

MEMORIE E STUDI DIPLOMATICI

COLLANA DIRETTA DA STEFANO BALDI

A GATEWAY TO THE FUTURE

ITALY'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE HELSINKI PROCESS

a cura di

Andrea Cascone

Editoriale Scientifica



Memorie e studi diplomatici

diretta da Stefano Baldi

A GATEWAY TO THE FUTURE
ITALY'S CONTRIBUTION
TO THE HELSINKI PROCESS

A cura di Andrea Cascone

EDITORIALE SCIENTIFICA
NAPOLI

The production of this volume was made possible thanks to the contribution of the Permanent Mission of Italy to the OSCE in Vienna. All evaluations expressed in the published contributions are attributable exclusively to the Authors and do not necessarily reflect the institutions to which they belong. The digital edition of this book is published on the website of the Permanent Representation of Italy to the OSCE <https://delegazioneosce.esteri.it> and on the website of the series <https://diplosor.wordpress.com/collana-di-libri/> under a Creative Commons Attribution – Non-commercial – No Derivative Works 4.0 Italy License. More information about the URL licence: <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode>

Proprietà letteraria riservata

© Copyright 2025 Editoriale Scientifica s.r.l.
via San Biagio dei Librai, 39 - 80138 Napoli
www.editorialescientifica.com info@editorialescientifica.com
ISBN 979-12-235-0416-1

INDICE

ANDREA CASCONI	
<i>Editor's Note</i>	9

LAMBERTO ZANNIER	
<i>Preface</i>	11

PART 1

ITALY, THE PATH TOWARDS HELSINKI AND BEYOND: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

LUCIANO MONZALI	
<i>Italy's Policy Towards Central-Eastern Europe in the Age of Détente</i>	19

FEDERICO IMPERATO	
<i>Italy and the Origins of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe</i>	27

FABIO BETTANIN	
<i>Moscow and the CSCE</i>	35

PAOLO SOAVE	
<i>USA and the CSCE</i>	43

GIUSEPPE SPAGNULO	
<i>Italy and the 'CSCE Follow-ups' from Belgrade to Vienna (1977-1989)</i>	49

MATTEO GERLINI	
<i>The End of the Cold War and the Creation of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</i>	57

PART 2

THE ROAD TO HELSINKI AND BEYOND: OFFICIAL STATEMENTS BY ITALY

<i>Speech by H.E. Ambassador Marco Favale at the Helsinki Preliminaries, 1 December 1972</i>	71
<i>Speech by the Hon. Minister of Foreign Affairs Giuseppe Medici at the CSCE Ministerial Session in Helsinki, 5 July 1973</i>	75
<i>Statement by the President of the Council of Ministers Aldo Moro at the CSCE Summit in Helsinki, 1 August 1975</i>	81
<i>Statement by the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Luciano Radi at the Preparatory Meeting in Belgrade, 7 October 1977</i>	87
<i>Statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Emilio Colombo at the Preparatory Meeting in Madrid, 11 November 1980</i>	95
<i>Statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Giulio Andreotti at the CSCE Tenth Anniversary Meeting in Helsinki, 31 July 1985</i>	105
<i>Statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Giulio Andreotti at the Follow-up Meeting in Vienna, 4 November 1986</i>	113
<i>Statement by the President of the Council of Ministers Giulio Andreotti at the CSCE Summit in Paris, 19 November 1990</i>	121
<i>Statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Vincenzo Scotti at the Follow-up Meeting in Helsinki, 9-10 July 1992</i>	125
<i>Address by the Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi at the Summit of Heads of The State and Government of the CSCE in Budapest, 5 December 1994</i>	129

HISTORICAL POSTERS OF CSCE EVENTS (1988 – 1991)	135
BIBLIOGRAPHY ON ITALY, THE HELSINKI PROCESS AND CSCE/OSCE	143
INDEX OF AUTHORS	149

