international organizations for the democratization of CEE, as well as for obtaining economic development and security, the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), stand vis a vis Russia.

European integration and regionalism are both forces that undermine the nation-states but also represent attempts to create new political arenas at the supranational and subnational level. Keating (1995, 1998, and 2001) argues that 'the emerging European space provides a new context to the articulation and pursuit of national demands. Under the slogan 'The Europe of the Peoples', nationalists strive to achieve other ways of realizing nationhood, by circumventing the nation-state. Therefore ERPs in Western Europe were found to be among the least Euro-skeptic ones. (De Winter 1994)

When Russian minorities refer to Russia, they usually refer to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), as regional organizations offered by Russia to the post-Soviet Republics as alternative to EU and NATO. These strategic foreign policies stances might as well determine the level of radicalism of the self-determination issues of the Russian national minorities in the newly nationalizing states. The three Baltic States, where Russian minority makes a significant proportion of the total number of citizens, have chosen to become EU Member States, which certainly adds to the way the Russian minority would 'play' the Kin State-CIS/CSTO card. This influence was most obvious in the 'inconsistent' tactic towards the relationship with the EU by the Ukrainian ERPs, which could be correlated to the annexation of Crimea by Russia and the 2014 war in East Ukraine.

For this purpose 'frequency coding' has been made to the explicit reference to any of the three international players, along with the positive references to sovereignty and territorial integrity and close ties to a kin state. The favorable mentions of any of the five 'other' issues of ERPs importance have been registered as a 'one'

and the absence of such declarations as 'zero'. By 'frequency' we do not refer to the times the issue appears within a manifesto, but how many manifestos contain such references at all. Each issue has been coded separately.

So, 42% from the total party manifesto cases contain an explicit reference to the importance of keeping the nationalizing state' sovereignty and integrity of its territorial borders, and 52.8% cases contain explicit reference to a Kin State. Only 21% put NATO integration among the other electoral appeals, which is almost the same as those parties that make a direct reference to the importance of relations with Russia or CIS (20.6%). Yet, 65% make positive references to the EU. (Table 4.3/ right part)

Table 4.3. and Table 4.4. (the right part of each) provide detailed cross-tabulated information on the frequencies and the share each 'other' issue takes within a country, and the frequency and the share each country constitutes within each issue, consequently. Czech Republic, Estonia and Kosovo's ERPs make no reference to 'Sovereignty' of nationalizing state's territory ever, while Albania's Greek party have made reference to sovereignty in all of the cases taken for observation (100%). Among the other countries where the 'Sovereignty' issue often appears to be important are Croatia (66%) and Ukraine (63.6%). In 8 out of 17 countries ERPs make reference to 'Kin States' with 52.2% from all the cases. The concentration of those positive references for close relationship with Russia are in the ERPs of Moldova (87.5%), Ukraine (77.3%) and Latvia and Estonia around 30-35%. The positive references to NATO are somewhat more dispersed, and yet 7 out of 17 countries have no ERPs refereeing to NATO (Albania, Poland, Czech Republic, Kosovo, Latvia, Moldova, Poland), and Ukraine has only one manifesto with positive reference to NATO.

While both 'Russia positive' and 'NATO positive' could be issues connected with specific types of ethnic groups, the positive references to the EU integration are made by 65.3% of all the cases, which is approximately three times higher than the references made for 'Russia positive' or 'NATO positive'. Albania, Bulgaria, Lithuania, and Romania have 100% party/cases positive references to EU, Croatia 93%, Slovakia 90%, Macedonia 76.9%, Czech Republic, 75%, Poland 72.7%, Latvia 71.4%, Serbia 70%. Therefore, the ERP family could be considered to be EU friendly, which considers the 'EU of Regions' as a very relevant policy for their cause.

From Table 4.4., on the other hand, we see how concentration of references within 'other' categories/issues are distributed by countries. The 'Sovereignty' issue has been mostly addressed by the ERPs in Ukraine (16.7%), and Czech Republic, Estonia and Kosovo have no reference to it. Albanian and Turkish parties in Macedonia make the most from the total 'KIN States' issue, (15.2%), and only Czech Republic does not 'participate' in the total share of party manifestos with a reference to this issue. 41.5% from the 'Russia positive' issue belong to Ukraine and 34.5% comes from Moldova. Macedonian ERPs are the leaders within the 'NATO' and 'EU' positive issues, with 40% from the total of NATO and 15.4% from the EU issue. Naturally, the Russian minorities of Latvia, Estonia, and Moldova, which strive for ties with Russia oppose NATO, and the Serbian community on Kosovo is famous for its anti-NATO sentiments after the 1999 NATO bombing on Yugoslavia.

The highest positive correlation we see between those party manifestos containing 'NATO positive' and 'EU positive' references (0.38), and the highest negative correlation between those manifestos containing 'Russia positive' and 'EU positive' references (-2.6), and somewhat lower negative correlation between those manifestos positively referring to Russia and those with 'NATO positive' references (Table 4.5). There is a weak positive correlation (0.11) between those parties standing for sovereignty of the nationalizing state and the ones that positively refer to the EU. From one side, this might be an indicator of the relevant influence the EU has on party politics through the Copenhagen Criteria (Keating, 1998), which made treatment of minorities a condition for membership. Namely, the end of the Cold War forced the Council of Europe's first real foray into the issue with the Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and later on the Charter on Regional and minority languages. (Keating 2001)

Every EU Progress Report on the Candidate Countries contains special section devoted to the country's progress in minority rights treatment. This inquiry might be more an indicator for the general trend of Europeanization within the CEE (Figure 4.2), especially after the first round of EU enlargement towards CEE in 2004, rather than a straightforward positive correlation between the support for the EU and exclusion of the possibility for territorial border changes.


While both 'Russia positive' and 'NATO positive' parties are positively associated with references to 'Kin states', we see slightly higher correlation between 'Kin State' reference and 'NATO positive' appeals

(0.1934) than the correlation between 'Kin State' and 'Russia positive' (0.1833). (Table 4.5.) There is a clear negative association between the manifesto cases 'Russia positive' and 'NATO positive' (-0.202), which correlation coefficient rises to -0.36 if instead on a dummy measure we use a three category 'NATO' measure ('minus one' for those parties that are against NATO integration, 'zero' for those who make no reference to NATO, and 'plus one' for those in favor of NATO integration).

Table 4.5. Correlation coefficients for 'ideology' and the 'other' issues.

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN IDEOLGY AND OTHER ISSUES						
	IDEOLOGY	SOVEREIGNTY	KIN STATE	RUSSIA +	NATO +	EU +
IDEOLOGY	1					
SOVEREIGNTY	-0.2304	1				
KIN STATE	-0.0048	0.1157	1			
RUSSIA positive	0.0363	0.0929	0.1833	1		
NATO positive	-0.053	0.0317	0.1934	-0.2026	1	
EU positive	-0.0664	0.1096	0.0298	-0.2554	0.3768	1

Figure 4.2. Trend for ERPs' EU positive references in time



Chapter 4.5. Correlating radicalism: cross-tabulating ideology and 'other' issues

Finally, we come to the point of correlating the five categories of ideology with the 'other' five issues. For this purpose we present Figure 3 where we see that the highest share in four out of five 'other issues' are for the Autonomist-Regional (35% from Sovereignty, 33.3% from Kin State, 40.5% from Russia Positive

and 41.5% from EU-Positive), and the lowest is always the Secessionist one (2.4% from Sovereignty, 5.7% from Kin State, 0% from Russia Positive, 4.9% from NATO positive, and 0.8% from EU-Positive). The highest share in NATO positive is for the Federalist. So we can conclude that Protectionist parties have their highest share in the Sovereignty category (26.2%),

Autonomist-Municipal in Russia-positive (31%), Autonomist-Regional in EU Positive (41.5%), and Federalist in NATO positive and Secessionist in Kin-State. That is to say, Protectionist parties mostly make references to the importance for keeping the sovereignty of the nationalizing state, the Autonomist-Municipal coincide mostly with Russia positive references, Autonomist-Regional with EU positive references, Federalist with NATO positive ones. Secessionists usually make references also to Kin State.


Table 4.6. Correlation coefficients for EU positive and the ideology categories.

CORRELATION COEFITIENS FOR EU + AND IDEOLOGY						
	EU POSITIVE	PROTECTIONIST	AUTONOMIST/ MUNICIPAL	AUTONOMIST/ REGIONAL	FEDERALIST	SECESSIONIST
EU POSITIVE	1					
PROTECTIONIST	-0.118	1				
AUTONOMIST/MUNICIPAL	0.073	-0.246	1			
AUTONOMIST/ REGIONAL	0.168	-0.308	-0.443	1		
FEDERALIST	-0.049	-0.201	-0.289	-0.362	1	
SECESSIONIST	-0.248	-0.09	-0.129	-0.162	-0.106	1

Table 4.7. Cross-tabulation of EU positive and Ideology

CROSSTABULATION EU+ AND IDEOLOGY								
			Ideology					Total
			Protectionist	Aut. Municipal	Aut. Regional	Federalist	Secessionist	
EU+	No	Count	14	15	17	15	8	69
		% within EU+	20.3%	21.7%	24.6%	21.7%	11.6%	100.0%
		% of Total	7.0%	7.5%	8.5%	7.5%	4.0%	34.7%
	Yes	Count	15	37	54	23	1	130
		% within EU+	11.5%	28.5%	41.5%	17.7%	.8%	100.0%
		% of Total	7.5%	18.6%	27.1%	11.6%	.5%	65.3%
Total		Count	29	52	71	38	9	199
		% within EU+	14.6%	26.1%	35.7%	19.1%	4.5%	100.0%
		% of Total	14.6%	26.1%	35.7%	19.1%	4.5%	100.0%

Figure 4.3. ERPs' positive references to five other issues cross ideology



Our conclusion generally goes in line with the assumption we made when we posited the bases for the importance of measuring the five 'other' ERPs' issues, i.e., the external support of a kin-state or other international organization motivates generally higher level of autonomy claims in ERPs ideologies. In addition we can see that Secessionist parties have lowest reference to nation-state sovereignty. From Table 4.5 we see negative correlation (-0.23) between 'Ideology' and 'Sovereignty'. This correlation tells us that more radical ERPs naturally avoid more direct commitment to keeping nationalizing state's sovereignty.

Table 4.6 we can look for correlations between the 'EU positive' issue and the other five categories of the dependent variable 'Ideology', and from Table 4.7. we can see the cross-tabulation of 'EU positive's' two values and all the other values of 'Ideology'. It is visible that only the two autonomist categories (the Autonomist_Municipal 28.5% and the Autonomist_Regional 41.5%), albeit indicating a weak correlation, take a positive sign in relation to 'EU positive'. Positive references to the EU integration, again, indicate that regionalism, decentralization and self-government is in line with the EU policies. Yet, the category of Secessionist parties, although a small category in size, is strongly negatively associated with 'EU positive' appeals (-0.25) (Table 4.5) This is a logical consequence if recalling the Copenhagen Criteria which in a sense 'impede' secessionist claims for the Candidate Countries of CEE. This condition is not applied to the 'old' EU member state, so unsurprisingly, we find secessionist ERPs that are highly pro-EU in Western Europe (De Winter, 1998; Keating 1998).

Chapter 4.6. Deducing radicalism: a summary.

This chapter initially aimed to narrow down the theoretical gap in the analyses of the ethno-regionalist party family in the Western and the Eastern European countries. It, moreover, offered a novel database on ERPs from CEE which contains information on parties that are normally neglected by empirical and qualitative studies. It finally offered a new angle from which ERPs' ideological radicalism could be analyzed (i.e. five other issues).

First of all we can conclude that countries with highest number of ERPs gaining at least one seat in national elections since the fall of communism are Bosnia and Herzegovina (13), Kosovo (11), Montenegro (11), Ukraine (11) and Macedonia (10), while only Albania and Bulgaria have only one each. The category Autonomist-Regional is the most frequent one among the five categories of radical (making almost 35.7% from the total coded cases). The Autonomist-Municipal has 26.1% from the total, the Federalist 19.1%, the Protectionist 14.6% and, finally, the Secessionist parties 4.5%.

It might seem surprising to see that the secessionist claims are at such low level among ERPs, if recalling the recent ethnic bloody past of the CEE region. But then, the highest share within both the Federalist and the Secessionist groups belong to Bosnia and Herzegovina's cases (52.6% and 66.7% consequently), which indeed had the bloodiest ethnic-conflict in the post-communist Europe. Serbia with almost 24% and Poland with almost 16% make the highest share from the Autonomist-Regional, Macedonia with 25% and Latvia with 17.3% make the highest percentage of the Autonomist-Municipal cases, and finally Macedonia with 24% and Ukraine with 21% make the highest share of the Protectionist ERPs' category. We found, nonetheless, that Secessionism as ideological position towards self-determination is reducing with time, while Federalist Party cases rise.

We saw that in only 3 out of 17 countries there has been no variation of the level of radical stances towards self-determination within ERPs' manifestos: Albania, Poland and Romania. Macedonia, on the other hand, demonstrates the greatest variation among the type of self-determination claims of its ERPs (varying from Protectionist to Secessionist); Moldova and Ukraine follow, varying from Protectionist to Federalist. (Table 4.8. in Appendix IV).

And yet, recalling Urwins' (1983) argument we could see that albeit territorial identity is in fact the issue ERPs have all in common, we could face towards other issues as well, in order to look beyond this narrow aspect of determining radicalism of ERPs for self-determination. Firstly, we found that 52% of all manifestos contain explicit references for closer relations with their Kin-States, while less than 50% (42%) acknowledges the importance of keeping the 'sovereignty' of the nationalizing state they live in. Only 21% of the manifestos make references for close ties with Russia and NATO, each. The Ukraine's party cases make the highest percentage (42%) of all the parties that refer positively to Russia.

Finally, 65% contain positive references towards EU. We thus conclude that the majority of the ERPs from CEE are EU optimists. While Ukraine also makes the highest percent within the 'Sovereignty' category (17%), Macedonia, holds the highest percentage in the rest of the three categories, Kin-state, NATO and EU positive (15%, 40% and 15% consequently).

We acknowledge that secessionism, albeit expected to be a real threat in the countries of CEE, is not at all the main game in town when it comes to ERPs' manifestos. Yet, federalism, which is in a growing trend, might be the real 'dissimulator' of the real secessionist ideals of certain parties on a long run or as ethnic-conflicts resolution tool. We believe that many ERPs from the post-communist societies refuse to openly make secessionist claims due to some internal and external pressures for peace and stability in the democratizing states, or even maybe to electoral parties' strategies for winning seats and office. Therefore, we are left with the final empirical analysis that should disclose the reasons for radicalism of the ERPs in CEE. The next Chapter shall address this question.

CHAPTER 5. EXPLAINING RADICALISM OF THE ERPs IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

As we have seen in the previous Chapter 4, ERPs may climb up five different levels of radicalism when it comes to their self-determination claims. In addition, we have observed how each of the five categories of radical (the dependent variable of this dissertation) interacts with more thorough claims (references) made within the party manifestos under analysis: positive references to the EU, NATO or Russia, positive references to a Kin-state for a national minority, and finally, positive statement over the importance for the nationalizing state to maintain its territorial borders and its sovereignty intact.

We hereby continue with our approach of 'cross tabulating' categories of the dependent variable with new factors, with the only difference that these new factors/variables go beyond the ERPs' manifestos references. This concluding Chapter aims towards finding potential factors of ERPs' radicalism, which factors are situated in the electoral competition space, the institutional engineering in a polity, the level of regional autonomy/decentralization and the influence by external factors, and finally the socio-economic factors and the level of democratization of the nationalizing states.

Therefore we shall start this Chapter 5 with section 5.1. which offers a short repetition of the hypotheses introduced in the beginning of the dissertation (Chapter 1.2.3.); then we continue with section 5.2. that specifies the quantitative method and the data to be used, along with the dependent and the independent variables' operationalization. In section 5.3. we offer a more thorough look into the results obtained from three models of the ordered logistic regressions using a threefold dependent variable, the estimated probabilities for radicalization, and the additional diagnostics of those models (run on modified samples). Lastly, in the final section 5.4., we try to get to a simplified inference from the quantitative results and ignite some controversial conclusions as possible future research puzzles.

Chapter 5.1. Another glimpse into the theoretical postulates of our hypotheses.

We finally come to the point of testing the potential explanations for the radicalism of the ERPs in CEE. For this purpose the introduction to the theoretical bases of our hypotheses placed in Chapter 1.2.3. could be of good use for the reader. A short summary of those hypotheses is offered in the following pages as well.

Three main clusters of hypotheses test the radicalism of ERPs in CEE: the first one embracing the electoral competition constellations in a polity, the second one including countries' level of decentralization/regional authority and the pressure of the EU conditionality for Candidate Countries, and the last one encompassing countries' socio- economic and democratic development.

The first group of hypotheses is in the core interest of this dissertation due to the leading theoretical starting point for this research. Rather than treating ERPs as zero-sum political actors (Keating, 2011) and focusing mainly on the 'classical' country dependent variables such as culture or economy (Tronconi 2009), this research joins the scholarship that treats ERPs as vote-maximizers and office-seekers (Elias and Tronconi 2011c; Zuber 2012; Bochsler and Szöcsik 2013; Elias, Zuber, Szöcsik 2015; Hepburn 2010; Gomez-Reino 2006).

Thus, in order to find potential explanatory factors for the radical ideological stances towards self-determination by the ERPs in CEE, seven hypotheses (thoroughly explained in Chapter 1.2.3. pp. 46-53) shall be tested:

H1: The size of the ERPs is negatively associated with radicalism of their ideologies.

H2: The higher the electoral fragmentation the more radical ERPs.

H3: The higher the number of competitive ethno-regionalist parties in election, the more radical ERPs.

H4: ERPs excluded from cabinet tend to radicalize more than those participating in governmental cabinets.

H5: When other ERP competitor has been part of the previous government, ERPs tend to radicalize.

H6: The change of party's leadership/President triggers radicalization of ERPs' ideology.

H7. ERPs tend to radicalize in time.

In sum, we shall test the ERPs' size and the ethno-regional fragmentation of their competition as potential explanatory radicalizers of ERPs. Moreover, the electoral opportunity for general electoral party fragmentation shall also be added as an explanatory variable. In addition to the representation in the legislative national bodies, we shall see how the inclusion/exclusion in government of ERPs affects their ideological positions towards self-determination and finally whether parties' age and leadership change could affect ideology radicalization.

The second cluster of variables shall test the level of decentralization of the country as a potential radicalizer of ERPs' self-determination claims and the external pressure as an incentive for radicalization. Therefore, one might assume that there is no logic in putting the level of demands for self-determination (self-government) for the territorially concentrated ethnic groups at a certain level and not aspire for always more autonomy as the actual level of decentralization increases. (Masseti and Schakel, 2013b) The EU, on the other hand is considered to be an external pressure on the national governments of the newly nationalizing states (aspiring for EU accession) which might be embraced by the ERPs in order to pressure the governments to fulfil their claims towards higher self-determination. Consequently, two hypotheses (for the details see Chapter 1.2.3 pp. 53-58)

H8a: Decentralization moderates ERPs' claims by giving them control over their own political, social and economic affairs.

H8b: Decentralization triggers radicalization of ERPs due to the reinforcement of the ethnic identities through strengthening of the ERPs, whose *raison d'être* shall only push towards more radicalization.

H9: ERPs from EU Member States have less radical self-determination claims than those who are not members yet.

Although, country-level factors have been subject to analyses in the study of ERPs, some with more and some with less explanatory power, only three shall be considered in this occasion (because of its possible effect on the electoral competition game) (for more see Chapter 1.2.3. pp.58-61) Namely, the level of democratization of the post-communist countries may play a crucial role in the way ethnic minorities have

been treated and represented in political life. The more democratized countries shall offer a wider space for protecting individual and minority rights against the tyranny of the state and the tyranny of the majority as well as they might opt for outbidding to the extreme and use radical rhetoric in order to gain votes. Which one prevails, the moderation power of the democratic inclusion of national minorities in the political systems, or the outbidding party competition rational choice rhetoric by ERPs?

