

JOINT

A joined-up Union, a stronger Europe

JOINT
Research Papers No. 23

January 2024

European Public Opinion on the Challenges and Future of EU Foreign and Security Policy

Rossella Borri,
Pierangelo Isernia,
Carlotta Mingardi
and Francesco Olmastroni



This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement N. 959143.

This publication reflects only the view of the author(s) and the European Commission is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains.

European Public Opinion on the Challenges and Future of EU Foreign and Security Policy

Rossella Borri, Pierangelo Isernia, Carlotta Mingardi
and Francesco Olmastroni*

Abstract

The present report illustrates the results of a survey conducted in six European countries (France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland and Spain) to assess public sentiments towards EU Foreign and Security Policy (EUFSP). Notably, the survey reveals a strong demand for more EUFSP, with a majority supporting a move away from the unanimity rule toward majority voting. Although there is support for greater defence capacities at the EU level, the majority remains unwilling to relinquish national armies for a unified force. The context of the Russia-Ukraine war introduces potential dissonance: majorities in most countries express readiness to support Ukraine, but differences in support levels and approaches emerge, particularly in Greece and Italy. The survey suggests that while conditions for a more integrated EUFSP exist, political elites need to articulate a persuasive argument for rebalancing the relationship between member states and the EU in foreign and defence matters in favour of the Union. The study acknowledges the possibility of public opinion shifting in the face of politicisation, leaving open questions for future research efforts.

* Rossella Borri is Senior Researcher at the University of Siena. Pierangelo Isernia is Full Professor of Political Science at the University of Siena. Carlotta Mingardi is Post-Doc Researcher at the University of Siena. Francesco Olmastroni is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Siena.

Introduction: Public opinion and European Foreign and Security Policy

The rules-based order is in crisis, and support for international cooperation is increasingly questioned at the domestic level in Europe.¹ Trade, migration, fiscal and monetary policies and even coordination on Covid-19 response measures are sources of domestic political controversies in several European countries.² Less perfectly clear, however, are the mechanisms through which such dynamics of increasing political controversiality take place – why this affects some sectors and issues more than others, and why it is particularly intense in some countries rather than others. From this viewpoint, the European Foreign and Security Policy (EUFSP), a concept that encompasses actions taken by the EU within formalised frameworks such as the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as well as national foreign policy endeavours carried out in coordination with EU institutions, is a particularly interesting case to analyse.

On the surface, both public opinion and data from political and bureaucratic elites show vast support for further cooperation, even integration, on foreign, security and defence issues, a sentiment widely acknowledged by experts and scholars.³ Actions that fall under our broad concept of EUFSP stand out because of the generally strong support they enjoy in public opinion. In addition, support for more EU foreign policy appears to have increased as a consequence of the Ukraine

¹ See John G. Ikenberry, “The End of Liberal International Order?”, in *International Affairs*, Vol. 94, No. 1 (January 2018), p. 7-23, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix241>; Columba Peoples, “The Liberal International Ordering of Crisis”, in *International Relations*, 7 October 2022, <https://doi.org/10.1177/00471178221128187>; John J. Mearsheimer, “Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order”, in *International Security*, Vol. 43, No. 4 (Spring 2019), p. 7-50, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00342; Elias Götz, “The Crisis of Liberal World Order”, in András Sajó, Renáta Uitz and Stephen Holmes (eds), *Routledge Handbook of Illiberalism*, London/New York, Routledge, 2022, p. 907-922; Riccardo Alcaro, “Contestation and Transformation. Final Thoughts on the Liberal International Order”, in *The International Spectator*, Vol. 53, No. 1 (March 2018), p. 152-167, DOI 10.1080/03932729.2018.1429533; Robert Jervis et al. (eds), *Chaos Reconsidered. The Liberal Order and the Future of International Politics*, New York, Columbia University Press, 2023.

² See Catherine E. De Vries, Sara B. Hobolt and Stefanie Walter, “Politicizing International Cooperation: The Mass Public, Political Entrepreneurs, and Political Opportunity Structures”, in *International Organization*, Vol. 75, No. 2 (Spring 2021), p. 306-332, DOI 10.1017/S0020818320000491; Julia C. Morse and Robert O. Keohane, “Contested Multilateralism”, in *The Review of International Organizations*, Vol. 9, No. 4 (December 2014), p. 385-412, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-014-9188-2>.

³ Ibid.

war.⁴ An analysis of available longitudinal data for the 2000-2020 period confirms stable public support for and increasing familiarity with EUFSP throughout Europe, with the neutral countries (which at the time still comprised Finland and Sweden, now member and soon-to-be member of NATO, respectively) and the United Kingdom (UK) showing a somewhat attenuated enthusiasm.⁵ Similarly, data indicate widespread support for further integration among political, business and social elites.⁶ When it comes to foreign, security and defence policies, the issue seems not to be “whether”, but rather “how much”, this set of policies should be Europeanised.

On the other hand, foreign, security and defence policies remain under the sole authority of member states, and there are no signs that this state of play is going to undergo significant advancements in the near future. Despite the widespread support from both masses and elites, why has there been so little progress in achieving deeper integration in the foreign and defence policy areas? Why, despite the broad and cross-sectional support for further integration on defence and foreign policy matters, is the progress so slow and incomplete? This might be the result of a combination of factors. On the one hand, the public support that does exist at the mass level might in fact be shallow or ignorant, or both. Support could be shallow because, as argued, Europeans may not want to pay for their defence (free riding), may not want to bear the human costs of the use of force (casualty aversion), or may not favour the use of force (soft vs. hard power). It could be ignorant because few people know much of foreign, security and defence issues and fewer are motivated to get informed. This combination of shallowness and ignorance qualifies support for a EUFSP as a form of “permissive consensus”. If such a “permissive consensus” on these topics does actually exist and is shallow, it means that it can easily be shaken.⁷ Politicians, no matter how enthusiastic they

⁴ Catarina Thomson et al., “European Public Opinion: United in Supporting Ukraine, Divided on the Future of NATO”, in *International Affairs*, Vol. 99, No. 6 (November 2023), p. 2485-2500, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiaad241>.

⁵ Leonardo Puleo, “Summary of Party Positions on EU Foreign, Security and Defence Policy. Case Studies: France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland and Spain”, in *JOINT Research Papers*, No. 9 (June 2022), <https://www.jointproject.eu/?p=1066>; Pierangelo Isernia et al., “Inventory of EUFSP-related Public and Elite Opinion Surveys”, in *JOINT Research Papers*, No. 10 (June 2022), <https://www.jointproject.eu/?p=1103>.

