One of the paradoxes faced by policy analysts concerns how agriculture benefits from relatively high levels of government support in most industrialised countries. In the European Union (EU), the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) continues to impose a heavy burden on consumers and taxpayers even though it has long ceased to perform its function as ‘cornerstone’ of the integration process. The aim here is to try and account for the reform resistance displayed by the CAP for so long, and to explain how the MacSharry Reform, which involved radical transformation of the CAP, was possible in 1992. During the 1980s, the ‘binomial asymmetry’ between need for CAP reform and inability to precipitate change led many agricultural economists to question the traditional neo-classical model. It was widely recognised that most agricultural policy was not decided simply on grounds of economic efficiency, so the effectiveness of basing policy advice just on traditional welfare analysis became increasingly doubtful. As political feasibility was an obstacle to adopting the reforms proposed, perhaps it should explicitly be taken into account in policy models. If agricultural economists extended their field of study to the political decision-making process, they might be able to identify sources of reform resistance and suggest ways in which this could be overcome. The literature which emerged involved application of the so-called ‘new political economy’ (NPE) approach to agricultural policy-making. The new political economy entails using the economic approach to analyse non-market decision-making. A central strand of this approach is public choice, or the application of economics to politics. The application of the NPE approach to the CAP decision-making process illustrates how agricultural questions were generally decided in an ‘isolated political circuit’ which appeared biased in favour of farm interests. However, when some external expediency such as a budgetary crisis or the need to conclude international trade negotiations reached sufficient urgency, other actors (such as finance ministers, heads of state, or third countries) entered the game, breaking down the isolation of agricultural policy-making and forcing change.

Senior, S.M. (1997). Applying the New Political Economy Approach to Explain Agricultural Policy Formation in the European Union. FIRENZE : Robert Schuman Centre, EUI.

Applying the New Political Economy Approach to Explain Agricultural Policy Formation in the European Union

SENIOR, SUSAN MARY
1997-01-01

Abstract

One of the paradoxes faced by policy analysts concerns how agriculture benefits from relatively high levels of government support in most industrialised countries. In the European Union (EU), the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) continues to impose a heavy burden on consumers and taxpayers even though it has long ceased to perform its function as ‘cornerstone’ of the integration process. The aim here is to try and account for the reform resistance displayed by the CAP for so long, and to explain how the MacSharry Reform, which involved radical transformation of the CAP, was possible in 1992. During the 1980s, the ‘binomial asymmetry’ between need for CAP reform and inability to precipitate change led many agricultural economists to question the traditional neo-classical model. It was widely recognised that most agricultural policy was not decided simply on grounds of economic efficiency, so the effectiveness of basing policy advice just on traditional welfare analysis became increasingly doubtful. As political feasibility was an obstacle to adopting the reforms proposed, perhaps it should explicitly be taken into account in policy models. If agricultural economists extended their field of study to the political decision-making process, they might be able to identify sources of reform resistance and suggest ways in which this could be overcome. The literature which emerged involved application of the so-called ‘new political economy’ (NPE) approach to agricultural policy-making. The new political economy entails using the economic approach to analyse non-market decision-making. A central strand of this approach is public choice, or the application of economics to politics. The application of the NPE approach to the CAP decision-making process illustrates how agricultural questions were generally decided in an ‘isolated political circuit’ which appeared biased in favour of farm interests. However, when some external expediency such as a budgetary crisis or the need to conclude international trade negotiations reached sufficient urgency, other actors (such as finance ministers, heads of state, or third countries) entered the game, breaking down the isolation of agricultural policy-making and forcing change.
1997
Senior, S.M. (1997). Applying the New Political Economy Approach to Explain Agricultural Policy Formation in the European Union. FIRENZE : Robert Schuman Centre, EUI.
File in questo prodotto:
File Dimensione Formato  
NPE and ag.pdf

non disponibili

Tipologia: Post-print
Licenza: NON PUBBLICO - Accesso privato/ristretto
Dimensione 851.03 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
851.03 kB Adobe PDF   Visualizza/Apri   Richiedi una copia

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11365/16588
 Attenzione

Attenzione! I dati visualizzati non sono stati sottoposti a validazione da parte dell'ateneo