In addition, the economic progress in a country might incite better social trust and thus less radicalism in terms of self-determination, or, pay off the ethnic conflict; and finally, the higher level of corruption might help overcoming divisions in a ruling elite which eventually could glue the inter-ethnic cleavage and result with less radical ideology of ERPs. Corrupt ethnic elites in government might moderate as a result of individual benefits of the office as well.

Therefore, we hypothesize:

H10a: ERPs from liberal democracies at higher level are less radical due to the higher possibility for ERPs' representation.

H10b: ERPs from liberal democracies at higher level are more radical due to the intra-ethnic outbidding possibility for ERPs.

H11: The economic development of a country decreases the radicalism of the self-determination claims by ERPs.

H12 is: Corruption decreases the level of radicalism of ERPs.

And yet, the list of potential factors is not exhausted with these twelve hypotheses. Some potential reasons for ERPs' radicalism are difficult to measure and others are difficult to compare at large N analysis. Nonetheless, testing these factors on CEE wide sample might be an insight plus into the study of ERPs' ideology and might provoke new questions, puzzles and problems worth researching in future.

Chapter 5.2. Method specification and data

In the first chapter a wider emphasis on the methodology of this dissertation has been made, including the unit of analysis, the mechanism for case selection and a thorough elaboration of the dependent variable's operationalization throughout its categorization.

In sum, the unit of analysis in this work is ERPs' national elections manifesto/program. ERPs are selected according to the principle of at least one gained seat ever at national elections for an individual party, chosen out of 17 countries of CEE in the post-communist period. The two excluded countries are Hungary and Slovenia due to no successful ERPs at national elections, in the first case, and due to special 'competition restrictive' electoral rules for electing representatives at national elections in the second case. One additional restriction from those who comply with the rule of one seat ever won at national election is applied to twenty small national-minority parties (cultural organizations) of Romania (due to the over-generous electoral provisions for those parties).

In total 328 cases of party manifestos should construct the population of 90 ERPs participation at national elections since first independent multi-party elections in 17 countries (period of about 25 years). Nonetheless, due to non-existing, or non-available written party manifestos for each of these electoral campaigns, the final number of cases counts 199 party manifestos in the period between 1990 and 2015.

Chapter 5.2.1. Dependent Variable

As it has been introduced in Chapter 1, sequence 1.3.3 and sequence 1.3.4., and in the Chapter 4 in more details, the dependent variable of this dissertation is the level of radicalism/extremism of ERPs ideology regarding self-determination.

The mayor contribution of this dissertation is precisely the original 'coding' of the available manifestos/programs according to the five categories that have already been introduced. The outcome variable therefore is coded according to five categories: Protectionist, Municipal_Autonomist, Regional_Autonomist, Federalist and Secessionist ERPs. The direction of radicalism goes from left to right, from less to more extreme/radical ERP.


In Chapter 4, section 4.3.1. the issue of the ambiguous declaration of secessionist claims by the ERPs of CEE has been elaborated. We have seen how those parties that make certain references towards secessionism, do that vaguely, and it contradicts with other statements that go in line with defense of the current sovereignty of the state etc. In addition, some Federalist parties, are famous for its pro-secessionist public speeches, and yet their documents do not contain open references to it. Therefore, we acknowledge the thinness of the line between these two categories in practice and we suggest that these categories may construct one joint category which shall embrace both the Federalist and the Secessionist parties. In this way we avoid overestimating the secessionist claims by some parties, and we do not pretend not to be aware of the real-life rhetorics by some ERPs' which are not officially supported by programmatic stances or declarations. Just for instance, we could see public rhetoric by the PDP in Macedonia, the AISD in Bosnia or the PR in Ukraine which were pro secessionist, while their party manifestos did not explicitly claimed independence appeals.

Consequently, the model of quantitative analysis used for this dissertation depends on the type of our dependent variable. Therefore, an ordered logistic regression should fit the best due to the ordered nature of the categories, which a multinomial logistic model might neglect. (Powers and Xie 1999; Kohler and Kreuter 2012; Long and Freese 2014)

In addition we can see the distribution of the outcome variable (Figure 5.1.) according to the operationalized original five categories, (later on we shall see three other possible types of operationalization). We can see that the distribution of the cases across categories is in favor of the middle category of Regional_Autonomist (35.7%), followed by the Municipal_Autonomist (26.6%), and then by the Federalist (19%), the Protectionist (14%) and finally the Secessionist (4.5%). As we can see, the final category is disproportionately smaller than the rest.

The dependent variable, albeit due to the ambiguity of the two last categories has been shrunk to four categories, it can further on be contracted as firstly a three and then a two categories variable. To begin with, the category Protectionist and the category Municipal_autonomist could be merged in one category of "Low", the Regional_autonomist could be considered as "Middle" and the Federalist and Secessionist categories as "High" category of radical self-determination claims/ideology. (Figure 5.1.)

Figure 5.1. Four different operationalization options for the outcome variable, and their frequency distribution from the data under analysis.



If we want to finally simplify the statistical model, we could make an attempt to re-categorize these three categories into only two categories, “Moderates” and “Radicals”, with the first one enclosing the first three initial categories of Protectionist, Municipal_autonomist, and Regional_autonomist, and the second one encompassing the two radical categories Federalist and Secessionist ERPs.

From a statistical point of view these diverse measurements of the dependent variable may be used in order to shorten the models and give more straightforward answers to the regression models. From a theoretical point of view gathering the initially ordered categories into smaller ones, which are ordered in the same direction as previously, is not unjustifiable as there were no ambiguous cases within the rest of the categories in the first place. Therefore separating, for instance, the Municipal from the Regional Autonomist parties is clear due to the size and the function of the region/territory the groups ask autonomy for. The level of radicalism clearly is higher in the second case, and therefore grouping the Protectionist and the Municipal in a 'Low' level category is also reasonable or at least justifiable.

Finally, by adding the Autonomist_Regional to this already constructed 'low' category of radical as opposed to the 'middle' and the 'high' would simplify the measurement of the dependent variable in only two categories. Therefore, the new dichotomous measure would assess those parties aiming at high decentralization of powers for a certain Region (Moderates) versus those whose aspirations go as far as gaining higher law making powers for the region (which goes beyond regionalism i.e. con/federalism or secession (Radicals)).

In Figure 5.1 we can see the detailed presentation of the frequencies of each of the four possible operationalizations of the dependent variable. The four category measurement (ID_4) counts from zero to three and we see that Protectionist holds 14.6%, Municipal_autonomist holds 26.1%, the Regional_autonomist holds 35.7%, and the joint Federalist and Secessionist category holds 23.6% from the total of 199 cases. When the outcome variable is structured as three ordinal categories variable (ID_3), we see 40.7% in the 'low', 35.7% in the 'middle' and 23.6% in the 'high' radical category. Finally the dichotomous variable (ID_2) counts 23.6% Radical as opposed to 77.4% Moderate ERPs.

Chapter 5.2.2. Independent variables

Twelve independent variables corresponding to the twelve hypotheses shall be included in the model. Table 5.1. contains all the variables labels, type, their measurement and the expected direction according to the

hypotheses, and Table 5.2. offers a summary of the number of observations, the mean and the standard deviation, and the minimum and maximum each variable of the sample can take.

In the first cluster of hypotheses addressing electoral competition seven independent variables will be used. The first variable labeled as 'SeatsShare' measures the proportion of the seats won by party X from the total number of seats in the lower chambers of the national legislative bodies in each country and election. The variable is continuous and could take from zero to hundred per cent (in this sample it goes maximum up to 70.3%). The data is gathered from the official sources of electoral data of each country. The expected direction of the hypothesis is negative.

The next variable labeled as 'Efragmentation' measures the level of fragmentation of the electoral race. This variable weights parties by size and it is obtained by first taking the vote share of each party as a decimal, squaring this value, and summing these values for all parties. Independents are ignored. The figure obtained is then subtracted from 1 to produce the figure for electoral fragmentation. This measure is taken from Siaroff's (2000) dataset, and these figures may also serve as proxy for the proportionality of the system. Consequently, the higher the value, the more fragmented the electoral competition is (indicating possible higher proportionality). While the variable may vary from zero to one, the observed cases of electoral fragmentation take minimum 0.55 and maximum of 0.98. The expected direction of the hypothesis is positive.

The 'NoCompetitors' variable stands for number of competitors and measures the number of ethno-regionalist competitor parties to the party observed. In the count of number of parties only ERPs aspiring for the same ethnic groups' electorate are considered, while the party observed is not counted. This means that the total number of parties competing is always one party plus the number of competitor parties ('NoCompetitors' variable). The number could go from zero to infinity, while from the summary in Table 5.2. we see that the real maximum goes up to ten ERPs. The data was gathered from the Official Electoral/Statistic State Offices providing final results and reports on national elections in each country. The expected direction is positive.

The variable 'InGovernment' states whether the ERP has been part of the previous cabinet i.e. whether the party has been part of the governmental coalition right before the moment of new elections. In case of a

positive outcome this dichotomous variable takes 1 (one) and in case of a negative answer it takes 0 (zero). We expect a negative direction of the hypothesis and we see from the independent variables' summary that 19% (Table 5.2.) of the observed cases have been part of the government before the elections.

Table 5.1. Independent variables, label, type, measurement and expected direction of the hypothesis.

HYPOTHESES	LABEL	TYPE OF VARIABLE	MEASUREMENT	DIRECTION
H1	SeatShare	Continuous	from 0% to 100%	Negative
H2	Efragmentation	Continuous	from 0 to 1	Positive
H3	NoCompetitors	Continuous	from 0 to $+\infty$	Positive
H4	InGovernment	Dichotomous	0- excluded from government; 1- included in previous government.	Negative
H5	OthersInGovernment	Dichotomous	0- no other ERP in government in previous government; 1- other ERP has been part of the previous government.	Positive
H6	PresidentChange	Dichotomous	0- no change of party President has happened in between these and the last elections; 1- party President has been changed between these and the last elections.	Positive
H7	PartyAge	Continuous	from 0 to $+\infty$	Positive
H8	RegionalGov	Continuous	from 0 to 1	positive or negative
H9	InEU	Dichotomous	0- the country is not yet an EU Member; 1- the country is an EU Member.	Negative
H10	LiberalDemocracy	Continuous	from 0 to 1	positive or negative
H11	GDPpCgrowth	Continuous	from -100% to 100%	Negative
H12	Corruption	Continuous	from 0 to 1	Negative

The variable 'OthersInGovernment' is a dichotomous variable, like the previous one, with the only difference that it refers to the inclusion in government of the competitor parties instead of the observed party. That is to say, the variable takes zero when no competitor ERP has been part of the previous government, and takes one if one or more parties have been included in the previous government. The variable does not measure the inclusion of the observed variable in the previous government, which means that the observed party could or could not have been included in the previous government as well. The mean of this variable is slightly higher than the first one, i.e. 22% of the parties observed had a competitor party included in previous government (Table 5.2.). The information for coding this variable has been collected from the Parties and Elections database. We expect positive direction in this case.

The variable 'PresidentChange' is a dichotomous variable whose positive outcome (measured as 1) signifies that there has been a leadership change within the party X in the period between the elections observed and the previous ones. The negative outcome (measured as zero) means that the same president (leadership) has stayed in between elections i.e. no change has been made. We expect positive direction of the hypothesis.

The 'PartyAge' variable is a continuous one that counts the number of years the ERP has been registered as a political party. While it can take from zero to infinity (or given the time span of elections observed 25 years), the observed maximum is indeed 25 years (Table 5.2.). Here as well we expect positive direction.

In the second cluster of variables we have the variable 'RegionalGov' and "In_EU". The variable labeled as 'RegionalGov' answers the question: are there elected regional governments, and if so, to what extent can they operate without interference from unelected bodies at the regional level. The lowest score would be reserved for a country that has no elected regional governments. A medium score would be accorded a country that has elected regional governments but where those governments are subordinate to unelected officials at the regional level (perhaps appointed by a higher-level body). A high score would be accorded to a country in which regional governments are elected and able to operate without restrictions from unelected actors at the regional level (with the exception of judicial bodies). (Naturally, regional governments remain subordinate to the national government.)

The data for this variable is borrowed from the Varieties of Democracy Project. (Coppedge et al., 2016) It uses the variable named as Regional government index (D) labeled as 'v2xel_regelec'. This variable uses another variable named as regional government elected (v2elsrgel), recoded so that 0=none elected, 1=only executive elected, 2=only assembly elected, and 3=both elected. This new construct is then scaled to vary from 0-1 and multiplied by regional offices relative power (v2elrgpwr) scaled to vary from 0-1. (Coppedge et al., 2016, pp. 60) Thus, the variable varies from zero to one, when one is the most regional authority (maximum 0.97 in this sample) and we expect both, positive or negative, direction.

The variable 'InEU' is a dichotomous variable which with one states is the country whose ERP we are observing has been a full EU Member State in the given year, and zero if that is not the case. The data is available on the web page of the EU. We expect positive direction.

Finally, the socio-economic and democratization factors are measured by three variables: 'LiberalDemocracy', 'GDPpCgrowth' and 'Corruption'.

The 'LiberalDemocracy' variable is again used from the Varieties of Democracy Project which in the V-Dem codebook can be found as 'Liberal democracy index (D) (v2x_libdem). (Coppedge at all, 2016 pp. 46) This variable answers the question: to what extent is the ideal of liberal democracy achieved? The liberal principle of democracy emphasizes the importance of protecting individual and minority rights against the tyranny of the state and the tyranny of the majority. The liberal model takes a "negative" view of political power insofar as it judges the quality of democracy by the limits placed on government. This is achieved by constitutionally protected civil liberties, strong rule of law, an independent judiciary, and effective checks and balances that, together, limit the exercise of executive power. To make this measure of liberal democracy, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account. This index goes from zero to one, with an actual variation from 0.08 to 0.88 in this sample (Table 5.2.). The expected direction of this variable is negative.

The variable labeled as 'GDPpCgrowth' measures the annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency.³⁸ The source is the World Bank data and in this sample it takes values from -30.7% to 92.4% growth of GDP per capita (Table 5.2.).

The final variable 'Corruption' measures the level of political corruption in a polity and it once more takes the values of the 'Political corruption index (D) (v2x_corr)' constructed in the V-Democracy Project. (Coppedge at all, 2016, pp.66) The question answered with this index is: How pervasive is political corruption? The directionality of the V-Dem corruption index runs from less corrupt to more corrupt. The corruption index includes measures of six distinct types of corruption that cover both different areas and levels of the polity realm, distinguishing between executive, legislative and judicial corruption. Within the executive realm, the measures also distinguish between corruption mostly pertaining to bribery and corruption due to embezzlement.

³⁸ Aggregates are based on constant 2005 U.S. dollars. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data file.

They differentiate between corruptions in the highest echelons of the executive (at the level of the rulers/cabinet) on the one hand, and in the public sector at large on the other. The measures thus tap into several distinguished types of corruption: both 'petty' and 'grand'; both bribery and theft; both corruption aimed and influencing law making and that affecting implementation. The index is arrived at by taking the average of public sector corruption index, the executive corruption index, the indicator for legislative corruption, and the indicator for judicial corruption. In other words, these four different government spheres are weighted equally in the resulting index. The index takes from zero to one, but the actual data varies from 0.1 to 0.9 (Table 5.2.) The expected direction is negative.

We can finally check for multicollinearity from the Table 5.3. Variable 'Corruption' and 'LiberalDemocracy' have the highest correlation of -0.785, which is at the 'border' of being alarming towards multicollinearity. While it is probably theoretically intuitive why are high level of liberal democracy and high level of political corruption negatively correlated, it is also important to test both variables separately due to the different theoretical implications these variables might have on the radicalism of the ERPs (mentioned before).

Some alternative variables have been constructed and tested on the models, and yet excluded from the final analysis from various reasons. To start with, the proportionality of the electoral system and its effect on the proliferation of parties was also tested through a categorical factor variable distinguishing majority, mixed and proportional representation electoral systems. Yet, due to the low variation across categories, (especially the high concentration of PR systems within the sample, see Figure 2.4 in Chapter 2), this variable has been excluded. Some electoral systems have incentives for the ERPs through the electoral provisions but instead of a dummy variable that shall indicate existence or absence of such electoral provisions we choose the proxy measurement of proportionality i.e. electoral fragmentation (H2).

In addition to the Share of seats, as a share of parties' size, a variable measuring the percentage of votes an ERP has from the total of the regional votes in election has been constructed. While it is positively correlated with the variable 'SeatsShare' (0.35) the models worked better when this variable was excluded.

Table 5.2. Summary of Independent variables (number of observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum).

SUMMARY OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES					
Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
SeatShare	199	7.23	10.81	0	70.30
Efragmentation	199	0.80	0.08	0.53	0.98
NoCompetitors	199	2.36	2.81	0	10
InGovernment	199	0.19	0.39	0	1
OthersInGovernment	199	0.22	0.42	0	1
PresidentChange	199	0.18	0.39	0	1
PartyAge	199	9.58	7.63	0	25
RegionalGov	184	0.51	0.38	0	0.97
InEU	199	0.14	0.34	0	1
LiberalDemocracy	187	0.48	0.21	0.08	0.88
GDPpCgrowth	162	3.49	11.93	-30.71	92.36
Corruption	187	0.56	0.21	0.10	0.89

Table 5.3. Correlations between the independent variables

CORRELATION BETWEEN THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES												
	SeatShare	Efragme ntation	NoCom petitors	InGover nment	OthersInG overnment	President Change	Party Age	Regiona lGov	InEU	LiberalDe mocracy	GDPpCg rowth	Corrupt ion
SeatShare	1.000											
Efragmentation	-0.050	1.000										
NoCompetitors	-0.030	0.378	1.000									
InGovernment	0.260	0.044	-0.034	1.000								
OthersInGovernment	-0.134	0.110	0.500	-0.125	1.000							
PresidentChange	-0.039	0.102	-0.001	-0.015	-0.147	1.000						
PartyAge	0.034	0.061	-0.048	0.148	0.053	0.124	1.000					
RegionalGov	-0.003	0.220	-0.038	0.037	0.135	0.121	0.160	1.000				
InEU	0.032	-0.016	-0.267	-0.028	-0.241	0.297	0.362	-0.005	1.000			
LiberalDemocracy	-0.009	0.020	-0.481	-0.071	-0.507	0.145	0.131	0.029	0.533	1.000		
GDPpCgrowth	-0.006	-0.062	0.071	-0.016	0.071	0.127	0.046	0.124	0.012	-0.090	1.000	
Corruption	0.091	-0.086	0.452	0.070	0.346	-0.149	-0.122	-0.113	-0.542	-0.785	-0.023	1.000

The variable 'RegionalGov' as well could be measured using the Regional Authority Index (RAI) (Hooghe et al. 2016) and thus it could be much more comparable to the existing work on Western European ERPs. Nonetheless, there are too few CEE cases covered by the existing RAI which diminishes the sample for the final analysis. The correlation between RAI (Hooghe, Marks and Schakel 2010), and the V-Dem Elected Regional Government Index (Coppedge et al. 2016) is 0.65 which reassures us of the good fit of the V-Dem Regional Government Index used in this dissertation.

As it has been introduced in the literature review part of Chapter 1, the access to media might influence ERPs' fortunes, and there is a reasonable expectation that it might affect their behavior and rhetoric as well.

Nonetheless, the high multicollinearity between the variable measuring the access to media (once more used from the V-Dem Project) and democracy suggested that this variable shall be omitted from the models. Therefore, the variable Liberal Democracy shall be used as it covers more aspects of the possibilities for representation of minorities in the political system.