MATTEO GERLINI

THE END OF THE COLD WAR
AND THE CREATION OF THE ORGANISATION
FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

The end of the Cold War could be considered as coinciding with the end of the bipolar system, i.e., with the end of an international system based on States that - to different degrees - were linked to the Soviet Union or the United States of America, or followed tangent lines in the search for autonomy, without succeeding in their turn in aggregating a third bloc. If one chooses this coincidence, one invariably loses the significance of the events from 1987 on, when the great tension between the two blocs finally eased, to 1992, when the Soviet bloc no longer existed and the US unipolar temptation began. In essence, the substantial difference between the Cold War and the bipolar system fades away; a space that was not at all conceptual but rather real and pragmatic, and in which the transformation of the CSCE into the OSCE took place. Amid hopes and surprises, the transition from Conference to Organisation developed intertwiningly with the end of the Cold War and it was marked, more or less unexpectedly, by the end of bipolarity.

The Helsinki Final Act had marked the climax of the Great Détente, but subsequent events seemed to fall short of the expectations that the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe had nurtured. The détente crisis, with the resurgence of tensions and conflicts encapsulated in the Second Cold War, seemed to have left the CSCE in a past, near but definitely gone¹.

In reality, the main crises of the Second Cold War did not directly affect the structure of the Helsinki Accords. The Euro-Missile crisis with its peak in 1979 developed around the divergent interpretation of the SALT I agreements: the Soviet government regarded the SS-20

¹ L. NUTI, *The Crisis of Détente in Europe. From Helsinki to Gorbachev*, London e New York, 2009.

missiles as a modernisation permitted by the agreements, the US government regarded them as an increase in nuclear warheads, followed in this assumption by many Western European governments². The start of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan took place on 27 December, a few days after the NATO meeting (12 December) that adopted the double-track decision, formalising the Euro-missile crisis within tracks from which the course of events ultimately did not derail. Pershing II missiles would be deployed within NATO, along with BMG 109G Gryphon missiles, with the readiness to stop if the Soviet Union agreed to withdraw its new launchers³. The escalating tension marked by the war in Afghanistan equally did not call into question the letter of the agreements and commitments made by the Soviet government with the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. In fact, the document stated that states would respect the sovereign equality and individuality of each member, as well as all rights inherent in and encompassed by their sovereignty, including in particular the right of each state to legal equality, territorial integrity, and political freedom and independence⁴. The Soviet Union had committed itself, albeit non-bindingly, not to interfere in the CSCE area, so military intervention in Afghanistan did not violate the agreements.

The Intermediate-range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty of 8 December 1987 closed not only the Euro-Missile Crisis, but the last Cold War chapter, leaving the proxy wars in Africa to die out by force of inertia⁵. The Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, increased the resources devoted to the reform programme - perestroika, literally “restructuring”, which aimed to introduce civil and political freedoms in the Soviet Union.

The Gorbachev reform programme implied the end of Soviet control over the people's democracies in the Warsaw Pact countries: for

² B. ROTHER, F. BOZO, L. NUTI, M.-P. REY, *The Euromissiles Crisis and the End of the Cold War*, Washington, 2015.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ V.-Y. GHEBALI, *The Diplomacy of Détente: The CSCE from Helsinki to Vienna 1973-1989*, Vol. I, Bruxelles, 1989.

⁵ M. GUDERZO, B. BAGNATO, *The Globalization of Cold War. Diplomacy and local confrontation*, Washington, 2010.

them began the great change of 1989, with the first free movement across what had been the iron curtain.

Hungary opened its borders with Austria on 27 June 1989, thus allowing East German citizens, who could easily move within the Warsaw Pact countries, to also cross easily into West Germany. On 9 November of the same year, the Berlin Wall was finally torn down.

It was quite understandable that the CSCE was the first international arena in which the ongoing transition could find a constructive, and if possible evolutionary, dimension. As early as 1989, the participating States agreed on the relevance of the CSCE, whose spirit - faded but not extinguished during the second Cold War - had partly triggered the process of transformation in Eastern Europe. Therefore, the “change” pushed that common spirit which had animated the Helsinki Agreements towards the creation of an organisation that would translate the same principles into action, broadening and deepening them. This was a natural evolution, but neither necessary nor inevitable. The process became concrete in 1989 and reached completion in 1996, through a process of institutionalising the aims and objectives of the CSCE into what was to become the OSCE.

