


Appendix of “Embedded Liberalism, Economic Nationalism, or Welfare Chauvinism? Experimental Evidence on Policy Preferences in Tough Times”

A Descriptive evidence


A.1 Support for welfare state’s expansion and free trade

Figure A.1: Support for Welfare State Expansion



Sources: [Lehmann et al. \(2024\)](#), [Döring & Manow \(2024\)](#), [Rooduijn et al. \(2024\)](#).

Figure A.2: Right Populist Support for Free Trade



Sources: [Lehmann *et al.* \(2024\)](#), [Döring & Manow \(2024\)](#), [Rooduijn *et al.* \(2024\)](#).

A.2 Indicators of aggregate economic performance for France, Germany and Italy


Figure A.3: Current account balance (% of GDP) for France, Germany and Italy (1990-2021)



Source: World Bank Databank


(<https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators/Series/BN.CAB.XOKA.GD.ZS>)

Figure A.4: GDP growth for France, Germany and Italy (1990-2021)



Source: World Bank Databank
(<https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators/Series/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG>)

Figure A.5: Total factor productivity index (2017 = 1) for France, Germany and Italy (1990-2019)



Source: Feenstra *et al.* (2015), retrieved from <https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/tfp-at-constant-national-prices-20111>.

B Vignette experiment

B.1 Balance tests

Table B.1: Balance tests for redistribution treatment, vignette experiment [Italy]

<i>Redistribution treatment =</i>	0		1		Test
Variable	N	Percent	N	Percent	
Gender	1608		1525		$\chi^2 = 2.717$
... female	865	53.8%	866	56.8%	
... male	743	46.2%	659	43.2%	
Education	1608		1525		$\chi^2 = 1.321$
... < tertiary	1252	77.9%	1214	79.6%	
... tertiary	356	22.1%	311	20.4%	
Ideology	1420		1344		$\chi^2 = 3.057$
... left	465	32.7%	417	31%	
... centre	294	20.7%	287	21.4%	
... right	385	27.1%	398	29.6%	
... none	276	19.4%	242	18%	

Statistical significance markers: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01

Table B.2: Balance tests for migration treatment, vignette experiment [Italy]

<i>Migration treatment =</i>	0		1		Test
Variable	N	Percent	N	Percent	
Gender	1554		1579		$\chi^2 = 0.732$
... female	871	56%	860	54.5%	
... male	683	44%	719	45.5%	
Education	1554		1579		$\chi^2 = 0.143$
... < tertiary	1228	79%	1238	78.4%	
... tertiary	326	21%	341	21.6%	
Ideology	1360		1404		$\chi^2 = 2.99$
... left	446	32.8%	436	31.1%	
... centre	296	21.8%	285	20.3%	
... right	375	27.6%	408	29.1%	
... none	243	17.9%	275	19.6%	

Statistical significance markers: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01

Table B.3: Balance tests for trade treatment, vignette experiment [Italy]

<i>Trade treatment =</i>	0		1		Test
Variable	N	Percent	N	Percent	
Gender	1544		1589		$\chi^2 = 0.798$
... female	866	56.1%	865	54.4%	
... male	678	43.9%	724	45.6%	
Education	1544		1589		$\chi^2 = 2.812$
... < tertiary	1235	80%	1231	77.5%	
... tertiary	309	20%	358	22.5%	
Ideology	1358		1406		$\chi^2 = 3.601$
... left	422	31.1%	460	32.7%	
... centre	285	21%	296	21.1%	
... right	406	29.9%	377	26.8%	
... none	245	18%	273	19.4%	

Statistical significance markers: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01

Table B.4: Balance tests for left-right treatment, vignette experiment [Italy]

<i>Left-right treatment =</i>	0		1		Test
Variable	N	Percent	N	Percent	
Gender	1627		1506		$\chi^2 = 2.635$
... female	922	56.7%	809	53.7%	
... male	705	43.3%	697	46.3%	
Education	1627		1506		$\chi^2 = 0.063$
... < tertiary	1284	78.9%	1182	78.5%	
... tertiary	343	21.1%	324	21.5%	
Ideology	1425		1339		$\chi^2 = 5.124$
... left	466	32.7%	416	31.1%	
... centre	303	21.3%	278	20.8%	
... right	412	28.9%	371	27.7%	
... none	244	17.1%	274	20.5%	

Statistical significance markers: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01

Table B.5: Balance tests for split-ballot experiment [Italy]

<i>Split =</i>	success		failure		Test
Variable	N	Percent	N	Percent	
Gender	1599		1534		$\chi^2 = 0.127$
... female	878	54.9%	853	55.6%	
... male	721	45.1%	681	44.4%	
Education	1599		1534		$\chi^2 = 0.382$
... < tertiary	1251	78.2%	1215	79.2%	
... tertiary	348	21.8%	319	20.8%	
Ideology	1411		1353		$\chi^2 = 2.665$
... left	463	32.8%	419	31%	
... centre	299	21.2%	282	20.8%	
... right	381	27%	402	29.7%	
... none	268	19%	250	18.5%	

Statistical significance markers: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01

Table B.6: Balance tests for redistribution treatment, vignette experiment [France]

<i>Redistribution treatment =</i>	0		1		Test
Variable	N	Percent	N	Percent	
Gender	1288		1247		$\chi^2 = 0.051$
... female	641	49.8%	614	49.2%	
... male	647	50.2%	633	50.8%	
Education	1244		1211		$\chi^2 = 2.081$
... < tertiary	717	57.6%	662	54.7%	
... tertiary	527	42.4%	549	45.3%	
Ideology	992		959		$\chi^2 = 1.461$
... left	325	32.8%	290	30.2%	
... centre	216	21.8%	214	22.3%	
... right	451	45.5%	455	47.4%	

Statistical significance markers: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01

Table B.7: Balance tests for migration treatment, vignette experiment [France]

<i>Migration treatment =</i>	0		1		Test
Variable	N	Percent	N	Percent	
Gender	1291		1244		$\chi^2 = 5.081^*$
... female	668	51.7%	587	47.2%	
... male	623	48.3%	657	52.8%	
Education	1245		1210		$\chi^2 = 0.177$
... < tertiary	705	56.6%	674	55.7%	
... tertiary	540	43.4%	536	44.3%	
Ideology	985		966		$\chi^2 = 3.909$
... left	306	31.1%	309	32%	
... centre	235	23.9%	195	20.2%	
... right	444	45.1%	462	47.8%	

Statistical significance markers: * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$

Table B.8: Balance tests for trade treatment, vignette experiment [France]

<i>Trade treatment =</i>	0		1		Test
Variable	N	Percent	N	Percent	
Gender	1255		1280		$\chi^2 = 0.655$
... female	632	50.4%	623	48.7%	
... male	623	49.6%	657	51.3%	
Education	1217		1238		$\chi^2 = 0.816$
... < tertiary	672	55.2%	707	57.1%	
... tertiary	545	44.8%	531	42.9%	
Ideology	963		988		$\chi^2 = 2.83$
... left	312	32.4%	303	30.7%	
... centre	197	20.5%	233	23.6%	
... right	454	47.1%	452	45.7%	

Statistical significance markers: * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$

Table B.9: Balance tests for left-right treatment, vignette experiment [France]

<i>Left-right treatment =</i>	0		1		Test
Variable	N	Percent	N	Percent	
Gender	1259		1276		$\chi^2 = 0.328$
... female	631	50.1%	624	48.9%	
... male	628	49.9%	652	51.1%	
Education	1218		1237		$\chi^2 = 1.007$
... < tertiary	697	57.2%	682	55.1%	
... tertiary	521	42.8%	555	44.9%	
Ideology	965		986		$\chi^2 = 0.496$
... left	303	31.4%	312	31.6%	
... centre	219	22.7%	211	21.4%	
... right	443	45.9%	463	47%	

Statistical significance markers: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01

Table B.10: Balance tests for split-ballot experiment [France]

<i>Split =</i>	success		failure		Test
Variable	N	Percent	N	Percent	
Gender	1202		1270		$\chi^2 = 0.501$
... female	603	50.2%	618	48.7%	
... male	599	49.8%	652	51.3%	
Education	1166		1230		$\chi^2 = 0.43$
... < tertiary	663	56.9%	682	55.4%	
... tertiary	503	43.1%	548	44.6%	
Ideology	944		970		$\chi^2 = 0.886$
... left	305	32.3%	299	30.8%	
... centre	201	21.3%	222	22.9%	
... right	438	46.4%	449	46.3%	

Statistical significance markers: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01

Table B.11: Balance tests for redistribution treatment, vignette experiment [Germany]

<i>Redistribution treatment =</i>	0		1		Test
Variable	N	Percent	N	Percent	
Gender	1240		1259		$\chi^2 = 0.621$
... female	643	51.9%	632	50.2%	
... male	597	48.1%	627	49.8%	
Education	1240		1259		$\chi^2 = 1.349$
... < tertiary	765	61.7%	806	64%	
... tertiary	475	38.3%	453	36%	
Ideology	1145		1179		$\chi^2 = 1.12$
... left	442	38.6%	455	38.6%	
... centre	454	39.7%	448	38%	
... right	249	21.7%	276	23.4%	

Statistical significance markers: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01

Table B.12: Balance tests for migration treatment, vignette experiment [Germany]

<i>Migration treatment =</i>	0		1		Test
Variable	N	Percent	N	Percent	
Gender	1240		1254		$\chi^2 = 0.135$
... female	639	51.5%	636	50.7%	
... male	601	48.5%	618	49.3%	
Education	1240		1254		$\chi^2 = 1.737$
... < tertiary	796	64.2%	772	61.6%	
... tertiary	444	35.8%	482	38.4%	
Ideology	1150		1169		$\chi^2 = 1.196$
... left	432	37.6%	465	39.8%	
... centre	454	39.5%	445	38.1%	
... right	264	23%	259	22.2%	

Statistical significance markers: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01

Table B.13: Balance tests for trade treatment, vignette experiment [Germany]

<i>Trade treatment =</i>	0		1		Test
Variable	N	Percent	N	Percent	
Gender	1233		1261		$\chi^2 = 1.23$
... female	616	50%	659	52.3%	
... male	617	50%	602	47.7%	
Education	1233		1261		$\chi^2 = 0.02$
... < tertiary	773	62.7%	795	63%	
... tertiary	460	37.3%	466	37%	
Ideology	1146		1173		$\chi^2 = 0.666$
... left	451	39.4%	446	38%	
... centre	435	38%	464	39.6%	
... right	260	22.7%	263	22.4%	

Statistical significance markers: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01

Table B.14: Balance tests for left-right treatment, vignette experiment [Germany]

<i>Left-right treatment =</i>	0		1		Test
Variable	N	Percent	N	Percent	
Gender	1246		1253		$\chi^2 = 0.009$
... female	634	50.9%	641	51.2%	
... male	612	49.1%	612	48.8%	
Education	1246		1253		$\chi^2 = 0.099$
... < tertiary	779	62.5%	792	63.2%	
... tertiary	467	37.5%	461	36.8%	
Ideology	1162		1162		$\chi^2 = 2.725$
... left	452	38.9%	445	38.3%	
... centre	434	37.3%	468	40.3%	
... right	276	23.8%	249	21.4%	

Statistical significance markers: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01

Table B.15: Balance tests for split-ballot experiment [Germany]

<i>Split =</i>	success		failure		Test
Variable	N	Percent	N	Percent	
Gender	1240		1230		$\chi^2 = 0.007$
... female	629	50.7%	627	51%	
... male	611	49.3%	603	49%	
Education	1240		1230		$\chi^2 = 1.744$
... < tertiary	795	64.1%	756	61.5%	
... tertiary	445	35.9%	474	38.5%	
Ideology	1155		1152		$\chi^2 = 1.793$
... left	433	37.5%	454	39.4%	
... centre	448	38.8%	450	39.1%	
... right	274	23.7%	248	21.5%	

Statistical significance markers: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01

B.2 Regression tables (main analysis)

Table B.16: Regression analysis (vignette experiment)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>								
	Right person to deal with closure			Defends people's interests			Defends workers' interests		
	(ITA)	(FRA)	(GER)	(ITA)	(FRA)	(GER)	(ITA)	(FRA)	(GER)
Redistribution	0.171** (0.075)	0.345*** (0.081)	0.418*** (0.075)	0.222*** (0.077)	0.295*** (0.085)	0.339*** (0.073)	0.189** (0.077)	0.467*** (0.081)	0.575*** (0.073)
Migration	0.075 (0.076)	−0.292*** (0.081)	0.213*** (0.076)	−0.021 (0.077)	−0.466*** (0.085)	−0.034 (0.074)	0.039 (0.077)	−0.246*** (0.081)	0.242*** (0.074)
Trade	−0.039 (0.075)	−0.092 (0.080)	0.210*** (0.076)	−0.075 (0.077)	−0.138 (0.085)	0.019 (0.074)	−0.043 (0.077)	−0.202** (0.081)	0.067 (0.074)
Left-right	0.041 (0.076)	0.095 (0.080)	0.267*** (0.076)	−0.004 (0.078)	0.007 (0.084)	0.173** (0.074)	−0.015 (0.078)	0.056 (0.081)	0.310*** (0.074)
Graduate	−0.035 (0.091)	−0.124 (0.082)	−0.024 (0.079)	−0.011 (0.092)	−0.0005 (0.086)	−0.001 (0.077)	−0.112 (0.096)	0.031 (0.082)	0.016 (0.077)
Female	−0.016 (0.079)	0.114 (0.087)	−0.058 (0.079)	0.010 (0.080)	0.106 (0.089)	−0.021 (0.078)	0.039 (0.080)	0.136 (0.087)	−0.045 (0.078)
Age	−0.005 (0.004)	−0.004 (0.004)	−0.009*** (0.003)	−0.001 (0.004)	−0.0004 (0.004)	−0.006* (0.003)	−0.004 (0.004)	−0.002 (0.004)	−0.008*** (0.003)
Homemaker	−0.080 (0.138)	0.159 (0.235)	0.277 (0.238)	−0.138 (0.139)	0.029 (0.296)	0.041 (0.224)	−0.072 (0.137)	0.014 (0.222)	0.268 (0.227)
Pensioner	−0.096 (0.134)	0.133 (0.140)	0.264** (0.128)	−0.049 (0.137)	−0.027 (0.145)	0.126 (0.127)	0.079 (0.138)	−0.038 (0.142)	0.249* (0.127)
Student	−0.058 (0.179)	−0.004 (0.213)	−0.369** (0.157)	0.190 (0.183)	−0.104 (0.211)	−0.289* (0.164)	0.123 (0.177)	0.069 (0.191)	−0.273* (0.154)
Unable to work	−0.324 (0.379)	−0.012 (0.385)	0.135 (0.177)	−0.153 (0.294)	−0.284 (0.375)	0.102 (0.163)	−0.381 (0.319)	−0.489 (0.357)	0.159 (0.168)
Employed	−0.452***	0.050	0.440	−0.241**	−0.109	0.169	−0.274**	−0.085	0.179

	(0.116)	(0.198)	(0.281)	(0.122)	(0.210)	(0.266)	(0.121)	(0.200)	(0.258)
Left	−0.158	0.009	−0.059	−0.407***	0.053	−0.168**	−0.270***	0.117	−0.088
	(0.098)	(0.106)	(0.086)	(0.101)	(0.115)	(0.083)	(0.102)	(0.107)	(0.084)
None	0.011			−0.056			0.117		
	(0.114)			(0.119)			(0.118)		
Right	0.094	0.172*	−0.047	0.041	0.186*	−0.028	0.045	0.279***	−0.023
	(0.100)	(0.099)	(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.105)	(0.100)	(0.102)	(0.098)	(0.100)
Constant	4.149***	3.607***	3.579***	4.276***	4.117***	4.165***	4.335***	3.834***	3.858***
	(0.205)	(0.234)	(0.195)	(0.210)	(0.252)	(0.192)	(0.215)	(0.234)	(0.194)
Observations	2,141	1,883	2,301	2,180	1,891	2,296	2,189	1,890	2,302
R ²	0.019	0.029	0.038	0.024	0.034	0.020	0.019	0.043	0.053
Adjusted R ²	0.012	0.022	0.033	0.017	0.027	0.014	0.012	0.036	0.047
Residual Std. Error	1.608	1.578	1.587	1.655	1.643	1.547	1.661	1.580	1.546
F Statistic	2.797***	4.033***	6.536***	3.477***	4.756***	3.355***	2.799***	5.982***	9.144***

Note: Robust standard errors (HC1) in parentheses. Significance scores: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

B.3 Effect sizes

Table B.17: Predicted values for different combinations of the experiment treatments (Italian sample)

<i>Formulations of experimental treatments:</i>							
Redistribution	Migration	Trade	Ideology	Prediction	SE	Lower	Upper
A	A	B	A	4.028	0.080	3.870	4.185
A	A	A	A	3.989	0.080	3.832	4.145
A	A	B	B	3.986	0.077	3.835	4.138
A	B	B	A	3.953	0.079	3.798	4.107
A	A	A	B	3.947	0.076	3.798	4.097
A	B	A	A	3.914	0.079	3.759	4.068
A	B	B	B	3.911	0.079	3.756	4.067
A	B	A	B	3.872	0.079	3.718	4.027
B	A	B	A	3.856	0.079	3.702	4.011
B	A	A	A	3.817	0.078	3.664	3.971
B	A	B	B	3.815	0.077	3.663	3.967
B	B	B	A	3.781	0.077	3.631	3.932
B	A	A	B	3.776	0.077	3.626	3.926
B	B	A	A	3.742	0.077	3.591	3.893
B	B	B	B	3.740	0.079	3.585	3.895
B	B	A	B	3.701	0.079	3.547	3.855

Notes: Prediction based on models in which the dependent variable is “[Name] is the right person to deal with the plant’s closure” (see Table B.16). Lower and upper bounds based on a 95% confidence interval. Predicted values are ordered from the highest to the lowest value.