In addition banning certain parties in a polity might trigger reaction by the political actors. We could expect that such a ban might be expected as negative signal for the national minorities. We know of at least two such scenarios, where ethnic parties were banned from the electoral race, in Albania and Bulgaria.

The real effect this ban had on the Greek and the Turkish minorities in these countries (accordingly) was in the naming of the parties (avoiding the name of the ethnic group they represent), while the program stayed more or less the same in the given period (if somewhat less radical). And yet, there are only few such cases to be able to use the variable in this sample. Therefore it is excluded from the model.

Chapter 5.3. Results from the quantitative analyses of the radicalism of ERPs in CEE

In this section we will finally test our hypotheses using quantitative statistical models for categorical variables. Given that the first two possible measurements offered for our dependent variable (ID_4 and ID_3) are ordered, we shall use the ordered rather than the multinomial logistic regression model which does not take into account the ordered nature of the categories.³⁹ In addition, Table 5.4. (in Appendix V) contains the correlations between the three versions/measurements of the dependent variable (ID_4, ID_3 and ID_2), and the independent variables. RegionalGovernment and OthersInGovernment are highly correlated to each measurement of the dependent variable, while the rest of the independent variables vary in the correlation coefficients with the different measures of the dependent variable. The variable that changes its correlation coefficients the most across different measures of the dependent variable is LiberalDemocracy. This variable changes 0.14 correlation coefficient points between ID_2 and ID_3 and 0.23 between ID_2 and ID_4.

For the purpose of finding the clearest and most straightforward statistical model we ran three separate models for each of the three operationalized dependent variables (as a fourfold, a threefold and a dichotomous variable). We found the middle measurement of the dependent variable ID_3 as 'Low', 'Middle' and 'High' radical to be the most successful in providing significant explanations of the radicalism of the self-determination claims by the CEE ERPs. Therefore in the following three sections we provide the results from the ordered logistic regressions when the threefold operationalization of the dependent variable is used (section 5.3.1.), then we offer a glimpse into the predicted probabilities of change in radicalism of ERPs when we change the independent variables (section 5.3.2.) and finally we present additional diagnostics on the same models with restricted samples (section 5.3.3.). We present the main empirical findings in section 5.3.4.

The tables and the explanation on the regressions of the same models which have been ran with the fourfold and the dichotomous measurement of the dependent variable are enclosed in the Appendix V

³⁹ Nonetheless, as we shall shortly after witness, the ordered logit model (ologit) very often does not meet the parallel-lines assumption and therefore we would have to reach for a less restrictive and yet more parsimonious and interpretable model than the multinomial mlogit i.e. the generalized ordered logit model with partial proportional odds (gologit2). (Williams, 2006, 2016; Mc Cullagh and Nelder 1989).

(Table 5.5., Table 5.8., Table 5.9, Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3.), but those results are not to be discussed here due to limited space, and for the purpose of better coherency (focus) in reporting the final results.

Chapter 5.3.1. Results from the ordered logistic regressions with the dependent variable operationalized as an ordinal variable with three categories.

We have finally arrived at the threshold of inferring what can be considered as a significant predictor of the level of radicalism of the ERPs in CEE.

Once we have recoded the dependent variable as three categories ordinal variable (low, middle and high radical ERP) (named as ID_3), we run an ordered logistic regression. The three models of the regressions test the three clusters of independent variables introduced before. The first model (ID_3_1) includes only those variables testing hypotheses regarding the electoral competition strategies and constellations in a polity, the second one (ID_3_2) adds the level of regional government and the EU as a factor of decentralization, and the third model (ID_3_3) adds the socio-economic and democratization factors. As we enlarge the models with more factor variables, the number of observations declines. We can see that the first model in each of the three scenarios (outcome variable measurement) counts 199 cases, the second model counts 184, while the final ones count 159.

Table 5.6 contains our findings from the ordered logit regression (ologit). We see that in all of the three models the inclusion of other ERPs in previous government is a radicalizer of ERPs' self-determination claims (at a level of confidence of 99% i.e. $p < 0.01$), as well as the electoral fragmentation ($p < 0.05$) and party's age ($p < 0.01/0.05/0.01$ in the three models accordingly). The inclusion in previous government is a statistically significant moderator in the first two models, but it fails to prove significant in the third model. While elected regional government is positively related to radicalism of ERPs (in both the second and the third model), liberal democracy and corruption are significant moderators (included only in the third model). While the positive sign stays in all three models only the final one proves the number of seats share of an ERP as radicalizer.

Overall, if looking at the final model ID_3_3 we confirm six theories (H2, H5, H7, H8b, H10a, and H12), and we reject three (H1, H8b, and H10b). We do not find statistical significance for the confirmation of H6 and H9, while H3, H4 and H11, albeit insignificant, behave in an opposite manner of the expected hypotheses.

Due to the significant *brant* test statistics, which proves that the parallel-line assumption has been violated in the final model ID_3_3, (See Appendix V, Figure 5.3.) a Generalized Logistic Regression (*gologit2*)⁴⁰ was run. Table 5.7 in continuation contains the log-odds for the ID_3_3 generalized ordered model (*gologit2*). The column zero (0) contains the logit odds for a party to be low radical as opposed to middle and high radical, while the one (1) column, contains the logit odds for a party to be low and middle radical as opposed to high radical.

The *gologit* regression show the same results presented above in Table 5.6. (from the *ologit* ID_3_3 model), with the only difference in the coefficients for the variable Party Age (P_Age) (the rectangle around the variable Party Age shall emphasize the different logit odds for the zero and one coefficient blocs). That is to say, we need to be careful when reading/interpreting the signs and the coefficients/ parameter estimates for P_Age because the variable Party Age violates the parallel-line assumption. When liberated from the proportional odds assumption, the variable Party Age, albeit positive in sign in both categories, loses its strength in the second group (0+1 vs. 2) and it is only significant in the first one.

This means that party age is much more powerful radicalizer factor for the low than the middle and the high category ERPs. That is to say, although ERPs tend to radicalize at advanced age, this radicalization is much stronger from a low to middle and high category, than it is from low and middle to high category. Moreover it is only significant for the low against the middle and high category (0 vs. 1+2).

In conclusion, if looking at the third model of ID_3_3, we have proven hypotheses H2, H5, H8b, H10a and H12, while we have refuted H1, H8a and H10b.

⁴⁰ This model tests for parallel lines assumption violation and specifies the model more precisely so that we correct the model for those variables where the model might be misinterpreted if 'read' from the *ologit* output. Since *gologit2* can fit models that are less restrictive than the parallel-lines models fitted by *ologit* (whose assumptions are often violated) we go for the *autofit* option, detect the variables that violated the parallel-lines assumption i.e. those variable for whom the coefficients are not the same for each cumulative logistic regression of the outcome variable. (Williams, 2006, 2016)

Table 5.6. Estimates for logistical odds for radicalization of the ERPs (dependent variable a three category ordinal variable)

Models for Dependent variable ID_3	ID_3_1	ID_3_2	ID_3_3
SeatsShare	0.024 -1.82	0.027 -1.92	0.031 (2.08)*
Efragmentation	5.118 (2.55)*	4.584 (2.08)*	6.258 (2.56)*
NoCompetitors	-0.121 -1.8	-0.05 -0.68	-0.054 -0.59
lnGovernment	0.738 (1.97)*	0.863 (2.03)*	0.707 -1.55
OtherslnGovernment	3.142 (6.38)**	2.982 (5.76)**	2.619 (4.46)**
P_change	0.45 -1.19	0.496 -1.2	0.53 -1.12
P_Age	0.046 (2.37)*	0.066 (2.63)**	0.073 (2.47)*
RegionalGov		2.148 (4.78)**	2.104 (4.20)**
ln_EU		-0.726 -1.44	-0.901 -1.41
LiberalDemocracy			-5.008 (2.56)*
GDPpCgrowth			0.03 -1.51
Corruption			-4.38 (2.54)*
Cut1_cons	4.742 (2.94)**	5.636 (3.19)**	1.83 -0.71
Cut2_cons	6.867 (4.16)**	8.057 (4.42)**	4.44 -1.69
N	199	184	159

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01

Table 5.7. Log-odds estimates through generalized ordered logit model for ID_3_3, npl for P_Age

Log- odds estimates through generalized ordered logit model, npl for P_Age		
	0 (0 vs. 1+2)	1 (0+1 vs. 2)
SeatsShare	0.033 (2.19)*	0.033 (2.19)*
Efragmentation	6.609 (2.62)**	6.609 (2.62)**
NoCompetitors	-0.048 (0.53)	-0.048 (0.53)
InGovernment	0.733 (1.55)	0.733 (1.55)
OthersInGovernment	2.610 (4.45)**	2.610 (4.45)**
P_change	0.512 (1.05)	0.512 (1.05)
P_Age	0.121 (3.37)**	0.003 (0.08)
RegionalGov	2.236 (4.29)**	2.236 (4.29)**
In_EU	-1.117 (1.63)	-1.117 (1.63)
LiberalDemocracy	-5.119 (2.59)**	-5.119 (2.59)**
GDPpCgrowth	0.023 (1.16)	0.023 (1.16)
Corruption	-4.589 (2.63)**	-4.589 (2.63)**
_cons	-2.404 (0.88)	-3.827 (1.39)
	159	159

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01

Chapter 5.3.2. Predicting the radicalism of the ERPs in CEE

In the previous models we have tested the direction and the strength of the logistic odds for ERPs' radicalism as a result of twelve factors. But we are now interested in how much change in the outcome variable (radicalism of an ERP) can be triggered by a given amount of change in the factor variables. For this purpose we would hereby observe the marginal effects and the predicted probabilities for an ERP to be radical for the model ID_3_3, after it has been run as a generalized ordered logistic regression (liberated from the parallel lines assumption for the variable PartyAge).

In Appendix V (Table 10), we displays the marginal effects showing the change in probability for an ERP of being radical when the predictor or independent variables increase by one unit. For continuous variables this represents the instantaneous one unit change (albeit the unit may be very small), and for the binary variables, the discrete change is from zero to one (so the one unit is usually thought). The other variables are being held constant at their means. Nonetheless, marginal effects in this fairly complicated scenario of an ordinal outcome variable with three categories might see less tangible, and therefore a second attempt is made in order to better predict the radicalism of ERPs.

In continuation, we show table Table 5.11, in order to 'play' with the probabilities of radicalism that can be found in the sample of the ERPs of CEE used for this dissertation. In this table we see the change in the predicted probabilities for an ERP being radical (through the three categories of Y) for a specified unit change in the independent variables. For dummies the one unit change goes from zero to one, but for the continuous variables it goes from one standard deviation minus to one standard deviation plus their mean.

Namely, albeit the change of one unit for the dummy variables is logically from zero to one and it will stay unchanged in the models of predicted probabilities, the change of the continuous variables instead of just an instantaneous unit change would go from one standard deviation lower than the mean to one standard deviation higher than the mean of the factor variable under observation.

To recap once more, Table 5.11 contains the calculation of the predicted probabilities for each category of ID_3 (ideology/radical) and the change between the two possible values of the factor variable 'low' or 'high'. To specify it better, for dummies 'low' value is zero and 'high' value is one, and for continuous variables,

'low' value is one standard deviation minus the mean of the independent variable and 'high' value is one standard deviation plus the mean. The probability that a party would be among the low, the medium or the high radical ERPs (the values of the dependent variable) are displayed for each of the two possible values (low or high) of the independent variables. In addition the change between the two values of the independent variable are displayed in the column 'Change'.

For instance, we can see that when an ERP is faced with a competitor ERP Y, that has been part of the previous government, the chances for the observed party X to be low level radical drop for 33%, while those for ERP X to be middle level radical increase for 51%. The great increase in the middle category is balanced with the 18% less chances for that party to be a high level radical when other competitor party is in government (see the chance column for OthersInGovernment independent variable).

Another high percentage change of probabilities for radicalism when changing the independent variable from low to high value is detected in the Party_Age variable. With a change from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean, which in this case is from 2 to 17 years (a 15 years of change) we have a drastic change within the low and the middle category of radical, i.e. it drops 33 % in the first one and it increases for 32% in the middle category of the dependent variable radical (see column change for variable Party_Age).

A very similar percentage of change happened with the change from low to high value of Liberal Democracy, and Corruption. The probability that a party would be low level radical increases for 23% while it decreases for 30% for the high level radical category. Similarly, a change from low to high level of Corruption increases the chances that a party would be low level radical for 33% and decreases the chances that a party would be high level radical for 32%. A change from high to low in Regional Government Index decreases the probability for 29% for a party to be low level radical and increases the chances for it to be high level radical for 28%.

Finally, when a country is EU Member State the probability of a party to be in the low level radical category increases for 23%, while the chance for it to be in the middle category of radical decreases for 10% and the probability to be in the high radical category decreases for 14%.

Table 5.11. Predicted probabilities for changes of the independent variables from 'low' to 'high' for ID_3_3

PREDICTED PROBABILITIES CHANGE				
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE				
	DEPENDENT VARIABLE	LOW	HIGH	CHANGE
SeatsShare	0 (low)	0.30	0.17	-0.13
	1 (medium)	0.56	0.57	0.02
	2 (high)	0.14	0.26	0.11
Efragmentation	0 (low)	0.34	0.15	-0.19
	1 (medium)	0.54	0.56	0.02
	2 (high)	0.13	0.30	0.17
NoCompetitors	0 (low)	0.20	0.25	0.05
	1 (medium)	0.58	0.57	0.00
	2 (high)	0.22	0.18	-0.04
InGovernment	0 (low)	0.26	0.14	-0.11
	1 (medium)	0.57	0.55	-0.02
	2 (high)	0.17	0.30	0.13
OthersInGovernment	0 (low)	0.38	0.04	-0.33
	1 (medium)	0.11	0.62	0.51
	2 (high)	0.52	0.34	-0.18
PresidentChange	0 (low)	0.18	0.27	0.09
	1 (medium)	0.57	0.57	-0.01
	2 (high)	0.24	0.16	-0.08
PaartyAge	0 (low)	0.44	0.11	-0.33
	1 (medium)	0.36	0.69	0.32
	2 (high)	0.19	0.20	0.01
RegionalGov	0 (low)	0.40	0.11	-0.29
	1 (medium)	0.50	0.52	0.01
	2 (high)	0.10	0.38	0.28
InEU	0 (low)	0.20	0.44	0.23
	1 (medium)	0.58	0.48	-0.10
	2 (high)	0.22	0.09	-0.14
LiberalDemocracy	0 (low)	0.09	0.32	0.23
	1 (medium)	0.48	0.55	0.07
	2 (high)	0.43	0.14	-0.30
GDPpCgrowth	0 (low)	0.28	0.18	-0.09
	1 (medium)	0.56	0.57	0.01
	2 (high)	0.16	0.24	0.09
Corruption	0 (low)	0.09	0.43	0.33
	1 (medium)	0.50	0.48	-0.01
	2 (high)	0.41	0.09	-0.32

The rest of the changes are below the 20%, which shall never be underestimated, knowing that a real change actually depends on the factor variable's measurement and one need to be very cautious when interpreting probabilities exactly due to the usually superior image predicted probabilities might leave for the dummy variables as opposed to the continuous variables. (Liao 1994)

One final comment regarding Table 5.11. will be given to the variable SeatsShare. As we can see from the table, the change from low to high value of SeatsShare makes 13% less probability for a party to be among the low radical category of the dependent variable, and 11% higher probability for it to belong to the group of high radical parties. This means that there is an about 11% higher probability that a party would become Federalist or Secessionist if the Seats Share goes from 4% to 18%, i.e. a change of 14%. If only looking at the one unit change of the SeatShare variable values (taken as low and high) we will not be able to depict the effect of the change in the factor variable on the outcome. (see Appendix V, Table 5.10.)

For the purpose of better visual grasping of the inquiries of Table 5.11. the highest percentage points change from low to high value of the factor variable is in bold. Clearly we detect the highest changes in probability of radicalization change when the independent variable changes from low to high for Party_Age and Corruption, for the low value of the independent variable (-33% change for P_Age, and 33% change for Corruption).

Chapter 5.3.3. Additional diagnosis and predictions

One additional, but important test we would like to run in order to do a robustness check of our model is to check for influential cases. Therefore, we run the same *ologit* and *gologit* models with restricted samples in order to check how much our inferences change when we exclude same countries (cases) from the sample. Given that Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia each constitute 13% of the total sample each, (which is the highest country cases share from the total sample), we would like to see how would the same (ordered and generalized ordered) logistic regressions turn out if those counties were separately excluded from the sample.

Table. 5.12. Log-odds for ologit ID_3_3 model when some countries are excluded from the sample

		Full model	Macedonia	BiH	Ukraine and Moldova
ID_3_3	SeatsShare	0.031 (2.08)*	0.031 (2.05)*	0.026 (1.75)	-0.008 (0.22)
	Efragmentation	6.258 (2.56)*	6.045 (2.41)*	4.327 (1.72)	9.814 (3.01)**
	NoCompetitors	-0.054 (0.59)	-0.079 (0.84)	-0.082 (0.86)	-0.059 (0.34)
	InGovernment	0.707 (1.55)	0.588 (1.20)	0.565 (1.20)	1.010 (1.84)
	OthersInGovernment	2.619 (4.46)**	2.336 (3.52)**	2.543 (3.91)**	3.315 (3.59)**
	P_change	0.530 (1.12)	0.528 (1.07)	0.469 (0.96)	0.580 (1.02)
	P_Age	0.073 (2.47)*	0.093 (2.74)**	0.069 (2.19)*	0.053 (1.52)
	RegionalGov	2.104 (4.20)**	1.690 (2.91)**	1.449 (2.64)**	1.972 (3.20)**
	In_EU	-0.901 (1.41)	-1.230 (1.83)	-0.777 (1.21)	-0.313 (0.43)
	LiberalDemocracy	-5.008 (2.56)*	-5.215 (2.56)*	0.067 (0.02)	-6.287 (2.41)*
	GDPpCgrowth	0.030 (1.51)	0.039 (1.72)	-0.004 (0.13)	0.037 (1.43)
	Corruption	-4.380 (2.54)*	-3.977 (2.32)*	-0.597 (0.27)	-4.356 (1.81)
cut1	_cons	1.830 (0.71)	1.368 (0.52)	4.579 (1.59)	3.513 (1.04)
cut2	_cons	4.440 (1.69)	4.297 (1.61)	7.201 (2.46)*	6.772 (1.97)*
<i>N</i>		159	136	134	121

In addition, we would like to make a test on the sample if we excluded Ukraine and Moldova jointly, because of the theoretical emphasis made in Chapter 3 regarding the origins and the nature of the parties observed as ERPs coming from these two countries. (Wydra, 2013; Danero I. 2013)

Table 5.12. contains the log-odds coefficients and the significance level for each independent variable as an explanatory variable of the radicalism of ERP (measured as a three ordered categories variable). We hereby present only the ologit models for the full as opposed to the three other models from which certain country cases have been excluded (the first one excluding the Macedonian party cases, the second one excluding the Bosnian party cases and the third one excluding the cases from Ukraine and Moldova altogether)⁴¹

We can see that in the H5 and H8 remain unchanged. They are positively and significantly related to radicalism of the ERPs of CEE in all of the *ologit* cases presented in Table 5.12. No change in the outcomes are found if Macedonia excluded from the sample, while H2, H7 and H12 lose significance/are not proven with the sample excluding Ukraine and Moldova. Yet, the most influential cases obviously are the Bosnia and Herzegovina party cases, whose exclusion from the sample is paid by the loss of significance for four variables, and therefore H2, H3, H10 and H12 fail to be proven.⁴²

Chapter 5.4. Towards an inference

In this Chapter we have presented several different models in order to gradually depict the effect the chosen factor variables could have on the dependent variable 'radicalism of ERPs'. Our main model ID_3_3, upon whose results we shall conclude this chapter is the generalized ordered logit model using the threefold ordinal measurement of radicalism of ERPs ('low', 'middle' and 'high' radical). The reason for this is not only from a statistical point of view, and for the purpose of narrowing the categories of the ordinal variable in the name of simplification of the results, but it is as well from a theoretical point of view. To be exact, we can see that these three categories/values of the dependent variable 'low', 'middle' and 'high' reflect a fairly

⁴¹ The gologit2 model is presented in the Appendix V, Table 5.13.