Speaking at the Council of Europe on 6 July 1989, Gorbachev proposed the creation of a common European home. In his project, Gorbachev referred back to the Helsinki Final Act. Therefore, as Armellini recalls, the discussion revolved around a “Helsinki II”, which would end the period of the division of Europe⁶.

On a strategic level, the dynamic started with the INF Treaty accelerated in 1989, with the start of negotiations for the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) between the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries, aimed at significantly reducing land and air armaments in Europe. The negotiation tackled the problem of the armaments needed to conduct surprise attacks and large-scale invasions, covering the area known as the ATTU (Atlantic to the Urals). It was a crucial step for the East-West convergence because it dismantled much of the military investment that had been at the basis of the formation of the blocs, and thus the division of Europe. The negotiation and its

⁶ A. ARMELLINI, *L'Italia e la Carta di Parigi della CSCE per una nuova Europa. Storia di un negoziato (luglio-novembre 1990)*, Napoli, 2022.

Treaty nourished the evolution of the CSCE into the OSCE, as it changed security doctrines in Europe.

The Ottawa Open Skies Treaty of 12-13 February 1990 continued and completed this path of decreasing militarisation of Europe. According to Armellini, Ottawa was a difficult moment for Italian diplomacy and for the Minister of foreign affairs, Gianni De Michelis, who was trying to seize the open spaces to leave the constraints of post-war and bipolarity behind him once and for all⁷.

The chronology of the organisation of the CSCE's conferences on the human dimension is interesting: the first in Paris from 30 May to 23 June 1989, on the eve of the opening of the Hungarian border, was followed the year after by a new meeting in Copenhagen, from 5 to 29 June, in the course of the free elections in the former Soviet Republics; finally, a third in Moscow, from 10 September to 4 October 1991, in the aftermath of the putsch. The theme of the human dimension was contained in the “third basket” of the Helsinki Accords, which Ennio Di Nolfo considers the one that cracked the Soviet construct⁸. The intention was to build a ‘common and global’ security organisation centred on this basket. The final document of the Copenhagen conference set out the elements of the human dimension in a reunited Europe, where pluralistic democracy and rule of law would be essential to guarantee respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms⁹.

Other initiatives within the CSCE context were running in parallel to the conferences on the human dimension. Some of them were far more important than those conferences, with an obvious osmosis, nurturing a process not lacking in the empiricism needed to deal with the great complexity of founding an international organisation. On the occasion of Gorbachev 's State visit to Italy on 29 November 1990, Minister De Michelis had the opportunity to express Italy's appreciation for the reform plan of the Soviet leader, reiterating that he shared the spirit of Helsinki. Only a “Helsinki II” would have resolved the problems of East and West, which De Michelis saw beyond the rhetoric – although

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ E. DI NOLFO, *Dagli imperi militari agli imperi tecnologici*, Roma-Bari, 2014 (2002).

⁹ V.Y. GHEBALI, *The OSCE in Post-Communist Europe: Towards a Pan-European Security Identity 1990-1996*, Vol. II, Bruxelles, 1996.

based on the reality – of the triumph of the West and the end of the blocs. A thirty-five-member Summit was proposed, and a Preparatory Committee was convened in November 1990 in Paris. The Preparatory Committee worked expeditiously and prepared the text of the Paris Charter for a New Europe. In the Paris negotiations there was an identity of position between the United States and the Soviet Union, and both the European Community commitment on the part of the governments of the EC Member States and the Atlantic commitment on the part of the United States were renewed.

For the Americans, the institutionalisation of the CSCE seemed to question the survival of NATO. Would it become a second player compared to the OSCE? It was a debate that animated only the Americans and the Western Europeans, because the Russians were preoccupied with quite different problems and were moreover indirectly involved in the debate. In fact, it was in those months that De Michelis argued for the need for the Soviet Union to join the Atlantic Alliance¹⁰.