⁶ Pierangelo Isernia et al., “Inventory of EUFSP-related Public and Elite Opinion Surveys”, cit.

⁷ See Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, “A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus”, in *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 39,




are in principle, are reluctant to scale up Europeanisation in these areas because they worry that domestic policy entrepreneurs, including opposition parties, could agitate and politicise the issue. This could turn the permissive consensus into a constraining dissensus. Once an issue gets politicised, grounds for disagreement among European publics are more likely to emerge, as symbolic favourability will be put to the test, potentially leading to disagreement among continental Europeans.

Be that as it may, the fundamental step to inquire into that issue is to assess the extent to which such consensus does indeed exist and what its actual content is. This report is an attempt to answer this question. It explores the attitudes of the general public toward EUFSP and the extent to which public opinion of six EU member states is ready to contemplate changes in the structures underpinning EU foreign and security policy. The six countries have been selected based on their demographic and economic size and general orientation with regard to European integration. While public opinion in these six countries may not be reflective of public preferences in the other EU member states, it is indicative of whether changes to EUFSP structures may at least rely on a critical mass of public support, given that these countries enjoy significant influence in intra-EU negotiations.

The report starts with explaining the methodology of the survey (Section 1). It then breaks down into four sections. Section 2 focuses on how the public views the international system, looking in particular at three dimensions: threats, distribution of power and patterns of amity and alliances. Section 3 examines the public perception of the EU as an international actor. Section 4 zeroes in on arguably the most important security issue affecting the EU, the Ukraine war. In this section we discuss the attitudes toward the war of the public and the support for two

No. 1 (January 2009), p. 1-23, DOI 10.1017/S0007123408000409; Swen Hutter, Edgar Grande and Hanspeter Kriesi (eds), *Politicising Europe. Integration and Mass Politics*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2016; Michael Zürn, Martin Binder and Matthias Ecker-Ehrhardt, "International Authority and Its Politicization", in *International Theory*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (March 2012), p. 69-106, DOI 10.1017/S1752971912000012. On the role of permissive consensus in foreign and security policy see also Richard C. Eichenberg, "NATO and European Security after the Cold War. Will European Citizens Support a Common Security Policy?", in Brigitte L. Nacos, Robert Y. Shapiro and Pierangelo Isernia (eds), *Decisionmaking in a Glass House. Mass Media, Public Opinion, and American and European Foreign Policy in the 21st Century*, Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield, 2000, p. 155-176; and Kaija Schilde, Stephanie B. Anderson and Andrew D. Garner, "A More Martial Europe? Public Opinion, Permissive Consensus, and EU Defence Policy", in *European Security*, Vol. 28, No. 2 (2019), p. 153-172, DOI 10.1080/09662839.2019.1617275.



of the main policies adopted by the EU: sanctions toward Russia and shipment of weapons to Ukraine. Finally, in Section 5 we explore how public opinion sees possible changes to EUFSP policies and structures. We focus again on three dimensions. The first, which we refer to as ‘conceptual’ changes, concerns the role of the EU in international security. The second is about the unexploited potential for more EU cooperation in selected policy areas. The third and final dimension revolves around handing over greater competences in foreign and security policy to EU institutions through formal changes to voting procedures. Our aim is to determine the extent to which public opinion is supportive of these changes and account for national differences, while also considering whether public support for ‘more Europe’ is thick or shallow. We thus lay the groundwork for further research on the conditions under which EUFSP can be politicised, which is going to be the focus of a second report.


1. Methodology

The data in this report are drawn from a multi-country survey conducted in the final two months of 2023 in France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, and Spain.⁸ The survey questionnaire was designed by the research team of the University of Siena (UNISI) with inputs from the other partners in the JOINT project. In formulating the questionnaire, careful consideration was given to insights derived from the focus groups conducted in spring 2022 and findings obtained from the nine case studies the project has investigated.

The questionnaire’s general aim is to explore people’s acceptability of an enhanced EUFSP. The survey also includes questions about latent opinions, individual predispositions, ideological orientations as well as socio-demographic background of participants.

The questionnaire was initially drafted in English and then translated into the languages of the six countries by native speakers. The questionnaire employed

⁸ The results of the focus groups are analysed by Carlotta Mingardi et al., “Framing Public Perception of the Challenges to the EU Foreign Security and Defence Policy. Focus Groups as a Method of Investigation”, in *JOINT Research Papers*, No. 11 (October 2022), <https://www.jointproject.eu/?p=1332>. The reports on the nine case studies are available at JOINT website: <https://www.jointproject.eu>.



gender-neutral language to avoid the use of words that might be construed as biased, discriminatory or demeaning by implying that one sex or social gender is the standard or norm.

Fieldwork was subcontracted to the professional survey company Toluna, which was responsible for survey scripting, pre-testing and implementation. The samples were drawn from Toluna opt-in panels in the six countries. Toluna offered rewards (i.e., points that can be accumulated and used for online purchases) to its panellists for each completed survey. The survey was administered online using the CAWI (Computer-Assisted Web Interview) technique.

Online panels rely on non-probabilistic sampling procedures, where individuals voluntarily enrol to take part in the general panel. This potentially introduces a self-selection bias. To mitigate this bias, a robust sampling frame and effective procedures were established. Specifically, quotas were formulated to guarantee that survey outcomes could serve as a basis for accurate estimations of the target populations in the six countries. All six opt-in samples set quotas for age by gender, region of residency (according to Eurostat's NUTS2 classification), and educational attainment (soft quotas). Quota targets are based on Eurostat demographic data.

The UNISI team conducted multiple tests of the online questionnaire before the survey launch. Additionally, to ensure proper functionality, the survey underwent a pre-test with a sample of 100 respondents per country in October 2023. Statistical tests on the pre-test data were performed by the UNISI team, and pre-test interviews were not included in the final datasets.

The survey fieldwork spanned approximately two months. Invitations were sent out in two separate launches: soft launch and full launch.

Participants who did not comply with security checks or survey requirements (e.g., respondents who completed the survey in less than 40 per cent of the median response time, that is, our cut-off quality threshold for 'speeders') were filtered out. Additionally, individuals were excluded if their demographic profile had already met the required quota. In the end, the survey was completed by a total of 18,583 individuals aged 18 and above, residing in the six countries and enrolled in Toluna's opt-in panel.

