In this work we are concerned with static price games played by a given number of capacity- constrained firms producing a homogeneous commodity. The focus is mainly on capacity configurations in which either all firms are equal or all are so except a larger one and such that no pure strategy equilibrium exists. We show that in the former case the symmetrical solution is the unique equilibrium whereas in the latter a number of asymmetrical equilibria may also exist.

DE FRANCESCO, M.A., Salvadori, N. (2010). Oligopoli simmetrici e oligopoli asimmetrici. STUDI ECONOMICI, LXV(100), 65-89.

Oligopoli simmetrici e oligopoli asimmetrici

DE FRANCESCO, MASSIMO ALFIERO;
2010-01-01

Abstract

In this work we are concerned with static price games played by a given number of capacity- constrained firms producing a homogeneous commodity. The focus is mainly on capacity configurations in which either all firms are equal or all are so except a larger one and such that no pure strategy equilibrium exists. We show that in the former case the symmetrical solution is the unique equilibrium whereas in the latter a number of asymmetrical equilibria may also exist.
2010
DE FRANCESCO, M.A., Salvadori, N. (2010). Oligopoli simmetrici e oligopoli asimmetrici. STUDI ECONOMICI, LXV(100), 65-89.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11365/19853
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