⁴² Nonetheless, each *ologit* model proves to be violating the parallel lines assumption, and this notion required that three other models that will fix this violation will be run. (Appendix V, Figure 5.4)

good distinction regarding the general behavior of the observed parties: parties that are low level radical are the Protectionist and the Municipal_Autonomists, and the parties that are high level radical are the Federalists and the Secessionist. Naturally, the Regional_Autonomist divide the low from the high category, constructing a single category itself.

From this model, therefore, we can conclude that we have proved five hypotheses H2, H5, H7, H8a and H12, and we have rejected two (H1 and H10). We do not find statistical significance for the confirmation of H6 and H9, while H3, H4 and H11, albeit insignificant, have opposite directions than the expected ones.

To start with the most statistically significant ones across the three separate models of ID_3, we meet the expected positive direction of the H2 and H5. That is to say, 'ElectoralFragmentation' and 'OthersInGovernment' are two variables that ignite radicalism of the ERPs across the three ID_3 models. The first significant radicalizer is the electoral fragmentation variable. The model proves H2 hypothesis that the higher the electoral fragmentation the more radical ERPs would be. This has been expected due to the proportionality of the system understood as a driver for party fragmentation and in effect inter and intra-ethnic outbidding. (Horowitz 1985) Therefore with this variable we do not confirm those theories that expect that proportionality would mitigate conflict due to the possibility of representation, nor Newman's (1996) claims that the proliferation of parties, which will open space for varieties of ERPs' policy stances (beyond self-determination, shall alleviate ethnic conflict. On the contrary, we confirm that the race to the extreme would rise as the number of parties in general grows. Given the nature of the independent variable in question, we do not distinguish inter versus intra ethnic outbidding in proving H2. We only claim that the proliferation of parties in election increases the general competition, thus instigates outbidding and extremism.

In addition, we confirm another hypothesis based on the intra-ethnic outbidding rational - the H5. We prove that when other ERP competitor has been part of the previous government, ERPs tend to radicalize. This result was expected as a consequence of the outbidding strategies expected to be embraced by ERPs when other ERP competitor has already been on power. Given the political space, the ERP in government is presumably the moderate one (Elias and Tronconi 2011c) and therefore the ERPs under analysis has

incentives to radicalize its appeals towards self-determination and distinguish itself from the party in government.

One additional important notion regarding the measurement of the variable *OthersInGovernment* shall be made. The variable takes in consideration all those cases where there has been a competitive party Y to the party X included in previous government, including those cases when the party X itself have been part of that same government (usually under some type of power sharing regulation). One might assume that in such case the motive for party X to radicalize should not be strong enough as it should be when that party X has been out of the government, while at the same time other competitive party Y has been participating in it. Yet, this is necessary not the case all the time. Namely, the very existence of the two ERPs in the political scene signalizes intra-ethnic outbidding per se, no matter the reason for such competition (individual-from the leadership, or programmatic-ideological).

Inclusion in government as the highest objective of every party makes competitors engage themselves in joint coalitions in order to be on power. This could be the case with the ERPs as well. Apart from some ideological reasons, they might have been included in a minority party governments which usually increases their bargaining potential, thus ERPs desire to be part of such cabinets. This, nonetheless, does not automatically alleviate the competitive strategies towards the other ERP cabinet partner. Thus, inclusion in government of the main competitor results normally with the expected race to the extreme at next elections in order for the party X to distinguish itself from its competitor party Y as the real representative of the ethnic group's interest.

We go forward and confirm those theories that see decentralization as a conflict instigator due to the very *raison d'etre* for these parties (ERPs). We confirm H8b and endorse those scholars that perceive ERPs' *raison d'etre* in the search for more and more self-government/decentralization, and thus expect that each reform towards gaining more regional autonomy should only trigger more strives for it in future. The decentralization therefore, as theorized by Rudolf and Thomson (1985), Narang (1995), De Winter (1998), Brancati (2006), Sorens (2012), and Massetti and Schakel (2013b), by reinforcing ethnic and regional identities, which on its hand boosts regional parties, increases ethnic conflict and secessionism.

The confirmation of the hypotheses H2, H5 and H8b speaks loud about the importance the intra-ethnic and the inter-ethnic competition strategies and electoral provisions have on the ideologies of ERPs.

Another variable which is significant, albeit rejecting our initial hypothesis H1, is the variable ERP Size. Size, unlike expected, turns out to be significant radicalizer. And yet, another deeper look into Table 5.12 could give us a hint into the reasoning for that. Once we take out the Bosnia and Herzegovina cases, the relationship loses power and it is not significant, moreover if we take out Ukraine and Moldova the sign turns negative (albeit insignificant). This could mean that the Ukrainian and Moldovan party cases have high influence on this variable. If we look at Table 4.2. (Appendix IV) we can notice the Communist Party of Ukraine and the Party of Regions in Ukraine, and the Party of Socialist of the Republic of Moldova and the Party of Communist of Moldova to be among the Federalist ones. These parties in particular are among those ERPs of CEE with highest best vote share.⁴³

Moving forward with the individual party variables, we prove that the ERPs' age is significantly correlated to radicalization. Although it is not significant for the radical category of ideology (when parallel lines assumption is released) it is significantly radicalizing the low level radical parties versus the middle and the radical together. That is to say, the positive impact on radicalization is stronger (and significant) for the low category as opposed to the middle and the high radical. Therefore, we say that in older ERPs tend to turn from low to middle or radical more than the low and middle to radical. One possible explanation for this outcome is the ongoing decentralization and Europeanization trends of the post-communist countries which incentivize decentralization and autonomy, especially for the enduring ERPs, but it alleviates the most radical rhetoric due to two reasons. The first is closely related with the theory behind the H1.i.e. bigger parties should have profit in attracting votes from ideology moderation, and the second is the logic behind H10b, that democracy alleviates radical narratives due to greater minorities' inclusion in the political system.

We confirmed ERPs from high level liberal democracies to be less radical than those ERPs coming from countries at a low level of democracy (H10a). Therefore, we contradict Saideman, Lanoue and Campenni (2002) argumentation that ethnic protests and rebellion are more likely in democracies than in authoritarian

⁴³ The CPU in 1998 has won 25.4%, PR in 2007 have won 33.4%, PSRM in 2014 has gained 20.5%, and the PCRM have reached up to 50% of the total votes.

regimes. They claimed that democracies make this kind of process more likely because of the necessity to play to a larger audience, while in authoritarian regimes, leaders may compete with each other for the support of the relevant constituency.

We therefore agree with the rationale of Lijphart 1994; Newman 1996; and Cohen 1997 that democracy indeed triggers moderation due to better representation. This should not contradict the outbidding logic (the already proven hypothesis that proportionality of the system/ higher electoral fragmentation boosts radicalism), because this variable speaks of several additional elements that makes democracy a moderator of ERPs. The liberal democracy variable, among other subjects, measures the level of protecting liberal and individual minority rights against the tyranny of the state and the tyranny of the majority and takes into consideration the level of electoral democracy. In addition, the EU integration and democratization processes appears as a strong factor of moderation, throughout its constant support for democratization which eases ethnically strong narratives.

The variable EU membership, albeit insignificant, goes in the same direction of our initial assumption that the pre-EU accession period should boost ERPs extremism more than the post accession one.

The final hypothesis we manage to prove, but as well goes in the negative direction, is the H12 arguing that corruption moderates ERPs' self-determination claims. We confirm Nye's (1967) expectations that as a benefit of corruption we might expect improvement of the governmental capacity, i.e. corruption may help overcome divisions in a ruling elite that might otherwise result in destructive conflict. Being the glue sufficient for elite to govern, we expected that ethnic parties in government (just as Elias and Tronconi 2011 suggested) would have to deal with the same challenges every government has to deal with (including corruption). Therefore we prove that corruptive societies 'pay off secessionism' by 'gluing the ethno-regionalist cleavage at elite level.

The H6 tested with the Presidential Change variable goes in the expected positive direction but it is insignificant, and the rest of the hypotheses H3, H4 and H11 have not meet the expected direction and were not significant. In sum we have proven that the highest radicalizing power comes from the electoral fragmentation and the decentralization level, and the inclusion in government of the competitor parties, i.e., the party competition rational choices. The democratization, on the other hand, and, ironically, the high level of corruption moderate ERPs' ideologies.

CONCLUSIONS

This work on Ethno-regionalist parties in CEE has been an attempt to contribute to the scholarship of ethno-territorial politics in post-communist societies, which compared to the Western European ethno-regionalism studies have been lagging behind in method and scope. Apart from contributing to the field with comparatively empirical methodology, which is usually not the main technique used for analyzing this party family in CEE, this dissertation makes an attempt to contribute to the scholarship addressing a fresh theoretical approach in analyzing ethno-regionalist party family even in the advanced democracies. Namely, we have presented a research design which tried to primarily encompass possible explanatory variables of the radicalism of ERPs in CEE that treat this party family as a rational strategic electoral actor, rather than a zero-sum player. That is to say, we observed variables that look for the ERPs positions towards its competitors in terms of representation and power holding, as we tried to look inside the parties' motives for taking certain positions such are parties' leadership change and parties' time span. We added classical socio-economic variables only after we tried to see how the actual level of self-government in a polity, and the external pressures might have influenced parties' ideologies.

In our way to find answers to the main research question "what accounts for the radicalism of ERPs' self-determination claims" we have firstly detected the possible hot spots for ethno-regionalist flames i.e. we have mapped the territorial concentrated ethno-regional groups in CEE. In addition to that we have pointed to the mobilized ethno-regionalist social cleavage in each CEE country, i.e. we have located the past and the current parties organized along the center-periphery cleavage.

We could clearly see that among the countries with lowest percentage share of its titular ethnic groups are Montenegro (45% Montenegrins), Bosnia and Herzegovina (50.1% Bosnian Muslims), Latvia (62 % Latvians), Macedonia (64% Macedonians) and Czech Republic (64% Czechs), while Poland, Kosovo and Croatia, are countries whose titular ethno-national groups surpasses 90% of the total population. Nonetheless, the real heterogeneity has been identified only after analyzing the fragmentation of the very minority ethnic groups in a country. Countries with ethno-national minority groups overpassing 20% are Bosnia and Herzegovina (Serbs), Montenegro (Serbs), Latvia (Russians), Macedonia (Albanians) and

Estonia (Russians). Montenegro has three ethno-national groups above 4.5% (Serbian, Bosnian/Bosniak, and Albanians), and there are four countries with two ethno-national groups above 4.5%, Bosnia and Herzegovina (Serbian and Croatian), Bulgaria (Turkish and Roma), Lithuania (Polish and Russian) and Moldova (Ukrainian and Russian).

The initial analysis of the size, success and leadership change of ERPs of CEE counts ninety parties and 328 country/party/electoral year party manifesto cases. 80% of those parties (72 out of 90) have been coded for the purpose of measuring of the dependent variable in the empirical analysis and 61% of all cases (199 out of 328) have been empirically tested. The main reason for that is the unavailability of party manifestos for many of these usually small and local parties whose campaigns mostly depend on public speeches and charismatic leaders, as well as participation in grand coalitions (something above 25% of the cases, almost 50% of which are coalitions with non ERPs and 35% are coalition with other ERPs).

Today (as of January 2016) 39 out of 90 ER parties/coalitions of CEE are parliamentary parties. Bosnia and Herzegovina has currently six ERPs in Federal Parliament, representing the Croatian or the Serbian people, Kosovo and Montenegro as well have six ERPs each, and Macedonia has five parties in national parliament. Albania, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Ukraine each has a single ERPs in national parliaments. Latvia's Harmony Center, The Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova and the Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova have the highest vote share of all current ERPs in CEE, 23%, 21.51% and 17.48% consequently; twelve ERPs have vote share below 1%.

From the size of the analyzed ERPs in CEE one important question arises: how much regional ERPs really are in certain countries, given the high vote share? For instance the Ukraine's Party of Regions or the Communist Party in certain elections won such a large share of the total votes and seats obtained in National Parliament that one may ask whether those parties could be considered as mainstream parties with a high ideological focus on the territorial and the multicultural issue. The Moldovan Communist Party moreover have gained up to 70% in one period of time, which just goes in support for the previous question.

Only, 8 out of 39 parties today have no competitor ERP; that is to say, we could be confident that for 80% of the ERPs under analysis, we can apply the intra-ethnic outbidding rationale.

The first, little anticipated, observation from the coding of the ERPs' manifestos (199 cases) is that secessionism is not such often 'threat', as one might expect when it comes to ethno-territorial politics in the post-communist countries. And yet, isn't it?

Secessionism, albeit being the least preferred option among the parties under analysis (9 out of 199 cases), should never be underestimated, what so ever. While already in Chapter 4 we have concluded that for the purpose of this empirical research the secessionist and the federalist appeals shall be cautiously put in a joint category, and the reason for that was the ambiguous language used by ERPs when they referred to secession, we also warned that federalist appeals shall not be naively considered to be unambiguously and firmly that- an inside of the state framework appeal.

Just in the approximately one year of empirical testing and writing of this dissertation there has been a proliferation of new radical public narratives by the President of Republika Srpska (the Leader of AISD), Milorad Dodik, whose clear public standing position towards the status of Republika Srpska is 'independence from Bosnia and Herzegovina. In May 2016 he claimed that 'Republika Srpska has never before been under such threat to disappear as now'. (Beta 2016) Moreover, the 25 September 2016 'referendum' for independence, the so called 'Republika Srpska's Day' (Rose 2016) reawakened fears of new conflicts in Bosnia as the results were 99.8% in favor of independence (with almost 56% turnout).(Delauney 2016) This 'referendum' was backed by all the Serbian parties in Republika Srpska and opposed by the Bosniak MPs in the Republika Srpska's Parliament. While Russia's President, Vladimir Putin and President Dodik met just ahead of the controversial 'Referendum', and the referendum had its 'blessing' from Russia, (Kovacevic 2016) the US Treasury has sanctioned President Dodik for obstructing the Dayton Peace Agreement (which ended the war of 1992 to 1995) by defying the orders of Bosnia's Constitutional Court.

The Acting OFAC Director, John E. Smith stated: "By obstructing the Dayton Accords, Milorad Dodik poses a significant threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. [...] Today's action underscores the US commitment to the Dayton Accords and supports international efforts for the country's continued European integration." (Rose 2017)

If we recall Chapter 3 and moreover the dependent variable measurement and the coding of the manifestos for this research, we shall also recall that not only have we witnessed BiH's Serbian parties to be ambiguously secessionist and federalist, but we have coded Dodik's AISD to be only federalist (in 2010 and 2014). Therefore, we see how inconsistent party's public rhetoric is with its ideological positions on paper. The same could be said for the Ukraine's pro-Russian parties where we almost did not note secessionist claims by political parties, and yet we witnessed ethno-regional war in the areas with prevailing Russian community, moreover the Communist Party of Ukraine has been banned by the Constitutional Court for supporting the independence of Crimea and the pro-independents movements in Eastern Ukraine.

We have inferred that 63% of the manifestos contain positive reference to EU integration, which on the other hand is negatively correlated to the positive references (within ERPs' manifestos) to Russia and positively to the positive attitudes towards NATO. While we do observe strong influence by Russia and the US, along with the EU, in the war of Ukraine, ERPs are not exclusively affected by foreign pressures in their strategic electoral determinations. Secessionist parties are naturally among those with least reference to the importance for the nationalizing state to keep its sovereignty and territorial borders unchanged, and the middle level Autonomist_Regional category is the one with the highest percentage of such claims (2.4% vs. 35% consequently).

The previous notions have been made in order for us to acknowledge the challenge which post-communist ERPs face when it comes to public pro-secessionist self-determination claims. Given the fragile political constellations (especially in a post conflict periods) in the frail nation states, and the external pressures, we see that the entropy resistant cultures avoid to openly express their independentist appeals, and rather opt for federalist narratives, which by no means are considered to be mild ideological positions in democratizing societies such are the ones under analysis in this dissertation.

And yet, the possibility for these shy secessionist claims to outgrow and become flamboyant intra-ethnic conflicts is not to be underestimated.

In spite of the feasible initial impression that we have been faced with methodological obstacle to infer the factors for ERPs' radicalism, after we considered federalist and secessionist ERPs as one joint category, we had a good ground for analysis indeed, and we run empirical tests on three models for each of the three

possible measures of the outcome variable- radicalism of ERPs' self-determination claims. Despite the fact that the models vary little across the three different variable measures, we shall only conclude with the model ID_3_3 which tests radicalism at three levels: low, middle and high. In sum, we have contributed to the study on ethno-regionalism in CEE by proving initially six hypotheses (H2, H5, H7, H8b, H10a and H12), and moreover, with the given sample we managed to reject one more hypothesis (H1).

Two different forces have been detected to be the main drivers of CEE ERPs' behavior at elections. The first one is the vote and office maximizing, rational choice strategies ERPs make before elections, and the second one is the Europeanization, throughout democratization, pressure that each post-communist nationalizing state was faced with.

Two significant radicalizers across the three models of ID_3 are the electoral fragmentation in election and the inclusion in previous government by the competitor ERP. As expected, the proportionality of the system, understood as a driver for party fragmentation, in effect triggers inter and intra-ethnic outbidding (Horowitz 1985) We confirm that the race to the extreme would increase with the boost of the number of parties in election. In addition we prove that as a reflection of the outbidding strategies which parties normally embrace when other competitor party has previously been on power, ERPs' ideologies will radicalize. As a complement to this logic of 'outbidding' we confirm that decentralization is ERP's radicalizer. We endorse the reasoning that due to their very *raison d'être*, ERPs shall always ask for more regional autonomy than the one in 'hands'. So, by reinforcing ethnic and regional identities, which on its part boosts the regional parties, the higher level of regional government will increase ethnic conflict and instigate further secessionist claims. (Rudolf and Thomson 1985; Narang 1995; De Winter 1998; Brancati 2006; Sorens 2012; and Massetti and Schakel 2013b)

ERPs' size and age prove to be significant radicalizers, while the leadership change, albeit as it is positively correlated to radicalism (as it has been expected), does not prove significant in these models.

We move to the country level variables to confirm the H10a which argued that higher level liberal democracies moderate, and low level democracies radicalize ERPs. Rejecting Saideman, Lanoue and Campenni's (2002) theory that ethnic protests and rebellion are more likely in democracies than in authoritarian regimes, we make a very important switch in the argument over the ethnic outbidding and

democratic regimes. Namely, we argue that democracy indeed triggers moderation due to better representation. (Lijphart 1994; Newman 1996; and Cohen 1997) Our variable which measures the level of protecting liberal and individual minority rights against the tyranny of the state and the tyranny of the majority indeed proves inclusion to be important for the extremism of ERPs' alleviation. And yet, we connect the democratization variable with the inseparable integrative processes of EU and its conditionality. While it is not in this thesis' power, nor interest, to elaborate the conditionality and the democratization of the candidate states, we do believe that the EU integrationist path (more precisely the pre-accession period) has much to do with igniting pro-decentralization (even autonomist) appeals in the ideologies of ERPs, while relieving the federalist and the secessionist ones. The EU integration, albeit insignificant, follows this negative correlation with the ERPs' radicalism.

Probably the most controversial hypotheses that has been proven in this dissertation addresses corruption as a possible glue for inter-ethnic conflicts at elite level. While recognizing the measurement drawback of depicting directly ethnic corruption within a polity, the available measure on general corruption suggests that H12 is negatively significant factor of radicalism. Confirming Nye's (1967) expectations that one benefit of corruption could be the improvement of the governmental capacity, we do believe that corruption may help overcome divisions in a ruling elite that might otherwise result in destructive conflict. Corruption can serve as the glue sufficient for elites to govern. It is not intention of this dissertation to recommend corruption over ethnic outbidding, rather it aims to point out on possible indicators of ethnic radical rhetoric.