Table 1 | Survey participants (full launch and soft launch) by country

France	Germany	Greece	Italy	Poland	Spain	Total
3,000	3,000	3,000	3,000	3,285	3,298	18,538

Despite the aforementioned efforts in designing a robust sampling frame, it is essential to acknowledge that online panels may sometimes disproportionately represent certain population segments. Notably, younger and older age groups are less represented in certain countries, as are respondents with lower education levels. Weighting will be applied to address sampling bias. Due to the lack of known probabilities of selection in opt-in samples, all respondents are given a base weight of 1. Subsequently, the base weight for each sample is adjusted to align with population benchmarks in the sampling frame.

2. The image of the international system

In this section, we explore what are the images of the international system held by public opinion in the six countries. Following the tradition of images in international relations,⁹ we delve into three main dimensions of the public image of the international system: the most relevant perceived threats, the feelings towards the main international actors, and the relative power of the main actors across three dimensions, namely cultural, military, and economic power. Understanding participants' worldviews is crucial for contextualising the world in which public opinion in our six countries believes the EU is entering, especially as we approach the end of the second year of the war in Ukraine and other areas of Europe and the world are experiencing outbreaks of open conflict.

⁹ See Robert Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1970; and Richard K. Herrmann et al., "Images in International Relations: An Experimental Test of Cognitive Schemata", in *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 41, No. 3 (September 1997), p. 403-433, <https://doi.org/10.1111/0020-8833.00050>.

2.1 International threats

The most threatening issues that EU societies must address in the near future, according to respondents (Table 2), include international terrorism (88 per cent), tensions between Russia and the West (87 per cent), and climate change (85 per cent). These threats are followed by cyber-attacks (83 per cent) and tensions between China and the West (77 per cent). Lastly, respondents identified migration (79 per cent) and Covid-19-like pandemics (67 per cent) as significant threats.

Table 2 | Attitudes towards international threats ('very important' or 'somewhat important' threat, in %)


International threats	France	Germany	Greece	Italy	Poland	Spain	Total
Large numbers of migrants and refugees coming into [Country]	74	85	82	70	82	75	79
International terrorism	90	85	83	88	89	91	88
The global spread of a disease such as Covid-19	56	64	64	69	74	77	67
The effects of climate change	85	79	84	88	85	88	85
Tensions between the West and China	69	80	66	78	82	82	77
Tensions between the West and Russia	82	87	81	88	94	89	87
Cyber-attacks on [Nationality] institutions and companies	83	83	70	80	88	90	83

Question 1.1: Here is a list of possible international threats to [Country] in the next 10 years. Please select if you think each one on the list is a very important, somewhat important, not very important or not an important threat at all.

The EU and the United States are the actors towards which the public in all six countries express the warmest feelings (Figure 1). France has the highest average score (almost 89) for the EU, while Greece ranks the lowest with 68. The US gets similar results, with some variations across countries. In particular, French and Polish respondents express the warmest feelings (88 and 82, respectively), while Germans and Italians hover around 70, and Greek and Spanish publics fall between 64 and 65. Feelings are cooler towards non-EU actors such as China, Russia, and NATO. Polish interviewees express the coldest feelings towards Russia (27). In contrast, warmer feelings towards Russia are found in France and Greece with average scores of 65 (France) and 59 (Greece), respectively. German, Italian, and

Spanish respondents score around 50 per cent, with the Spanish sample slightly on the lower end of the spectrum at 42.

Figure 1 | Feelings towards different countries and institutions (0-100 scale, averages)




Question 1.2: Now we would like to rate your feelings towards some countries and institutions with '100' meaning a very warm, favourable feeling, '0' meaning a very cold, unfavourable feeling, and '50' meaning not particularly warm or cold. You can use any number from 0 to 100.

China is generally perceived quite warmly, with the highest average score recorded in France at 72 and a relatively high minimum of 53 in Poland. Similarly, feelings towards Turkey are generally warm, except for Greece, where the average feelings are cooler at 46. Ukraine is warmly perceived, with average scores ranging from 64 in Greece and Poland to 88 in France. Similarly, NATO garners warm perceptions, with scores ranging from 59 in Greece to 85 in Poland and an unexpectedly high 97 in France.

Turning to the distribution of power in the international system as perceived by public opinion in the six countries, the focus was on four main actors: the US, China, Russia and the EU. The US is perceived as the most powerful in military terms, with an average of 76 per cent of respondents considering it *very* powerful (Figure 2).

Figure 2 | Perceptions about international actors' power in military terms ('very powerful', in %)




Question 2.2_1: Please, tell us how powerful you think each of the following actors is in military terms?

In Spain, 87 per cent of respondents share this view, followed by Greece (79 per cent), Poland (78 per cent), Italy (76 per cent), France (69 per cent) and Germany (68 per cent). Spain is the country where 80 per cent of respondents see China as next in military terms, with an average response of 63 per cent across countries

considering China very powerful in this dimension. Russia rates much lower, with an average of 50 per cent of respondents across countries viewing this country as a very powerful military actor. The EU is by far considered the least powerful actor in military terms.

The picture slightly changes when considering economic power (Figure 3). As expected, the US and China are perceived as the two most powerful economic actors. An average of 64 per cent of respondents think China is very powerful in economic terms, a view held in particular by 81 per cent of the Spanish respondents. Russia is next while, unexpectedly, the EU is at the bottom of the list. In none of the selected countries did respondents seeing the EU as 'very powerful' exceed 35 per cent, with Spain having the highest percentage (35 per cent) and Italy the lowest (13 per cent). Considering the role of the EU in the global economy, this perception is clearly out of sync with reality and might suggest that perceptions here are affected by the low level of satisfaction for the actual performance of the EU's economy.


Figure 3 | Perceptions about international actors' power in economic terms ('very powerful', in %)



Question 2.2_2: And how powerful do you think each of the following actors is in economic terms?

In cultural terms, the perceived distribution of power varies (Figure 4). While none of the actors emerges as clearly the most powerful, 43 per cent of respondents identify the EU as the most powerful actor in cultural terms, followed by the US and China, with an average around 30 per cent. Last comes Russia. Interestingly, China is deemed very powerful in cultural terms in Greece and Spain, exceeding 40 per cent compared to the cross-country average of 30 per cent.

Figure 4 | Perceptions about international actors' power in cultural terms ('very powerful', in %)



Question 2.2_3: And how powerful do you think each of the following actors is in cultural terms?

In conclusion, China and the US stand out as the two countries perceived as the most powerful actors in most domains. Even if one can presume that the war in Ukraine might have impacted the perception of its power, Russia maintains a strong position in the view of the public in all six countries in almost all domains, including the economic one. In contrast, public perception of the EU fails to accurately reflect its true economic influence: despite being widely seen as having a dominant cultural role, the EU's military significance and, unexpectedly, its economic strength, are underestimated.