Table B.18: Predicted values for different combinations of the experiment treatments (French sample)

Formulations of experimental treatments:

Redistribution	Migration	Trade	Ideology	Prediction	SE	Lower	Upper
A	B	B	A	3.981	0.081	3.822	4.140
A	B	A	A	3.889	0.084	3.725	4.053
A	B	B	B	3.886	0.081	3.727	4.045
A	B	A	B	3.794	0.082	3.633	3.954
A	A	B	A	3.689	0.082	3.528	3.850
B	B	B	A	3.636	0.081	3.477	3.795
A	A	A	A	3.597	0.083	3.434	3.759
A	A	B	B	3.593	0.083	3.430	3.756
B	B	A	A	3.544	0.082	3.383	3.704
B	B	B	B	3.541	0.082	3.380	3.701
A	A	A	B	3.501	0.082	3.340	3.662
B	B	A	B	3.448	0.081	3.289	3.608
B	A	B	A	3.343	0.081	3.185	3.502
B	A	A	A	3.251	0.080	3.094	3.408
B	A	B	B	3.248	0.083	3.085	3.411
B	A	A	B	3.156	0.081	2.998	3.314

Notes: Prediction based on models in which the dependent variable is “[Name] is the right person to deal with the plant’s closure” (see Table B.16). Lower and upper bounds based on a 95% confidence interval. Predicted values are ordered from the highest to the lowest value.

Table B.19: Predicted values for different combinations of the experiment treatments (German sample)

Formulations of experimental treatments:

Redistribution	Migration	Trade	Ideology	Prediction	SE	Lower	Upper
A	A	A	A	4.229	0.075	4.082	4.375
A	A	B	A	4.018	0.074	3.873	4.163
A	B	A	A	4.015	0.073	3.871	4.159
A	A	A	B	3.962	0.074	3.816	4.108
B	A	A	A	3.811	0.074	3.665	3.956
A	B	B	A	3.805	0.074	3.659	3.950
A	A	B	B	3.752	0.075	3.605	3.899
A	B	A	B	3.749	0.073	3.606	3.891
B	A	B	A	3.600	0.073	3.456	3.744
B	B	A	A	3.597	0.074	3.451	3.743
B	A	A	B	3.544	0.075	3.398	3.690
A	B	B	B	3.538	0.075	3.392	3.685
B	B	B	A	3.387	0.075	3.240	3.534
B	A	B	B	3.334	0.075	3.187	3.480
B	B	A	B	3.331	0.074	3.185	3.476
B	B	B	B	3.120	0.076	2.971	3.269

Notes: Prediction based on models in which the dependent variable is “[Name] is the right person to deal with the plant’s closure” (see Table B.16). Lower and upper bounds based on a 95% confidence interval. Predicted values are ordered from the highest to the lowest value.

B.4 Conditional models

To test the conditional models, we rely on the following specifications:

$$\begin{aligned} Y_i | (\text{Redistribution}_i = 1) &= \alpha_0 + \beta_1 \text{Migration}_i + \beta_2 \text{Trade}_i + \beta_3 \text{Ideology}_i + \varepsilon_i \\ Y_i | (\text{Redistribution}_i = 0) &= \alpha_0 + \beta_1 \text{Migration}_i + \beta_2 \text{Trade}_i + \beta_3 \text{Ideology}_i + \varepsilon_i \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

$$\begin{aligned} Y_i | (\text{Trade}_i = 1) &= \alpha_0 + \beta_1 \text{Redistribution}_i + \beta_2 \text{Migration}_i + \beta_3 \text{Ideology}_i + \varepsilon_i \\ Y_i | (\text{Trade}_i = 0) &= \alpha_0 + \beta_1 \text{Redistribution}_i + \beta_2 \text{Migration}_i + \beta_3 \text{Ideology}_i + \varepsilon_i \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

$$\begin{aligned} Y_i | (\text{Migration}_i = 1) &= \alpha_0 + \beta_1 \text{Redistribution}_i + \beta_2 \text{Trade}_i + \beta_3 \text{Ideology}_i + \varepsilon_i \\ Y_i | (\text{Migration}_i = 0) &= \alpha_0 + \beta_1 \text{Redistribution}_i + \beta_2 \text{Trade}_i + \beta_3 \text{Ideology}_i + \varepsilon_i \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

Table B.20: Regression analysis (Conditional models, Vignette experiment, first dependent variable, Italy)

	Dependent variable:							
	Francesco Ferrari is the right person to deal with the plant's closure							
	(Redis.=0)	(Redis.=1)	(Migr.=0)	(Migr.=1)	(Trade=0)	(Trade=1)	(Left=0)	(Left=1)
Redistribution			0.211** (0.106)	0.120 (0.105)	0.023 (0.108)	0.311*** (0.106)	0.181* (0.102)	0.162 (0.108)
Migration	0.124 (0.107)	0.027 (0.107)			0.087 (0.107)	0.058 (0.105)	0.130 (0.104)	0.077 (0.108)
Trade	−0.172 (0.107)	0.084 (0.106)	0.018 (0.104)	−0.071 (0.104)			−0.082 (0.102)	−0.033 (0.108)
Left-right	0.052 (0.107)	0.024 (0.105)	0.089 (0.106)	0.030 (0.106)	−0.006 (0.110)	0.089 (0.105)		
Graduate	−0.187 (0.128)	0.152 (0.128)	−0.130 (0.129)	−0.003 (0.128)	−0.054 (0.138)	−0.014 (0.122)	0.082 (0.122)	−0.122 (0.133)
Female	−0.068 (0.112)	0.025 (0.111)	−0.036 (0.113)	−0.003 (0.111)	0.043 (0.113)	−0.075 (0.112)	−0.071 (0.110)	0.053 (0.113)
Age	−0.009* (0.005)	−0.001 (0.005)	−0.004 (0.005)	−0.008 (0.005)	−0.006 (0.005)	−0.005 (0.005)	−0.009** (0.005)	−0.0002 (0.005)
Homemaker	−0.089 (0.189)	−0.083 (0.202)	−0.107 (0.184)	0.003 (0.203)	0.007 (0.193)	−0.161 (0.194)	0.133 (0.179)	−0.254 (0.205)
Pensioner	−0.066 (0.184)	−0.128 (0.195)	−0.103 (0.177)	−0.052 (0.198)	−0.132 (0.187)	−0.077 (0.190)	−0.006 (0.170)	−0.140 (0.199)
Student	−0.216 (0.255)	0.091 (0.247)	−0.076 (0.259)	−0.068 (0.245)	−0.032 (0.255)	−0.109 (0.250)	−0.008 (0.268)	0.069 (0.246)
Unable to work	−0.294 (0.492)	−0.332 (0.483)	−0.160 (0.495)	−0.426 (0.571)	−0.771** (0.369)	0.004 (0.581)	0.206 (0.519)	−0.970* (0.533)
Employed	−0.353* (0.185)	−0.536*** (0.151)	−0.303* (0.180)	−0.524*** (0.150)	−0.443*** (0.172)	−0.504*** (0.160)	−0.348** (0.145)	−0.555*** (0.182)
Left	−0.259* (0.185)	−0.058 (0.151)	−0.560*** (0.180)	0.248* (0.150)	−0.197 (0.172)	−0.138 (0.160)	−0.444*** (0.145)	0.140 (0.182)

	(Redis.=0)	(Redis.=1)	(Migr.=0)	(Migr.=1)	(Trade=0)	(Trade=1)	(Left=0)	(Left=1)
None	(0.141) 0.081	(0.138) −0.091	(0.138) −0.056	(0.139) 0.057	(0.143) 0.172	(0.137) −0.149	(0.129) −0.302*	(0.148) 0.283*
Right	(0.159) 0.134	(0.163) 0.053	(0.157) 0.229	(0.166) −0.041	(0.163) 0.165	(0.158) 0.034	(0.157) 0.315**	(0.163) −0.138
Constant	(0.147) 4.437*** (0.268)	(0.136) 4.028*** (0.310)	(0.140) 4.130*** (0.275)	(0.143) 4.275*** (0.271)	(0.140) 4.211*** (0.292)	(0.142) 4.097*** (0.266)	(0.136) 4.356*** (0.263)	(0.145) 3.878*** (0.296)
Observations	1,095	1,046	1,055	1,086	1,053	1,088	1,103	1,038
R ²	0.032	0.016	0.057	0.022	0.025	0.024	0.060	0.024
Adjusted R ²	0.020	0.003	0.044	0.009	0.012	0.011	0.048	0.011
Residual Std. Error	1.627	1.586	1.579	1.613	1.619	1.600	1.559	1.630
F Statistic	2.579***	1.220	4.485***	1.740**	1.905**	1.864**	5.000***	1.790**

Note: Robust standard errors (HC1) in parentheses. Significance scores: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table B.21: Regression analysis (Conditional models, Vignette experiment, second dependent variable, Italy)

<i>Dependent variable:</i>								
Francesco Ferrari defends the interests of the Italians								
	(Redis.=0)	(Redis.=1)	(Migr.=0)	(Migr.=1)	(Trade=0)	(Trade=1)	(Left=0)	(Left=1)
Redistribution			0.269** (0.108)	0.151 (0.108)	0.211* (0.111)	0.207* (0.108)	0.212** (0.106)	0.243** (0.110)
Migration	0.037 (0.110)	−0.091 (0.109)			0.115 (0.110)	−0.147 (0.108)	0.043 (0.108)	−0.040 (0.111)
Trade	−0.063 (0.110)	−0.117 (0.107)	0.102 (0.107)	−0.224** (0.107)			−0.099 (0.106)	−0.088 (0.111)
Left-right	−0.007 (0.110)	−0.006 (0.108)	0.056 (0.109)	−0.029 (0.108)	−0.034 (0.112)	0.011 (0.108)		
Graduate	−0.163 (0.128)	0.200 (0.131)	−0.057 (0.129)	−0.053 (0.130)	−0.040 (0.140)	0.004 (0.123)	0.021 (0.122)	−0.007 (0.136)
Female	0.037 (0.114)	−0.038 (0.112)	0.021 (0.113)	−0.009 (0.111)	0.040 (0.113)	0.001 (0.113)	−0.062 (0.112)	0.089 (0.114)
Age	−0.001 (0.005)	0.0002 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)	−0.005 (0.005)	−0.003 (0.005)	0.0004 (0.005)	−0.0001 (0.005)	−0.001 (0.006)
Homemaker	−0.076 (0.200)	−0.215 (0.194)	−0.243 (0.184)	−0.006 (0.205)	−0.063 (0.207)	−0.240 (0.187)	−0.176 (0.182)	−0.054 (0.209)
Pensioner	0.023 (0.194)	−0.117 (0.193)	−0.192 (0.176)	0.127 (0.206)	−0.179 (0.193)	0.089 (0.197)	−0.129 (0.178)	0.080 (0.205)
Student	0.144 (0.261)	0.204 (0.252)	0.113 (0.266)	0.155 (0.239)	0.164 (0.253)	0.132 (0.260)	0.261 (0.297)	0.250 (0.238)
Unable to work	0.040 (0.382)	−0.506 (0.477)	0.274 (0.378)	−0.792* (0.470)	−1.165*** (0.316)	0.472 (0.325)	0.274 (0.413)	−0.683 (0.418)
Employed	−0.137 (0.187)	−0.335** (0.163)	−0.140 (0.189)	−0.288* (0.159)	−0.275 (0.186)	−0.243 (0.160)	−0.243 (0.158)	−0.247 (0.190)
Left	−0.643***	−0.152	−0.906***	0.105	−0.366**	−0.463***	−0.745***	−0.045

	(Redis.=0)	(Redis.=1)	(Migr.=0)	(Migr.=1)	(Trade=0)	(Trade=1)	(Left=0)	(Left=1)
None	(0.144)	(0.141)	(0.143)	(0.139)	(0.146)	(0.139)	(0.135)	(0.148)
	−0.036	−0.118	−0.156	0.035	0.091	−0.210	−0.271	0.152
	(0.166)	(0.168)	(0.170)	(0.166)	(0.163)	(0.173)	(0.175)	(0.163)
Right	0.044	0.021	0.150	−0.063	0.293**	−0.213	0.201	−0.114
	(0.155)	(0.141)	(0.150)	(0.144)	(0.146)	(0.146)	(0.142)	(0.153)
Constant	4.334***	4.462***	4.176***	4.428***	4.243***	4.306***	4.378***	4.103***
	(0.284)	(0.311)	(0.293)	(0.264)	(0.305)	(0.273)	(0.265)	(0.321)
Observations	1,126	1,054	1,073	1,107	1,085	1,095	1,121	1,059
R ²	0.039	0.016	0.086	0.016	0.043	0.021	0.068	0.015
Adjusted R ²	0.027	0.003	0.074	0.003	0.030	0.008	0.056	0.002
Residual Std. Error	1.693	1.607	1.620	1.652	1.672	1.632	1.605	1.685
F Statistic	3.188***	1.202	7.130***	1.256	3.424***	1.662*	5.736***	1.126

Note: Robust standard errors (HC1) in parentheses. Significance scores: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table B.22: Regression analysis (Conditional models, Vignette experiment, third dependent variable, Italy)

<i>Dependent variable:</i>								
Francesco Ferrari defends the rights of the workers								
	(Redis.=0)	(Redis.=1)	(Migr.=0)	(Migr.=1)	(Trade=0)	(Trade=1)	(Left=0)	(Left=1)
Redistribution			0.237** (0.109)	0.138 (0.106)	0.117 (0.109)	0.247** (0.108)	0.156 (0.106)	0.231** (0.109)
Migration	0.090 (0.111)	−0.011 (0.108)			0.210* (0.109)	−0.119 (0.109)	0.034 (0.107)	0.095 (0.110)
Trade	−0.097 (0.110)	−0.003 (0.106)	0.168 (0.109)	−0.227** (0.106)			−0.118 (0.105)	−0.007 (0.111)
Left-right	−0.054 (0.111)	0.036 (0.107)	−0.034 (0.112)	0.015 (0.107)	−0.084 (0.111)	0.039 (0.109)		
Graduate	−0.158 (0.134)	−0.043 (0.134)	−0.171 (0.133)	−0.117 (0.136)	−0.096 (0.145)	−0.144 (0.127)	0.034 (0.130)	−0.234* (0.139)
Female	−0.045 (0.115)	0.126 (0.112)	0.102 (0.116)	−0.034 (0.111)	0.064 (0.114)	0.035 (0.114)	−0.109 (0.110)	0.192* (0.115)
Age	−0.008 (0.005)	−0.001 (0.005)	−0.002 (0.005)	−0.007 (0.005)	−0.003 (0.005)	−0.007 (0.005)	−0.006 (0.005)	−0.001 (0.006)
Homemaker	−0.011 (0.201)	−0.134 (0.186)	−0.132 (0.187)	−0.002 (0.200)	−0.043 (0.192)	−0.112 (0.191)	0.003 (0.181)	−0.117 (0.208)
Pensioner	0.199 (0.198)	−0.023 (0.192)	0.017 (0.181)	0.168 (0.207)	−0.190 (0.191)	0.368* (0.197)	0.039 (0.180)	0.161 (0.207)
Student	0.010 (0.244)	0.200 (0.256)	0.141 (0.268)	0.027 (0.221)	−0.014 (0.245)	0.161 (0.248)	0.164 (0.271)	0.205 (0.235)
Unable to work	−0.080 (0.426)	−0.835** (0.392)	0.021 (0.425)	−0.815* (0.469)	−1.396*** (0.336)	0.228 (0.407)	0.016 (0.536)	−0.796** (0.332)
Employed	−0.109 (0.192)	−0.404*** (0.154)	−0.098 (0.183)	−0.386** (0.159)	−0.281 (0.183)	−0.324** (0.160)	−0.347** (0.161)	−0.208 (0.185)
Left	−0.524***	−0.005	−0.638***	0.102	−0.319**	−0.248*	−0.583***	0.063