Within this framework, De Michelis also presented the “Pentagonal” proposal, an evolution of his earlier “Quadrangular” initiative. Since 1988 he had promoted a dialogue with the governments of Austria, Hungary and Yugoslavia aimed at building a structure of economic and political cooperation, subsidiary to the alliances and the EC. When Italy held the presidency of the European Community in 1990, he relaunched the proposal by extending it to Czechoslovakia, and later, in 1991, to Poland, thus becoming a ‘Hexagonal’¹¹. It is relevant to remember how much De Michelis and Italian policy sought to translate the spirit of Helsinki into regional actions, informed by that practice that was at the basis of the construction of the OSCE, i.e., compatibility with alliances, or rather with the Atlantic Alliance, given that the Warsaw Pact in 1991 was to end following the coup in the Soviet Union.

The Paris Charter for a New Europe of 21 November 1990 accelerated the process of transforming the CSCE into the OSCE, which was to be completed in 1995. But by the time the CSCE became an

¹⁰ G. DE MICHELIS, *La lunga ombra di Yalta. La specificità della politica italiana*, Venezia, 2003.

¹¹ IDEM, *La lezione della storia. Sul futuro dell'Italia e le prospettive dell'Europa*, 2013.

organisation, its Eastern European promoters had already left the scene. Although at the time of the adoption of the Paris Charter, only Lithuania had declared independence from the USSR, the coup in Russia in August 1991 had eliminated the Paris Charter's firmest political supporter, namely Gorbachev. Within a few months, the leading institutional actor in guaranteeing the charter, the USSR, had disappeared. Before the coup, in April 1991, Georgia had formally left the Soviet Union. After the coup, all the Republics of the USSR had declared their independence. Governed by Boris Yeltsin, the new Russian Federation promoted the Commonwealth of Independent States, a mild institutional formula compared to the previous Soviet Union, which Georgia refused to join.

On 7 February 1992, the Maastricht Treaty was signed; Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the European Union in the same year that the OSCE was created, 1995. NATO, whose function seemed to be called into question by the end of the Warsaw Pact, found new impetus in those years. In 1994, the Partnership for Peace was launched, a partnership initiative with other countries that was prodromal to the enlargement of the Alliance. The Central European countries joined the alliance in 1997 with Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, but already two years earlier, in 1995, NATO had been skilfully reinserted by President Bill Clinton into the strategic and political landscape of the new international system with the 1993 Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia. This framework seriously and irreversibly downsized the aspirations that some had attributed to the expected OSCE, which could have played the same role in the war that ravaged the former Yugoslav Republic. However, the renewal of NATO and the creation of the EU gave the organisation in essence a far-reaching regional role, compatible and in many respects integrated with the EU and also with NATO.

According to Galbreath, after that set of events branded in a simplified manner as “the collapse of the Berlin Wall”, the CSCE had in fact focused on maintaining a democratic character in the post-Soviet transition and – a logically connected but not necessary element – free market reforms¹², i.e., a direction of economic freedom after State-directed

¹² D.J. GALBREATH, *The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe*, London e New York, 2007.

economy, but whose declination was so vast that it was ultimately difficult to manage. Interwoven with this powerful shift towards the market was another one, perhaps even more powerful: nationalism, which had never really dissolved in the Soviet system, re-emerged forcefully. Although the democratisation programme of the CSCE deployed the weight of the international forum towards the institutions and actors of reference in the democratic transition, the nations - or ethnicities, depending on the perspective of observation - demolished the Yugoslav Federation; they contributed to dissolving the Soviet Union, which collapsed under the pressure of different and purely internal political forces; they divided Czechoslovakia, posing an objective problem to an institution that guaranteed in its fundamentals the maintenance of its borders. On a contiguous but different level was the reunification of Germany, which dissolved the German Democratic Republic.