2.2 Relations with China, the US and Russia

A set of questions delved deeper into the relationship between the EU and key actors, seeking to understand how the public perceives the nature of the relationships between their own country and the great powers. Specifically, we explored respondents' views of the nature of the relationships between each of the six EU countries and China, Russia, and the US. We tapped into whether the respondents considered each of them to be an ally they share interests and values with; a partner to cooperate with; a rival to compete with; or an enemy to confront. Figures 5 to 7 display the results by actor. As can be seen, there is a quite defined picture of how citizens of the selected countries see the world and the relations of their own countries.

Even though feelings towards China are quite warm, 43 per cent of respondents consider China a *rival*, with no significant difference among countries, except for Greece (Figure 5). Consistent with the previous findings of this report on general perceptions of China, over 50 per cent of Greek respondents identified China as a partner and 15 per cent as an ally. The situation reverses in France and Germany, showing the highest percentage (above 50 per cent) of respondents who see China as a rival, and around 10 per cent of respondents identifying China as an enemy. While both Spain and Poland have an average of 44 per cent seeing China as a rival, 11 per cent of respondents in Spain also frame it as an ally.

The United States is consistently regarded as a partner and as an ally across the six countries, with an average of 45 per cent and 37 per cent of respondents indicating so, respectively. France, Germany, and Poland also report more than 10 per cent of respondents considering the US as a *rival* (Figure 6).

Almost two years after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, on average, 50 per cent of respondents across all six countries identify Russia as an *enemy*, with the highest percentage (74 per cent) in Poland (Figure 7). However, two notable outliers emerge: Greece stands out with 24 per cent of respondents seeing Russia as an ally and around 30 per cent as a partner; conversely, in Italy, 46 per cent of respondents see Russia as an enemy and 18 per cent as a partner. Notably, around 8 per cent of German respondents view Russia as an ally.

Figure 5 | Attitudes towards countries' relations with China (in %)




Figure 6 | Attitudes towards countries' relations with the United States (in %)





Figure 7 | Attitudes towards countries' relations with Russia (in %)



Question 3.6: We now move to discuss the role of a few countries in international relations. Which of the following terms better defines the nature of the present relations between [Country] and each of the following actors?

2.3 Attitudes toward the international system

The survey also explored the general attitudes of respondents towards the international system. Table 3 reports the percentages of those who agree with some statements. Two main results stand out. First, possibly as a consequence of the war in Ukraine, majorities or substantial pluralities of Europeans look at military power as an important asset in international relations. They support the use of force to prevent aggression from any expansionist power. Yet, Europeans are less enthusiastic about considering war as a tool of conflict management, although majorities in all countries (except for Italy), with France and Poland leading the way at 73 per cent and 75 per cent, agree about the importance of a strong military. Second, the public in all European countries, with some national variations, shows a remarkably parochial and self-centred view of foreign policy. Roughly half of the respondents believe that a country should pursue its own interests, even when allies object, with Spain presenting the lowest score (38 per cent).

Table 3 | Attitudes towards international affairs (figures are percentages of those who agree with each statement)

	France	Germany	Greece	Italy	Poland	Spain	Total
[Country] should always do what is in its own interest, even if our allies object	52	45	62	53	53	38	51
[Country] should take all steps including the use of force to prevent aggression by any expansionist power	55	43	53	50	60	52	52
[Country] needs a strong military to be effective in international relations	73	56	58	39	75	53	59
[Country] should be more willing to share its wealth with other nations, even if it doesn't coincide with our political interest	29	27	19	27	26	30	26
[Country] should spend significantly more money on foreign aid	22	22	29	21	23	29	24
[Country] already does enough to help the world's poor	58	59	51	48	57	40	52
Under some conditions, war is necessary to obtain justice	42	36	32	28	35	34	35
Economic power is more important in world affairs than military power	49	55	64	60	51	62	57

Question 9.1.2_6: And now tell us whether you agree or disagree with each of the following items...

Public opinion appears to hold limited enthusiasm when it comes to sharing the country's wealth with other nations, with levels of agreement ranging between 26 and 30 per cent in the six countries. Similar attitudes are shown on the issue of foreign aid, with those in agreement with their country investing more resources ranging from 21 per cent in Italy to 29 per cent in Spain and Greece. 52 per cent of total respondents believe that their country is already doing enough to help the most vulnerable globally.

Summary

There are three main takeaways from this section: China and the US are widely perceived to be the most powerful actors in the international arena across all domains, with only their cultural influence surpassed by the EU. While the EU is regarded as very powerful in cultural terms, it is seen as less influential in economic terms, despite trade historically being its main source of influence. Attitudes towards relations with China, Russia and the US mostly reflect the current state of affairs in EU member states' diplomatic relations: with some outliers (Greece), the US is mostly considered an ally or a partner, China mostly a rival, and Russia an enemy. Finally, attitudes towards the use of force and war in pursuit of foreign policy objectives are not particularly forthcoming, but military and economic power are considered strongpoints in international affairs.


3. The role of the EU as an international actor

In this section, we shift the focus onto the EU and how it should behave in the international context. The following section discusses how public opinion in the six countries views the role of the EU and its geopolitical ambitions, the nature of its actorness (whether civil or military), and what type of defence arrangements the EU should entertain with NATO.

The vast majority of respondents believe that the EU has a role to play in international relations (Figure 8). However, the scale of such ambition differs. On average, 44 per cent of respondents believe that the EU should pursue *global* ambitions, while 43 per cent deem that it should mostly stick to a *regional* dimension. Among the least supportive of the EU's global reach we find Poland, with 45 per cent of respondents wishing the EU to focus on its regional challenges and only 32 per cent believing the EU should aspire to global outreach. Greece follows, with 52 per cent wishing the EU to be a regional actor and 40 per cent believing it should aim globally. The strongest supporter of EU's global ambitions is Italy, with 57 per cent of respondents seeing the EU more as a global actor and 32 per cent as a regional actor. Interestingly, 22 per cent of Polish respondents, 14 per cent of French and 13 per cent of German participants do not view the EU as

an international actor at all.

Figure 8 | Attitudes towards the international role of the EU (in %)



Question 2.5: In thinking about the European Union in international affairs, which statement comes closer to your position?

