Libet's Experiments and the Possibility of Free Conscious Decision

(2) In a famous series of experiments Libet has proved, many believe, that the way for human action is physiologically paved already before the conscious intention is formed. (3) A causal interpretation of these experiments which follows Libet's lines implies that even a compatibilist freedom of action and decision, as well as actions in a narrow sense, do not exist. (4) A compilation of several critiques of the experiments' interpretation, however, questions the most important parts of these interpretations, e.g. the temporal order, the nature of the conscious intention. (5) In addition, a more sophisticated picture of the work of intentions makes clear that in Libet's experiments in most cases there were no proximal intentions to flex one's finger but that these actions are intentional in virtue of the distal general intention to follow the experimenter's requests. (6) Finally, an elaboration of the role of consciousness and deliberation in decisions shows how the latter intentions can be free despite being based on unconscious processes.