We hereby conclude that, in analyzing ERPs in CEE, the ethnic-outbidding logic has been proven to hold in several instances. Nonetheless, whether ethnicity is still the only game in town, when treating ethnically heterogeneous societies, or there are other possible perspective for electoral competition strategies is to be tested in future work. Testing nested-competition strategies (Zuber 2012) is still maybe empirically challenging, but nonetheless of a crucial importance for future work. The failure to prove that the fragmentation of the very ERP family is potential for radicalism makes us believe that there could be something beyond just a statistical noise that could explain this outcome. In extremely fragmented ethnic blocks of parties, some parties might definitely try other strategies than ethnic radicalization in order to gain votes. Zuber's (2012) theory that usually big parties should opt for moderate and beyond segmented market

strategies could be a very reasonable expectation to this 'failure' to prove that intra-ethnic outbidding is necessarily a radicalizing ERPs' factor.

Given the fact that CEE is still in a democratizing trend and that ERPs from CEE should soon catch the Western Europe's ethno-regionalist rhythm and learn how to amplify their ideologies and strategies beyond the ethno-territorial issues i.e. they shall mainstreamize their programs in return.

One such driver could also be the very opposite direction of ethnicizing of the mainstream parties, which means accepting the narratives of regional autonomy, decentralization and protection of minority rights more vigorously.

More recent such example is the overturn in parties' platforms and electoral successes in the latest 2016 Macedonian elections. In spite of the exclusion of those cases from this thesis dataset, due to time limit, we can learn something from this latest Macedonian elections. Namely, in the December 2016 elections we have witnessed a situation of straightforward accommodation of the minority issues by the mainstream opposition party, as opposed to the strong ethnic narrative by the Albanian party in government (and several others), and moderate 'beyond self-determination' platform by a new opposition Albanian party. In addition to accommodation in terms of programmatic stances, the main opposition (mainstream) party have opened its lists for the minorities and campaigned sturdily the ethno-regionalist issue. The issue has been securitized from the side of the mainstream governing party⁴⁴, nonetheless, it have had a minority vote maximizing role for the opposition party, a 55% of loss of the votes for the Albanian governing party and 68% of that loss have gone for the new moderate party. This latest electoral story is indeed one confirmation that the ethnic party politics might move from strictly ethnically segmented to mixed market, especially in times of political crisis which goes beyond ethnic issues such is corruption (again, a very controversial issue).

And this is where new empirical research should focus in future. For that purpose future study shall focus on gathering more data on the ethno-regionalist party family in order to balance the information available across party families. Thus, an upgrade of the already existing data bases on parties' ideologies such as CMP, CHES, EPAC or the like is encouraged.

⁴⁴ The proposition from the opposition for making the Albanian language an official language on the whole territory of the country has been spun by the governing Macedonian party as a proposal for federalization.

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Figure I.5. Operationalization of the dependent variable "radicalization of the self-determination demands" by the ERPs.

DIMENSION OF RADICALISM OF THE ETHNO-REGIONALIST PARTIES' SELF-DETERMINATION CLAIMS										
LOW		→						HIGH		AUTHORS AND DATE
	Peripheral identity building	Regional autonomy	Federalism	Confederalism	Full independence					Rokkan and Urwin 1983
	Protectionists	Autonomists	Left-libertarian		Separatists					Müller-Rommel, 1994
	Protectionist	Autonomist	National-federalist		Irredentist					De Winter's, 1998
		Inside of state framework			Outside of state framework					Janne, 2007
	Affirmative action	Cultural Autonomy	Territorial Autonomy		Secession, Irredentist					
Unitarism-full integration/ Unionism			Devolution	Federalism	Independence					Hepburn 2010
	Soft Demands	Mild Demands (challenges to internal order)			Strong/Radical Demands (challenges to international order)					
	Protectionist	Decentralist			Secessionist					Dandoy, 2010
	Conservative	Participationist	Autonomist	Confederalist	Independence	Irredentist	Rattachist			
	Protectionist	Moderate parties			Radical parties					Massetti, Shakei, 2012
			Federalist		Amiguous and Separationist					
Majority nationalists seek hegemony within the current state they define as their nation-state	Moderate parties of the middle ground seek a common state in which no single ethno-national group dominates over another.									
Unitary State	Minority languages as official state languages. Education in the minority languages up to the tertiary level.	Cultural Autonomy	Decentralization and Decentralization on Ethnic Bases	Symmetrical Federalism	Asymmetrical Federalism in favor of national minority	Independence	Annexation of the national minority region by another state	Ethnonationalism		Szőcsik and Zuber, 2012
	Minority language use Education in and of the minority language.		Decentralization	Federalization	Asymmetrical federalism on ethnic basis	Secession	Irredentism	Territorial sub-national authority		Szőcsik, 2012
Centralization/ Strong central government/ Rejection of Multiculturalism and minority rights	Aaffirmative action/ Language rights	Strong minority rights/ Multiculturalism/ Group equality	Decentralization/ Strong autonomy/group rights, reconciliation, protest/boycot	Territorial rights	Political autonomy	Secession/Violent opposition				Gadjanova, 2013

Appendix II

Table 2.1. Census and Question Wording.

Country	Year of Census	Question wording	Answering Options	An option not to answer
ALBANIA	2011	Ethno-cultural group	an open answer	yes
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA	2013	Ethno/national declaration	a list of given options	yes
BULGARIA	2011	Ethnic group	a list of given options	yes
CROATIA	2011	Ethnicity	an open answer	no
CZECH REPUBLIC	2011	Ethnicity	an open answer	yes
ESTONIA	2011	Ethnicity	a list of given options	no
HUNGARY	2011	Nationality	a list of given options	yes
KOSOVO	2011	Ethnic or cultural group	an open answer	yes
LATVIA	2011	Ethnicity	an open answer	no
LITHUANIA	2011	Ethnicity	an open answer	no
MACEDONIA	2002	Ethnic affiliation	an open answer	yes
MOLDOVA	2004	Ethnicity	an open answer	no
MONTENEGRO	2011	National, ethnic affiliation	an open answer	no
POLAND	2011	Nationality	a list of given options	no
ROMANIA	2011	Ethnic group	an open answer	yes
SERBIA	2011	National Affiliation	an open answer	yes
SLOVAKIA	2011	Nationality	a list of given options	no
SLOVENIA	2002	Nationality/ethnicity	a list of given options	yes
UKRAINE	2001	Ethnic origin	an open answer	no

Source: National statistic offices *census official data and official questionnaires.

Table 2.2.a and b. Ethnic minorities by NUTS 3 regions and type of regions, maritime- not maritime, rural or urban, metropolitan or not.

a. EU countries by NUTS 3 (only Poland NUTS 2)

Country	ethnicity	NUTS 3	NUTS 3 perc	Coastal region	Rural - urban typology	Metro region corresponding to the NUTS 3	
BULGARIA	Turkish	Kardzhali	66.20	No	Rural region		
		Targovishte	35.80	No	Rural region		
		Shumen	30.30	No	Rural region		
		Dobrich	13.50	Yes	Intermediate region		
		Burgas	13.30	Yes	Intermediate region		
		Haskovo	12.50	No	Intermediate region		
CZECH REPUBLIC	Moravian	Kraj Vysocina	7.02	No	Rural region		
		Jihomoravský kraj	21.86	No	Intermediate region	Brno	
		Olomoucký kraj	12.14	No	Rural region		
		Zlínský kraj	16.43	No	Rural region		
CROATIA	Silesian	Moravskoslezsko	0.92	No	Intermediate region	Ostrava	
		Regional Affiliation	Istarska županija	12.11	Yes	Rural region	
	Primorsko-goranska županija		1.16	Yes	Intermediate region		
	Istarska županija		6.03	Yes	Rural region		
	Požeško-slavonska županija		0.76	No	Rural region		
	Serbian		Ličko-senjska županija	13.65	Yes	Rural region	
			Šibensko-kninska županija	10.53	Yes	Rural region	
	Bjelovarsko-bilogorska županija		6.31	No	Rural region		
	Virovitičko-podravska županija		6.06	No	Rural region		
	Dsječko-baranjska županija		7.76	No	Rural region		
	Vukovarsko-srijemska županija		15.50	No	Rural region		
	Karlovačka županija		10.40	No	Rural region		
	Sisačko-moslavačka županija	12.18	No	Rural region			
ESTONIA	Russian	Põhja-Eesti	31.35	Yes	Tallinn		
		Kirde-Eesti	72.39	Yes	Intermediate region		
		Lõuna-Eesti	23.10	No	Rural region		
HUNGARY	Roma	Komárom-Esztergom	6.94	No	Intermediate region		
		Somogy	7.46	No	Rural region		
		Tolna	3.55	No	Rural region		
		Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén	7.94	No	Intermediate region		
		Heves	5.99	No	Rural region		
		Hajdú-Bihar	3.22	No	Intermediate region	Debrecen	

		Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg	4.73	No	Rural region	
		Bács-Kiskun	4.02	No	Rural region	
LATVIA	Russian	Latgale	38.87	No	Rural region	
		Rīga	40.21	Yes	Urban region	Rīga
		Pierīga	19.29	Yes	Urban region	Rīga
LITHUANIA	Russian	Klaipėdos apskritis	10.40	Yes	Intermediate region	
		Utenos apskritis	12.44	No	Rural region	
		Vilniaus apskritis	10.28	No	Urban region	Vilnius
	Polish	Utenos apskritis	4.03	No	Rural region	
		Vilniaus apskritis	22.98	No	Urban region	Vilnius
POLAND*	Silesian	Śląskie	10.86	No	Urban region	Katowice
		Opolskie	10.42	No	Intermediate region	Opole
	German	Opolskie	7.70	No	Intermediate region	Opole
ROMANIA	Hungarian	Bihor	24.02	No	Intermediate region	No
		Cluj	14.99	No	Intermediate region	
		Satu Mare	32.69	No	Rural region	
		Sălaj	22.36	No	Rural region	
		Braşov	7.22	No	Intermediate region	
		Covasna	71.59	No	Rural region	
		Harghita	82.90	No	Rural region	
		Mureş	36.46	No	Rural region	
SLOVAKIA	Hungarian	Trnavský kraj	21.80	No	Rural region	
		Nitriansky kraj	24.60	No	Rural region	
		Banskobystrický kraj	10.20	No	Rural region	
		Košický kraj	9.40	No	Intermediate region	Košice
SLOVAKIA	Italian	Obalno-kraska	1.83	Yes	Intermediate region	
	Hungarian	Pomurska	4.50	No	Rural region	

b. The rest of the countries equivalent or the best possible equivalent to NUTS 3 (LAU I)

COUNTRY	ETHNICITY	NUTS 3 OR CLOSEST EQUIVALENT	PERCENTAGE	COASTAL REGION	RURAL-URBAN TYPOLOGY	METRO REGION
ALBANIA	Greek	Gjirokaštër	7.43	No	Intermediate region	
		Vlorë	6.88	Yes	Intermediate region	
MACEDONIA	Albanian	Jugozapaden	36.97	No	Intermediate region	N
		Poloski	73.22	No	Intermediate region	N
		Severoistocen	31.05	No	Intermediate region	N
		Skopski	21.91	No	Urban region	N

SERBIA	Turkish	Jugozapaden	9.67	No	Intermediate region	N
		Jugoistocen	7.44	No	Rural region	N
		Poloski	5.72	No	Intermediate region	N
	Albanian	Area of Pčinja	0.43	No		
		Area of Severna Bačka	7.78	No		
	Croatian	Area of Zapadna Bačka	5.78	No		
		Area of Srem	2.80	No		
		Area of Južna Bačka	1.63	No		
		Area of Raška	34.11	No		
	Bosniak	Area of Zlatibor	12.88	No		
		Area of Severni Banat	46.64	No		
	Hungarian	Area of Severna Bačka	40.80	No		
		Area of Srednji Banat	12.55	No		
		Area of Zapadna Bačka	9.34	No		
Area of Južna Bačka		7.78	No			
MONTENEGRO	Croatian	Herceg Novi	2.14	Yes		
		Kotor	6.87	Yes		
		Tivat	16.42	Yes		
	Muslim	Bar	8.00	Yes		
		Berane	6.02	No		
		Bijelo Polje	13.46	No		
		Plav	5.58	No		
		Pljevlja	5.95	No		
		Podgorica	2.31	No		
		Rozaje	4.68	Yes		
		Ulcinj	3.92	Yes		
		Zabljak	0.11	No		
		Albanian	Bar	5.98	Yes	
	Plav		18.88	No		
	Ulcinj		70.66	Yes		
	Bosniak	Berane	17.74	No		
		Bijelo Polje	27.36	No		
		Plav	51.94	No		
		Rozaje	83.96	No		
	Serbian	Andrijevića	62.97	No		
		Berane	43.61	No		
		Bijelo Polje	36.33	No		
		Budva	38.50	Yes		
		Herceg Novi	37.12	Yes		
		Kotor	35.91	Yes		
		Mojkovac	49.44	No		

		Pļjevlja	57.39	No		
		Pluzine	65.74	No		
		Savnik	43.33	No		
		Zabljak	42.62	No		
		Tivat	32.05	Yes		
KOSOVO	Gorani	Prizren	2.90	No		
	Turkish	Prizren	4.35	No		
	Serbian	Kosovska Mitrovica	12.08	No		
		Ferizaj	1.74	No		
		Gjilan	5.26	No		
		District of Prishtina	2.49	No		
	Bosniak	Pech	2.84	No		
		Prizren	6.34	No		
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA	Serbian	Republica Srpska	96.80	No		
		Federation BiH	2.30	No		
	Croatian	Federation BiH	22.80	No		
		Republica Srpska	1.00	No		
MOLDOVA	Russian	Municipiul Chişinău	13.92	No		
		Municipiul Bălţi	19.23	No		
		Raionul Anenii Noi	5.06	No		
		Raionul Basarabeasca	8.86	No		
		Raionul Cahul	6.46	No		
		Raionul Căuşeni	4.24	No		
		Raionul Cimişlia	3.89	No		
		Raionul Donduşeni	5.84	No		
		Raionul Edineţ	6.25	No		
		Raionul Floreşti	5.18	No		
		Raionul Ocniţa	4.89	No		
		Raionul Taraclia	4.96	No		
		U.T.A. Găgăuzia	3.82	No		
UKRAINE	Russian	The city of Sevastopol' (town's council)	71.60	Yes	Urban region	Y
		Autonomous Republic of Crimea	58.30	Yes		
		Luhans'k region	39.00	No		
		Donets'k region	38.20	Yes		
		Kharkiv region	25.60	No		
		Zaporizhzhia region	24.70	Yes		
		Odesa region	20.70	Yes		
		Dnipropetrovs'k region	17.60	No		

Table 2.4. Cultural differences between the titular and the minority ethno-national communities in CEE

country_name	titular ethnic group	language of the titular ethnic group	religion of the titular ethnic group	relevant minority	minority group language	religion of the titular ethnic group	minority group religion
ALBANIA	Albanian	Albanian - Indo-European; Albanian	Muslim	Greek	Greek - Indo-European; Hellenic; Greek (Hellenic)	Muslim	Orthodox Greek Christians
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA	Bosniak	Bosniak - Indo-European; Balto-Slavic; Slavik; South Slavic; Western; Serbo-Croatian; Shtokavian; Neo Shtokavian; Eastern Herzegovian;	Muslim	Serbian	Serbian - Indo-European; Balto-Slavic; Slavik; South Slavic; Western; Serbo-Croatian; Shtokavian; Neo Shtokavian; Eastern Herzegovian;	Muslim	Orthodox Serbian Christians
				Croatian	Croatian - Indo-European; Balto-Slavic; Slavik; South Slavic; Western; Serbo-Croatian; Shtokavian; Neo Shtokavian; Eastern Herzegovian;	Muslim	Roman Catholic
BULGARIA	Bulgarian	Bulgarian-Indo-European; Balto-Slavic; Slavik; South Slavic; Eastern South Slavic;	Bulgarian Orthodox Christians	Turkish	Turkish - Turkic; Oghuz; Western Oghuz;	Bulgarian Orthodox Christians	Muslim
CROATIA	Croatian	Croatian - Indo-European; Balto-Slavic; Slavik; South Slavic; Western; Serbo-Croatian; Shtokavian; Neo Shtokavian; Eastern Herzegovian;	Roman Catholicism	Italian / Istrian	Italian - Indo-European; Italic; Romance; Italo-Dalmatian; Tuscan;	Catholic Christians	Roman Catholic
				Italian / Istrian	Slovenian - Indo-European; Balto-Slavic; Slavik; South Slavic; Western South Slavic;	Catholic Christians	Roman Catholic
				Serbian	Serbian - Indo-European; Balto-Slavic; Slavik; South Slavic; Western; Serbo-Croatian; Shtokavian; Neo Shtokavian; Eastern Herzegovian; Serbian	Catholic Christians	Orthodox Serbian Christians
CZECH REPUBLIC	Czech	Czech-Indo-European; Balto-Slavic; Slavik; West Slavic; Czech-Slovak;	Roman Catholicism	Moravian / Silesian	Moravian - Indo-European; Balto-Slavic; Slavik; West Slavic; Czech-Slovak; Czech; Dialect of Czech language	Catholic Christians	Protestant Moravian Church
ESTONIA	Estonian	Estonian-Uralic languages; Finnic;	Evangelical Lutheranism.	Russian	Russian - Indo-European; Balto-Slavic; Slavik; East Slavic;	Evangelical Lutheranism.	Eastern Orthodox Russian Christians
KOSOVO	Albanian	Albanian - Indo-European;	Muslim	Turkish	Turkish - Turkic; Oghuz; Western Oghuz;	Muslim	Muslim
				Bosniak	Bosniak - Indo-European; Balto-Slavic; Slavik; South Slavic; Western; Serbo-Croatian; Shtokavian; Neo Shtokavian; Eastern Herzegovian;	Muslim	Muslim
				Gorani	Gorani - Našinski dialekt (Serbian dialect)	Muslim	Muslim

				Serbian	Serbian - Indo-European; Balto-Slavic; Slavic; South Slavic; Western; Serbo-Croatian; Shtokavian; Neo Shtokavian; Eastern Herzegovian;	Muslim	Orthodox Serbian Christians
LATVIA	Latvian	Latvian-Indo-European; Baltic; Eastern Baltic;	Lutherans	Russian	Russian - Indo-European; Balto-Slavic; Slavic; East Slavic;	Lutherans	Orthodox Russian Christians (Roman Catholicism in Latgale)
LITHUANIA	Lithuanian	Lithuanian-Indo-European; Balto-Slavic; Baltic; Eastern Baltic;	Roman Catholicism	Polish	Polish - Indo-European; Balto Slavic; Slavic; West Slavic;	Roman Catholicism	Catholic Christian
				Russian	Russian - Indo-European; Balto-Slavic; Slavic; East Slavic;	Roman Catholicism	Orthodox Russian Christians
MACEDONIA	Macedonian	Macedonian- Indo-European; Balto-Slavic; Slavic; South Slavic; Eastern South Slavic;	Macedonian Orthodox Christian	Albanian	Albanian - Indo-European;	Macedonian Orthodox Christian	Muslim
				Turkish	Turkish - Turkic; Oghuz; Western Oghuz;	Macedonian Orthodox Christian	Muslim
MOLDOVA	Moldovan /Romanian	Romanian - Indo-European; Italic; Romance; Eastern Romance; Romanian	Orthodox Christian (Moldovan and Bessarabian)	Russian	Russian - Indo-European; Balto-Slavic; Slavic; East Slavic;	Orthodox Christian (Moldovan and Bessarabian)	Orthodox Russian Christians
MONTENEGRO	Montenigrin	Montenegrin-Indo-European; Balto-Slavic; Slavic; South Slavic; Western; Serbo-Croatian; Shtokavian; Neo Shtokavian; Eastern Herzegovian;	Orthodox Christianity	Serbian	Serbian - Indo-European; Balto-Slavic; Slavic; South Slavic; Western; Serbo-Croatian; Shtokavian; Neo Shtokavian; Eastern Herzegovian;	Orthodox Christianity	Orthodox Serbian Christians
				Bosniak / Muslim	Bosniak - Indo-European; Balto-Slavic; Slavic; South Slavic; Western; Serbo-Croatian; Shtokavian; Neo Shtokavian; Eastern Herzegovian;	Orthodox Christianity	Muslim
				Croatian	Croatian - Indo-European; Balto-Slavic; Slavic; South Slavic; Western; Serbo-Croatian; Shtokavian; Neo Shtokavian; Eastern Herzegovian;	Orthodox Christianity	Roman Catholic
				Albanian	Albanian - Indo-European;	Orthodox Christianity	Muslim
POLAND	Polish	Polish - Indo-European; Balto Slavic; Slavic; West Slavic; Polish	Roman Catholicism	German	German - Indo-European; Germanic; West Germanic;	Catholic Christians	Christian (Lutherans and catholics)
				Silesian	Silesia-West Slavic (there is no concensus whether it is a dialect of Czech and Polish or a separate language).	Catholic Christians	Christian (Lutherans and catholics)
ROMANIA	Romanian	Romanian - Indo-European; Italic; Romance; Eastern Romance; Romanian	Eastern Orthodox Christian	Hungarian	Hungarian - Uralic; Finno-Ugric (traditional grouping);	Eastern Orthodox Christian	Christian (Catholics and Lutherans)