Asked the question about the most appropriate strategy to face crises between diplomacy and military responses, most respondents opted for diplomatic means (Table 4). On average, around 60 per cent believed that the EU should only use diplomatic means to manage a conflict, and 25 per cent on average opted for a combination of both diplomatic and military solutions. Among the countries most willing to adopt a combination of strategies, both diplomatic and military, is France, with 34 per cent of respondents preferring such an approach. When it comes to international crises, a majority of 50 per cent of participants prefer an EU common response rather than relying on national responses only. Poland is the country with the lowest score at 39 per cent.

Last, we addressed the question of the relationship between NATO and the EU. More participants showed a preference for military cooperation within the EU (36

per cent) than with NATO (25 per cent). Poland was the exception, with 48 per cent of respondents preferring military cooperation within NATO. However, the most interesting result is that 39 per cent of respondents locate themselves in between, a sign of the difficulty (on which we will tell more later on) to choose among the two.


Table 4 | Attitudes towards different defence strategies (figures are percentages of those who agree with each statement)

	France	Germany	Greece	Italy	Poland	Spain	Total
It is better to pursue diplomatic solutions	49	61	67	67	71	64	63
In-between	34	27	24	22	20	24	25
It is better to pursue military solutions	17	12	10	11	9	12	12
	France	Germany	Greece	Italy	Poland	Spain	Total
Each EU member state should prioritise its national interests	22	21	21	17	32	14	21
In-between	31	29	29	27	28	30	29
EU member states should have a common response	47	50	50	56	39	55	50
	France	Germany	Greece	Italy	Poland	Spain	Total
Better to strengthen military cooperation within NATO	19	28	12	18	48	22	25
In-between	40	39	40	41	33	41	39
Better to increase military cooperation within the EU	41	33	48	40	18	38	36

Question 2.4.1_2_3: 'To address these crises, it is better to strengthen military cooperation within NATO' vs. 'To address these crises, it is better to increase military cooperation within the European Union'.


To further clarify participants' position, we asked those who preferred a NATO solution whether it was still the best option to increase military cooperation within NATO if this meant having to participate in military operations in which no national interest was involved (Figure 9). 64 per cent of the respondents previously siding with cooperation with NATO confirmed their choice. The respondents preferring cooperation within the EU were asked whether they still wanted this option if this meant for the EU to act without the support of the US (Figure 10). 74 per cent of participants confirmed their choice. Results were highest in Greece (79 per cent) and lowest in Spain (64 per cent).

Figure 9 | Military cooperation with NATO when no national interest is involved (in %)



Question 2.4.3_1: Do you think that to address these problems it is better to strengthen military cooperation within NATO, even if this means having to participate in military operations in which there is no national interest involved?


Figure 10 | Military cooperation within the EU without support from the US (in %)



Question 2.4.3_2: Do you think that to address these problems it would be better to strengthen military cooperation within the EU, even if this meant that the European Union would have to deal with its security problems without the support of the United States?

Our questions also probed the public's attitudes towards NATO. With an average of 77 per cent and some variations among countries (notably Spain and Germany, reaching 92 per cent and 82 per cent of respondents replying accordingly), the majority of respondents still consider NATO essential to their own country's security (Figure 11).

Figure 11 | The role of NATO and country's security (in %)



Question 3.1: Some people say that NATO is still essential to our country's security. Others say it is no longer essential. Which of these views is closer to your own?

Yet, only 34 per cent of respondents agree that NATO is enough to ensure European territorial defence (Table 5), with Poland registering the highest percentage (50 per cent). Concerning EU relations with the US, 57 per cent of participants agreed that the EU should pursue more autonomy from its historical ally. 61 per cent said that the EU should develop its military strength as a pillar of NATO. Finally, 52 per cent agreed on the idea that NATO serves as a tool for the United States to exert control over its European allies. These data seem to confirm the quite ambivalent

attitudes of most Europeans in these six countries on the issue of privileging the EU or NATO (and relations with the US) in security matters.

Table 5 | Attitudes towards NATO and EU territorial defence (figures are percentages of those who agree with each statement)

	France	Germany	Greece	Italy	Poland	Spain	Total
NATO is sufficient for European territorial defence	30	34	22	32	50	36	34
The main goal of European defence should be to achieve greater autonomy	67	53	63	61	48	51	57
Europe must develop its military strength as a pillar of NATO	69	62	45	50	76	62	61
NATO is a way for the United States to control EU member states	54	47	61	54	41	52	52

Question 3.2: Please state whether you agree or disagree with the following statements: ...

Summary


The results from this section reveal at least two things. First, the majority of respondents wish the EU to play a role in international affairs. Views diverge on the scale of such ambitions, with some countries (Greece and Poland) preferring EU action to be more focused on the regional level, and others (Italy and Spain) wishing it to ‘go global’.

Second, while there is an overall acknowledgement of the centrality of NATO for European security, this is not considered sufficient. A slight majority of respondents want common EU responses to major security threats and are keen to see the development of an EU defence force, even autonomously from the US. There is, however, no defined picture, as Europeans from selected countries are uncertain about the exact balance in the relationship between the EU and NATO.

4. The war in Ukraine

A section of the survey was devoted to exploring European attitudes towards the war in Ukraine, arguably the most challenging foreign and defence policy issue the EU has faced. Our results paint a rather mixed picture.

Figure 12 | Views of the Russia-Ukraine war (in %)




Question 8.1: In thinking about the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, which side are you on?

We have already observed a substantial level of sympathy towards Ukraine among the public in the six countries. However, a more specific question asked which side the respondent was on when it comes to the war (Figure 12). The results reveal substantial differences among countries. Most respondents (55 per cent) side with Ukraine. The countries with the highest rates of support are Poland (75 per cent) and Spain (65 per cent). In France and Germany support slightly exceeds 50 per cent (55 per cent in France; 52 per cent in Germany). Italy falls slightly below the 50 per cent threshold, with 49 per cent of respondents openly siding with Ukraine. The most significant outlier is Greece, where only 32 per cent of the interviewed


population expressed support for the Ukrainian cause. Weak or relatively weak support for Ukraine does not entail appreciation for Russia, of which there is little. Rather, many attempt to distance themselves from both parties. The percentages of those siding with neither contestant goes up to 52 per cent among Greek respondents and to 43 per cent of Italians. Only in Poland does less than a fourth of the sample side with neither. In Germany and France, that percentage hovers just above a third of respondents.

The different inclination of European publics to side with Ukraine is confirmed by the support for concrete policy decisions to contribute to the defence of Ukraine. The survey explored support for two of the main strategies adopted by EU countries to assist Ukraine: the shipment of military equipment to Ukraine and the use of sanctions against Russia (Figure 13). The picture here is also complex and nuanced.