The need to respond to the centrifugal force of nationalism and the collapse of states in Central and Eastern Europe was one of the elements that most shaped the development of the conference into an organisation. It is no coincidence that one of the peculiarities of nationalism in Eastern Europe, the defence of the environment – eco-nationalism, as defined in historiography¹³ – found one of its first areas of development within the conference. The Environmental Protection meeting in Sofia in 1989 laid the grounds for the economic-environmental dimension that the Organization would acquire. Because environmentalism did not have an overtly subversive political project, Eastern Bloc institutions proved to be quite disarmed in dealing with protests across the society that ultimately challenged the Soviet model itself and Russian supremacy. Moreover, environmentalism addressed issues that tended toward a transnational dimension, as they followed physical geography rather than political geography. The Sofia meeting discussed countering three types of environmental crises: industrial accidents, chemical mismanagement, and threats to water sources. The meeting report called for greater coordination among participating states to prevent transboundary contamination. Although the meeting showed the importance of the environment in the CSCE agenda in the early post-Cold War period,

¹³ IDEM, *La lezione della storia. Sul futuro dell'Italia e le prospettive dell'Europa*, 2013.

this relevance was not preserved, according to Galbreath¹⁴. In the process of transforming the CSCE into the OSCE, a number of institutions dedicated to specific aspects inherent or cross-cutting to security and cooperation in strengthening democracy were created, but there was not one dedicated to the environment, despite what the “second basket” of the Final Act envisages. This has not prevented several participating States to continue paying attention to the topic in the OSCE agenda for the economic dimension.

The CSCE seemed to be the best political environment to deal with the problems arising from the ongoing transition in Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans. There had been not only the collapse of States, including in it the end of the German Democratic Republic, but there was also the stalling of transitions, and the opening of transnational crises whose roots often predated the Soviet system itself. Once the OSCE became an organization, it focused on crisis areas, including the vast Caspian and Central Asian region, a far cry from the European epicentre that had seen the rise of the CSCE. The Asian trajectory in the dissolution of the Soviet Union had created new States, new governments, new hopes and new problems. Certainly, even in Europe, aside from the Balkan crisis, not all democratic transitions followed the same path, as the Belarusian case still testifies.

The Conference created institutions with which to address the new challenges of the post-Cold War era from time to time, expanding a constellation of international subjects that in practice realized the transition from “Conference on” to “Organization for.” The process of establishing the bodies that eventually constituted the OSCE began with the aforementioned adoption of the Paris Charter for a New Europe. The Charter created a permanent Secretariat, the Conflict Prevention Center in Vienna and the Office for Free Elections (the precursor to the ODIHR) in Warsaw. Although the Charter was adopted in Paris, the choice of locations for the institutions and the proposed organization was all oriented toward Central and Eastern Europe. The CSCE was embarking on a transformative process looking primarily East of Vienna. And although the Secretariat was in the Austrian Capital, in

¹⁴ D.J. GALBREATH, *The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe*, London e New York, 2007.

general the other institutions were established in various locations, such as Warsaw, but also Copenhagen, where the Parliamentary Assembly was established in 1992, and The Hague, where the Office of the High Commissioner for Minorities is based. The decision to have a decentralized physiognomy was a strategy - according to some scholars - to avoid the hypertrophic development of a centralized bureaucracy. Thus, the Helsinki Document of 1992, implementing the guidelines established in Paris, had created the High Commissioner for National Minorities.

Reflecting the change in terminology from “Conference” to “Organization,” the position was created as High Commissioner “on” Minorities rather than “for” Minorities. Conflicts in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia between majorities and ethnic minorities, as well as perceived discrimination against Russians in the Baltic States, against Hungarians in Slovakia and Romania, and against Turks in Bulgaria – not an exhaustive list – stressed the need to address potential ethnic conflicts before they occurred. The focus on “national” minorities is noteworthy, as it excludes immigrants or refugees, concentrating the High Commissioner's work on former Eastern Bloc States, where the minority problem was more pressing than that of refugees or migration. With the Helsinki Document of 1992, the CSCE had created the only institution among international organizations dealing specifically with national minorities¹⁵.

Finally, after the Helsinki Summit in 1992, the third Summit in the process that began with the Paris Charter took place in Budapest, a Central European city that had experienced the intervention of Soviet armed forces to suppress the 1956 revolution. On December 6, 1994, the CSCE Summit in the Hungarian Capital decided to change the name from “Conference” to “Organization.” There was a common desire to give the CSCE a new political impetus, thus enabling it to play a crucial role in meeting the challenges of the 21st century. To reflect this determination, the CSCE would henceforth be known as the OSCE. By the time of the name change, most of the organization's bodies had

¹⁵ A. MIHR, *Transformation and Development. Studies in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Member States*, e-book, 2020.

already been created. Only the OSCE Representative on Media Freedom would be established later, in 1997¹⁶.

Whereas for the European dimension, i.e., “Helsinki II”, security and cooperation found its main axes of development in the European integration process and in the revitalization of the Atlantic structure, in South Caucasus and Central Asia a very different situation was created. In those areas the OSCE became the international framework within which to find resources for the consolidation of post-Soviet state transformation. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan joined the United Nations in 1992, and in conjunction, joined the OSCE as a regional organization capable of containing centrifugal drives.

The OSCE intervened following the civil war in Tajikistan with its first long-term mission since its creation, in Dushanbe in 1994, securing the peace agreements that ended the war in 1997. The following year, the OSCE opened centres in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, becoming a promoter of security with respect to terrorism and organized crime as well¹⁷.

The Euro-American intervention in Afghanistan following the attacks of Sept. 11th 2001 catalysed the concerns of OSCE participating States over Western interference in Central Asia, motivated by strengthening democracy and human rights. The conversion of the Shanghai Group - the forum that shared border management between Russia, China and neighbouring Central Asian countries - into the Shanghai Cooperation Initiative (SCO), also created in 2001 with the accession of Uzbekistan, must be understood within this historical framework. The process triggered by the invasion of Afghanistan also led, in its fundamentally destructive dynamics of international arrangements, to the subsequent transformation of the 1996 Tashkent Pact into the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) created in 2002, which included the South and Central Asian Caucasian countries in a new defence and security structure. In the years that followed, however, the same countries reconnected with the OSCE over fears

¹⁶ V.Y. GHEBALI, *The Role of OSCE in Eurasia: from the Lisbon Summit to the Maastricht Ministerial Council 1996-2003*, Vol. III, Bruxelles, 2014.

¹⁷ A. MIHR, *Between Peace and Conflict in the East and the West. Studies on transformation and development in the OSCE region*, Cham, 2021.

of a pan-Russian policy toward them. Turkmenistan never joined Moscow nor Beijing's defence organizations, while Uzbekistan suspended CSTO membership in 2012.

The “Wilsonianism in the boots” practiced by the George W. Bush Administrations weakened the OSCE, to the advantage of those structures that limited the European participation to the Russian Federation and excluded, naturally, the American one. However, on the other hand, it must be taken into account that since the beginning of the neo-isolationist retreat of the United States, to which the great financial crisis of 2008 contributed, the attractiveness of Russian and Chinese defence initiatives has cooled considerably. Conversely, the OSCE's credit in Asia has not dissolved, as shown, for example, by recent plans to exploit water resources, which are crucial in trying to avert conflicts over the use of water.

Finito di stampare nel mese di ottobre 2025
presso la *Grafica Elettronica* Napoli

La collana “Memorie e studi diplomatici”, diretta da Stefano Baldi, è dedicata a valorizzare figure ed attività della diplomazia italiana attraverso testimonianze e ricerche condotte da studiosi e storici.

The Cold War was a time of divisions and tensions. This publication focuses on the role of Italy in shaping the diplomatic discussions towards the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) and afterwards. Italy's diplomacy was instrumental in crafting the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, considering it an opportunity for détente.

The volume combines rigorous historical-political analysis with a close look into the archives: Part 1 explores Italy's diplomatic efforts through essays written by academic experts. Part 2 offers a direct access to history with a collection of national statements in key meetings that led to the Final Act and shaped the process that ultimately led to the creation of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, revealing the details of negotiations and debates that forged the future of the OSCE area, from Vancouver to Vladivostok. Finally, a stunning collection of CSCE and OSCE meeting posters offers a visual journey through the history of this vital organization.

The book includes contributions by Lamberto Zannier, Luciano Monzali, Federico Imperato, Paolo Soave, Giuseppe Spagnulo and Matteo Gerlini.

Andrea Cascone is an Italian diplomat, currently Permanent Representative of Italy to the OSCE in Vienna.

In copertina: Aldo Moro, Prime Minister of Italy, at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Helsinki, 1 August 1975 (ARCHIVIO ANSA)

ISBN 979-12-235-0416-1