SERBIA	Serbian	Serbian - Indo-European; Balto-Slavic; Slavik; South Slavic; Western; Serbo-Croatian; Shtokavian; Neo Shtokavian; Eastern Herzegovian;	Orthodox Serbian Christians	Hungarian	Hungarian - Uralic; Finno-Ugric (traditional grouping);	Orthodox Serbian Christians	Christian (Catholics and Lutherans)
				Bosniak	Bosniak - Indo-European; Balto-Slavic; Slavik; South Slavic; Western; Serbo-Croatian; Shtokavian; Neo Shtokavian; Eastern Herzegovian;	Orthodox Serbian Christians	Muslim
				Albanian	Albanian - Indo-European; Albanian	Orthodox Serbian Christians	Muslim
				Croatian	Croatian- Indo-European; Balto-Slavic; Slavik; South Slavic; Western; Serbo-Croatian; Shtokavian; Neo Shtokavian; Eastern Herzegovian;	Orthodox Serbian Christians	Roman Catholic
				Muslims	Bosniak - Indo-European; Balto-Slavic; Slavik; South Slavic; Western; Serbo-Croatian; Shtokavian; Neo Shtokavian; Eastern Herzegovian;	Orthodox Serbian Christians	Muslim
SLOVAKIA	Slovak	Slovak-Indo-European; Balto Slavic; Slavik; West Slavic; Czech-Slovak;	Roman Catholicism	Hungarian	Hungarian - Uralic; Finno-Ugric (traditional grouping);	Orthodox Serbian Christians	Christian (Catholics and Lutherans)
SLOVENIA	Slovenian	Slovenian - Indo-European; Balto-Slavic; Slavik; South Slavic; Western South Slavic;	Roman Catholicism	Italians	Italian - Indo-European; Italic; Romance; Italo-Dalmatian; Tuscan;	Roman Catholicism	Roman Catholic
				Hungarians	Hungarian - Uralic; Finno-Ugric (traditional grouping);	Orthodox Serbian Christians	Christian (Catholics and Lutherans)
UKRAINE	Ukrainian	Ukrainian - Indo-European; Balto-Slavic; Slavik; East Slavic;	Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church	Russian	Russian - Indo-European; Balto-Slavic; Slavik; East Slavic; Russian	Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church	Ukrainian Orthodox Christians (Unrecognized Kyiv Patriarchate over the Moscow-led Russian Church)

Table.2.6. CEE, area, population, population density, migration.

COUNTRY	Population 2014 *est.	Area in sq.km	Pop Density *person per sq.km
ALBANIA	2895947	28748	106
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA	3830911	51197	75
BULGARIA	7245677	11275	67
CROATIA	4246809	56594	76
CZECH REPUBLIC	10512419	78865	136
ESTONIA	1315819	44248	31
HUNGARY	9877365	25713	109
KOSOVO	1820631	93029	167
LATVIA	2001468	10908	32
LITHUANIA	2943472	64582	47
MACEDONIA*	2065769	65300	82
MOLDOVA	3559497	33846	124
MONTENEGRO	621521	13812	46
POLAND	38017856	312683	124
ROMANIA	19947311	238391	87
SERBIA	7146759	88361	82
SLOVAKIA	5415949	49035	113
SLOVENIA	2061085	20273	102
UKRAINE	45245894	603628	78

Source: EUROSTAT (population, area) World Bank Data (migration, population density)

Table 2.7. Name of the Regional and Local Government Units in the CEE Countries


Name of the Regional and Local Government Units in the CEE Countries			
COUNTRY	Period	Regional Government	Local Government
Albania	1989-1993	Districts (rhet)	Communes (komuna) and municipalities (Bashkia)
	1993-onwards	Regions (qarqe)	
Bosnia and Herzegovina		Entities	Municipalities (Općine)
Bulgaria		Regions (Oblasti)	Counties (Obshtina)
Croatia		Counties (Županije)	Municipalities (Općina)
Czech Republic		Regions (Kraje)	Municipalities (Obce)
Estonia		Counties	Towns and parishes (Linnad and vallad)
Hungary		Counties (Megyék)	Town regions and large villages
Kosovo			Municipalities
Latvia		Districts	Municipalities
Lithuania		Counties (Apskritis)	Municipalities (Savivaldybe)
Macedonia			Municipalities (Opštini)
Moldova	1990-1992	Rayons	Municipalities and communes
	1993-1998	Districts (Raioane) and towns (Orase)	
	1999-2003	Counties	
	2004-onwards	Districts (Raioane)	
Montenegro			Municipalities (Opštini)
Poland		Voivodships (Wojewodztwa)	Commune (gmina)
Romania		Counties (Judete)	Communes
Serbia		Districts	Municipalities (Opština)
Slovakia	1939-1995		Obce
	1996-onwards	Regions (Kraje)	Obce
Slovenia			Communes (Općine)
Ukraine		Regions (Oblastey)	Districts (Rayony)

Source: V-Dem Data (Coppedge et al. 2016)

Table 2.8. Territorial organization; NUTS Units and RAI Index, by country

COUNTRY	NUMBER OF UNITS			RAI
	NUTS 1	NUTS 2	NUTS 3	
ALBANIA	1	3	12	1.16
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA	NA	NA	NA	28.42
BULGARIA	2	6	28	1.10
CROATIA	1	2	21	8.05
CZECH REPUBLIC	1	8	14	5.33
ESTONIA	1	1	5	0.00
HUNGARY	2	7	20	10.51
KOSOVO	NA	NA	NA	0.00
LATVIA	1	1	6	0.29
LITHUANIA	1	1	10	2.53
MACEDONIA	1	1	8	0.40
MOLDOVA	NA	NA	NA	NA
MONTENEGRO	1	1	1	0.00
POLAND	6	16	72	5.86
ROMANIA	4	8	42	8.75
SERBIA	2	5	29	5.16
SLOVAKIA	1	4	8	4.17
SLOVENIA	1	2	13	0.57
UKRAINE	NA	NA	NA	NA
Correlation NUTS vs. RAI		0.56	0.52	

Figure 2.9. Gross Domestic Product Growth in Central and Eastern Europe (annual in %)




Source: World Bank Country Data (2016)


Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2005 U.S. dollars. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources.

Figure 2.10 Socio-economic parameters in CEE

a) Average GDP per Capita; b) Average Unemployment from total labor force by country




c) Average inflation rate by country; d) Average GINI coefficient by country




Source: World Bank Country Data (2016) The average calculations for the period 1989-2014.

Figure 2.II. Corruption Perception Index in CEE, minimum, maximum and average by country



Source: Transparency International CPI annual Reports.

Figure 3.1. Volatility in CEE 1990-2015



Total Volatility for the Figure 3.1. is calculated by first taking the absolute difference between the percentage of votes won in the elections and the percentage won in the previous elections by particular party (or 'others') and summing this value for all parties (and others). This value is then divided by 2 to yield Total Volatility (TV). If TV is 0.0 then there is no aggregate vote change from the previous elections. The value compares an election with the previous elections thus, there is no given values for the first elections in a country. The value uses Sierof's (2000) formula to calculate TV and it is comparable with the Total Volatility (TVOL) in his work that provides a comprehensive data set on the 372 postwar elections in 44 countries examined. The average most volatile countries are Slovakia (73%) Montenegro (72%) Czech Republic (72%) and Albania (70%), while Poland and Kosovo and Lithuania are the least volatile ones (not exceeding 50%). Be that as it may, Serbia is the country that keeps the record on instability in total party vote change over 90% in 2000 and 2003. In 1993, Latvia, as well, had volatility of over 90%. And yet, on average, volatility is decreasing which signifies a tendency of party system stabilization in the CEE.

Table 3.1. Parties representing ethno-national minorities at national level in the countries of CEE

PARTIES REPRESENTING ETHNO-NATIONAL MINORITIES AT NATIONAL LEVEL (at least one seat ever)				
COUNTRY	MINORITY	PARTY NAME (ENGLISH)	PARTY NAME (GROUP'S LANGUAGE)	ABBREVIATION
ALBANIA	Greek	Unity for Human Rights Party *Omonia	Κόμμα Ένωσης Ανθρώπινων Δικαιωμάτων *Ομόνοια	UHRP
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA	Croatian	Croatian Democratic Union BiH	Hrvatska demokratska zajednica Bosne i Hercegovine	CDUBiH
		New Croatian Initiative	Nova Hrvatska Inicijativa	NCI
		Croatian Democratic Union 1990	Hrvatska demokratska zajednica 1990	CDU 1990
	Serbian	Srbian Demokratska Party of BiH	Српска демократска Странка	SDP RS
		Serbian Radical Party (Vojislav Sheshelj)	Српска радикална странка (Војислав Шешељ)	SRP Sheshelj
		Radical Party of the Republic of Srpska	Радикална Странка Републике Српске	RPRS
		Serbian Radical Party of Republic of Srpska	Српска радикална странка Републике Српске	SRP RS
		Party for Democratic Progress	Партија демократског прогреса	PDP
		Alliance of Independent Social Democrats	Савез независних социјалдемократа	AISD
		SLOGA- UNITY	СЛОГА	UNITY
		Socialist Party	Социјалистичка Партија	SP
		Democratic People's Alliance	Демократски народни савез	DPA
		Srbian National Alliance	Српски народни савез Републике Српске	SNA
BULGARIA	Turkish	Movement for Rights and Freedoms	Hak ve Özgürlükler Hareketi	MRF
CROATIA	Serbian	Serbian Democratic Party	Српска Демократска Странка	SDP
		Serbian People's Party	Српска Народна Странка	SPP
		Independent Serbian Democratic Party	Самостална демократска српска странка	ISDP
Istrian	Istrian Democratic Assembly	Istarski demokratski sabor-Dieta democratica istriana	IDA	
CZECH REPUBLIC	Moravians/ Silesians	Moravane*	Moravane*	MORAVANE
		Moravian National Party	Moravská národní strana	MNP
ESTONIA	Russian	Our Home is Estonia	Наш дом Эстония	OHE
		Estonian United Left Party (Constitution Party)	Объединённой Левој Партии Эстонии (Конституционная партия)	ULP
		Russian Party in Estonia	Русская партия в Эстонии	RPE
KOSOVO	Bosniak /Montenegrin	Vakat Coalition (BDS, NB, USB)	Koalicija Vakati	VK
	Bosniak	Bosniak Party of Democratic Action of Kosovo	Bošnjačka Stranka Demokratske Akcije Kosova	BPOAK
	Gorani	Civic Initiative of Gora	Грађанска Иницијатива Горе	CIG

		Coalition for Gora	Коалиција за Гора	CG
	Turkish	Turkish Democratic Party of Kosovo	Kosova Demokratik Türk Partisi	TDPK
		Independent Liberal Party	Самостална Либерална Странка	ILP
		United Serbian List	Јединствена Српска Листа	USL
	Serbian	Serb Democratic Party of Kosovo and Metohija	Српска демократска Странка Косова и Метохије	SDP KM
		New Democratic Party	Нова Демократска Странка	NDP
		Progressive Democratic Party	Прогресивна Демократска Странка	PDP
		Srbian List	Српска Листа	SL
LATVIA		Harmony Centre (Concord)	Партија народног согласја, Центар Согласја	HC
	Russian	Latvian Russian Union-For Human Rights in United Latvia	Русский союз Латвии	LRU-FHRUL
		Socialist Party of Latvia	Социалистическая партия Латвии	SPL
		For Human Rights in United Latvia	За права человека в единой Латвии	FHRUL
LITHUANIA	Polish	Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania	Akcja Wyborcza Polaków na Litwie	EAPL
	Russian	Lithuanian Russian Union	Союз русских Литвы	LRU
	Turkish	Democratic Party of Turks	Makedonya Türk Demokratik Partisi	DPT
		Movement for National Unity of the Turks in Macedonia	Türk Milli Birlik Hareketi	MNUTM
		Party for Movement of the Turks in Macedonia	Türk Hareket Partisinin	PMTM
	Albanian	Party for Democratic Prosperity	Partia Per Prosperitet Demokratik	PPD
MACEDONIA		People's Democratic Party	Partise Demokratike Popullore	PDP
		Party for Democratic Prosperity of Albanians in Macedonia -People's Democratic Party	Partia Per Prosperitet Demokratik-Partise Demokratike Popullore	PPD PDP
		Democratic Party of the Albanians	Partia Demokratike Shqiptare	DPA
		Democratic Union for Integration	Bashkimi Demokratik për Integrim	DUI
		National Democratic Party	Partia Nacionale Demokratike	NDP
		National Democratic Revival	Rilindja Demokratike Kombëtare	NDR
	Russian	Socialist Party-Unity Movement	Социалистическая партия Молдовы	SPUM
MOLDOVA		Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova	Партия коммунистов Республики Молдова	PCRM
		Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova	Партия социалистов Республики Молдова	PSRM
		Social-Political Movement "Equality in Rights"	Mișcare Social-Politică Republicană Ravnopravie	SPMER
	Bosniak	Bosniak Party	Bošnjačka Stranka	BS
MONTENEGRO	Croatian	Croatian Civic Initiative	Hrvatska građanska inicijativa	HCI
	Albanian	Democratic Union of the Albanians	Unioni Demokratik i Shqiptarëve	DUA
		New Democratic Force - FORCA	Forca e Re Demokratike	NDF-F

		Albanian Coalition Perspektive	Koalicioni Shqiptar – Perspektiva	ACP
		Albanian Alternative	Alternativa Shqiptare	AA
		Party of Democratic Prosperity	Partia e prosperitet demokratik	PDP
	Serbian	Srbian List	Српска листа	SL
		Coalition: SNP NS DSS	Коалиција- СНП, НС, ДСС	C-SNP-NS-DSS
		Socialist People's Party of Montenegro	Социјалистичка народна партија Црне Горе	SPPM
		New Serb Democracy *Democratic Front	Нова српска демократија	NSD-DF
POLAND	German	German Minority	Deutsche Minderheit	GM
	Silesian, German	The Silesian Autonomy Movement	Ruch Autônômije Ślůnska/Bewegung für die Autonomie Schlesiens	SAM
ROMANIA	Hungarian	Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania	Româniai Magyar Demokrata Szövetség	DUHR
	Hungarian	Democratic Fellowship of Vojvodina Hungarians	Vajdasági Magyarok Demokratikus Közössége	DFVH
		Alliance of the Vojvodina Hungarians	Vajdasági Magyarok Demokratikus Közössége	AVH
	Croatians	Democratic Alliance of Croats in Vojvodina	Demokratski savez Hrvata u Vojvodini	DACV
SERBIA	Bosniak	Party of Democratic Action of Sandzak	Stranka demokratske akcije Sandžaka	PDAS
		Bosniak Democratic Party of Sandzak	Bošnjačka demokratska stranka Sandžaka	BDPS
	Albanian	Party for Democratik Action	Partia për veprim demokratik	PDA
	Muslims	Democratic Reform Party of Muslims	Demokratska reformska stranka Muslimana	DRPM
	Hungarian	SMK-MKP Hungarian Coalition	Együttélés, Magyar Kereszténydemokrata Mozgalom, Magyar Közösség Pártja	SMK-HC
SLOVAKIA		Bridge	Most-Híd	Bridge
UKRAINE	Russian	Communist Party of Ukraine	Коммунистическая партия Украины	CPU
		Party of Labor	Партия труда	PL
		Party of Regional Revival of Ukraine	Партия регионов	PRRU
		Opposition Bloc	Опозиційний блок	OB
		People's Democratic Party	Народно-демократическая партия	PDP
		Party Union Soyuz	Партия "Союз"	PU
		Civil Congress of Ukraine (Slavic Party)	Славянская партия, Гражданский конгресс Украины	CCU
		Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (Burduhan)	Социал-демократическая партия Украины	SDPU(B)
		Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (united) (Zbitnev)	Социал-демократическая партия Украины (об'єднана)	SDPU (U)
		Socialist Party of Ukraine	Социалистическая партия Украины	SDU
		Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine	Прогрессивная социалистическая партия Украины	PSPU

Table. 3.4. Party existence and leadership change over time

Party existence and leadership change over time			
COUNTRY	PARTY NAME	PERIOD OF EXISTENCE	LEADERSHIP
AIBANIA	Unity for Human Rights Party *Omonia	1991/1992-	Vasil Melo (1992-2002), Vangelis Dulles (2002-present)
	Croatian Democratic Union BiH	1990-	Davorin Perinović (1990), Stjepan Kljuić (1990-92), Milenko Brkić (1992), Mate Boban (1992-94), Dario Kordić (1994-95), Božo Rajić (1995-98), Ante Jelavić (1998-2002), Bariša Čolak (2002-05), Dragan Čović (2005-present)
	New Croatian Initiative	1998-2007	Kreshimir Zubak (1998-2007)
	Croatian Democratic Union 1990	2006-	Božo Ljubic (2006-2014), Martin Raguz (2014-2015), Ilija Cvitanović (2015-present)
	Srbian Demokratski Party of BiH	1990-	Radovan Karadžić (1990-1996), Aleksa Buha (1996-1998), Drgan Kalinich (1998-2004), Dragan Chavich (2004-2006), Mladen Bosic (2006-present)
	Serbian Radical Party (later Sheshelj)	1991	Vojislav Sheshelj
BIH	Radical Party of the Republic of Srpska	1998	N/A
	Serbian Radical Party of Republic of Srpska	1992	Nikola Poplashen (1992-1998) Milanko Mihajlica (1998- present)
	Party for Democratic Progress	1999	Mladen Ivanić (1999-2015) Branislav Borenović (2015-present)
	Alliance of Independent Social Democrats	1996	Milorad Dodik (1996-present)
	SLOGA- UNITY	1998	Biljana Plavshic, Milorad Dodik, Zivko Radishic (1998-2002)
	Socialist Party	1993	JNA Officers (1993-1998) Zivko Radishic (1998-2002) Petar Đokić (2002-present)
	Democratic People's Alliance	2000	Dragan Kostic (2000-2003), Marko Pavic (2003-present)
	Srbian National Alliance	1997-2006	Biljana Plavshic (1997-2006)
BULGARIA	Movement for Rights and Freedoms	1990	Ahmed Dogan (1990-2013) Lyutvi Ahmed Mestan (2013-2015) Three man chair until April 2016 Congress
	Serbian Democratic Party	1990-1995/6	Jovan Rašković and Jovan Đpacic (1990-1996)
CROATIA	Serbian People's Party	1991	Milan Đukić (1991-2007) Milan Rodic (2007-2013) Zoran Kojic (2013-present)
	Independent Serbian Democratic Party	1997	Vojislav Stanimirović (1997-present)
	Istrian Democratic Assembly	1990	Ivan Jakovčić (1990-2014), Boris Miletić (2014-present)
	Moravane	1990-1996	Boleslav Barta (1990-1991) Jan Kryčer (1991-1994) Jan Smejkal (1994-1996) Jan Smejkal (1996-1997) Jiří Bílý (1997-2005) Pavel Dohnal (2005-2009), Jiří Novotný (2009-2011), Milan Trnka (2011-2014), Pavel Dohnal (2014-2015) Andrew Hýsek (2015-present)
CZECH R.	Moravian National Party	1990-1997	Jan Smejkal (1994-1997)