Figure 13 | Views of military aid to Ukraine and sanction against Russia (figures are percentages of those who agree with each statement)



Question 8.2: Do you agree or disagree with the following decisions of [Country] as a result of Russia's invasion of Ukraine? To supply arms to the Ukrainian government; to apply economic sanctions against Russia.




The analysis of public sentiment on arms transfers to Ukraine reveals substantial support in countries like Poland and Spain, where there is a prevalent consensus in favour of the Ukrainian cause. In this context 80 per cent and 70 per cent of respondents, respectively, endorse military aid. However, the issue becomes more divisive in other countries, with lower levels of support observed in Germany (61 per cent), and France (64 per cent). Notably, Greece and Italy exhibit the least support, with only 38 per cent and 48 per cent of respondents, respectively, agreeing with the choice.

Support for sanctions against Russia is high in all countries, though the same pattern of variation across countries seems to emerge here as well. The staunchest supporters are in Poland, while approval of sanctions is more tepid in Greece. Figures range from 90 per cent of respondents in Poland in agreement with sanctions to 57 per cent in Greece, with an average result moving from 85 per cent in Spain to 72 per cent in Germany. As expected, the highest degree of disagreement can be found in Greece, with 25 per cent of respondents declaring a strong disagreement with this choice.

One important indicator of the publics' orientation towards the war is related to the actor considered the most responsible for the war. In response to a question that allowed respondents to allocate blame for the war among a set of actors, Russia unsurprisingly emerged as the country mostly blamed (Figure 14). The percentage of blame attributed to Russia varies across countries, from an average 78 per cent in Poland to 44 per cent in Greece. However, when given the opportunity, people tend to assign responsibilities to other actors as well. Ukraine is deemed partially responsible for the war by small but not insignificant minorities in all countries, with the highest percentage of blame recorded in Greece (19 per cent), followed by Italy (18 per cent), Germany and France (17 per cent), Spain (14 per cent) and Poland (12 per cent). Moreover, substantial minorities in some countries hold the US responsible for the war (24 per cent in Greece, 16 per cent in Italy, and 15 per cent in Germany). A portion of Greek respondents also assigns some responsibility to NATO (14 per cent). Overall, the actor less blamed for the present situation is the EU.


Figure 14 | Responsibility for the present situation in the Russia-Ukraine war-Russia (figures are the average percent of blame attributed by respondents to each actor)



Question 8.3: According to you, how much each of the following actors is responsible for the present situation in the Russia-Ukraine war? Assign the responsibility of each actor in percent.

In exploring the possible end of the war, predicting its outcome remains an uncertain matter. With the exception of Greece, where respondents lean slightly towards anticipating a Russian victory, and Poland, where the predicted outcome favours Ukraine, the public in the other countries expresses considerable uncertainty about the results (Figure 15).

Figure 15 | Which country is more likely to win (scale: 0-10)



Question 8.4: Regardless of which country you would like to see win the Russia-Ukraine conflict, which country do you think is more likely to win? Please indicate your opinion on a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means “Russia will certainly win” and 10 means “Ukraine will certainly win”.

Summary

Almost two years since the start of Russia’s aggression of Ukraine, a majority of respondents in the six countries continue to back Ukraine, with the strongest support in Poland and the least strong in Italy and Greece. While sympathy for the Ukrainian cause still holds and sympathy for Russia is generally low, a sizable share of respondents does not wish to take sides. Military aid to Ukraine is not overwhelmingly popular, with 60 per cent of respondents, on average, agreeing on the measure, though only 38 per cent of Greeks agree. The picture changes when considering economic sanctions against Russia. An average of 70 per cent of respondents agree with the economic sanctions, with Greece again coming last but still overwhelmingly in support (57 per cent) and Poland first (90 per cent). Finally, uncertainty about how the war will end is prevalent.

5. European integration: Which directions?

5.1 Selected policy areas


A portion of the survey aimed to explore the changes in different policy sectors that Europeans may be willing to support. The survey initially compared the level of integration that respondents believe currently exists in various policy areas with the one they desire. On average, respondents identified the EU as being somewhat insufficiently integrated in several policy fields, including migration, social and foreign policy, and expressed a desire for increased integration in these areas.

Table 6 | Views of current and wished for EU integration

How much it is integrated (% too little)	France	Germany	Greece	Italy	Poland	Spain	Total
Migration	41	57	70	65	40	50	54
Welfare	39	57	63	61	47	45	52
Foreign policy	27	49	54	42	35	30	40
Defence	42	55	57	50	49	34	48
Fiscal	29	42	53	49	29	37	40
Energy	39	53	51	52	41	39	46
Environment	40	51	46	51	36	38	44
How much it should be (% more)	France	Germany	Greece	Italy	Poland	Spain	Total
Migration	54	61	76	71	48	67	63
Welfare	48	58	75	68	52	68	62
Foreign policy	45	54	69	58	49	62	56
Defence	62	62	72	63	63	65	65
Fiscal	41	46	64	59	39	57	51
Energy	56	58	69	66	53	65	61
Environment	57	56	67	64	49	63	59

Question 4.1.1 and 4.1.2: On many issues, some say that the European Union is too much integrated, while others say that the European Union is not integrated enough. How much integrated do you think the European Union currently is on the following issues? And how much integrated do you think the European Union should be on the same issue?

The data show a general appreciation for increased integration in several policy domains (Table 6). Specifically, about 63 per cent of total respondents wish for more



integration in migration policy. A similar pattern is observed for welfare policies, with 62 per cent of respondents expressing a desire for much more integration, with the highest shares reported in Greece (76 per cent), Italy (71 per cent) and Spain (67 per cent). Foreign policy and defence show results in line with data regarding present integration (56 and 65 per cent, respectively). A similar pattern is found for fiscal policy (51 per cent), energy policy (61 per cent) and environmental policy (59 per cent).

These data, combined with the ones discussed in previous sections, confirm that Europeans are, in fact, supportive of *more* integration in many sectors. Despite national variations, there is a clear demand for more Europe, including in the defence and security sector.

5.2 Institutional structures

Finally, the survey explored what kind of policy and institutional changes people in Europe are more willing to accept. Around 66 per cent of respondents expressed the wish for the EU to assume a greater international role and to increase its military strength, even if this implied an increase in military spending (Table 7). Substantial majorities think the EU countries should combine their military forces (see discussion below). Conversely, Europeans appear divided on the possibility of the EU having its own seat in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), although 46 per cent of the French agreed to that notwithstanding the fact that France should renounce its veto-wielding permanent seat in the UNSC.