	(Redis.=0)	(Redis.=1)	(Migr.=0)	(Migr.=1)	(Trade=0)	(Trade=1)	(Left=0)	(Left=1)
None	(0.148) 0.084 (0.169)	(0.140) 0.128 (0.164)	(0.147) 0.082 (0.172)	(0.141) 0.153 (0.164)	(0.145) 0.256 (0.160)	(0.143) −0.022 (0.172)	(0.137) 0.026 (0.170)	(0.148) 0.213 (0.165)
Right	(0.153) 0.012 (0.153)	(0.137) 0.083 (0.137)	(0.149) 0.142 (0.149)	(0.140) −0.044 (0.140)	(0.140) 0.208 (0.140)	(0.148) −0.112 (0.148)	(0.141) 0.199 (0.141)	(0.148) −0.109 (0.148)
Constant	4.635*** (0.296)	4.232*** (0.307)	4.215*** (0.301)	4.559*** (0.273)	4.261*** (0.306)	4.465*** (0.278)	4.629*** (0.272)	3.978*** (0.326)
Observations	1,124	1,065	1,076	1,113	1,087	1,102	1,131	1,058
R ²	0.033	0.012	0.055	0.019	0.038	0.024	0.053	0.022
Adjusted R ²	0.021	−0.001	0.042	0.006	0.025	0.011	0.042	0.009
Residual Std. Error	1.703	1.612	1.653	1.647	1.664	1.647	1.622	1.679
F Statistic	2.742***	0.899	4.393***	1.500	3.004***	1.875**	4.505***	1.695*

Note: Robust standard errors (HC1) in parentheses. Significance scores: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table B.23: Regression analysis (Conditional models, Vignette experiment, first dependent variable, France)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Jean Dubois is the right person to deal with the plant's closure							
	(Redis.=0)	(Redis.=1)	(Migr.=0)	(Migr.=1)	(Trade=0)	(Trade=1)	(Left=0)	(Left=1)
Redistribution			0.263** (0.113)	0.436*** (0.112)	0.504*** (0.120)	0.175* (0.106)	0.139 (0.113)	0.559*** (0.115)
Migration	−0.389*** (0.115)	−0.240** (0.113)			−0.296** (0.120)	−0.281*** (0.109)	−0.232** (0.113)	−0.385*** (0.115)
Trade	0.065 (0.113)	−0.256** (0.111)	−0.084 (0.112)	−0.058 (0.111)			−0.085 (0.111)	−0.112 (0.114)
Left-right	−0.105 (0.115)	0.304*** (0.112)	0.143 (0.113)	0.008 (0.111)	0.123 (0.119)	0.063 (0.107)		
Graduate	−0.097 (0.117)	−0.144 (0.113)	−0.324*** (0.114)	0.063 (0.113)	−0.099 (0.120)	−0.152 (0.110)	−0.058 (0.114)	−0.201* (0.117)
Female	0.098 (0.122)	0.106 (0.120)	0.022 (0.120)	0.279** (0.119)	0.154 (0.128)	0.065 (0.116)	0.044 (0.119)	0.174 (0.125)
Age	0.001 (0.006)	−0.010* (0.006)	−0.002 (0.006)	−0.005 (0.006)	−0.002 (0.006)	−0.005 (0.006)	0.0003 (0.006)	−0.008 (0.006)
Homemaker	−0.342 (0.330)	0.643** (0.263)	0.064 (0.317)	0.158 (0.275)	0.159 (0.341)	0.228 (0.310)	0.014 (0.313)	0.279 (0.312)
Pensioner	−0.146 (0.191)	0.443** (0.201)	0.332* (0.194)	−0.029 (0.191)	0.174 (0.207)	0.091 (0.188)	−0.088 (0.189)	0.332* (0.201)
Student	0.045 (0.320)	−0.229 (0.274)	−0.061 (0.299)	0.057 (0.292)	0.278 (0.295)	−0.414 (0.274)	0.091 (0.279)	−0.147 (0.304)
Unable to work	−0.419 (0.776)	0.367 (0.427)	0.128 (0.358)	−0.013 (0.659)	0.870 (0.667)	−0.512 (0.395)	−0.284 (0.402)	0.231 (0.638)
Employed	0.097 (0.234)	−0.064 (0.309)	−0.025 (0.334)	0.111 (0.247)	0.094 (0.294)	0.006 (0.242)	−0.661*** (0.243)	0.546** (0.248)
Left	−0.194	0.236	−0.402***	0.389***	0.210	−0.175	−0.250*	0.273*

	(Redis.=0)	(Redis.=1)	(Migr.=0)	(Migr.=1)	(Trade=0)	(Trade=1)	(Left=0)	(Left=1)
Right	(0.151) 0.264*	(0.147) 0.058	(0.144) 0.547***	(0.150) −0.189	(0.157) 0.423***	(0.140) −0.020	(0.147) 0.256*	(0.151) 0.058
Constant	(0.147) 3.557*** (0.330)	(0.135) 4.136*** (0.313)	(0.140) 3.581*** (0.323)	(0.141) 3.271*** (0.314)	(0.145) 3.193*** (0.342)	(0.135) 3.900*** (0.303)	(0.142) 3.619*** (0.326)	(0.141) 3.735*** (0.318)
Observations	954	929	941	942	936	947	936	947
R ²	0.035	0.042	0.089	0.065	0.050	0.023	0.040	0.068
Adjusted R ²	0.022	0.028	0.076	0.052	0.037	0.009	0.027	0.055
Residual Std. Error	1.594	1.538	1.553	1.520	1.643	1.505	1.543	1.579
F Statistic	2.657***	3.049***	6.983***	4.995***	3.759***	1.674*	2.973***	5.250***

Note: Robust standard errors (HC1) in parentheses. Significance scores: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table B.24: Regression analysis (Conditional models, Vignette experiment, second dependent variable, France)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Jean Dubois defends the interests of the French							
	(Redis.=0)	(Redis.=1)	(Migr.=0)	(Migr.=1)	(Trade=0)	(Trade=1)	(Left=0)	(Left=1)
Redistribution			0.185 (0.114)	0.400*** (0.118)	0.365*** (0.125)	0.229** (0.113)	0.134 (0.120)	0.469*** (0.119)
Migration	−0.573*** (0.121)	−0.385*** (0.118)			−0.506*** (0.125)	−0.441*** (0.116)	−0.488*** (0.120)	−0.509*** (0.120)
Trade	−0.072 (0.121)	−0.218* (0.116)	−0.141 (0.115)	−0.064 (0.118)			−0.055 (0.118)	−0.226* (0.120)
Left-right	−0.165 (0.122)	0.169 (0.116)	−0.010 (0.115)	−0.021 (0.117)	0.100 (0.125)	−0.083 (0.114)		
Graduate	0.110 (0.123)	−0.115 (0.119)	−0.159 (0.116)	0.139 (0.120)	−0.084 (0.125)	0.082 (0.117)	−0.078 (0.119)	0.036 (0.122)
Female	0.091 (0.127)	0.121 (0.122)	0.019 (0.121)	0.283** (0.123)	0.093 (0.132)	0.112 (0.120)	−0.005 (0.123)	0.201 (0.129)
Age	0.001 (0.006)	−0.003 (0.006)	−0.001 (0.006)	0.0004 (0.007)	0.004 (0.007)	−0.004 (0.006)	0.002 (0.006)	−0.003 (0.006)
Homemaker	−0.688* (0.366)	0.688** (0.341)	−0.202 (0.339)	0.196 (0.402)	0.175 (0.487)	−0.072 (0.326)	−0.363 (0.345)	0.420 (0.404)
Pensioner	−0.057 (0.198)	0.033 (0.210)	0.270 (0.196)	−0.252 (0.205)	−0.212 (0.212)	0.144 (0.197)	−0.082 (0.194)	0.017 (0.209)
Student	0.076 (0.322)	−0.434 (0.281)	−0.190 (0.270)	−0.002 (0.320)	0.039 (0.285)	−0.277 (0.326)	0.081 (0.301)	−0.350 (0.279)
Unable to work	−0.561 (0.685)	−0.061 (0.463)	−0.126 (0.502)	−0.317 (0.530)	−0.295 (0.705)	−0.223 (0.419)	−0.498 (0.442)	−0.063 (0.583)
Employed	0.066 (0.275)	−0.344 (0.313)	−0.122 (0.354)	−0.084 (0.275)	−0.031 (0.310)	−0.196 (0.263)	−0.718*** (0.270)	0.294 (0.276)
Left	−0.063	0.215	−0.530***	0.589***	0.091	0.017	−0.187	0.287*

	(Redis.=0)	(Redis.=1)	(Migr.=0)	(Migr.=1)	(Trade=0)	(Trade=1)	(Left=0)	(Left=1)
	(0.169)	(0.155)	(0.158)	(0.158)	(0.172)	(0.155)	(0.161)	(0.165)
Right	0.356**	0.0003	0.593***	−0.207	0.271*	0.111	0.341**	0.004
	(0.160)	(0.141)	(0.144)	(0.156)	(0.161)	(0.140)	(0.151)	(0.148)
Constant	4.096***	4.551***	4.270***	3.430***	3.856***	4.196***	4.171***	4.145***
	(0.347)	(0.330)	(0.342)	(0.347)	(0.375)	(0.319)	(0.343)	(0.338)
Observations	958	933	944	947	937	954	941	950
R ²	0.050	0.037	0.100	0.078	0.042	0.029	0.058	0.059
Adjusted R ²	0.037	0.023	0.087	0.065	0.028	0.016	0.045	0.046
Residual Std. Error	1.670	1.596	1.589	1.581	1.696	1.595	1.617	1.639
F Statistic	3.843***	2.696***	7.919***	6.100***	3.080***	2.164***	4.397***	4.537***

Note: Robust standard errors (HC1) in parentheses. Significance scores: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table B.25: Regression analysis (Conditional models, Vignette experiment, third dependent variable, France)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Jean Dubois defends the rights of the workers							
	(Redis.=0)	(Redis.=1)	(Migr.=0)	(Migr.=1)	(Trade=0)	(Trade=1)	(Left=0)	(Left=1)
Redistribution			0.353*** (0.110)	0.597*** (0.114)	0.536*** (0.118)	0.399*** (0.109)	0.363*** (0.117)	0.589*** (0.111)
Migration	−0.388*** (0.115)	−0.141 (0.113)			−0.244** (0.119)	−0.254** (0.111)	−0.184 (0.118)	−0.339*** (0.111)
Trade	−0.129 (0.115)	−0.290*** (0.111)	−0.178 (0.110)	−0.187 (0.115)			−0.161 (0.116)	−0.257** (0.111)
Left-right	−0.069 (0.116)	0.174 (0.112)	0.094 (0.111)	−0.038 (0.114)	0.110 (0.120)	0.002 (0.109)		
Graduate	0.052 (0.117)	−0.021 (0.114)	−0.155 (0.113)	0.213* (0.116)	−0.044 (0.120)	0.112 (0.111)	0.013 (0.118)	0.029 (0.113)
Female	0.168 (0.122)	0.099 (0.119)	0.015 (0.119)	0.338*** (0.121)	0.096 (0.129)	0.165 (0.115)	0.127 (0.123)	0.135 (0.121)
Age	−0.005 (0.006)	−0.001 (0.006)	−0.003 (0.006)	−0.0004 (0.006)	0.0005 (0.006)	−0.005 (0.006)	−0.0004 (0.006)	−0.004 (0.006)
Homemaker	−0.519 (0.346)	0.488** (0.245)	−0.022 (0.298)	−0.062 (0.313)	0.002 (0.321)	0.058 (0.317)	−0.238 (0.290)	0.255 (0.308)
Pensioner	−0.114 (0.196)	0.072 (0.204)	0.268 (0.192)	−0.331 (0.205)	−0.136 (0.207)	0.054 (0.196)	−0.238 (0.195)	0.160 (0.199)
Student	0.138 (0.288)	−0.149 (0.255)	−0.049 (0.263)	0.185 (0.279)	0.216 (0.252)	−0.126 (0.300)	0.182 (0.251)	−0.082 (0.282)
Unable to work	−0.783 (0.656)	−0.246 (0.451)	−0.419 (0.441)	−0.439 (0.532)	−0.126 (0.647)	−0.706* (0.396)	−0.763* (0.399)	−0.199 (0.569)
Employed	0.351 (0.259)	−0.549* (0.283)	−0.193 (0.336)	0.008 (0.246)	0.073 (0.301)	−0.261 (0.243)	−0.926*** (0.261)	0.517** (0.249)
Left	−0.009	0.305**	−0.247*	0.441***	0.148	0.088	−0.191	0.412***

	(Redis.=0)	(Redis.=1)	(Migr.=0)	(Migr.=1)	(Trade=0)	(Trade=1)	(Left=0)	(Left=1)
	(0.154)	(0.148)	(0.149)	(0.149)	(0.158)	(0.145)	(0.149)	(0.148)
Right	0.433***	0.133	0.642***	−0.075	0.328**	0.250*	0.374***	0.147
	(0.144)	(0.136)	(0.136)	(0.141)	(0.146)	(0.133)	(0.141)	(0.134)
Constant	4.011***	4.236***	3.928***	3.404***	3.661***	3.773***	3.903***	3.870***
	(0.327)	(0.308)	(0.318)	(0.328)	(0.348)	(0.303)	(0.324)	(0.316)
Observations	958	932	943	947	938	952	939	951
R ²	0.052	0.029	0.088	0.089	0.044	0.037	0.072	0.069
Adjusted R ²	0.039	0.016	0.075	0.077	0.030	0.024	0.059	0.056
Residual Std. Error	1.594	1.545	1.538	1.547	1.631	1.535	1.564	1.561
F Statistic	3.958***	2.136**	6.858***	7.035***	3.257***	2.801***	5.517***	5.352***

Note: Robust standard errors (HC1) in parentheses. Significance scores: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table B.26: Regression analysis (Conditional models, Vignette experiment, first dependent variable, Germany)

<i>Dependent variable:</i>								
Andreas Müller is the right person to deal with the plant's closure								
	(Redis.=0)	(Redis.=1)	(Migr.=0)	(Migr.=1)	(Trade=0)	(Trade=1)	(Left=0)	(Left=1)
Redistribution			0.436*** (0.110)	0.368*** (0.101)	0.390*** (0.109)	0.444*** (0.105)	0.348*** (0.111)	0.495*** (0.100)
Migration	0.275** (0.107)	0.163 (0.108)			0.168 (0.107)	0.271** (0.106)	0.316*** (0.112)	0.143 (0.103)
Trade	0.174 (0.108)	0.236** (0.107)	0.155 (0.110)	0.234** (0.101)			0.344*** (0.112)	0.092 (0.102)
Left-right	0.204* (0.106)	0.340*** (0.107)	0.373*** (0.113)	0.180* (0.101)	0.410*** (0.109)	0.125 (0.105)		
Graduate	0.058 (0.111)	−0.092 (0.113)	−0.106 (0.118)	0.108 (0.105)	−0.009 (0.116)	−0.031 (0.108)	0.033 (0.117)	−0.076 (0.106)
Female	0.015 (0.112)	−0.129 (0.112)	0.041 (0.117)	−0.127 (0.106)	−0.065 (0.117)	−0.043 (0.108)	−0.045 (0.118)	−0.094 (0.106)
Age	−0.003 (0.005)	−0.014*** (0.005)	−0.008 (0.005)	−0.009** (0.004)	−0.011** (0.005)	−0.007 (0.005)	−0.009* (0.005)	−0.007* (0.004)
Homemaker	−0.256 (0.358)	0.781*** (0.301)	0.866*** (0.296)	−0.347 (0.272)	0.121 (0.258)	0.543 (0.443)	−0.068 (0.338)	0.554* (0.296)
Pensioner	0.025 (0.181)	0.517*** (0.183)	0.250 (0.184)	0.244 (0.175)	0.417** (0.184)	0.119 (0.179)	0.274 (0.190)	0.199 (0.173)
Student	−0.118 (0.228)	−0.599*** (0.215)	−0.532** (0.229)	−0.242 (0.209)	−0.396* (0.241)	−0.342* (0.206)	−0.242 (0.240)	−0.498** (0.201)
Unable to work	0.020 (0.264)	0.232 (0.239)	0.232 (0.287)	0.078 (0.213)	0.805*** (0.255)	−0.406* (0.215)	0.178 (0.264)	0.113 (0.227)
Employed	0.110 (0.374)	0.713* (0.408)	0.667 (0.561)	0.272 (0.262)	0.784** (0.322)	0.073 (0.459)	0.331 (0.358)	0.443 (0.443)
Left	−0.176	0.044	−0.367***	0.217*	−0.079	−0.056	−0.273**	0.143