ESTONIA	Our Home is Estonia	1995-1999	Viktor Andrejev (1995-1999)
	Estonian United Left Party	1994-	Viktor Andrejev (1994-2003), Georgy Boshrov (2003-2008), Sergei Jürgens, Heino Rüütel (2008-1015), Valev Kald, Vladimir Drozdov (2015-present)
	Russian Party in Estonia	1994-2012	Sergei Kuznersov (1994-2012)
KOSOVO	Vakat Coalition (BDS, NB, USB)	2004-	Rasim Demiri, Džezair Murati, Sadik Idrizi Husnija Bešković.(2001-present)
	Bosniak Party of Democratic Action of Kosovo	2010-	Hilmo Kandic
	Civic Initiative of Gora	1990-	Murselj Haljilji, Orhan Dragas (2009-present)
	Coalition for Gora	2014-	Adem Hodza (2014-present)
	Turkish Democratic Party of Kosovo	1999-	Mahir Yağcılar (1999-2010), Arif Bütüğ (2010-2011), Mahir Yağcılar (2011-present)
	Independent Liberal Party	2006-	Slobodan Petrović
	United Serbian List	2010-	Aleksandar Jablanovic
	Serb Democratic Party of Kosovo and Metohija	1990-	Milan Ivanovic
	New Democratic Party	2010-	Emilija Redjepi
	Progressive Democratic Party	2010-	Nenad Rashic
Srbian List	2014-	Slavko Simic (2014-)	
LATVIA	Harmony Centre	1994-	Jānis Jurkāns (1994-2005), Egils Rutkovskis (2005-2009) Nils Ushakovs (2010-present)
	Latvian Russian Union/ For HRUL	1994-	1994 to 2001-Yuri Petropavlovskis , Tatjana Ždanoka , Miroslav Mitrofanov (1994-2001) Tatjana Ždanoka and Vladimirs Buzajevs (2001-2014)Tatjana Ždanoka, Jakovs Pliners and Miroslav Mitrofanov (2014-present)
	Socialist Party of Latvia	1994-	Phillip Stroganov (1996-1999), Alfred Rubiks (1999-2016), Vladimirs Frolovs (2016-present)
	For Human Rights in United Latvia	2002-2006	Jānis Jurkāns, Tatjana Ždanoka, Alfred Rubiks (2002-2006)
LITHUANIA	Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania	1994-	Jan Senkevič (1994-1999), Waldemar Tomaszewski (1999-present)
	Lithuanian Russian Union	1995-	Sergei Dmitriyev (1995-present)
MACEDONIA	Democratic Party of Turks	1990	Kenan Hasip (1990-present)
	Movement for National Unity of the Turks in Macedonia	1996	Erdogan Sarac (1996-present)
	Party for Movement of the Turks in Macedonia	1999	Adnan Kahil (1999-present)
	Party for Democratic Prosperity	1990-	Nevzat Halili (1990-2001), Imer Imeri (2001-2002) Abdurahman Haliti (2002-2004), Abdyladi Vejseli (2004-present)
	People's Democratic Party	1990-1997	Iljaz Halimi (1990-1997)
	Party for Democratic Prosperity of Albanians in Macedonia –PDP	1994-1997	Arbën Xhaferi, Menduh Taci (1994-1997)
Democratic Party of the Albanians	1997-	Arbën Xhaferi (1997-2007), Menduh Taci (2007-present)	

	Democratic Union for Integration	2002-	Ali Ahmeti (2002-present)
	National Democratic Party	2002-2006	Kastriot Haxhirexha (2002-2003) Basri Haliti (2003-2006)
	National Democratic Revival	2011-	Rufi Osmani (2011-present)
MOLDOVA	Socialist Party-Unity Movement	1992-	Victor Morev (1992-present)
	Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova	1993-	Vladimir Voronin (1993-present)
	Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova	1997-	Boris Muravschii (1997-2011), Igor Dodon (2011-present)
	Social-Political Movement "Equality in Rights"	1998-	Valerii Klimenco (1998-present)
MONTENEGRO	Bosniak Party	2006-	Rafet Husovic (2006- present)
	Croatian Civic Initiative	2002-	Marija Vucinovic (2002-present)
	Democratic Union of the Albanians	1993-	Ferhat Dinosha (1993-present)
	New Democratic Force - FORCA	2005-	Nazif Cungu (2005-present)
	Albanian Coalition Perspektive	2009-2012	Nazif Cungu (2009-2012)
	Albanian Alternative	2006-	Gjergj Camaj (2006-present)
	Party of Democratic prosperity	2006-	Ali Rexha (2006-present)
	Srbian List	2006-2009	Andrija Mandić (2006-2009)
	Coalition: SNP NS DSS	2006-2009	Predrag Popović, Božidar Bojović, Ranko Kadić (2006-2009)
	Socialist People's Party of Montenegro	1998-	Momir Bulatovic (1998-2001), Srđan Milić (2001-present)
New Serb Democracy *Democratic Front	2009-	Andrija Mandić (2009-present)	
POLAND	German Minority	1991-	Henryk Kroll (1991-2005), Ryszard Galla (2005-2007) Rafał Bartek (2007-2012) and Bernard Gaida (2012-present)
	The Silesian Autonomy Movement	1991-	Rudolf Kołodziejczyk (1991), Paul Musiol (1991-1995), Zenon Wieczorek (1995-1999), Krzysztof Kluczniak (1999-2003), Jerzy Gorzelik (2003-present)
ROMANIA	Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania	1989-	Géza Domokos (1991-1993) Bela Marko (1993-2011), Hunor Kelemen (2011-present)
SERBIA	Democratic Fellowship of Vojvodina Hungarians	1991-	Sándor Páll (1991-2010), Csónka Aron (2010-present)
	Alliance of the Vojvodina Hungarians	1994-	József Kasza (1994-2007), István Pásztor/István Pásztor (2007-present)
	Democratic Alliance of Croats in Vojvodina	1990-	Bela Tonković (1990-2003), Petar Kuntić (2003-present)
	Party of Democratic Action of Sandzak	1990-	Sulejman Ugljanin (1990-present)
	Bosniak Democratic Party of Sandzak	1996-	Esad Džudžević (1996-present)
	Party for Democratik Action	1990-	Riza Halimi (1990-present)
	Democratic Reform Party of Muslims	1990-1993	Azar Zulji (1990-1993)

SLOVAKIA	SMK-MKP Hungarian Coalition	1990-	Kalman Janics (1990-1991) Béla Bugár (1991-2007), Pál Csáky (2007-2010), József Berényi (2010-present)
	Bridge	2009-	Bela Bugar (2009-present)
UKRAINE	Communist Party of Ukraine	1993-2014	Petro Symonenko (1993-2014)
	Party of Labor	1992-2000	Valentyn Landyk (1992-1993), Mykola Azarov (1993-2000)
	Party of Regional Revival of Ukraine	1997-	Volodyyr Rybar (1997-2001), Mykola Azarov (2001-2002), Volodymyr Semynozhenko (2002-2003), Viktor Yanukovic (2003-2010), Mykola Arzov (2010-2014), Borys Kolesnikov (2014-present)
	Opposition Bloc	2010-	Anatoli Kornienko (2010-2014), Yuriy Boyko (2014-present)
	People's Democratic Party	1996-	Anatoliy Matviyenko (1996-1999), Valeriy Pustovoienko (1999-2006), Lyudmyla Suprun (2006-present)
	Party Union Soyuz	1997-	Svitlana Savchenko (1997-2004), Alex KostusevLev (2004-2005) Mirimsky (2005-present)
	Civil Congress of Ukraine (Slavic Party)	1992-	Mykola Azarov (1992), Pavlo Khaimovych (1992-1993), Oleksandr Bazyliuk, (1993-2010), Oleksandr Luzan (2010-present)
	Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (Burduhan)	1990-	Yuri Buzdugan (1990-present)
	Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (united) (Zbitnev)	1990-	Andrew Nosenko (1990-1998), Viktor Medvedchuk (1998-2007), Yury Zahorodny (2007-present)
	Socialist Party of Ukraine	1991-	Oleksander Moroz (1991-2010), Vasily Tsushko (2010-2011), Moroz (2011-2012), Petro Ustenko (2012-2013), Mykola Rudkovsky (2013-2015), Nikolai Ilyich Garden (2015-present)
Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine	1996-	Nataliya Vitrenko (1996-present)	

Appendix IV

Table 4.2. ERP's change of radicalism of self-determination claims.

ERP'S IDEOLOGY per party/group/country			
Country	Ethnic Group	Party Name	Period and Ideology
Albania	Greek	Democratic Union of the Greek Minority "Omonia"	1991, 1992, 1997 – Protectionist
BiH	Croatian	Croatian Democratic Union BiH New Croatian Initiative Croatian Democratic Union 1990 Srbian Democratic Party of BiH	1990- Secessionist; 1998, 2010, 2014 – Federalism 2000, 2002- Federalist 2006, 2014- Federalist 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2006- Federalist 2010, 2014 Secessionist
	Serbian	Serbian Radical Party (later Sheshelj) Radical Party of the Republic of Srpska Serbian Radical Party of Republic of Srpska Party for Democratic Progress Alliance of Independent Social Democrats Socialist Party Democratic People's Alliance	1996, 1998 – Secessionist 1998- Federalist 2010- Federalist 2010, 2014- Federalist 2010, 2014- Federalist 2010, 2014- Federalist 2014- Secessionist
Bulgaria	Turkish	Movement for Rights and Freedoms	1990-Protectionist; 1994, 2001, 2005, 2009, 2013, 2014- Autonomist_Regional
Croatia	Serbian	Serbian Democratic Party Serbian People's Party Independent Serbian Democratic Party	1990- Secessionist 1992, 1995, 2000 - Autonomist_Municipal 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015- Autonomist_Municipal
	Istrian	Istrian Democratic Assembly	1992, 1995, 2000, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015- Autonomist_Regional
Czech R.	Moravians	Moravane'	1990- Federalist; 1992- Autonomist_Regional; 2010- Federalist
	Silesians	Moravian National Party	1996-Secessionist
Estonia	Russian	Our Home is Estonia	1995-Autonomist_Municipal
		Estonian United Peoples Party	1999-Protectionist; 2015-Autonomist_Municipal
Kosovo	Gorani	Civic Initiative of Gora	2010-Autonomist_Municipal
	Turks	Turkish Democratic Party of Kosovo	2014- Protectionist
	Serbian	Independent Liberal Party	2010, 2014- Autonomist_Municipal
Latvia	Russian	Harmony Party	1993, 1995-Protectionist; 1998, 2006, 2010-Autonomist_Municipal; 2011, 2014-Autonomist_Regional
		Equal Rights	1993, 2006, 2010, 2011, 2014- Autonomist Municipal
		Socialist Party of Latvia	1995- Autonomist Municipal
		For Human Rights in United Latvia	2002- Autonomist_Municipal
Lithuania	Polish	Association of Poles in Lithuania	1992, 2000, 2012- Autonomist_Municipal
	Russian	Lithuanian Russian Union	2008- Protectionist
Macedonia	Turkish	Democratic Party of Turks	2006, 2008, 2011, 2014- Protectionist
		Movement for National Unity of Turks	2006, 2008, 2011, 2014- Autonomist_Municipal
		Party of Movement of Turks	2006- Protectionist
	Albanian	Party for Democratic Prosperity People's Democratic Party	1990, Protectionist; 1994-Secessionist; 1998, Autonomist_Municipal; 2011-Federalist 1990-Protectionist; 1994- Autonomist_Municipal

		PDPA and PDP Democratic Party of the Albanians Democratic Union for Integration National Democratic Revival	1990, 1998- Autonomist_Municipal 2011, 2014-Autonomist_Regional 2002, 2006, 2008, 2011, 2014- Autonomist_Municipal 2011, 2014- Federalist
Moldova	Russian (Gagauzian)	Socialist Party-Unity Movement Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova Social-Political Movement "Equality in Rights"	1994-Protectionist; 2001- Autonomist_Regional 1998-Protectionist; 2001, 2005-Autonomist_Regional; 2009, 2010-Federalist; 2014-Autonomist_Regional 1998-Autonomist_Municipal; 2001, 2005, 2014- Federalist; 2001- Autonomist_Regional; 2005-Autonomist_Municipal; 2012-Autonomist_Regional
Montenegro	Bosniak	Bosniak Party	2012- Autonomist_Regional
	Croatian	Croatian Civic Initiative	2012-Autonomist_Municipal
	Albanian	New Democratic Force - FORCA	2012-Autonomist_Municipal
	Serbian	Srbian List People's Coalition, NS DSS Socialist People's Party of Montenegro New Serbian Democracy	2006-Federalist 2009-Autonomist_Municipal 2009, 2012-Autonomist_Municipal 2009, 2012-Autonomist_Municipal
Poland	German	German Minority	1991, 1993, 1997, 2001, 2007, 2011, 2015- Autonomist_Regional
	Silesian	The Silesian Autonomy Movemen	1991, 2001, 2005, 2015- Autonomist_Regional
Romania	Hungarian	Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania	1990, 1992, 1996, 2000, 2012- Autonomist_Regional
Serbia	Hungarian	Democratic Fellowship of Vojvodina Hungarians Alliance of the Vojvodina Hungarians Democratic Alliance of Croats in Vojvodina	1990- Protectionist; 1992, 1993, 1997, 2012- Autonomist_Regional 2000, 2007, 2008, 2012, 2014- Autonomist_Regional 2008, 2012, 2014- Autonomist_Regional
	Bosniak	Party of Democratic Action of Sandzak Bosniak Democratic Party of Sandzak	1990- Protectionist; 2012, 2014- Autonomist_Regional 2007- Autonomist_Regional
	Albanian	Party for Demokratik Action	1990, 1993- Autonomist_Regional
	Muslim	Democratic Reform Party of Muslims	2007- Protectionist
Slovakia	Hungarian	Hungarian Coalition Party	1990- Autonomist_Municipal; 1992, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2012- Autonomist_Regional
		Bridge	2010, 2012- Autonomist_Municipal
Ukraine	Russian	Communist Party of Ukraine	1994- Protectionist; 1998- Autonomist_Municipal; 2007- Protectionist; 2014- Federalist
		Party of Labor	1994- Federalist
		Party of Regions	2002- Autonomist_Regional; 2007- Federalist
		Opposition Bloc	2014- Autonomist_Regional
		People's Democratic Party	1998--Autonomist_Municipal; 2002- Atronomist_Regional
		Civil Congress of Ukraine (Slavic Party)	1994- Federalist
		Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (Burduhan)	1994- Autonomist_Regional
		Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (united) (Zbitnev)	1998- Protectionist; 2002, 2006 - Autonomist_Regional
		Socialist Party of Ukraine	1994, 1998- Protectionist; 2002- Autonomist_Regional; 2012- Autonomist_Municipal
Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine	1998- Protectionist; 2006, 2007- Federalist		

Table 4.8. Summary table of the coded cases/the distribution of categories of the dependent variable through countries.

SUMMARY TABLE OF TOTAL CODED CASES BY COUNTRY				
Country	ELECTORAL YEAR	NO. PARTIES	NO. CODED MANIFESTOS/ CASES	IDEOLOGY
Albania	3	1	3	3 Protectionist
BiH	8	11	26	20 Federalist; 6 Secessionist
Bulgaria	7	1	7	1 Protectionist; 6 Autonomist_Regional
Croatia	8	4	15	7 Autonomist_Municipal; 7 Autonomist_Regional; 1 Secessionist
Czech R.	4	2	4	1 Autonomist_Regional; 2 Federalist; 1 Secessionist
Estonia	3	2	3	1 Protectionist; 2 Autonomist_Municipal
Kosovo	2	3	4	1 Protectionist; 3 Autonomist_Municipal
Latvia	8	4	14	3 Protectionist; 9 Autonomist_Municipal; 2 Autonomist_Regional
Lithuania	4	2	4	1 Protectionist; 3 Autonomist_Municipal
Macedonia	8	9	26	7 Protectionist; 13 Autonomist_Mun.; 2 Autonomist_Reg.; 3 Federalist; 1 Secessionist
Moldova	7	4	16	3 Protectionist; 2 Autonomist_Municipal; 5 Autonomist_Regional; 6 Federalist
Montenegro	3	7	9	2 Autonomist_Municipal; 1 Autonomist_Regional; 1 Federalist
Poland	8	2	11	11 Autonomist_Regional
Romania	5	1	5	5 Autonomist_Regional
Serbia	9	7	20	3 Protectionist; 17 Autonomist_Regional
Slovakia	8	2	10	3 Autonomist_Municipal; 7 Autonomist_Regional
Ukraine	7	10	22	6 Protectionist; 3 Autonomist_Municipal; 7 Autonomist_Regional; 6 Federalist
TOTAL	102	72	199	

Appendix V

Table 5.4. Correlations between the dependent and independent variables.

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES			
	DEPENDENT VARIABLES		
	ID_4	ID_3	ID_2
NoCompetitors	0.17	0.22	0.33
SeatShare	0.07	0.07	0.08
Efragmentation	0.25	0.27	0.26
InGovernment	0.14	0.11	0.04
OthersInGovernment	0.43	0.47	0.53
PresidentChange	0.06	0.05	0.00
PartyAge	0.22	0.21	0.08
RegionalGov	0.40	0.44	0.33
InEU	-0.05	-0.12	-0.20
LiberalDemocracy	-0.19	-0.28	-0.42
GDPpCgrowth	0.26	0.22	0.20
Corruption	0.00	0.08	0.16

Figure 5.2. Omodel test for ordered logit regression when radical is measured as a fourfold variable ID_4.

```

Iteration 0: log likelihood = -209.77311
Iteration 1: log likelihood = -158.23555
Iteration 2: log likelihood = -155.94873
Iteration 3: log likelihood = -155.87231
Iteration 4: log likelihood = -155.87218

Ordered logit estimates                Number of obs =      159
LR chi2(12) = 107.80
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Pseudo R2 = 0.2569

Log likelihood = -155.87218

```

ID_4	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
NoCompetit~s	-.0560951	.0832678	-0.67	0.501	-.219297 .1071068
SeatsShare	.0274228	.0143849	1.91	0.057	-.0007712 .0556167
Efragmenta~n	5.88867	2.281598	2.58	0.010	1.416819 10.36052
InGovernment	.9033253	.4341068	2.08	0.037	.0524917 1.754159
OthersInGo~t	2.606258	.5823373	4.48	0.000	1.464898 3.747618
P_change	.3673004	.449822	0.82	0.414	-.5143344 1.248935
P_Age	.0498647	.027373	1.82	0.069	-.0037855 .1035149
RegionalGov	1.78384	.4639225	3.85	0.000	.8745688 2.693112
In_EU	-.6117635	.5942318	-1.03	0.303	-1.776436 .5529094
LiberalDem~y	-4.211736	1.904816	-2.21	0.027	-7.945106 -.478365
GDPpCgrowth	.0618472	.0274117	2.26	0.024	.0081214 .1155731
Corruption	-4.159606	1.592757	-2.61	0.009	-7.281353 -1.037859
(Ancillary parameters)					
_cut1	-.1315445	2.341619			
_cut2	1.80166	2.367895			
_cut3	4.346279	2.39714			

```

Approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds
across response categories:
chi2(24) = 58.58
Prob > chi2 = 0.0001

```

Table 5.5. Estimates for logistical odds for radicalization of the ERPs (dependent variable a four category ordinal variable)

Models for Dependent variable ID_4	ID_4_1	ID_4_2	ID_4_3
NoCompetitors	-0.12	-0.049	-0.056
	-1.92	-0.72	-0.67
SeatsShare	0.022	0.024	0.027
	-1.67	-1.78	-1.91
Efragmentation	4.446	3.952	5.889
	(2.39)*	(1.98)*	(2.58)**
InGovernment	0.873	0.99	0.903
	(2.41)*	(2.53)*	(2.08)*
OthersInGovernment	3.148	2.939	2.606
	(6.52)**	(5.96)**	(4.48)**
P_change	0.436	0.414	0.367
	-1.2	-1.08	-0.82
P_Age	0.045	0.053	0.05
	(2.37)*	(2.29)*	-1.82
RegionalGov		1.631	1.784
		(4.05)**	(3.85)**
In_EU		-0.364	-0.612
		-0.8	-1.03
LiberalDemocracy			-4.212
			(2.21)*
GDPpGrowth			0.062
			(2.26)*
Corruption			-4.16
			(2.61)**
cut1_cons	2.541	3.006	-0.132
	-1.74	-1.95	-0.06
cut2_cons	4.196	4.748	1.802
	(2.84)**	(3.04)**	-0.76
cut3_cons	6.323	7.092	4.346
	(4.18)**	(4.41)**	-1.81
N	199	184	159

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01

Figure 5.3. Gologit2 regression for ID_4

(gologit2 ID_4 NoCompetitors SeatsShare Efragmentation InGovernment OthersInGovernment P_change P_Age RegionalGov In_EU LiberalDemocracy GDPpCgrowth Corruption, p(In_EU LiberalDemocracy Efragmentation NoCompetitors SeatsShare RegionalGov InGovernment P_change OthersInGovernment))

```

Generalized Ordered Logit Estimates
Number of obs = 159
Wald chi2(18) = 72.41
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Pseudo R2 = 0.3529
Log likelihood = -135.75445
    
```

- (1) [0]In_EU - [1]In_EU = 0
- (2) [0]LiberalDemocracy - [1]LiberalDemocracy = 0
- (3) [0]Efragmentation - [1]Efragmentation = 0
- (4) [0]NoCompetitors - [1]NoCompetitors = 0
- (5) [0]SeatsShare - [1]SeatsShare = 0
- (6) [0]RegionalGov - [1]RegionalGov = 0
- (7) [0]InGovernment - [1]InGovernment = 0
- (8) [0]P_change - [1]P_change = 0
- (9) [0]OthersInGovernment - [1]OthersInGovernment = 0
- (10) [1]In_EU - [2]In_EU = 0
- (11) [1]LiberalDemocracy - [2]LiberalDemocracy = 0
- (12) [1]Efragmentation - [2]Efragmentation = 0
- (13) [1]NoCompetitors - [2]NoCompetitors = 0
- (14) [1]SeatsShare - [2]SeatsShare = 0
- (15) [1]RegionalGov - [2]RegionalGov = 0
- (16) [1]InGovernment - [2]InGovernment = 0
- (17) [1]P_change - [2]P_change = 0
- (18) [1]OthersInGovernment - [2]OthersInGovernment = 0

	ID_4	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
0						
	NoCompetitors	-.0206694	.0882373	-0.23	0.815	-.1936114 .1522725
	SeatsShare	.033428	.014806	2.26	0.024	.0044087 .0624472
	Efragmentation	6.161901	2.484565	2.48	0.013	1.292243 11.03156
	InGovernment	.7146037	.460309	1.55	0.121	-.1875854 1.616793
	OthersInGovernment	2.170537	.5843032	3.71	0.000	1.025324 3.315751
	P_change	.3885682	.4729017	0.82	0.411	-.5383021 1.315439
	P_Age	-.0815313	.0546058	-1.49	0.135	-.1885566 .025494
	RegionalGov	2.418555	.5270527	4.59	0.000	1.385551 3.45156
	In_EU	-.7924817	.6832351	-1.16	0.246	-2.131598 .5466345
	LiberalDemocracy	-6.692503	2.174696	-3.08	0.002	-10.95483 -2.430177
	GDPpCgrowth	.337631	.0786278	4.29	0.000	.1835234 .4917387
	Corruption	-8.7747	2.152519	-4.08	0.000	-12.99356 -4.555839
	_cons	4.828606	2.889998	1.67	0.095	-.835686 10.4929
1						
	NoCompetitors	-.0206694	.0882373	-0.23	0.815	-.1936114 .1522725
	SeatsShare	.033428	.014806	2.26	0.024	.0044087 .0624472
	Efragmentation	6.161901	2.484565	2.48	0.013	1.292243 11.03156
	InGovernment	.7146037	.460309	1.55	0.121	-.1875854 1.616793
	OthersInGovernment	2.170537	.5843032	3.71	0.000	1.025324 3.315751
	P_change	.3885682	.4729017	0.82	0.411	-.5383021 1.315439
	P_Age	.1098263	.0369568	2.97	0.003	.0373923 .1822603
	RegionalGov	2.418555	.5270527	4.59	0.000	1.385551 3.45156
	In_EU	-.7924817	.6832351	-1.16	0.246	-2.131598 .5466345
	LiberalDemocracy	-6.692503	2.174696	-3.08	0.002	-10.95483 -2.430177
	GDPpCgrowth	-.0155354	.0417907	-0.37	0.710	-.0974435 .0663728
	Corruption	-5.711698	1.90403	-3.00	0.003	-9.443529 -1.979867
	_cons	-.3981775	2.866223	-0.14	0.890	-6.015871 5.219516
2						
	NoCompetitors	-.0206694	.0882373	-0.23	0.815	-.1936114 .1522725
	SeatsShare	.033428	.014806	2.26	0.024	.0044087 .0624472
	Efragmentation	6.161901	2.484565	2.48	0.013	1.292243 11.03156
	InGovernment	.7146037	.460309	1.55	0.121	-.1875854 1.616793
	OthersInGovernment	2.170537	.5843032	3.71	0.000	1.025324 3.315751
	P_change	.3885682	.4729017	0.82	0.411	-.5383021 1.315439
	P_Age	-.0072857	.04092	-0.18	0.859	-.0874873 .072916
	RegionalGov	2.418555	.5270527	4.59	0.000	1.385551 3.45156
	In_EU	-.7924817	.6832351	-1.16	0.246	-2.131598 .5466345
	LiberalDemocracy	-6.692503	2.174696	-3.08	0.002	-10.95483 -2.430177
	GDPpCgrowth	.009011	.0206492	0.44	0.663	-.0314608 .0494827
	Corruption	-3.854278	2.057332	-1.87	0.061	-7.886575 .1780184
	_cons	-3.037974	2.931302	-1.04	0.300	-8.78322 2.707272

Table 5.8. Estimates for logistic odds for radicalization of the ERPs (dependent variable a dichotomous variable)

Models for Dependent variable ID_2	ID_2_1	ID_2_2	ID_2_3
NoCompetitors	-0.046	0.011	0.005
	-0.51	-0.1	-0.04
SeatsShare	0.046	0.043	0.047
	(2.69)**	(2.38)*	(2.44)*
Efragmentation	7.479	6.2	6.142
	(2.48)*	-1.88	-1.63
InGovernment	0.566	0.45	0.04
	-1.04	-0.72	-0.06
OthersInGovernment	3.264	3.082	2.56
	(5.50)**	(4.72)**	(3.29)**
P_change	0.504	0.757	0.455
	-0.9	-1.23	-0.64
P_Age	-0.012	0.014	0.017
	-0.42	-0.39	-0.41
RegionalGov		1.988	1.964
		(2.71)**	(2.40)*
In_EU		-1.473	-1.086
		-1.28	-0.84
LiberalDemocracy			-6.634
			(2.64)**
GDPpCgrowth			0.019
			-0.84
Corruption			-4.802
			(1.97)*
_cons	-8.629	-8.995	-2.729
	(3.47)**	(3.36)**	-0.67
N	199	184	159

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01

Table 5.9. Model no.3 for each measurement of the dependent variable

Model three for each measurement of the dependent variable	ID_4_3	ID_3_3	ID_2_3
NoCompetitors	-0.056	-0.054	0.005
	-0.67	-0.59	-0.04
SeatsShare	0.027	0.031	0.047
	-1.91	(2.08)*	(2.44)*
Efragmentation	5.889	6.258	6.142
	(2.58)**	(2.56)*	-1.63
InGovernment	0.903	0.707	0.04
	(2.08)*	-1.55	-0.06
OthersInGovernment	2.606	2.619	2.56
	(4.48)**	(4.46)**	(3.29)**
P_change	0.367	0.53	0.455
	-0.82	-1.12	-0.64
P_Age	0.05	0.073	0.017
	-1.82	(2.47)*	-0.41
RegionalGov	1.784	2.104	1.964
	(3.85)**	(4.20)**	(2.40)*
In_EU	-0.612	-0.901	-1.086
	-1.03	-1.41	-0.84
LiberalDemocracy	-4.212	-5.008	-6.634
	(2.21)*	(2.56)*	(2.64)**
GDPpCgrowth	0.062	0.03	0.019
	(2.26)*	-1.51	-0.84
Corruption	-4.16	-4.38	-4.802
	(2.61)**	(2.54)*	(1.97)*
cut1_cons	-0.132	1.83	-2.729
	-0.06	-0.71	-0.67
cut2_cons	1.802	4.44	
	-0.76	-1.69	
cut3_cons	4.346		
	-1.81		
N	159	159	159

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01

Figure 5.4. Brant test results for ID_3

```
. brant, detail
Estimated coefficients from j-1 binary regressions

                y>0                y>1
NoCompetitors  -.09573513          .00519518
SeatsShare     .01397016          .04706317
Efragmentation 6.6216835          6.1422673
InGovernment   1.158064           .04029892
OthersInGovernment 2.1632208      2.5601233
P_change       .3929877          .45492269
P_Age          .09870923         .01718642
RegionalGov    2.3124327         1.9637638
In_EU         -1.0595318         -1.085713
LiberalDemocracy -4.0611543        -6.6342928
GDPpCgrowth   .03357436           .0193794
Corruption    -3.9807753        -4.8019114
_cons        -2.8789187        -2.7286416
```

Brant Test of Parallel Regression Assumption

Variable	chi2	p>chi2	df
All	14.83	0.251	12
NoCompetit~s	0.46	0.497	1
SeatsShare	2.28	0.131	1
Efragmenta~n	0.01	0.904	1
InGovernment	1.73	0.189	1
OthersInGo~t	0.21	0.644	1
P_change	0.01	0.937	1
P_Age	2.73	0.098	1
RegionalGov	0.15	0.695	1
In_EU	0.00	0.985	1
LiberalDem~y	0.66	0.418	1
GDPpCgrowth	0.17	0.676	1
Corruption	0.08	0.779	1

A significant test statistic provides evidence that the parallel regression assumption has been violated.

Figure 5.5. Brant test statistics for ID_3 model using each of the three reduced sample options

a). ID_3 model when Macedonia is excluded from the sample

```
. brant, detail
Estimated coefficients from j-1 binary regressions

                y>0                y>1
NoCompetitors  -.16164832          .06462197
SeatsShare     .00612374          .05848142
Efragmentation 6.8894129          6.6066051
InGovernment   1.0777017          -.46500099
OthersInGovernment 1.2295777      2.4944559
P_change       .26373535          .55044652
P_Age          .12859956          .03997729
RegionalGov    1.466331          3.1506711
In_EU         -1.4916518         -1.2318706
LiberalDemocracy -4.459864        -5.6872518
GDPpCgrowth   .05255741          .02372649
Corruption    -2.8940189        -4.4437042
_cons        -2.6624694        -5.0893437
```

Brant Test of Parallel Regression Assumption

Variable	chi2	p>chi2	df
All	18.16	0.111	12
NoCompetit~s	1.80	0.180	1
SeatsShare	5.24	0.022	1
Efragmenta~n	0.00	0.953	1
InGovernment	2.24	0.134	1
OthersInGo~t	1.44	0.230	1
P_change	0.12	0.727	1
P_Age	2.20	0.138	1
RegionalGov	1.70	0.192	1
In_EU	0.03	0.854	1
LiberalDem~y	0.11	0.737	1
GDPpCgrowth	0.47	0.491	1
Corruption	0.25	0.617	1

A significant test statistic provides evidence that the parallel regression assumption has been violated.

b). ID_3 model when Bosnia is excluded from the sample

```
. brant, detail
Estimated coefficients from j-1 binary regressions
```

	y>0	y>1
NoCompetitors	-.09702391	-.15788545
SeatsShare	.01307107	.04073784
Efragmentation	6.1718396	4.9278428
InGovernment	1.1210525	-.31102791
OthersInGovernment	2.0978928	2.8271356
P_change	.39328841	.36174873
P_Age	.09663087	.01267781
RegionalGov	2.1820464	.08059477
In_EU	-1.0245205	-.65441114
LiberalDemocracy	-3.1826381	3.800846
GDPpCgrowth	.02814049	-.0490185
Corruption	-3.3092955	3.8435784
_cons	-3.2641697	-10.743719

Brant Test of Parallel Regression Assumption

Variable	chi2	p>chi2	df
All	40.65	0.000	12
NoCompetitors	0.13	0.714	1
SeatsShare	1.54	0.214	1
Efragmentation	0.07	0.788	1
InGovernment	2.47	0.116	1
OthersInGovernment	0.58	0.447	1
P_change	0.00	0.971	1
P_Age	2.53	0.112	1
RegionalGov	4.22	0.040	1
In_EU	0.07	0.797	1
LiberalDemocracy	2.58	0.109	1
GDPpCgrowth	4.98	0.026	1
Corruption	3.05	0.081	1

A significant test statistic provides evidence that the parallel regression assumption has been violated.

c). ID_3 model when Ukraine and Moldova are excluded from the sample

```
. brant, detail
Estimated coefficients from j-1 binary regressions
```

	y>0	y>1
NoCompetitors	-.21572834	.38993218
SeatsShare	.01569911	-.12800986
Efragmentation	7.6166708	19.654821
InGovernment	1.179283	1.2711895
OthersInGovernment	2.7301903	2.7242272
P_change	.34759718	.7455038
P_Age	.0885777	-.05851069
RegionalGov	2.5401472	.24611142
In_EU	-.94223739	.77573968
LiberalDemocracy	-2.3355733	-9.306302
GDPpCgrowth	.01176551	.15663769
Corruption	-1.8702825	-4.2842284
_cons	-5.4056305	-11.912664

Brant Test of Parallel Regression Assumption

Variable	chi2	p>chi2	df
All	27.48	0.007	12
NoCompetitors	5.19	0.023	1
SeatsShare	2.36	0.125	1
Efragmentation	1.56	0.211	1
InGovernment	0.00	0.945	1
OthersInGovernment	0.00	0.997	1
P_change	0.09	0.767	1
P_Age	4.48	0.034	1
RegionalGov	2.54	0.111	1
In_EU	0.88	0.348	1
LiberalDemocracy	1.72	0.189	1
GDPpCgrowth	-2.00	-.999.000	1
Corruption	0.18	0.670	1

A significant test statistic provides evidence that the parallel regression assumption has been violated.

Table 5.10. Marginal effects for ID_3

MARGINAL EFFECTS FOR ID_3 (gologit2)						
Dependent variable values	LOW		MIDDLE		HIGH	
Independent variables						
SeatsShare	-0.006	*	0.001		0.005	*
Efragmentation	-1.158	**	0.108		1.051	**
NoCompetitors	0.008		-0.001		-0.008	
InGovernment	-0.114		-0.017		0.131	
OthersInGovernment	-0.334	**	-0.179		0.513	**
P_change	-0.082		-0.008		0.089	
P_Age	-0.021	**	0.021	**	0.000	
RegionalGov	-0.392	**	0.036		0.355	**
In_EU	0.234		-0.097		-0.137	*
LiberalDemocracy	0.897	**	-0.083		-0.814	*
GDPpCgrowth	-0.004		0.000		0.004	
Corruption	0.804	**	-0.075		-0.729	*

Table 5.13. Log-odds for gologit2 ID_3_3 model with restricted samples

	Gologit2 ID_3_3 (* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$)	Full Model	Macedonia	BiH	Ukraine/Moldova
0	NoCompetitors	-0.048 (0.53)	-0.075 (0.78)	-0.125 (1.24)	-0.190 (0.96)
	SeatsShare	0.033 (2.19)*	0.013 (0.68)	0.030 (1.79)	0.003 (0.08)
	Efragmentation	6.609 (2.62)**	7.372 (2.74)**	5.351 (1.96)	9.403 (2.61)**
	lnGovernment	0.733 (1.55)	1.521 (2.15)*	0.704 (1.39)	1.175 (1.90)
	OtherslnGovernment	2.610 (4.45)**	2.094 (3.16)**	1.864 (2.74)**	2.476 (2.75)**
	P_change	0.512 (1.05)	0.461 (0.90)	0.534 (1.05)	0.521 (0.82)
	P_Age	0.121 (3.37)**	0.149 (3.31)**	0.076 (2.35)*	0.098 (2.34)*
	RegionalGov	2.236 (4.29)**	2.037 (3.18)**	2.036 (3.23)**	2.248 (3.23)**
	ln_EU	-1.117 (1.63)	-1.518 (1.97)*	-0.891 (1.28)	-0.668 (0.81)
	LiberalDemocracy	-5.119 (2.59)**	-6.508 (2.97)**	-2.889 (0.89)	-3.113 (1.02)
	GDPpCgrowth	0.023 (1.16)	0.029 (1.23)	0.029 (0.85)	0.008 (0.30)
	Corruption	-4.589 (2.63)**	-5.115 (2.79)**	-2.748 (1.04)	-2.388 (0.88)
	_cons	-2.404 (0.88)	-1.673 (0.60)	-2.880 (0.92)	-6.166 (1.57)
	1	NoCompetitors	-0.048 (0.53)	-0.075 (0.78)	-0.125 (1.24)
SeatsShare		0.033 (2.19)*	0.059 (2.98)**	0.030 (1.79)	0.003 (0.08)
Efragmentation		6.609 (2.62)**	7.372 (2.74)**	5.351 (1.96)	9.403 (2.61)**
lnGovernment		0.733 (1.55)	-0.741 (0.93)	0.704 (1.39)	1.175 (1.90)
OtherslnGovernment		2.610 (4.45)**	2.094 (3.16)**	4.050 (3.77)**	2.476 (2.75)**
P_change		0.512 (1.05)	0.461 (0.90)	0.534 (1.05)	0.521 (0.82)
P_Age		0.003 (0.08)	0.037 (0.86)	0.076 (2.35)*	-0.074 (1.27)
RegionalGov		2.236 (4.29)**	2.037 (3.18)**	0.121 (0.13)	2.248 (3.23)**
ln_EU		-1.117 (1.63)	-1.518 (1.97)*	-0.891 (1.28)	-0.668 (0.81)
LiberalDemocracy		-5.119 (2.59)**	-6.508 (2.97)**	7.317 (1.71)	-6.905 (2.22)*
GDPpCgrowth		0.023 (1.16)	0.029 (1.23)	-0.144 (2.56)*	0.008 (0.30)
Corruption		-4.589 (2.63)**	-5.115 (2.79)**	6.231 (1.57)	-2.388 (0.88)
_cons		-3.827 (1.39)	-3.483 (1.24)	-15.419 (3.06)**	-6.633 (1.66)
//		159	136	134	121