A litmus test of the public's willingness to further integrate is the amount of support it shows for changes in the voting rules within the EU and the institutional procedure used by the EU to vote on security and defence matters (Table 8). Unanimity is not very popular: 58 per cent of respondents said they would prefer the option of qualified majority voting (Germany and Spain going beyond 60 per cent), which involves a combination of special majorities of member states and overall population, while 23 per cent of respondents opted for an absolute majority of states.

Table 7 | Attitudes on how the EU can achieve a greater international role (% agree)

	France	Germany	Greece	Italy	Poland	Spain	Total
The European Union should increase its military strength, even if this requires increased military spending	73	67	68	49	78	60	66
The European Union should concentrate on economic power, even if this means it will not be able to act independently on military issues	57	61	65	65	69	62	63
The countries of the European Union should combine their military forces into a single European army, even though [Country] may not always agree with EU decisions	68	62	65	66	64	72	66
The European Union should have a single seat on the United Nations Security Council, even if this implies that our country will not have a seat at the UN Security Council	46	48	59	54	48	53	51

Question 5.1: Some say that the European Union needs to do certain things in order to assume a greater international role. To what extent do you agree with the following statements?

Table 8 | Attitudes on the voting procedure within the Council of the European Union (in %)

	France	Germany	Greece	Italy	Poland	Spain	Total
By absolute majority (50% + 1 of member states in favour)	26	22	24	23	22	21	23
By qualified majority (55% of member states in favour and representing at least 65% of EU population)	56	64	53	58	54	61	58
By unanimity (100% of member states in favour)	17	14	23	18	24	17	19
I don't know/ I prefer not to answer	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Question 5.2: As you may know, the Council of the European Union is the body formed by the ministers of the EU member states. In your opinion, when the Council takes decisions on defence and security issues of the EU, what percentage should be given a majority.

Still, the ambivalence of the public opinion as regards the military and security arrangements of the EU, persists. When asked about the relationship between a possible future EU army and NATO, only one-tenth of the sample in all countries, except in Greece, favoured an EU common army outside NATO (Table 9). About 33 per cent of total respondents preferred cooperation between an EU common army and NATO *within* NATO, while 25 per cent opted for acting within NATO, but with a stronger role for the EU. The option of member states to act autonomously from both the EU and NATO was favoured on average by 12 per cent of respondents, with no significant variation across countries, except for Greece, where it reached 20 per cent.

Table 9 | Relations between NATO and a possible EU army (in %)

	France	Germany	Greece	Italy	Poland	Spain	Total
NATO as it is now	11	16	7	11	28	15	15
NATO with a stronger role for the EU (e.g., the military commander chosen among an EU member states)	24	28	21	28	25	25	25
EU common army, within NATO (a bilateral alliance between the United States and the EU)	33	30	32	32	33	35	33
EU common army, outside NATO	15	9	20	14	4	14	12
[Country]'s security policy should be independent from both the EU and NATO	16	17	19	14	10	10	14
I don't know/ I prefer not to answer	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Question 5.4: There is a lot of discussion on what is the best framework in which the [Nationality] security policy should be carried out. You find below a list of possible solutions that [Country] could pursue. Please, choose the one you think would be the preferred choice for your country.

Europeans seem to favour a stronger EU but not a fully federalised one in defence matters. 61 per cent of respondents view the coordination of national armies at the EU level as the best possible solution (Table 10). The concept of an “EU army” is supported only by 21 per cent of respondents in Italy, 19 per cent in Germany and 18 per cent in Spain. The option of maintaining only national armies received less than 13 per cent of respondents’ support overall, except in Poland, where it reached 22 per cent.

Table 10 | Attitudes towards a European Union's army (in %)

	France	Germany	Greece	Italy	Poland	Spain	Total
There should be a European army to replace existing national armies	16	19	16	21	13	18	17
There should be national armies coordinated at the European level	65	60	65	55	60	64	61
There should be only national armies, with no coordination at the European level	14	12	10	11	22	8	13
There should be neither national nor European armies	5	9	8	13	5	8	8
I don't know/ I prefer not to answer	0	0	0	0	0	0	0


Question 5.3: Sometimes, people talk about the need to create a European army. Which of the following is closest to your opinion on this subject?

Summary

Results from this section show a favourable position of the public in all six countries regarding moving forward with integration. This occurs for different policy fields, including foreign and defence policy. Desire for further integration is also proved by the expressed preference for majority voting in matters of foreign and defence policy within the Council by 60 per cent of respondents. The picture starts becoming more blurred when considering the exact nature of more security and defence integration and especially its relationship with NATO. Finally, the public does not appear to be in favour of an 'EU common army', with 61 per cent of respondents opting for more coordination at the EU level of national armies.

Conclusions

Our survey aimed to explore public attitudes towards EUFSP, addressing a set of research questions about the conceptual, policy and institutional changes that the European public in the six surveyed countries is willing to support.




The survey's results paint a complex picture of the image of the EU among European citizens in the six countries surveyed. There is no lack of sympathy for the EU. As the feeling thermometer shows, the Union is among the institutions towards which majorities in all countries have an average score well above 70 on a 0-100 scale. Irrespective of national variations, which still exist, only NATO can compete with the EU in terms of warmth.

However, the EU is mostly seen as quite an ineffectual actor on the world scene. In all six countries, the US and China are perceived as the two main powers globally. This perception extends to the economic dimension of power. The EU is seen as influential – albeit not significantly – only in cultural terms. Interestingly, people are not ready to acknowledge a role for the EU in the economic area, where the EU is clearly much stronger than Russia.

Perhaps consequently, public opinion strives for more Europe. Still, there is confusion and mixed feelings about how to strengthen it. There are questions about the optimal combination of national and EU powers and what the relationship with the US and NATO should look like. The survey's results point in different directions.

Europeans desire a more autonomous EU. With the partial exception of Poland, respondents in all the surveyed countries consider NATO as insufficient for Europe's territorial defence. Additionally, in all countries – albeit with some division in Poland – the public believes European defence “should achieve greater autonomy”. Europeans (with the partial exception of France) overwhelmingly favour diplomacy over military solutions to address conflicts and crises. Unsurprisingly, there is no clear appetite for an independent European military force, and attitudes towards NATO remain overwhelmingly positive. While the Atlantic Alliance enjoys favourable sentiments, the relationship with the US is seen as fraught with potentially worrisome problems by significant minorities. This is not a question of anti-Americanism, as we find very little evidence of it in our data, but rather a genuine puzzlement about how the relationship might evolve and what the implications of this evolution might be for Europe.