	(Redis.=0)	(Redis.=1)	(Migr.=0)	(Migr.=1)	(Trade=0)	(Trade=1)	(Left=0)	(Left=1)
Right	(0.120) 0.135 (0.150)	(0.121) −0.204 (0.145)	(0.129) 0.312** (0.147)	(0.111) −0.451*** (0.144)	(0.124) −0.146 (0.153)	(0.117) 0.024 (0.143)	(0.130) 0.182 (0.148)	(0.110) −0.313** (0.148)
Constant	3.300*** (0.274)	4.229*** (0.270)	3.507*** (0.287)	3.825*** (0.253)	3.600*** (0.283)	3.759*** (0.253)	3.485*** (0.284)	3.868*** (0.247)
Observations	1,135	1,166	1,139	1,162	1,136	1,165	1,152	1,149
R ²	0.022	0.043	0.076	0.054	0.054	0.035	0.048	0.046
Adjusted R ²	0.011	0.033	0.065	0.043	0.043	0.024	0.037	0.035
Residual Std. Error	1.575	1.592	1.620	1.511	1.595	1.572	1.643	1.513
F Statistic	1.947**	4.021***	7.122***	5.028***	4.970***	3.195***	4.406***	4.242***

Note: Robust standard errors (HC1) in parentheses. Significance scores: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table B.27: Regression analysis (Conditional models, Vignette experiment, second dependent variable, Germany)

<i>Dependent variable:</i>								
Andreas Müller defends the interests of the Germans								
	(Redis.=0)	(Redis.=1)	(Migr.=0)	(Migr.=1)	(Trade=0)	(Trade=1)	(Left=0)	(Left=1)
Redistribution			0.277** (0.108)	0.370*** (0.095)	0.411*** (0.106)	0.274*** (0.101)	0.230** (0.108)	0.450*** (0.100)
Migration	−0.044 (0.103)	−0.005 (0.105)			0.069 (0.105)	−0.123 (0.103)	0.014 (0.109)	−0.068 (0.101)
Trade	0.086 (0.104)	−0.039 (0.105)	0.105 (0.109)	−0.097 (0.096)			0.058 (0.108)	−0.016 (0.101)
Left-right	0.067 (0.103)	0.290*** (0.105)	0.245** (0.111)	0.129 (0.095)	0.212** (0.107)	0.115 (0.102)		
Graduate	0.009 (0.107)	−0.007 (0.110)	−0.003 (0.117)	0.059 (0.100)	−0.146 (0.113)	0.141 (0.105)	−0.040 (0.114)	0.042 (0.105)
Female	0.087 (0.108)	−0.140 (0.111)	0.036 (0.116)	−0.024 (0.101)	0.091 (0.113)	−0.104 (0.107)	−0.002 (0.114)	−0.058 (0.105)
Age	−0.0004 (0.005)	−0.011** (0.004)	−0.001 (0.005)	−0.009** (0.004)	−0.004 (0.005)	−0.008* (0.004)	−0.009* (0.005)	−0.002 (0.004)
Homemaker	−0.326 (0.344)	0.406 (0.284)	0.276 (0.297)	−0.302 (0.300)	−0.153 (0.238)	0.279 (0.434)	−0.241 (0.351)	0.301 (0.244)
Pensioner	−0.179 (0.178)	0.453** (0.180)	−0.144 (0.178)	0.371** (0.172)	0.168 (0.189)	0.070 (0.169)	0.254 (0.186)	−0.009 (0.173)
Student	−0.039 (0.225)	−0.533** (0.238)	−0.385 (0.253)	−0.211 (0.201)	−0.502** (0.242)	−0.156 (0.220)	−0.299 (0.240)	−0.300 (0.227)
Unable to work	0.062 (0.235)	0.116 (0.229)	−0.096 (0.282)	0.303 (0.185)	0.478** (0.227)	−0.179 (0.225)	0.052 (0.232)	0.167 (0.224)
Employed	−0.161 (0.347)	0.523 (0.398)	0.290 (0.537)	0.130 (0.256)	0.346 (0.325)	−0.054 (0.431)	0.254 (0.345)	−0.013 (0.436)
Left	−0.254**	−0.074	−0.505***	0.127	−0.182	−0.147	−0.267**	−0.069

	(Redis.=0)	(Redis.=1)	(Migr.=0)	(Migr.=1)	(Trade=0)	(Trade=1)	(Left=0)	(Left=1)
Right	(0.115) 0.038	(0.119) −0.080	(0.131) 0.375***	(0.101) −0.476***	(0.121) 0.048	(0.114) −0.118	(0.126) 0.056	(0.110) −0.147
Constant	(0.142) 3.944*** (0.267)	(0.141) 4.711*** (0.269)	(0.136) 3.954*** (0.285)	(0.141) 4.277*** (0.237)	(0.147) 3.943*** (0.281)	(0.136) 4.401*** (0.247)	(0.139) 4.338*** (0.275)	(0.145) 4.162*** (0.254)
Observations	1,133	1,163	1,135	1,161	1,133	1,163	1,145	1,151
R ²	0.012	0.024	0.067	0.051	0.039	0.020	0.019	0.028
Adjusted R ²	0.001	0.013	0.056	0.040	0.028	0.009	0.008	0.016
Residual Std. Error	1.522	1.565	1.594	1.443	1.557	1.531	1.598	1.494
F Statistic	1.052	2.181***	6.143***	4.711***	3.511***	1.790**	1.708*	2.479***

Note: Robust standard errors (HC1) in parentheses. Significance scores: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table B.28: Regression analysis (Conditional models, Vignette experiment, third dependent variable, Germany)

		Dependent variable:						
		Andreas Müller defends the rights of the workers						
	(Redis.=0)	(Redis.=1)	(Migr.=0)	(Migr.=1)	(Trade=0)	(Trade=1)	(Left=0)	(Left=1)
Redistribution			0.588*** (0.107)	0.526*** (0.097)	0.495*** (0.105)	0.665*** (0.102)	0.401*** (0.105)	0.756*** (0.100)
Migration	0.297*** (0.106)	0.193* (0.103)			0.181* (0.105)	0.306*** (0.104)	0.237** (0.106)	0.255** (0.103)
Trade	−0.028 (0.107)	0.158 (0.102)	−0.006 (0.109)	0.122 (0.098)			0.237** (0.106)	−0.089 (0.101)
Left-right	0.133 (0.105)	0.489*** (0.103)	0.340*** (0.110)	0.325*** (0.098)	0.487*** (0.106)	0.134 (0.102)		
Graduate	−0.006 (0.109)	0.060 (0.107)	−0.094 (0.115)	0.154 (0.100)	−0.092 (0.112)	0.146 (0.105)	−0.077 (0.111)	0.117 (0.105)
Female	0.005 (0.111)	−0.104 (0.108)	−0.018 (0.116)	−0.068 (0.103)	−0.019 (0.112)	−0.068 (0.108)	−0.012 (0.113)	−0.120 (0.105)
Age	−0.008* (0.005)	−0.009** (0.004)	−0.007 (0.005)	−0.010** (0.004)	−0.006 (0.005)	−0.012*** (0.004)	−0.015*** (0.005)	−0.001 (0.004)
Homemaker	−0.021 (0.299)	0.523 (0.350)	0.354 (0.296)	0.097 (0.347)	0.195 (0.255)	0.428 (0.410)	0.073 (0.312)	0.449 (0.322)
Pensioner	0.168 (0.178)	0.370** (0.181)	0.053 (0.181)	0.413** (0.172)	0.209 (0.183)	0.304* (0.177)	0.360* (0.191)	0.131 (0.166)
Student	−0.213 (0.226)	−0.317 (0.213)	−0.222 (0.236)	−0.366* (0.200)	−0.296 (0.218)	−0.269 (0.212)	−0.411* (0.216)	−0.161 (0.227)
Unable to work	0.203 (0.261)	0.145 (0.221)	0.365 (0.284)	0.009 (0.191)	0.449* (0.258)	−0.070 (0.213)	0.033 (0.240)	0.274 (0.229)
Employed	−0.107 (0.338)	0.447 (0.388)	0.617 (0.517)	−0.104 (0.232)	0.464* (0.281)	−0.179 (0.442)	0.276 (0.318)	−0.012 (0.415)
Left	−0.180	0.016	−0.378***	0.184*	−0.103	−0.087	−0.292**	0.115

	(Redis.=0)	(Redis.=1)	(Migr.=0)	(Migr.=1)	(Trade=0)	(Trade=1)	(Left=0)	(Left=1)
Right	(0.120) 0.086 (0.145)	(0.117) −0.110 (0.137)	(0.130) 0.328** (0.137)	(0.106) −0.422*** (0.140)	(0.120) −0.058 (0.146)	(0.117) 0.013 (0.136)	(0.123) 0.041 (0.138)	(0.114) −0.145 (0.142)
Constant	3.954*** (0.275)	4.314*** (0.267)	3.844*** (0.286)	4.093*** (0.247)	3.754*** (0.280)	4.045*** (0.252)	4.266*** (0.275)	3.764*** (0.257)
Observations	1,137	1,165	1,139	1,163	1,138	1,164	1,150	1,152
R ²	0.021	0.040	0.083	0.072	0.060	0.062	0.049	0.073
Adjusted R ²	0.009	0.029	0.073	0.061	0.049	0.052	0.038	0.063
Residual Std. Error	1.554	1.535	1.585	1.465	1.551	1.536	1.573	1.500
F Statistic	1.819**	3.667***	7.869***	6.837***	5.490***	5.862***	4.538***	6.903***

Note: Robust standard errors (HC1) in parentheses. Significance scores: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

B.5 Heterogeneous effects

Table B.29: Heterogeneous effects, Vignette experiment (Italy)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Francesco Ferrari is the right person to deal with the plant's closure							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Redistribution	0.097 (0.085)	0.120 (0.106)	0.274*** (0.099)	0.177** (0.079)	0.309** (0.133)	0.096 (0.089)	0.045 (0.095)	0.129 (0.089)
Migration	0.027 (0.086)	0.042 (0.108)	0.393*** (0.100)	0.272*** (0.079)	0.004 (0.133)	−0.189** (0.089)	−0.078 (0.093)	−0.145 (0.089)
Trade	−0.052 (0.085)	0.030 (0.106)	0.068 (0.098)	0.046 (0.079)	−0.009 (0.133)	−0.153* (0.089)	−0.236** (0.094)	−0.059 (0.089)
Left	0.066 (0.086)	−0.005 (0.107)	0.292*** (0.100)	0.127 (0.079)	0.135 (0.134)	−0.146 (0.089)	−0.027 (0.094)	−0.102 (0.090)
Ideology: right			1.105*** (0.211)					
Nat. identity				1.140*** (0.260)				
Income: high					−0.499 (0.330)			
Income: middle					0.325* (0.187)			
Pro-migration						−1.129*** (0.187)		
Pro-trade							−0.640*** (0.173)	
Pro-welfare								−0.708*** (0.187)
Univ. graduate	−0.271	−0.035	−0.081	−0.043	−0.036	−0.033	−0.032	−0.050

Dependent variable:

		Francesco Ferrari is the right person to deal with the plant's closure							
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
38		(0.217)	(0.091)	(0.097)	(0.090)	(0.091)	(0.089)	(0.091)	(0.091)
	Female	−0.025	−0.081	−0.052	−0.018	−0.016	−0.039	−0.026	−0.021
		(0.079)	(0.176)	(0.085)	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.078)	(0.079)	(0.079)
	Age	−0.005	−0.005	−0.004	−0.005	−0.005	−0.005	−0.005	−0.005
		(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
	Homemaker	−0.079	−0.076	−0.049	−0.054	−0.067	−0.041	−0.076	−0.062
		(0.138)	(0.138)	(0.151)	(0.136)	(0.138)	(0.138)	(0.138)	(0.137)
	Pensioner	−0.103	−0.099	−0.119	−0.070	−0.104	−0.109	−0.109	−0.095
		(0.134)	(0.134)	(0.140)	(0.131)	(0.133)	(0.131)	(0.134)	(0.132)
	Student	−0.059	−0.056	−0.116	−0.056	−0.042	−0.070	−0.068	−0.034
		(0.180)	(0.180)	(0.197)	(0.181)	(0.180)	(0.180)	(0.180)	(0.181)
	Unable to work	−0.328	−0.353	−0.412	−0.376	−0.341	−0.351	−0.386	−0.382
		(0.381)	(0.382)	(0.415)	(0.355)	(0.385)	(0.394)	(0.369)	(0.371)
	Unemployed	−0.448***	−0.447***	−0.502***	−0.460***	−0.429***	−0.453***	−0.469***	−0.431***
		(0.117)	(0.116)	(0.126)	(0.113)	(0.117)	(0.115)	(0.117)	(0.114)
	Ideology: left	−0.159	−0.152		−0.157	−0.155	−0.164	−0.149	−0.122
		(0.098)	(0.098)		(0.098)	(0.098)	(0.100)	(0.099)	(0.100)
	Ideology: none	0.010	0.010		−0.011	0.025	0.018	−0.001	0.030
		(0.114)	(0.114)		(0.114)	(0.115)	(0.114)	(0.115)	(0.115)
	Ideology: right	0.095	0.098		0.063	0.102	0.094	0.096	0.104
		(0.100)	(0.100)		(0.099)	(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.100)
	Univ. graduate × Redistr.	0.338*							
		(0.177)							
	Univ. graduate × Migration	0.220							
		(0.179)							
	Univ. graduate × Trade	0.050							
		(0.179)							

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Francesco Ferrari is the right person to deal with the plant's closure							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Univ. graduate × Left	−0.112 (0.179)							
Female × Redistr.		0.107 (0.149)						
Female × Migration		0.066 (0.151)						
Female × Trade		−0.143 (0.150)						
Female × Left		0.103 (0.151)						
Right × Redistr.			−0.281 (0.172)					
Right × Migration			−0.781*** (0.170)					
Right × Trade			−0.166 (0.170)					
Right × Left			−0.817*** (0.172)					
Nat. identity × Redistr.				−0.117 (0.220)				
Nat. identity × Migration				−1.132*** (0.219)				
Nat. identity × Trade				−0.411* (0.220)				
Nat. identity × Left				−0.378* (0.222)				
Income: high × Redistr.					−0.052			

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	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Francesco Ferrari is the right person to deal with the plant's closure							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Pro-trade × Trade							0.414*** (0.151)	
Pro-trade × Left							0.132 (0.153)	
Pro-welfare × Redistr.								0.133 (0.160)
Pro-welfare × Migration								0.656*** (0.162)
Pro-welfare × Trade								0.106 (0.161)
Pro-welfare × Left								0.425*** (0.164)
Constant	4.193*** (0.207)	4.177*** (0.222)	3.756*** (0.219)	3.958*** (0.203)	3.986*** (0.235)	4.468*** (0.210)	4.451*** (0.211)	4.331*** (0.208)
Observations	2,141	2,141	1,803	2,141	2,141	2,141	2,141	2,141
R ²	0.022	0.020	0.051	0.042	0.027	0.048	0.028	0.032
Adjusted R ²	0.014	0.012	0.041	0.033	0.015	0.039	0.019	0.023
Residual Std. Error	1.607	1.609	1.598	1.592	1.606	1.587	1.602	1.599
F Statistic	2.553***	2.329***	5.273***	4.603***	2.347***	5.291***	3.106***	3.536***

Note: Robust (HC1) standard errors in parentheses. Significance scores: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. The dependent variable is the level of agreement with the statement “Francesco Ferrari is the right person to deal with the plant's closure successfully”. ‘Education’ is “high” if the respondent holds at least an undergraduate degree. Respondents who placed themselves on a value greater than 4 on a 1-to-7 scale (where 1 mean “left” and 7 means “right”) are considered as right-wing. In the Italian sample, respondents who refused to place themselves on a left-right scale were excluded. National identity’ scores 1 if the respondent, when asked if she feels more Italian or European, answers “only Italian”. Income is “middle” for respondents who earn between 20,000 and 99,000 euros per year. Income is “high” is for respondents who earn more than 100,000 euros per year. Respondents are considered ‘pro-immigration’ if they agree with the statement “In general, immigration will improve our culture with new ideas and habits”. Respondents who placed themselves on a value smaller than 4 on a 1-to-7 scale (where 1 means “International trade is an opportunity for

economic growth thanks to the increase in our exports” and 7 means “International trade is a threat to economic growth due to increased imports”) are considered ‘pro-trade’. Respondents who placed themselves on a value smaller than 4 on a 1-to-7 scale (where 1 means “Public spending must be increased by raising taxes” and 7 means “Public spending needs to be cut in order to reduce taxes”) are considered ‘pro-welfare’. All models are weighted.

Table B.30: Heterogeneous effects, Vignette experiment (**France**)

	Dependent variable:							
	Jean Dubois is the right person to deal with the plant's closure							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Redistribution	0.387*** (0.108)	0.307*** (0.114)	0.576*** (0.103)	0.452*** (0.087)	0.701*** (0.148)	0.141 (0.101)	0.339*** (0.089)	0.316*** (0.087)
Migration	−0.468*** (0.109)	−0.502*** (0.113)	0.266** (0.104)	−0.074 (0.087)	0.114 (0.151)	−0.929*** (0.100)	−0.265*** (0.089)	−0.368*** (0.087)
Trade	−0.089 (0.107)	−0.043 (0.113)	0.030 (0.102)	0.026 (0.086)	−0.096 (0.151)	−0.227** (0.101)	−0.134 (0.089)	−0.048 (0.087)
Ideology	0.182* (0.107)	−0.012 (0.113)	0.344*** (0.103)	0.104 (0.086)	0.052 (0.150)	−0.123 (0.100)	0.098 (0.089)	−0.029 (0.087)
Univ. graduate	−0.160 (0.192)	−0.130 (0.082)	−0.144* (0.080)	−0.113 (0.081)	−0.129 (0.083)	−0.136* (0.080)	−0.132 (0.085)	−0.117 (0.086)
Female	0.117 (0.087)	−0.204 (0.192)	0.146* (0.085)	0.089 (0.085)	0.116 (0.086)	0.127 (0.085)	0.156* (0.090)	0.116 (0.090)
Age	−0.003 (0.004)	−0.003 (0.004)	−0.004 (0.004)	−0.005 (0.004)	−0.004 (0.004)	−0.004 (0.004)	−0.002 (0.004)	−0.004 (0.004)
Homemaker	0.143 (0.235)	0.189 (0.226)	0.096 (0.217)	0.155 (0.253)	0.128 (0.244)	0.116 (0.233)	0.171 (0.247)	0.242 (0.255)
Pensioner	0.120 (0.140)	0.104 (0.140)	0.182 (0.135)	0.193 (0.139)	0.123 (0.139)	0.130 (0.136)	0.105 (0.147)	0.134 (0.143)
Student	−0.019 (0.213)	−0.0003 (0.209)	−0.016 (0.200)	−0.032 (0.206)	−0.056 (0.215)	0.013 (0.216)	0.020 (0.233)	−0.011 (0.229)
Unable to work	−0.010 (0.385)	−0.003 (0.380)	0.139 (0.376)	−0.013 (0.397)	−0.065 (0.391)	0.119 (0.383)	−0.009 (0.428)	−0.218 (0.340)
Unemployed	0.066 (0.196)	0.019 (0.196)	0.051 (0.205)	0.042 (0.194)	−0.028 (0.203)	0.106 (0.200)	0.021 (0.210)	0.109 (0.208)
Ideology: left	0.009 (0.106)	0.015 (0.106)	−0.007 (0.104)	0.021 (0.105)	0.019 (0.106)	−0.032 (0.104)	0.028 (0.111)	0.022 (0.113)

<i>Dependent variable:</i>								
	Jean Dubois is the right person to deal with the plant's closure							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Ideology: right	0.172*	0.170*	1.377***	0.134	0.178*	0.059	0.195*	0.160
	(0.100)	(0.100)	(0.191)	(0.098)	(0.099)	(0.099)	(0.104)	(0.104)
Nat. identity				1.284***				
				(0.226)				
Income: middle					0.371*			
					(0.210)			
Income: high					1.719**			
					(0.739)			
Pro-migr.						−1.597***		
						(0.185)		
Pro-trade							0.084	
							(0.309)	
Pro-welfare								−1.234***
								(0.386)
Univ. graduate * Redistr.	−0.092							
	(0.163)							
Univ. graduate * Migration	0.383**							
	(0.162)							
Univ. graduate * Trade	−0.016							
	(0.161)							
Univ. graduate * Ideology	−0.205							
	(0.162)							
Female * Redistr.		0.089						
		(0.160)						
Female * Migration		0.435***						
		(0.161)						
Female * Trade		−0.088						

		<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
		Jean Dubois is the right person to deal with the plant's closure							
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
45			(0.160)						
	Female * Ideology		0.202						
			(0.160)						
	Ideology: right * Redistr.			−0.500***					
				(0.159)					
	Ideology: right * Migration			−1.217***					
				(0.160)					
	Ideology: right * Trade			−0.188					
				(0.158)					
	Ideology: right * Ideology			−0.534***					
				(0.159)					
	Nat. identity * Redistr.				−0.530**				
					(0.215)				
	Nat. identity * Migration				−1.207***				
					(0.216)				
	Nat. identity * Trade				−0.488**				
				(0.214)					
Nat. identity * Ideology				−0.088					
				(0.216)					
Income: high * Redistr.						−0.841			
						(0.634)			
Income: high * Migration						−0.044			
						(0.675)			
Income: high * Trade						−0.891			
						(0.579)			
Income: high * Ideology						−0.241			
						(0.577)			

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<i>Dependent variable:</i>								
Jean Dubois is the right person to deal with the plant's closure								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Pro-welfare * Trade								(0.313) −0.316 (0.320)
Pro-welfare * Ideology								1.104*** (0.326)
Constant	3.615*** (0.243)	3.749*** (0.253)	3.031*** (0.240)	3.420*** (0.233)	3.324*** (0.270)	4.343*** (0.233)	3.500*** (0.245)	3.768*** (0.242)
Observations	1,883	1,883	1,883	1,883	1,883	1,883	1,750	1,708
R ²	0.034	0.035	0.079	0.060	0.044	0.100	0.031	0.048
Adjusted R ²	0.025	0.026	0.070	0.051	0.032	0.091	0.020	0.038
Residual Std. Error	1.576	1.574	1.539	1.554	1.570	1.521	1.582	1.562
F Statistic	3.647***	3.789***	8.847***	6.287***	3.585***	10.900***	2.866***	4.518***

Note: Robust (HC1) standard errors in parentheses. Significance scores: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. The dependent variable is the level of agreement with the statement “Jean Dubois is the right person to deal with the plant’s closure successfully”. ‘Education’ is “high” if the respondent holds at least an undergraduate degree. Respondents who placed themselves on a value greater than 4 on a 1-to-7 scale (where 1 mean “left” and 7 means “right”) are considered as right-wing. National identity’ scores 1 if the respondent, when asked if she feels more French or European, answers “only French”. Income is “middle” for respondents who earn between 20,000 and 99,000 euros per year. Income is “high” is for respondents who earn more than 100,000 euros per year. Respondents are considered ‘pro-immigration’ if they agree with the statement “In general, immigration will improve our culture with new ideas and habits”. Respondents who placed themselves on a value smaller than 4 on a 1-to-7 scale (where 1 means “International trade is an opportunity for economic growth thanks to the increase in our exports” and 7 means “International trade is a threat to economic growth due to increased imports”) are considered ‘pro-trade’. Respondents who placed themselves on a value smaller than 4 on a 1-to-7 scale (where 1 means “Public spending must be increased by raising taxes” and 7 means “Public spending needs to be cut in order to reduce taxes”) are considered are considered ‘pro-welfare’. All models are weighted.

Table B.31: Heterogeneous effects, Vignette experiment (**Germany**)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Andreas Müller is the right person to deal with the plant's closure							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Redistribution	0.471*** (0.095)	0.435*** (0.109)	0.521*** (0.084)	0.381*** (0.081)	0.368*** (0.142)	0.378*** (0.104)	0.429*** (0.089)	0.354*** (0.083)
Migration	0.109 (0.096)	0.223** (0.111)	0.456*** (0.085)	0.354*** (0.081)	0.299** (0.147)	−0.438*** (0.104)	0.134 (0.091)	0.159* (0.084)
Trade	0.203** (0.096)	0.211* (0.111)	0.175** (0.085)	0.213*** (0.081)	0.093 (0.144)	0.109 (0.105)	0.151* (0.090)	0.223*** (0.084)
Ideology	0.288*** (0.096)	0.243** (0.110)	0.427*** (0.084)	0.338*** (0.081)	0.405*** (0.143)	0.093 (0.104)	0.212** (0.090)	0.231*** (0.084)
Univ. graduate	−0.063 (0.190)	−0.024 (0.079)	−0.009 (0.079)	−0.006 (0.079)	−0.011 (0.081)	0.001 (0.077)	−0.038 (0.084)	−0.063 (0.082)
Female	−0.065 (0.080)	−0.056 (0.183)	−0.052 (0.079)	−0.046 (0.079)	−0.054 (0.080)	−0.076 (0.078)	−0.095 (0.082)	−0.083 (0.082)
Age	−0.009*** (0.003)	−0.009*** (0.003)	−0.008** (0.003)	−0.008** (0.003)	−0.008** (0.003)	−0.008** (0.003)	−0.010*** (0.003)	−0.009** (0.003)
Homemaker	0.256 (0.241)	0.282 (0.240)	0.188 (0.228)	0.283 (0.246)	0.263 (0.242)	0.243 (0.247)	0.396 (0.241)	0.258 (0.255)
Pensioner	0.262** (0.128)	0.265** (0.129)	0.255** (0.127)	0.254** (0.127)	0.249* (0.129)	0.206 (0.126)	0.276** (0.132)	0.231* (0.133)
Student	−0.382** (0.158)	−0.368** (0.157)	−0.352** (0.157)	−0.321** (0.155)	−0.356** (0.158)	−0.363** (0.156)	−0.339** (0.169)	−0.407** (0.163)
Unable to work	0.150 (0.177)	0.134 (0.177)	0.155 (0.177)	0.167 (0.179)	0.139 (0.175)	0.127 (0.172)	0.085 (0.193)	0.154 (0.182)
Unemployed	0.438 (0.281)	0.435 (0.283)	0.339 (0.266)	0.461* (0.277)	0.425 (0.285)	0.378 (0.265)	0.556* (0.309)	0.509* (0.309)
Ideology: left	−0.063 (0.086)	−0.061 (0.085)	−0.062 (0.085)	−0.045 (0.085)	−0.048 (0.086)	−0.010 (0.086)	−0.064 (0.090)	−0.024 (0.091)

<i>Dependent variable:</i>								
Andreas Müller is the right person to deal with the plant's closure								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Ideology: right	−0.058 (0.104)	−0.047 (0.105)	0.982*** (0.210)	−0.063 (0.105)	−0.034 (0.104)	−0.091 (0.102)	−0.032 (0.108)	−0.040 (0.109)
Nat. identity				0.852*** (0.249)				
Income: middle					−0.033 (0.209)			
Income: high					0.317 (0.391)			
Pro-migr.						−1.172*** (0.175)		
Pro-trade							−0.508** (0.219)	
Pro-welfare								−1.030*** (0.250)
Univ. graduate * Redistr.	−0.136 (0.156)							
Univ. graduate * Migration	0.269* (0.156)							
Univ. graduate * Trade	0.007 (0.156)							
Univ. graduate * Ideology	−0.062 (0.156)							
Female * Redistr.		−0.037 (0.150)						
Female * Migration		−0.021 (0.151)						
Female * Trade		0.001						

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		<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
		Andreas Müller is the right person to deal with the plant's closure							
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
			(0.152)						
	Female * Ideology		0.051						
			(0.151)						
	Ideology: right * Redistr.			−0.462***					
				(0.179)					
	Ideology: right * Migration			−1.029***					
				(0.179)					
	Ideology: right * Trade			0.044					
				(0.180)					
	Ideology: right * Ideology			−0.624***					
				(0.181)					
	Nat. identity * Redistr.				0.128				
					(0.213)				
	Nat. identity * Migration				−0.881***				
					(0.212)				
	Nat. identity * Trade				−0.050				
					(0.219)				
	Nat. identity * Ideology				−0.424*				
					(0.218)				
	Income: high * Redistr.					−0.562*			
						(0.304)			
	Income: high * Migration					0.323			
						(0.302)			
	Income: high * Trade					−0.149			
						(0.300)			
	Income: high * Ideology					−0.478			
						(0.298)			


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<i>Dependent variable:</i>								
Andreas Müller is the right person to deal with the plant's closure								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Pro-welfare * Trade								(0.238) −0.029 (0.244)
Pro-welfare * Ideology								0.395 (0.241)
Constant	3.614*** (0.205)	3.580*** (0.218)	3.280*** (0.196)	3.384*** (0.203)	3.537*** (0.236)	4.104*** (0.211)	3.785*** (0.205)	3.652*** (0.204)
Observations	2,301	2,301	2,301	2,301	2,301	2,301	2,114	2,151
R ²	0.041	0.039	0.067	0.054	0.047	0.089	0.045	0.057
Adjusted R ²	0.033	0.031	0.060	0.046	0.037	0.082	0.036	0.048
Residual Std. Error	1.587	1.589	1.565	1.576	1.583	1.546	1.593	1.596
F Statistic	5.370***	5.089***	9.096***	6.903***	4.715***	11.798***	5.199***	6.755***

Note: Robust (HC1) standard errors in parentheses. Significance scores: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. The dependent variable is the level of agreement with the statement “Andreas Müller is the right person to deal with the plant's closure successfully”. ‘Education’ is “high” if the respondent holds at least an undergraduate degree. Respondents who placed themselves on a value greater than 4 on a 1-to-7 scale (where 1 mean “left” and 7 means “right”) are considered as right-wing. National identity’ scores 1 if the respondent, when asked if she feels more German or European, answers “only German”. Income is “middle” for respondents who earn between 20,000 and 99,000 euros per year. Income is “high” is for respondents who earn more than 100,000 euros per year. Respondents are considered ‘pro-immigration’ if they agree with the statement “In general, immigration will improve our culture with new ideas and habits”. Respondents who placed themselves on a value smaller than 4 on a 1-to-7 scale (where 1 means “International trade is an opportunity for economic growth thanks to the increase in our exports” and 7 means “International trade is a threat to economic growth due to increased imports”) are considered ‘pro-trade’. Respondents who placed themselves on a value smaller than 4 on a 1-to-7 scale (where 1 means “Public spending must be increased by raising taxes” and 7 means “Public spending needs to be cut in order to reduce taxes”) are considered are considered ‘pro-welfare’. All models are weighted.

B.6 Results of the vignette experiment when removing responses presented with implausible treatments


Figure B.1: Results of the regression analysis (Experiment #1, baseline model)



Notes: 95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors. The dependent variable is the level of agreement with the statement “[Name Surname] is the right person to deal with the plant’s closure successfully.” All models are weighted and include controls for age, gender, employment status, ideology, and education. The responses removed from the analysis are those of people who received a treatment including a “right-wing politician” who “has avoided pushing back migrants and has increased the funding for integration policies”.

B.7 Results of the vignette experiment when excluding respondents who failed attention checks (Italy) and manipulation checks (France and Germany)

Figure B.2: Results of the regression analysis (Experiment #1, baseline model)



Notes: 95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors. The dependent variable is the level of agreement with the statement "[Name Surname] is the right person to deal with the plant's closure successfully." All models are weighted and include controls for age, gender, employment status, ideology, and education.

B.8 Results of the vignette experiment (interaction between China import shock and experimental treatment)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	[Name] is the right person to deal with the plant's closure		
	(ITA)	(FRA)	(GER)
Redistribution	0.276** (0.139)	0.367*** (0.091)	0.600*** (0.213)
Migration	0.195 (0.139)	−0.311*** (0.092)	0.100 (0.214)
Trade	−0.154 (0.140)	−0.058 (0.091)	0.201 (0.214)
Left	0.125 (0.140)	0.085 (0.091)	0.486** (0.213)
Import shock	0.797 (1.640)	1.636 (10.103)	−0.661 (1.158)
Univ. graduate	−0.033 (0.092)	−0.126 (0.082)	−0.020 (0.079)
Female	−0.015 (0.079)	0.112 (0.087)	−0.059 (0.079)
Age	−0.005 (0.004)	−0.004 (0.004)	−0.009*** (0.003)
Homemaker	−0.073 (0.140)	0.157 (0.235)	0.268 (0.236)
Pensioner	−0.095 (0.135)	0.131 (0.140)	0.273** (0.129)
Student	−0.057 (0.183)	−0.006 (0.213)	−0.360** (0.158)
Unable to work	−0.296 (0.381)	−0.007 (0.387)	0.128 (0.176)
Unemployed	−0.462*** (0.119)	0.045 (0.198)	0.422 (0.281)
Ideology: left	−0.164* (0.099)	0.010 (0.106)	−0.064 (0.086)
Ideology: none	0.024 (0.114)		
Ideology: right	0.094 (0.101)	0.174* (0.099)	−0.034 (0.105)
Redistribution * Import shock	−1.095	−3.712	−0.947

	(1.403)	(8.637)	(0.995)
Migration * Import shock	−1.300	3.131	0.512
	(1.402)	(8.695)	(0.995)
Trade * Import shock	1.256	−5.737	0.043
	(1.409)	(8.725)	(0.999)
Left * Import shock	−0.937	1.752	−1.077
	(1.406)	(8.737)	(0.991)
Constant	4.073***	3.597***	3.733***
	(0.248)	(0.239)	(0.302)
Observations	2,131	3,305	2,301
R ²	0.022	0.030	0.043
Adjusted R ²	0.012	0.024	0.035
Residual Std. Error	1.609	1.189	1.585
F Statistic	2.318***	5.292***	5.386***

Note: Data on China import shock are from XXX. In the models for Italy and France, the correspondence between NUTS 2 data on import shock and geographical location was not univocal (geographical location in the survey experiment data collection comprised in some cases more than one NUTS 2 region). Whenever this happened, we assigned the same respondent to more than one NUTS 2 code. We weighted these responses accordingly (if a respondent has been assigned to two NUTS 2 codes, each entry was weighted 0.5, if a respondent has been assigned to three NUTS 2 codes, each entry was weighted 0.333, and so forth). For this reason, we computed clustered standard errors (at respondent level) in models for Italy and France. Robust (HC1) standard errors in parentheses in models for Germany. Significance scores: * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$. The dependent variable is the level of agreement with the statement “[Name] is the right person to deal with the plant’s closure successfully”. All models are weighted.

C Split-ballot experiment: Policy Preferences vs Competence

We conducted a split-ballot experiment in which half of the sample was shown Introduction A and the other half was shown Introduction B (see Table C.1).

Table C.1: Alternative formulations of the split-ballot experiment

Introduction A	Introduction B
Six months have passed. The firm has eventually decided to not close the plant and to not dismiss any employees.	Six months have passed. The firm has eventually decided to close the plant and to dismiss all employees.

All respondents were asked to place themselves on a scale from 1 (“I would not vote for [the politician / the politician’s party] at the next election”) to 7 (“I would vote for [the politician / the politician’s party] at the next election”). The text referred to the politician in the French case (where the president is directly elected) and to his party in the Italian and German cases (where voters elect members of parliament and the head of government is appointed after the election).

We ran our main model conditional on the politician being successful or unsuccessful in handling the negative economic shock:

$$\begin{aligned}
 Y_i | (\text{Success}_i = 1) &= \alpha_0 + \beta_1 \text{Redistribution}_i + \beta_2 \text{Migration}_i + \beta_3 \text{Trade}_i + \beta_4 \text{Ideology}_i + \varepsilon_i \\
 Y_i | (\text{Success}_i = 0) &= \alpha_0 + \beta_1 \text{Redistribution}_i + \beta_2 \text{Migration}_i + \beta_3 \text{Trade}_i + \beta_4 \text{Ideology}_i + \varepsilon_i
 \end{aligned}
 \tag{5}$$

Our models are weighted by age, gender, education, and region of residence to compensate for the (mostly minor) deviations from the aforementioned quotas. All model specifications include the following control variables: age, gender, employment status,¹⁵ ideology,¹⁶ and education level (having or not having a university degree). As expected, the correlation between each control and each treatment is very low, given the randomization implemented in the vignette experiment.¹⁷

Figures C.1 and C.2 display the results of the second experiment. As expected, the treatment significantly affects the likelihood of voting for the politician in all countries: if he manages to avoid the plant’s closure, voters are more likely to re-elect him (Figure C.1). Figure C.2 assesses whether the politician’s success or failure in avoiding the closure affects the impact of the previous treatments. This is certainly not the case for the social expenditure and redistribution policy: a candidate who has adopted a redistributive policy always receives more votes, *regardless* of how he managed the negative shock. This finding is consistent with the results of the first experiment, which showed that redistribution was the only policy that was consistently supported across the three countries.


The three countries demonstrate diverging patterns on attitudes to immigration: Italians are indifferent to it; the French consistently reward an anti-immigration president; and Germans consistently

¹⁵ This variable contained the following categories: “working now,” “unemployed,” “retired,” “permanently disabled,” “temporarily laid off,” “homemaker,” and “student.”

¹⁶ Left–right position on a 1 to 7 scale. Recoded to a categorical variable with values “left” (1–3), “center” (4), or “right” (5–7). The Italian survey also contained the option “I don’t recognize myself on this scale.”

¹⁷ Tables B.1–B.15 in the Appendix report the results of the balance tests for both experiments.

Figure C.1: Effect of the outcome of the crisis on the likelihood of voting for the politician




Notes: The dependent variable indicates the placement on a scale from 1 (“I would not vote for [politician] at the next election”) to 7 (“I would vote for [politician] at the next election”). 95% confidence intervals are displayed.

reward a pro-immigration chancellor. Similar results are observed for trade policy. It does not matter for Italians, while it matters (in the form of support for a protectionist president) for the French. Germans reward a free-trade-oriented chancellor if he prevented the plant’s closure, but not if he failed.

The German experiment shows that a left-wing politician is more likely to receive votes if he prevented the plant’s closure, but ideology is not significant if he failed to do so. Overall, the politicians’ policy platforms matter much more than whether they prevented the plant’s closure. This result may suggest that politicians in globalized economies are held less accountable for negative economic shocks, which are perceived as being largely out of the hands of the incumbent president/chancellor.

Figure C.2: Results of the regression analysis (baseline model)



Notes: 95% confidence intervals based on robust standard errors. The dependent variable indicates the placement on a scale from 1 ("I would not vote for [politician] at the next election") to 7 ("I would vote for [politician] at the next election"). All models are weighted and include controls for age, gender, socio-economic class, employment status, ideology, and education. Full results in Table C.2.

Table C.2: Regression analysis (Split-ballot experiment)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Avoided the plant's closure			Did not avoid the plant's closure		
	(ITA)	(FRA)	(GER)	(ITA)	(FRA)	(GER)
Redistribution	0.279** (0.120)	0.249* (0.131)	0.276** (0.113)	0.236** (0.119)	0.407*** (0.121)	0.284*** (0.110)
Migration	0.070 (0.119)	−0.338** (0.132)	0.182 (0.113)	−0.028 (0.120)	−0.460*** (0.122)	0.362*** (0.110)
Trade	−0.054 (0.118)	−0.200 (0.129)	0.265** (0.114)	−0.011 (0.119)	−0.239** (0.121)	−0.001 (0.110)
Left-right	0.027 (0.120)	0.157 (0.130)	0.239** (0.113)	0.137 (0.120)	0.144 (0.120)	0.146 (0.112)
Graduate	−0.205 (0.148)	−0.200 (0.133)	−0.207* (0.120)	0.267* (0.145)	−0.050 (0.124)	0.047 (0.114)
Female	0.020 (0.124)	0.019 (0.138)	−0.075 (0.118)	−0.193 (0.125)	−0.091 (0.132)	−0.292** (0.116)
Age	−0.002 (0.006)	0.001 (0.007)	0.005 (0.005)	−0.002 (0.006)	−0.010 (0.007)	−0.015*** (0.005)
Homemaker	−0.262 (0.224)	0.269 (0.623)	−0.237 (0.414)	0.160 (0.226)	0.187 (0.284)	0.498 (0.429)
Pensioner	−0.190 (0.211)	0.025 (0.218)	0.261 (0.196)	−0.020 (0.215)	0.313 (0.211)	0.095 (0.192)
Student	0.027 (0.276)	−0.319 (0.401)	−0.124 (0.245)	0.105 (0.282)	0.136 (0.291)	−0.425* (0.242)
Unable to work	−0.244 (0.502)	−0.128 (0.714)	0.366* (0.222)	−0.203 (0.488)	−0.162 (0.446)	−0.124 (0.242)
Employed	−0.362** (0.165)	0.178 (0.300)	0.173 (0.427)	0.187 (0.198)	−0.236 (0.284)	−0.293 (0.349)
Left	−0.533*** (0.152)	0.008 (0.182)	−0.163 (0.126)	−0.475*** (0.161)	−0.184 (0.163)	0.052 (0.125)
None	−0.113 (0.189)			−0.405** (0.187)		
Right	−0.122 (0.155)	0.113 (0.170)	−0.126 (0.156)	−0.066 (0.166)	0.044 (0.147)	0.114 (0.152)
Constant	4.247*** (0.315)	4.028*** (0.388)	3.445*** (0.284)	3.501*** (0.351)	3.697*** (0.363)	3.633*** (0.304)
Observations	1,098	929	1,154	1,049	948	1,148
R ²	0.031	0.025	0.039	0.027	0.051	0.039
Adjusted R ²	0.017	0.010	0.028	0.012	0.037	0.027

Residual Std. Error	1.812	1.793	1.672	1.795	1.662	1.665
F Statistic	2.289***	1.686*	3.345***	1.878**	3.576***	3.261***

Note: Robust standard errors (HC1) in parentheses. Significance scores:
 *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

D Conjoint experiment

D.1 Text of the conjoint experiment's background scenario

We will now describe a hypothetical scenario that [Italy / France / Germany] could face in the future. It's 2031. A well-known company has announced the closure of its biggest plant in Italy. 10,000 workers are at risk of losing their job. The government is discussing a plan to increase social expenditure to deal with plant closures. There are several proposals on the government's table. Proposals differ as to which type of social expenditure will be increased, which category of people will benefit from it, and who will pay for it. We ask you to compare three pairs of proposals and let us know your opinion.

D.2 Marginal means

Table D.1: Marginal means for the conjoint experiment (**Italy**)

Feature	Level	Estimate	Std. Error	z	p-value
Type of expenditure	basic income	0.507	0.012	40.665	0
Type of expenditure	unemployment benefits	0.518	0.011	45.541	0
Type of expenditure	reconversion	0.558	0.012	46.920	0
Type of expenditure	early retirement	0.499	0.012	41.629	0
Nationality	Italian and foreign	0.545	0.009	57.725	0
Nationality	only Italian	0.496	0.009	52.492	0
Work history	irrespective of work history	0.541	0.010	52.451	0
Work history	at least 3 years work history	0.517	0.010	49.587	0
Work history	at least 10 years work history	0.502	0.011	45.532	0
Reason for layoff	all layoffs	0.554	0.011	52.048	0
Reason for layoff	offshoring	0.527	0.011	49.373	0
Reason for layoff	automation	0.480	0.011	45.331	0
Taxation	all citizens, irrespective of income	0.375	0.012	30.416	0
Taxation	proportional to income	0.544	0.012	44.461	0
Taxation	high-income people	0.557	0.012	48.079	0
Taxation	high-income p., reduction for low-income p.	0.608	0.012	50.502	0

Note: The outcome is a dummy variable that scores 1 if the respondent likes the proposal. Standard errors clustered by respondents. N = 8,408.

Table D.2: Marginal means for the conjoint experiment (**France**)

Feature	Level	Estimate	Std. Error	z	p-value
Type of expenditure	basic income	0.468	0.013	37.158	0
Type of expenditure	unemployment benefits	0.501	0.012	41.569	0
Type of expenditure	reconversion	0.571	0.012	49.094	0
Type of expenditure	early retirement	0.528	0.013	41.498	0
Nationality	French and foreign	0.522	0.010	51.475	0
Nationality	only French	0.513	0.010	51.645	0
Work history	irrespective of work history	0.528	0.011	46.632	0
Work history	at least 3 years work history	0.514	0.011	47.515	0
Work history	at least 10 years work history	0.510	0.011	48.063	0
Reason for layoff	all layoffs	0.545	0.011	50.264	0
Reason for layoff	offshoring	0.510	0.011	45.772	0
Reason for layoff	automation	0.496	0.011	44.730	0
Taxation	all citizens, irrespective of income	0.433	0.012	35.039	0
Taxation	proportional to income	0.533	0.012	44.539	0
Taxation	high-income people	0.532	0.013	42.478	0
Taxation	high-income p., reduction for low-income p.	0.567	0.012	46.675	0

Note: The outcome is a dummy variable that scores 1 if the respondent likes the proposal. Standard errors clustered by respondents. N = 8,544.

Table D.3: Marginal means for the conjoint experiment (**Germany**)

Feature	Level	Estimate	Std. Error	z	p-value
Type of expenditure	basic income	0.468	0.012	38.397	0
Type of expenditure	unemployment benefits	0.465	0.012	38.690	0
Type of expenditure	reconversion	0.486	0.013	38.670	0
Type of expenditure	early retirement	0.445	0.012	36.440	0
Nationality	German and foreign	0.506	0.010	49.943	0
Nationality	only German	0.427	0.010	43.833	0
Work history	irrespective of work history	0.466	0.011	42.095	0
Work history	at least 3 years work history	0.491	0.011	45.180	0
Work history	at least 10 years work history	0.439	0.011	40.066	0
Reason for layoff	all layoffs	0.481	0.011	43.876	0
Reason for layoff	offshoring	0.468	0.010	45.497	0
Reason for layoff	automation	0.448	0.011	41.215	0
Taxation	all citizens, irrespective of income	0.435	0.012	35.138	0
Taxation	proportional to income	0.492	0.013	38.607	0
Taxation	high-income people	0.474	0.012	39.502	0
Taxation	high-income p., reduction for low-income p.	0.463	0.012	38.025	0

Note: The outcome is a dummy variable that scores 1 if the respondent likes the proposal. Standard errors clustered by respondents. N = 8,536.

D.3 Full results of the conjoint experiment (average marginal component effects)

D.3.1 First dependent variable: liked proposal

Table D.4: Results of the conjoint experiment (Italy)

Feature	Level	Estimate	Std. Error	z	p-value
Type of expenditure	basic income	0			
Type of expenditure	unemployment benefits	0.009	0.015	0.557	0.578
Type of expenditure	reconversion	0.049	0.016	3.128	0.002
Type of expenditure	early retirement	-0.009	0.016	-0.553	0.580
Nationality	Italian and foreign	0			
Nationality	only Italian	-0.047	0.012	-3.885	0.0001
Work history	irrespective of work history	0			
Work history	at least 3 years work history	-0.024	0.013	-1.780	0.075
Work history	at least 10 years work history	-0.037	0.014	-2.694	0.007
Reason for layoff	all layoffs	0			
Reason for layoff	offshoring	-0.028	0.014	-2.033	0.042
Reason for layoff	automation	-0.073	0.013	-5.457	0
Taxation	all citizens, irrespective of income	0			
Taxation	proportional to income	0.169	0.016	10.720	0
Taxation	high-income people	0.183	0.016	11.676	0
Taxation	high-income p., reduction for low-income p.	0.231	0.016	14.214	0

Note: The outcome is a dummy variable that scores 1 if the respondent likes the proposal. Standard errors clustered by respondents. N = 8,408.

Table D.5: Results of the conjoint experiment (**France**)

Feature	Level	Estimate	Std. Error	z	p-value
Type of expenditure	basic income	0			
Type of expenditure	unemployment benefits	0.031	0.015	2.002	0.045
Type of expenditure	reconversion	0.103	0.016	6.569	0
Type of expenditure	early retirement	0.057	0.016	3.583	0.0003
Nationality	French and foreign	0			
Nationality	only French	-0.007	0.013	-0.581	0.561
Work history	irrespective of work history	0			
Work history	at least 3 years work history	-0.013	0.013	-1.019	0.308
Work history	at least 10 years work history	-0.018	0.013	-1.335	0.182
Reason for layoff	all layoffs	0			
Reason for layoff	offshoring	-0.037	0.013	-2.747	0.006
Reason for layoff	automation	-0.049	0.014	-3.590	0.0003
Taxation	all citizens, irrespective of income	0			
Taxation	proportional to income	0.100	0.015	6.681	0
Taxation	high-income people	0.098	0.016	6.145	0
Taxation	high-income p., reduction for low-income p.	0.135	0.016	8.623	0

Note: The outcome is a dummy variable that scores 1 if the respondent likes the proposal. Standard errors clustered by respondents. N = 8,544.

Table D.6: Results of the conjoint experiment (**Germany**)

Feature	Level	Estimate	Std. Error	z	p-value
Type of expenditure	basic income	0			
Type of expenditure	unemployment benefits	-0.003	0.016	-0.204	0.839
Type of expenditure	reconversion	0.019	0.016	1.212	0.226
Type of expenditure	early retirement	-0.022	0.016	-1.416	0.157
Nationality	German and foreign	0			
Nationality	only German	-0.078	0.013	-6.081	0
Work history	irrespective of work history	0			
Work history	at least 3 years work history	0.024	0.013	1.780	0.075
Work history	at least 10 years work history	-0.029	0.014	-2.036	0.042
Reason for layoff	all layoffs	0			
Reason for layoff	offshoring	-0.012	0.013	-0.911	0.362
Reason for layoff	automation	-0.034	0.013	-2.548	0.011
Taxation	all citizens, irrespective of income	0			
Taxation	proportional to income	0.055	0.016	3.383	0.001
Taxation	high-income people	0.040	0.016	2.497	0.013
Taxation	high-income p., reduction for low-income p.	0.029	0.016	1.771	0.077

Note: The outcome is a dummy variable that scores 1 if the respondent likes the proposal. Standard errors clustered by respondents. N = 8,536.

D.3.2 Second dependent variable: rating of proposal

Table D.7: Results of the conjoint experiment (Rating proposals, **Italy**)

Feature	Level	Estimate	Std. Error	z	p-value
Type of expenditure	basic income	0			
Type of expenditure	unemployment benefits	−0.002	0.052	−0.045	0.964
Type of expenditure	reconversion	0.156	0.055	2.835	0.005
Type of expenditure	early retirement	−0.031	0.054	−0.578	0.563
Nationality	Italian and foreign	0			
Nationality	only Italian	−0.168	0.041	−4.092	0.00004
Work history	irrespective of work history	0			
Work history	at least 3 years work history	−0.067	0.045	−1.490	0.136
Work history	at least 10 years work history	−0.132	0.046	−2.848	0.004
Reason for layoff	all layoffs	0			
Reason for layoff	offshoring	−0.094	0.046	−2.042	0.041
Reason for layoff	automation	−0.251	0.047	−5.399	0
Taxation	all citizens, irrespective of income	0			
Taxation	proportional to income	0.518	0.055	9.480	0
Taxation	high-income people	0.669	0.055	12.189	0
Taxation	high-income p., reduction for low-income p.	0.756	0.055	13.646	0

Note: The outcome variable is a [1,7] score of each proposal. Standard errors clustered by respondents. N = 8,408.

Table D.8: Results of the conjoint experiment (Rating proposals, **France**)

Feature	Level	Estimate	Std. Error	z	p-value
Type of expenditure	basic income	0			
Type of expenditure	unemployment benefits	0.019	0.054	0.359	0.720
Type of expenditure	reconversion	0.270	0.053	5.095	0
Type of expenditure	early retirement	0.142	0.055	2.582	0.010
Nationality	French and foreign	0			
Nationality	only French	0.028	0.045	0.615	0.538
Work history	irrespective of work history	0			
Work history	at least 3 years work history	-0.033	0.045	-0.731	0.465
Work history	at least 10 years work history	-0.044	0.046	-0.949	0.342
Reason for layoff	all layoffs	0			
Reason for layoff	offshoring	-0.179	0.045	-3.980	0.0001
Reason for layoff	automation	-0.171	0.046	-3.697	0.0002
Taxation	all citizens, irrespective of income	0			
Taxation	proportional to income	0.329	0.052	6.326	0
Taxation	high-income people	0.362	0.053	6.857	0
Taxation	high-income p., reduction for low-income p.	0.477	0.053	8.917	0

Note: The outcome variable is a [1,7] score of each proposal. Standard errors clustered by respondents. N = 8,544.

Table D.9: Results of the conjoint experiment (Rating proposals, **Germany**)

Feature	Level	Estimate	Std. Error	z	p-value
Type of expenditure	basic income	0			
Type of expenditure	unemployment benefits	-0.014	0.052	-0.267	0.790
Type of expenditure	reconversion	0.077	0.054	1.444	0.149
Type of expenditure	early retirement	-0.135	0.054	-2.513	0.012
Nationality	German and foreign	0			
Nationality	only German	-0.261	0.047	-5.595	0
Work history	irrespective of work history	0			
Work history	at least 3 years work history	0.083	0.046	1.825	0.068
Work history	at least 10 years work history	-0.046	0.048	-0.960	0.337
Reason for layoff	all layoffs	0			
Reason for layoff	offshoring	-0.038	0.045	-0.838	0.402
Reason for layoff	automation	-0.061	0.046	-1.348	0.178
Taxation	all citizens, irrespective of income	0			
Taxation	proportional to income	0.172	0.054	3.193	0.001
Taxation	high-income people	0.105	0.053	1.999	0.046
Taxation	high-income p., reduction for low-income p.	0.087	0.054	1.603	0.109

Note: The outcome variable is a [1,7] score of each proposal. Standard errors clustered by respondents. N = 8,536.

D.3.3 Third dependent variable: probability to sign a petition for the proposal

Table D.10: Results of the conjoint experiment (Signing a petition, **Italy**)

Feature	Level	Estimate	Std. Error	z	p-value
Type of expenditure	basic income	0			
Type of expenditure	unemployment benefits	-0.062	0.053	-1.168	0.243
Type of expenditure	reconversion	0.077	0.057	1.343	0.179
Type of expenditure	early retirement	-0.033	0.057	-0.569	0.569
Nationality	Italian and foreign	0			
Nationality	only Italian	-0.144	0.042	-3.454	0.001
Work history	irrespective of work history	0			
Work history	at least 3 years work history	-0.107	0.048	-2.221	0.026
Work history	at least 10 years work history	-0.167	0.049	-3.404	0.001
Reason for layoff	all layoffs	0			
Reason for layoff	offshoring	-0.092	0.050	-1.850	0.064
Reason for layoff	automation	-0.217	0.049	-4.421	0.00001
Taxation	all citizens, irrespective of income	0			
Taxation	proportional to income	0.395	0.056	7.027	0
Taxation	high-income people	0.550	0.058	9.496	0
Taxation	high-income p., reduction for low-income p.	0.613	0.059	10.439	0

Note: The outcome variable measures the probability that the respondent would sign a petition in favor of a proposal, which can take values from 1 (lowest probability) to 7 (highest probability). Standard errors clustered by respondents. N = 8,408.

Table D.11: Results of the conjoint experiment (Signing a petition, **France**)

Feature	Level	Estimate	Std. Error	z	p-value
Type of expenditure	basic income	0			
Type of expenditure	unemployment benefits	0.038	0.059	0.652	0.514
Type of expenditure	reconversion	0.281	0.058	4.818	0.00000
Type of expenditure	early retirement	0.121	0.060	2.001	0.045
Nationality	French and foreign	0			
Nationality	only French	0.035	0.048	0.731	0.465
Work history	irrespective of work history	0			
Work history	at least 3 years work history	-0.054	0.049	-1.092	0.275
Work history	at least 10 years work history	-0.108	0.052	-2.101	0.036
Reason for layoff	all layoffs	0			
Reason for layoff	offshoring	-0.086	0.051	-1.668	0.095
Reason for layoff	automation	-0.097	0.051	-1.918	0.055
Taxation	all citizens, irrespective of income	0			
Taxation	proportional to income	0.253	0.057	4.430	0.00001
Taxation	high-income people	0.306	0.058	5.245	0.00000
Taxation	high-income p., reduction for low-income p.	0.392	0.059	6.695	0

Note: The outcome variable measures the probability that the respondent would sign a petition in favor of a proposal, which can take values from 1 (lowest probability) to 7 (highest probability). Standard errors clustered by respondents. N = 8,544.

Table D.12: Results of the conjoint experiment (Signing a petition, **Germany**)

Feature	Level	Estimate	Std. Error	z	p-value
Type of expenditure	basic income	0			
Type of expenditure	unemployment benefits	0.007	0.056	0.130	0.897
Type of expenditure	reconversion	-0.001	0.059	-0.012	0.991
Type of expenditure	early retirement	-0.115	0.058	-1.972	0.049
Nationality	German and foreign	0			
Nationality	only German	-0.205	0.048	-4.262	0.00002
Work history	irrespective of work history	0			
Work history	at least 3 years work history	0.026	0.050	0.512	0.609
Work history	at least 10 years work history	-0.045	0.050	-0.911	0.362
Reason for layoff	all layoffs	0			
Reason for layoff	offshoring	-0.007	0.049	-0.150	0.881
Reason for layoff	automation	-0.009	0.049	-0.186	0.853
Taxation	all citizens, irrespective of income	0			
Taxation	proportional to income	0.191	0.060	3.210	0.001
Taxation	high-income people	0.164	0.055	2.999	0.003
Taxation	high-income p., reduction for low-income p.	0.147	0.058	2.533	0.011

Note: The outcome variable measures the probability that the respondent would sign a petition in favor of a proposal, which can take values from 1 (lowest probability) to 7 (highest probability). Standard errors clustered by respondents. N = 8,536.

D.4 Heterogeneous effects

D.4.1 Italy

Table D.13: Differences in marginal means for different levels of education (voters with tertiary education vs. others)

Feature	Level	Est.	Std. Error	z	p-value
Type of expenditure	basic income	−0.027	0.027	−1.015	0.310
Type of expenditure	unemployment benefits	−0.013	0.024	−0.532	0.595
Type of expenditure	reconversion	0.055	0.025	2.185	0.029
Type of expenditure	early retirement	−0.034	0.025	−1.362	0.173
Nationality	Italian and foreign	0.032	0.019	1.656	0.098
Nationality	only Italian	−0.046	0.020	−2.265	0.023
Work history	irrespective of work history	−0.030	0.021	−1.399	0.162
Work history	at least 3 years work history	0.025	0.022	1.134	0.257
Work history	at least 10 years work history	−0.009	0.023	−0.408	0.683
Reason for layoff	automation	−0.001	0.022	−0.061	0.952
Reason for layoff	all layoffs	−0.030	0.022	−1.344	0.179
Reason for layoff	offshoring	0.015	0.022	0.694	0.488
Taxation	all citizens, irrespective of income	−0.0005	0.025	−0.019	0.984
Taxation	proportional to income	0.009	0.025	0.363	0.717
Taxation	high-income people	−0.008	0.025	−0.322	0.747
Taxation	high-income p., reduction for low-income p.	−0.014	0.025	−0.565	0.572

Note: Standard errors clustered by respondents. N = 8,408.

Table D.14: Differences in marginal means for different political ideology (right-wing voters vs. others)

Feature	Level	Est.	Std. Error	z	p-value
Type of expenditure	basic income	-0.044	0.027	-1.670	0.095
Type of expenditure	unemployment benefits	-0.048	0.025	-1.918	0.055
Type of expenditure	reconversion	-0.038	0.025	-1.544	0.123
Type of expenditure	early retirement	-0.001	0.025	-0.046	0.963
Nationality	Italian and foreign	-0.106	0.020	-5.358	0.00000
Nationality	only Italian	0.044	0.020	2.198	0.028
Work history	irrespective of work history	-0.054	0.022	-2.463	0.014
Work history	at least 3 years work history	-0.037	0.022	-1.679	0.093
Work history	at least 10 years work history	-0.005	0.023	-0.197	0.844
Reason for layoff	automation	-0.020	0.022	-0.883	0.377
Reason for layoff	all layoffs	-0.027	0.022	-1.205	0.228
Reason for layoff	offshoring	-0.051	0.023	-2.238	0.025
Taxation	all citizens, irrespective of income	0.056	0.026	2.122	0.034
Taxation	proportional to income	-0.062	0.026	-2.354	0.019
Taxation	high-income people	-0.061	0.025	-2.460	0.014
Taxation	high-income p., reduction for low-income p.	-0.064	0.025	-2.522	0.012

Note: Standard errors clustered by respondents. Voters were classified as right-wing if they placed themselves on values from 5 to 7 on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means “left” and 7 means “right”. N = 8,408.

Table D.15: Differences in marginal means for different levels of income
(middle- and high-income voters vs. others)

Feature	Level	Est.	Std. Error	z	p-value
Type of expenditure	basic income	-0.043	0.026	-1.649	0.099
Type of expenditure	unemployment benefits	-0.026	0.024	-1.066	0.286
Type of expenditure	reconversion	0.044	0.025	1.757	0.079
Type of expenditure	early retirement	0.025	0.025	0.986	0.324
Nationality	Italian and foreign	-0.006	0.020	-0.297	0.767
Nationality	only Italian	0.007	0.020	0.344	0.731
Work history	irrespective of work history	-0.024	0.022	-1.107	0.268
Work history	at least 3 years work history	0.017	0.022	0.752	0.452
Work history	at least 10 years work history	0.009	0.023	0.389	0.697
Reason for layoff	automation	0.023	0.022	1.041	0.298
Reason for layoff	all layoffs	-0.010	0.022	-0.437	0.662
Reason for layoff	offshoring	-0.014	0.023	-0.640	0.522
Taxation	all citizens, irrespective of income	0.021	0.026	0.807	0.420
Taxation	proportional to income	-0.014	0.026	-0.560	0.575
Taxation	high-income people	-0.014	0.025	-0.555	0.579
Taxation	high-income p., reduction for low-income p.	0.021	0.025	0.814	0.415

Note: Standard errors clustered by respondents. Household income is considered middle and high if greater than 30,000€ per year. N = 8,408.

Table D.16: Differences in marginal means for different levels of support for increasing social expenditure (voters in favour of increasing social expenditure vs. others)

Feature	Level	Est.	Std. Error	z	p-value
Type of expenditure	basic income	0.059	0.026	2.285	0.022
Type of expenditure	unemployment benefits	0.061	0.024	2.611	0.009
Type of expenditure	reconversion	0.010	0.025	0.396	0.692
Type of expenditure	early retirement	0.059	0.025	2.409	0.016
Nationality	Italian and foreign	0.064	0.020	3.188	0.001
Nationality	only Italian	0.029	0.019	1.489	0.137
Work history	irrespective of work history	0.069	0.021	3.254	0.001
Work history	at least 3 years work history	0.020	0.022	0.928	0.354
Work history	at least 10 years work history	0.054	0.023	2.378	0.017
Reason for layoff	automation	0.038	0.022	1.748	0.080
Reason for layoff	all layoffs	0.084	0.022	3.836	0.0001
Reason for layoff	offshoring	0.019	0.022	0.871	0.384
Taxation	all citizens, irrespective of income	-0.011	0.025	-0.430	0.667
Taxation	proportional to income	0.030	0.025	1.168	0.243
Taxation	high-income people	0.053	0.024	2.221	0.026
Taxation	high-income p., reduction for low-income p.	0.121	0.025	4.882	0.00000

Note: Standard errors clustered by respondents. Respondents who placed themselves on a value greater than 4 on a 1-to-7 scale (where 7 means “social expenditure should be increased”) are considered in favor of increasing public expenditure. N = 8,408.

Table D.17: Differences in marginal means for different levels of economic vulnerability (economically vulnerable voters vs. others)

Feature	Level	Est.	Std. Error	z	p-value
Type of expenditure	basic income	0.065	0.027	2.364	0.018
Type of expenditure	unemployment benefits	0.036	0.025	1.436	0.151
Type of expenditure	reconversion	0.058	0.025	2.316	0.021
Type of expenditure	early retirement	0.049	0.026	1.878	0.060
Nationality	Italian and foreign	0.044	0.020	2.163	0.031
Nationality	only Italian	0.061	0.021	2.923	0.003
Work history	irrespective of work history	0.022	0.023	0.937	0.349
Work history	at least 3 years work history	0.076	0.022	3.457	0.001
Work history	at least 10 years work history	0.060	0.025	2.421	0.015
Reason for layoff	automation	0.062	0.023	2.672	0.008
Reason for layoff	all layoffs	0.044	0.023	1.892	0.058
Reason for layoff	offshoring	0.054	0.023	2.346	0.019
Taxation	all citizens, irrespective of income	0.087	0.027	3.264	0.001
Taxation	proportional to income	0.025	0.026	0.947	0.344
Taxation	high-income people	0.083	0.025	3.346	0.001
Taxation	high-income p., reduction for low-income p.	0.023	0.027	0.845	0.398

Note: Standard errors clustered by respondents. Respondents who placed themselves on values greater than 1 on a 0-to-10 scale (where 0 means “very unlikely” and 10 means “very likely”) measuring the likelihood that the respondent’s job could be off-shored in the next future are considered vulnerable. N = 8,408.

D.4.2 France

Table D.18: Differences in marginal means for different levels of education (voters with tertiary education vs. others)

Feature	Level	Est.	Std. Error	z	p-value
Type of expenditure	basic income	−0.037	0.026	−1.422	0.155
Type of expenditure	unemployment benefits	−0.016	0.024	−0.681	0.496
Type of expenditure	reconversion	−0.014	0.024	−0.580	0.562
Type of expenditure	early retirement	−0.024	0.026	−0.936	0.349
Nationality	French and foreign	0.010	0.021	0.497	0.619
Nationality	only French	−0.056	0.020	−2.783	0.005
Work history	irrespective of work history	−0.009	0.023	−0.380	0.704
Work history	at least 3 years work history	−0.042	0.022	−1.943	0.052
Work history	at least 10 years work history	−0.016	0.022	−0.717	0.473
Reason for layoff	automation	−0.023	0.023	−1.016	0.310
Reason for layoff	all layoffs	−0.032	0.022	−1.426	0.154
Reason for layoff	offshoring	−0.013	0.023	−0.556	0.578
Taxation	all citizens, irrespective of income	0.0005	0.025	0.019	0.985
Taxation	proportional to income	−0.009	0.025	−0.375	0.708
Taxation	high-income people	−0.046	0.026	−1.806	0.071
Taxation	high-income p., reduction for low-income p.	−0.036	0.025	−1.477	0.140

Note: Standard errors clustered by respondents. N = 8,544.

Table D.19: Differences in marginal means for different political ideology (right-wing voters vs. others)

Feature	Level	Est.	Std. Error	z	p-value
Type of expenditure	basic income	-0.020	0.026	-0.779	0.436
Type of expenditure	unemployment benefits	-0.046	0.025	-1.859	0.063
Type of expenditure	reconversion	0.031	0.023	1.339	0.180
Type of expenditure	early retirement	-0.045	0.026	-1.703	0.089
Nationality	French and foreign	-0.104	0.020	-5.071	0.00000
Nationality	only French	0.065	0.020	3.218	0.001
Work history	irrespective of work history	-0.052	0.023	-2.289	0.022
Work history	at least 3 years work history	-0.016	0.022	-0.721	0.471
Work history	at least 10 years work history	0.007	0.022	0.333	0.739
Reason for layoff	automation	-0.039	0.023	-1.718	0.086
Reason for layoff	all layoffs	-0.023	0.022	-1.034	0.301
Reason for layoff	offshoring	-0.002	0.023	-0.070	0.944
Taxation	all citizens, irrespective of income	0.011	0.025	0.446	0.656
Taxation	proportional to income	-0.015	0.024	-0.610	0.542
Taxation	high-income people	-0.031	0.026	-1.213	0.225
Taxation	high-income p., reduction for low-income p.	-0.037	0.025	-1.461	0.144

Note: Standard errors clustered by respondents. Voters were classified as right-wing if they placed themselves on values from 5 to 7 on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means “left” and 7 means “right”. N = 8,544.

Table D.20: Differences in marginal means for different levels of income
(middle- and high-income voters vs. others)

Feature	Level	Est.	Std. Error	z	p-value
Type of expenditure	basic income	-0.123	0.026	-4.728	0.00000
Type of expenditure	unemployment benefits	-0.069	0.025	-2.740	0.006
Type of expenditure	reconversion	-0.014	0.024	-0.590	0.555
Type of expenditure	early retirement	-0.043	0.027	-1.604	0.109
Nationality	French and foreign	-0.066	0.021	-3.113	0.002
Nationality	only French	-0.059	0.021	-2.823	0.005
Work history	irrespective of work history	-0.094	0.024	-3.970	0.0001
Work history	at least 3 years work history	-0.064	0.023	-2.792	0.005
Work history	at least 10 years work history	-0.032	0.022	-1.437	0.151
Reason for layoff	automation	-0.061	0.023	-2.677	0.007
Reason for layoff	all layoffs	-0.080	0.023	-3.537	0.0004
Reason for layoff	offshoring	-0.047	0.024	-2.005	0.045
Taxation	all citizens, irrespective of income	-0.037	0.026	-1.422	0.155
Taxation	proportional to income	-0.034	0.025	-1.340	0.180
Taxation	high-income people	-0.052	0.026	-1.957	0.050
Taxation	high-income p., reduction for low-income p.	-0.119	0.025	-4.694	0.00000

Note: Standard errors clustered by respondents. Household income is considered middle and high if greater than 30,000€ per year. N = 8,544.

Table D.21: Differences in marginal means for different levels of support for increasing social expenditure (voters in favour of increasing social expenditure vs. others)

Feature	Level	Est.	Std. Error	z	p-value
Type of expenditure	basic income	0.111	0.028	3.996	0.0001
Type of expenditure	unemployment benefits	0.090	0.026	3.473	0.001
Type of expenditure	reconversion	0.001	0.025	0.043	0.966
Type of expenditure	early retirement	0.016	0.027	0.576	0.565
Nationality	French and foreign	0.108	0.021	5.082	0.00000
Nationality	only French	0.001	0.022	0.024	0.981
Work history	irrespective of work history	0.088	0.024	3.672	0.0002
Work history	at least 3 years work history	0.030	0.024	1.286	0.198
Work history	at least 10 years work history	0.045	0.023	1.931	0.053
Reason for layoff	automation	0.043	0.025	1.720	0.085
Reason for layoff	all layoffs	0.050	0.023	2.116	0.034
Reason for layoff	offshoring	0.069	0.024	2.922	0.003
Taxation	all citizens, irrespective of income	0.043	0.027	1.556	0.120
Taxation	proportional to income	0.047	0.026	1.812	0.070
Taxation	high-income people	0.030	0.028	1.085	0.278
Taxation	high-income p., reduction for low-income p.	0.092	0.026	3.578	0.0003

Note: Standard errors clustered by respondents. Respondents who placed themselves on a value greater than 4 on a 1-to-7 scale (where 7 means “social expenditure should be increased”) are considered in favor of increasing public expenditure. N = 8,544.

Table D.22: Differences in marginal means for different levels of economic vulnerability (economically vulnerable voters vs. others)

Feature	Level	Est.	Std. Error	z	p-value
Type of expenditure	basic income	−0.010	0.028	−0.369	0.712
Type of expenditure	unemployment benefits	0.032	0.026	1.218	0.223
Type of expenditure	reconversion	0.008	0.026	0.297	0.766
Type of expenditure	early retirement	−0.017	0.029	−0.587	0.557
Nationality	French and foreign	0.021	0.022	0.964	0.335
Nationality	only French	−0.017	0.021	−0.812	0.417
Work history	irrespective of work history	0.001	0.026	0.020	0.984
Work history	at least 3 years work history	0.004	0.024	0.162	0.872
Work history	at least 10 years work history	0.003	0.024	0.105	0.917
Reason for layoff	automation	0.025	0.025	1.000	0.317
Reason for layoff	all layoffs	−0.005	0.024	−0.188	0.851
Reason for layoff	offshoring	−0.014	0.025	−0.558	0.577
Taxation	all citizens, irrespective of income	−0.018	0.028	−0.662	0.508
Taxation	proportional to income	0.011	0.027	0.390	0.697
Taxation	high-income people	0.041	0.028	1.456	0.145
Taxation	high-income p., reduction for low-income p.	−0.026	0.027	−0.956	0.339

Note: Standard errors clustered by respondents. Respondents who placed themselves on values greater than 1 on a 0-to-10 scale (where 0 means “very unlikely” and 10 means “very likely”) measuring the likelihood that the respondent’s job could be off-shored in the next future are considered vulnerable. N = 8,544.

D.4.3 Germany

Table D.23: Differences in marginal means for different levels of education (voters with tertiary education vs. others)

Feature	Level	Est.	Std. Error	z	p-value
Type of expenditure	basic income	−0.047	0.026	−1.790	0.073
Type of expenditure	unemployment benefits	0.0005	0.026	0.019	0.985
Type of expenditure	reconversion	−0.007	0.027	−0.255	0.799
Type of expenditure	early retirement	−0.060	0.026	−2.298	0.022
Nationality	German and foreign	−0.029	0.022	−1.338	0.181
Nationality	only German	−0.028	0.021	−1.330	0.183
Work history	irrespective of work history	−0.030	0.024	−1.231	0.218
Work history	at least 3 years work history	−0.003	0.023	−0.114	0.909
Work history	at least 10 years work history	−0.055	0.023	−2.376	0.018
Reason for layoff	automation	−0.022	0.023	−0.966	0.334
Reason for layoff	all layoffs	−0.042	0.023	−1.792	0.073
Reason for layoff	offshoring	−0.022	0.022	−0.987	0.324
Taxation	all citizens, irrespective of income	−0.006	0.027	−0.239	0.811
Taxation	proportional to income	−0.058	0.027	−2.159	0.031
Taxation	high-income people	−0.032	0.026	−1.225	0.221
Taxation	high-income p., reduction for low-income p.	−0.020	0.027	−0.741	0.459

Note: Standard errors clustered by respondents. N = 8,536.

Table D.24: Differences in marginal means for different political ideology (right-wing voters vs. others)

Feature	Level	Est.	Std. Error	z	p-value
Type of expenditure	basic income	-0.040	0.028	-1.464	0.143
Type of expenditure	unemployment benefits	-0.010	0.027	-0.351	0.726
Type of expenditure	reconversion	-0.013	0.029	-0.464	0.642
Type of expenditure	early retirement	-0.023	0.027	-0.840	0.401
Nationality	German and foreign	-0.115	0.022	-5.147	0.00000
Nationality	only German	0.068	0.022	3.054	0.002
Work history	irrespective of work history	-0.051	0.025	-2.067	0.039
Work history	at least 3 years work history	-0.023	0.025	-0.933	0.351
Work history	at least 10 years work history	0.006	0.025	0.248	0.804
Reason for layoff	automation	-0.054	0.025	-2.150	0.032
Reason for layoff	all layoffs	-0.021	0.025	-0.837	0.403
Reason for layoff	offshoring	0.006	0.023	0.256	0.798
Taxation	all citizens, irrespective of income	-0.003	0.029	-0.106	0.915
Taxation	proportional to income	-0.029	0.030	-0.958	0.338
Taxation	high-income people	-0.080	0.027	-2.963	0.003
Taxation	high-income p., reduction for low-income p.	0.020	0.029	0.691	0.489

Note: Standard errors clustered by respondents. Voters were classified as right-wing if they placed themselves on values from 5 to 7 on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means “left” and 7 means “right”. N = 8,536.

Table D.25: Differences in marginal means for different levels of income
(middle- and high-income voters vs. others)

Feature	Level	Est.	Std. Error	z	p-value
Type of expenditure	basic income	-0.021	0.026	-0.827	0.408
Type of expenditure	unemployment benefits	-0.045	0.025	-1.793	0.073
Type of expenditure	reconversion	0.002	0.026	0.061	0.951
Type of expenditure	early retirement	-0.032	0.026	-1.251	0.211
Nationality	German and foreign	-0.032	0.021	-1.523	0.128
Nationality	only German	-0.018	0.021	-0.872	0.383
Work history	irrespective of work history	-0.027	0.024	-1.143	0.253
Work history	at least 3 years work history	-0.022	0.023	-0.963	0.335
Work history	at least 10 years work history	-0.024	0.023	-1.056	0.291
Reason for layoff	automation	-0.030	0.023	-1.325	0.185
Reason for layoff	all layoffs	-0.029	0.023	-1.262	0.207
Reason for layoff	offshoring	-0.017	0.022	-0.768	0.443
Taxation	all citizens, irrespective of income	-0.021	0.026	-0.775	0.438
Taxation	proportional to income	-0.053	0.027	-1.979	0.048
Taxation	high-income people	-0.014	0.025	-0.558	0.577
Taxation	high-income p., reduction for low-income p.	-0.010	0.025	-0.411	0.681

Note: Standard errors clustered by respondents. Household income is considered middle and high if greater than 30,000€ per year. N = 8,536.

Table D.26: Differences in marginal means for different levels of support for increasing social expenditure (voters in favour of increasing social expenditure vs. others)

Feature	Level	Est.	Std. Error	z	p-value
Type of expenditure	basic income	0.080	0.025	3.267	0.001
Type of expenditure	unemployment benefits	0.017	0.025	0.696	0.486
Type of expenditure	reconversion	−0.006	0.026	−0.214	0.831
Type of expenditure	early retirement	0.037	0.025	1.506	0.132
Nationality	German and foreign	0.068	0.021	3.326	0.001
Nationality	only German	−0.002	0.020	−0.087	0.930
Work history	irrespective of work history	0.075	0.022	3.340	0.001
Work history	at least 3 years work history	0.041	0.022	1.859	0.063
Work history	at least 10 years work history	−0.018	0.023	−0.805	0.421
Reason for layoff	automation	0.045	0.022	2.024	0.043
Reason for layoff	all layoffs	0.038	0.022	1.695	0.090
Reason for layoff	offshoring	0.017	0.021	0.815	0.415
Taxation	all citizens, irrespective of income	0.038	0.026	1.505	0.132
Taxation	proportional to income	0.049	0.026	1.872	0.061
Taxation	high-income people	0.022	0.025	0.904	0.366
Taxation	high-income p., reduction for low-income p.	0.023	0.025	0.905	0.365

Note: Standard errors clustered by respondents. Respondents who placed themselves on a value greater than 4 on a 1-to-7 scale (where 7 means “social expenditure should be increased”) are considered in favor of increasing public expenditure. N = 8,536.

Table D.27: Differences in marginal means for different levels of economic vulnerability (economically vulnerable voters vs. others)

Feature	Level	Est.	Std. Error	z	p-value
Type of expenditure	basic income	−0.020	0.029	−0.689	0.491
Type of expenditure	unemployment benefits	−0.018	0.029	−0.628	0.530
Type of expenditure	reconversion	0.023	0.031	0.740	0.459
Type of expenditure	early retirement	0.036	0.031	1.159	0.247
Nationality	German and foreign	−0.054	0.024	−2.254	0.024
Nationality	only German	0.064	0.024	2.681	0.007
Work history	irrespective of work history	−0.032	0.028	−1.165	0.244
Work history	at least 3 years work history	0.037	0.028	1.342	0.180
Work history	at least 10 years work history	0.007	0.026	0.266	0.791
Reason for layoff	automation	0.023	0.026	0.886	0.376
Reason for layoff	all layoffs	0.001	0.028	0.024	0.981
Reason for layoff	offshoring	−0.005	0.026	−0.199	0.842
Taxation	all citizens, irrespective of income	−0.006	0.032	−0.197	0.844
Taxation	proportional to income	0.003	0.031	0.082	0.934
Taxation	high-income people	−0.011	0.028	−0.387	0.699
Taxation	high-income p., reduction for low-income p.	0.036	0.030	1.205	0.228

Note: Standard errors clustered by respondents. Respondents who placed themselves on values greater than 1 on a 0-to-10 scale (where 0 means “very unlikely” and 10 means “very likely”) measuring the likelihood that the respondent’s job could be off-shored in the next future are considered vulnerable. N = 8,536.

E Information about the survey experiments

Our research adheres to the APSA Principles and Guidance for Human Subjects Research, and it has received ethics clearance from the Research Ethics Board of McGill University (REB #21-09-001, 1 September 2021).

E.1 *GfK Italy*: Ethical considerations (Italian sample, vignette and split-ballot experiments)

Subjects are recruited offline by the survey company *GfK Italy*, regardless of their access to the Internet. If they agree to participate, they are provided with a tablet to complete incentivized online surveys. In the first stage, households are selected through stratified random sampling, using region, urban area, and the number of household members as the main strata. In the second stage, a sample of individuals is randomly selected based on gender, age, geographical area, and the size of the urban area, following pre-defined quotas. The distribution of sociodemographic characteristics in the sample aligns closely with that of the general population. However, the sample is more skewed toward highly educated individuals compared to the general population.

The study did not involve at-risk or vulnerable populations. Our sample is representative (in terms of age, sex, region, and employment status) of the Italian adult population.

The study did not use deception.

The study did not intervene in the political process.

The study protects the confidentiality of the respondents. We, as researchers, did not collect data that would make the respondents identifiable.

E.2 *Respondi*: Ethical considerations (French & German samples, vignette and split-ballot experiments; Italian, French & German samples, conjoint experiment)

We conducted our original survey with *Respondi*. The sample was drawn from an online panel used only for market research and for which membership and participation are voluntary and follow a double opt-in registration process. The respondents were able to take the survey only after reading the consent form and agreeing to it. The consent form clearly stated key details such as the following: 1) the study was an academic survey; 2) who conducted the study and who funded it; 3) the general goal of the study; 4) how the data will be used; 5) how the subjects can end the survey at any point by simply closing their browser; 6) how the data will be protected; and 7) how the respondent can contact the Research Ethics Board or the researchers.

The study did not involve at-risk or vulnerable populations. Our sample is representative (in terms of age, sex, region, and employment status) of the French/German adult population.

The study did not use deception.

The study did not intervene in the political process.

The study protects the confidentiality of the respondents. We, as researchers, did not collect data that would make the respondents identifiable.

The respondents were compensated for their work by *Respondi*. Specifically, each respondent received \$1 for their answers. This represents approximately 32% of the fee we paid to *Respondi* for an interview. The payment is in line with what other similar platforms offer to respondents.

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