The problem of multiple Nash equilibria in games of strategic substitutes on networks is studied. We consider a general model of public goods provision on network, and analyze in detail the properties of Nash equilibria with particular attention for the subset of equilibria that optimize some global quantities (optimal equilibria) and to those that are robust to small perturbations (stable equilibria). We conclude that finding good approximate optimal equilibria is not that difficult, and we describe the performances of different algorithms. On the other hand, finding stable equilibria is extremely difficult, by means of naive best-response dynamics as well as using advanced messagepassing algorithms. This is a consequence of the intrinsically different spatial organization of the two sets of equilibria

Pin, P. (2013). Public Goods in Networks: A Statistical Mechanics Approach. In Game Theory and Applications – Volume 16 (pp. 59-80). NOVA Publishers.

Public Goods in Networks: A Statistical Mechanics Approach

PIN, PAOLO
2013-01-01

Abstract

The problem of multiple Nash equilibria in games of strategic substitutes on networks is studied. We consider a general model of public goods provision on network, and analyze in detail the properties of Nash equilibria with particular attention for the subset of equilibria that optimize some global quantities (optimal equilibria) and to those that are robust to small perturbations (stable equilibria). We conclude that finding good approximate optimal equilibria is not that difficult, and we describe the performances of different algorithms. On the other hand, finding stable equilibria is extremely difficult, by means of naive best-response dynamics as well as using advanced messagepassing algorithms. This is a consequence of the intrinsically different spatial organization of the two sets of equilibria
2013
9781626184442
Pin, P. (2013). Public Goods in Networks: A Statistical Mechanics Approach. In Game Theory and Applications – Volume 16 (pp. 59-80). NOVA Publishers.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11365/690629
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