Against this backdrop, it is no surprise that the European public apparently seem ready to accept more sovereignty transfers to the EU in foreign and security policy. Three pieces of information are relevant here. The first is the existence of a strong



demand for more EUFSP. That this demand is not shallow is apparently confirmed by the answers to the question about how the EU should take its decision: less than a quarter of the Europeans surveyed support the unanimity rule. A majority wants the EU to move in the direction of majority voting. Second, there is some support also for greater defence capacities. While most Europeans are not eager to increase domestic defence expenditures, the Europeans surveyed agree that defence efforts at the EU level should be stepped up. However, and this is the third point, the European public is not ready to give up national armies in favour of a single unified one. No more than a fifth of respondents (and in several countries much less than that) favour that option. Instead, majorities in all six countries support greater coordination of national armies at the EU level.

The Russia-Ukraine war offers a vantage point from which these attitudes can be explored more in-depth. The survey's results on the war reveal elements of potential dissonance between what the public thinks and what it may be ready to do in a concrete case. Majorities are ready to side with Ukraine in the war in most countries, but not all (Greece). Support for economic sanctions against Russia and for helping Ukraine militarily is still high in most countries, again with the well-known exception of Greece and (as far as weapons shipments are concerned) Italy. While not big, these differences are not irrelevant. The survey's results do not offer any solid evidence that, faced with the actual prospect of their country's government being overruled on matters of such magnitude, public support for strengthening EUFSP through such radical changes as abandoning the unanimity rule would hold.

However, the survey does point to an institutionally stronger EUFSP being definitely in the realm of possibilities. The missing piece in the puzzle seems to be the articulation by European political elites of a persuasive argument for rebalancing the relationship between member states and the EU in foreign and defence matters in favour of the latter. According to our survey, the necessary public opinion conditions for such an argument exist. Whether such conditions are also sufficient – that, is whether they can disappear in the face of politicisation – is a question for our next research effort.

References

Riccardo Alcaro, "Contestation and Transformation. Final Thoughts on the Liberal International Order", in *The International Spectator*, Vol. 53, No. 1 (March 2018), p. 152-167, DOI 10.1080/03932729.2018.1429533

John H. Aldrich et al., "Foreign Policy and the Electoral Connection", in *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 9 (June 2006), p. 477-502, DOI 10.1146/annurev.polisci.9.111605.105008

Catherine E. De Vries, Sara B. Hobolt and Stefanie Walter, "Politicizing International Cooperation: The Mass Public, Political Entrepreneurs, and Political Opportunity Structures", in *International Organization*, Vol. 75, No. 2 (Spring 2021), p. 306-332, DOI 10.1017/S0020818320000491

Richard C. Eichenberg, "NATO and European Security after the Cold War. Will European Citizens Support a Common Security Policy?", in Brigitte L. Nacos, Robert Y. Shapiro and Pierangelo Isernia (eds), *Decisionmaking in a Glass House. Mass Media, Public Opinion, and American and European Foreign Policy in the 21st Century*, Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield, 2000, p. 155-176

Christopher Gelpi, "Public Opinion and the Conduct of Foreign Policy", in Dan Reiter (ed.), *Understanding War and Peace*, 2nd ed., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2024, p. 114-145

Elias Götz, "The Crisis of Liberal World Order", in András Sajó, Renáta Uitz and Stephen Holmes (eds), *Routledge Handbook of Illiberalism*, London/New York, Routledge, 2022, p. 907-922

Richard K. Herrmann et al., "Images in International Relations: An Experimental Test of Cognitive Schemata", in *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 41, No. 3 (September 1997), p. 403-433, <https://doi.org/10.1111/0020-8833.00050>

Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, "A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus", in *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 39, No. 1 (January 2009), p. 1-23, DOI 10.1017/S0007123408000409

Swen Hutter, Edgar Grande and Hanspeter Kriesi (eds), *Politicising Europe. Integration and Mass Politics*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2016

John G. Ikenberry, "The End of Liberal International Order?", in *International Affairs*, Vol. 94, No. 1 (January 2018), p. 7-23, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix241>

Pierangelo Isernia et al., "Inventory of EUFSP-related Public and Elite Opinion Surveys", in *JOINT Research Papers*, No. 10 (June 2022), <https://www.jointproject.eu/?p=1103>

Robert Jervis, *The Logic of Images in International Relations*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1970


Robert Jervis et al. (eds), *Chaos Reconsidered. The Liberal Order and the Future of International Politics*, New York, Columbia University Press, 2023

John J. Mearsheimer, "Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order", in *International Security*, Vol. 43, No. 4 (Spring 2019), p. 7-50, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00342

Carlotta Mingardi et al., "Framing Public Perception of the Challenges to the EU Foreign Security and Defence Policy. Focus Groups as a Method of Investigation", in *JOINT Research Papers*, No. 11 (October 2022), <https://www.jointproject.eu/?p=1332>

Julia C. Morse and Robert O. Keohane, "Contested Multilateralism", in *The Review of International Organizations*, Vol. 9, No. 4 (December 2014), p. 385-412, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-014-9188-2>

Columba Peoples, "The Liberal International Ordering of Crisis", in *International Relations*, 7 October 2022, <https://doi.org/10.1177/00471178221128187>



Leonardo Puleo, “Summary of Party Positions on EU Foreign, Security and Defence Policy. Case Studies: France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland and Spain”, in *JOINT Research Papers*, No. 9 (June 2022), <https://www.jointproject.eu/?p=1066>

Kaija Schilde, Stephanie B. Anderson and Andrew D. Garner, “A More Martial Europe? Public Opinion, Permissive Consensus, and EU Defence Policy”, in *European Security*, Vol. 28, No. 2 (2019), p. 153-172, DOI 10.1080/09662839.2019.1617275

Catarina Thomson et al., “European Public Opinion: United in Supporting Ukraine, Divided on the Future of NATO”, in *International Affairs*, Vol. 99, No. 6 (November 2023), p. 2485-2500, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiaad241>

Michael Zürn, Martin Binder and Matthias Ecker-Ehrhardt, “International Authority and Its Politicization”, in *International Theory*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (March 2012), p. 69-106, DOI 10.1017/S1752971912000012



JOINT

A joined-up Union, a stronger Europe



www.jointproject.eu



info@jointproject.eu



facebook.com/JOINTprojectonline



[@joint_project](https://twitter.com/joint_project)



linkedin.com/company/joint-project



This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement N. 959143. This publication reflects only the view of the author(s) and the European Commission is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains.